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Book review: Gregg D. Caruso, and Owen Flanagan, eds. Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals & Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience.

Gregg D. Caruso, and Owen Flanagan, eds. Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals & Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp xviii + 372. Paper. Can. $38.65. ISBN: 978 0 19 047073 0.

   Is humankind no more than a “victim of neuronal circumstances”, “just a pack of neurons”? In other words, is humankind naïve in denying epiphenomenalism, the notion that all mental processes can be reduced without remainder to brain-biology? Is existentialism’s ‘self’, a self-making born of radical commitment with its inescapable risk, finally no self at all, and the anguish pertaining to such risk no more than a neurological twitch? Is the freedom essential to existentialism (the capacity for choice that issues in self-determination) as indefensible—and ridiculous—as a denial of the law of gravity? Despite the prevalence and force of assorted determinisms that bear upon the human, has neuroscience eliminated that self-determination apart from which human agency disappears, guilt is impossible, and the criminal justice system replaced by a social engineering that re-programmes those heretofore deemed deviant?

  In its exploration of and, for the most part, affinities with the above, the book identifies three kinds of existentialism. In two or three sentences it speaks of first-wave existentialism, found in Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche and probing human selfhood in light of God (or, in the case of Nietzsche, of God’s absence). Again, briefly, second-wave existentialism, represented by Sartre, Camus, and de Beauvoir, is said to be a post-Holocaust attempt at creating a human authenticity (contrasted with the inauthenticity of Sartre’s “bad faith” or Heidegger’s “the herd” or even Nietzsche’s “the they”) with respect to social transformation. Third-wave existentialism, neuro-existentialism, the book’s dominating concern, avers that while neuroscience affords scientific truth concerning the brain and its functioning, it simultaneously disenchants in that it eliminates that self necessary for self-transcendence, deliberation, assessment, judgement, and uncoerced commitment.

   This third wave maintains that the good, the true, and the beautiful have no meaning inasmuch as the human entity has no capacity for discerning, accessing, or discussing such: the foregoing is an illusion in that all that remains is a neuro-plexiform item whose biological complexity may be greater than that of simpler life-forms, but whose personhood is no more than seeming even as theirs is never suggested.

   The book consists of four major divisions: I—Morality, Love and Emotion; II—Autonomy, Consciousness and the Self; III—Free Will, Moral Responsibility and Meaning; IV—Neuroscience and the Law.

   Given the general tenor of the book, the reader is surprised initially at Maureen Sie’s chapter, “All You Need is Love(s): Exploring the Biological Platform of Morality”. Here she maintains that our nature as loving beings can explain our nature as moral beings. Throughout she borrows overtly from C.S. Lewis’s The Four Loves, electing to change his “charity” (agape) to “kindness” on account of her unbelief. Departing from Lewis (and from the trajectory of her argument) she introduces a discussion of oxytocin and vasopressin, hormones whose neuro-chemical properties foster attachment narrowly and sociability broadly. In light of her adducing that oxytocin can be administered through nasal spray, her argument, strong to this point on account of her use of Lewis, is weakened: the thesis she began with, our loving nature as the ground of our moral nature, is now no more than “appealing”.

   Other chapters invite a profound Christian response. Jesse Prinz explores “Moral Sedimentation”, the “phenomenon of experiencing the world and acting in through the filter of the past, without necessarily realizing it.” While his proposal that sedimentation may move from mind to brain remains speculative, his chapter calls forth Christian comment on the place of spiritual formation, the place of a faith-facilitated ‘deposit’ in one’s unconscious mind that continues to assert itself even when we aren’t aware of it. Not least, his discussion of sedimentation should elicit a discussion of tradition, the manner in which the church’s tradition can be beneficent teacher or brutal tyrant, and the peril of amnesia on the part of individual, congregation, or denomination; namely, those beset with amnesia (i.e., the absence of Christian memory), lack an identity; and lacking an identity, they can never be trusted.

   Oddly, in a book that largely dismisses everything that existentialism has upheld, and denies self, agency, responsibility, culpability and desert, the last chapter, “The Neuroscientific Non-Challenge to Meaning, Morals, and Purpose” by jurist Stephen J. Morse, argues compellingly so as to overturn much of the book. Morse maintains that neuroscience has not brought forward scientific grounds for a reductionism that reduces meaning, morals and purpose to mere chimera. In addition, Morse argues that the denial of self, agency, responsibility, and desert collapses human dignity, undercuts justice, and fuels social coercion. Ironically, the last sentence of the book rebukes much of the book: “As C.S. Lewis recognized long ago, (1953: “The humanitarian theory of punishment”), a system that treats people as responsible agents is ultimately more humane and respectful.”

   Readers with expertise in existentialist philosophy will be disappointed to find little recognition of, and less exploration of, features essential to this philosophy. While the book purports to be an attempt at relating existentialism’s major tenets to neuroscience’s discoveries, the book is largely a reductionist dismissal of all that existentialism regards as decisive. It remains puzzling that readers are told repeatedly that self, agency, assessment, and related notions have been rendered groundless because reducible to neurological processes, when readers, on every page, are asked tacitly to assess the evidence presented, weigh the arguments adduced, evaluate the proposals for social re-structuring, and articulate consent or disagreement. What are these activities except those of a self, an agent— anything but mere synaptic firings? The title, Neuroexistentialism, appears to be a misnomer in that existentialism is mentioned only to be set aside; i.e., neurology has rendered existentialism a phantasm.

   Related to the above is the book’s omission of the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness. While it is indubitable that increasingly complex neural structures and mechanisms support increasing levels of consciousness, it is also recognized that increasingly complex neural structures are quantitative, while the shift from consciousness to self-consciousness is qualitative. There is no acknowledgement of this crucial matter on the part of those contributors who are most adamant about neuro-determinism (or near neuro-determinism). There is no suggestion of any acquaintance with, for instance, Roger Penrose’s insistence that his book, The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics, cried out to be followed by his Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness (by which he meant ‘self-consciousness’), which search remains ‘missing’ for reasons that frustrate those wedded to naturalism but not those possessed of biblical faith. The latter are aware that human beings are human, ultimately, in that they are the recipients of God’s address. According to Scripture, the characteristic of God is that God speaks. Humans, then, are characteristically those who hear (and from whom God both invites and mandates a response). God is person par excellence; humans are person inasmuch as they are ‘personned’ by the Person. Finite human self-consciousness, on this understanding, is an aspect of the image of that God who is possessed of infinite self-transcendence, and who therein allows us to know him truly and adequately yet never exhaustively.

Victor A. Shepherd

Tyndale University College & Seminary,

Toronto, Ontario

Emil Ludwig Fackenheim

EMIL LUDWIG FACKENHEIM 1916-2003: Philosopher, Professor, Rabbi, Friend – And survivor of Sachsenhausen

(Touchstone, January 2008)

 

  I: As soon as the gnome-like professor entered the lecture hall the fourth-year philosophy class in 1965 fell silent. Other students had sat under his teaching in previous years. I had not.  Plainly he was deemed formidable.  At the same time he struck me as scrawny, wasted in some respects, but above all haunted. The veneration that the class afforded him reflected the reputation he had gained in two decades: he was a luminary in the University of Toronto ’s Department of Philosophy. (U of T’s philosophy department was renowned the world over, and was slightly smaller only than Oxford ’s.)

The course was devoted chiefly to the study of Hegel, a post-Kantian German idealist over whom Fackenheim had laboured for twenty years, the outcome of which would soon be his monumental The Religious Dimension in Hegel’s Thought.   (This book inscribed his name in the international “Who’s Who” of the most erudite philosophers.)         While the course focussed on Hegel, it also investigated pre-Hegel thinkers in the German tradition such as Fichte and Schelling, as well as post-Hegel or “left-wing” Hegelians such as Kierkegaard, Marx and Nietzsche. The class concluded with a brief examination of Heidegger and Sartre. Quickly I perceived that philosophy would be done in this course with unparalleled rigour, intensity and profundity.

In class Fackenheim discussed philosophy only; theology was never mentioned, even though everyone was aware of his reputation as a Jewish thinker. Throughout the entire two-semester course no theological pronouncement was heard, with one exception.   Virtually as an aside, one day, Fackenheim amplified a philosophical point he deemed crucial by contrasting it almost casually with his “The characteristic of the living God is that God speaks.”   The comment embedded itself in me like shrapnel, and lurks in my psyche, where it reminds me constantly that because God speaks characteristically, any deity that has to be concluded or inferred or deduced, according to the logic of the Hebrew Bible, is ipso facto an idol.

 

II: Months later I tentatively called on Fackenheim in his office in order to discuss the essay I was to write in the course.   There he appeared much less intimidating.   With his feet on his desk, his chair tipped back and his glasses perched on his forehead, he scrabbled in his shirt pocket for one of the cigars of assorted shapes and colours, fired it up and rendered the few feet between us near-opaque. We had talked about my essay for only a few minutes (he approved the topic) when he declaimed with unmistakable warmth yet also with an authoritative emphasis that closed the door on further philosophical conversation, “Shepherd, enough about philosophy.  Let’s talk about GOD.” (Never having spoken with him before, I had no idea how he had learned of my interest in theology.) The instant he said “God”, the room filled with the Shekinah, the perceptible glory of the “Presence”.   By now his cigar smoke was nothing less than incense, akin to the incense in the temple that had engulfed Isaiah of old. And just as Isaiah was never going to forget the moment of divine visitation, together with utmost human sensitivity to it, I would never forget the man in front of me whose seemingly irreverent posture was no longer noticed on account of his transparency to the Holy One of Israel.

“Shepherd,” Fackenheim continued after another noxious exhalation, “modernity thinks God to be vague, abstract, ethereal, ‘iffy’. God, however, is concrete, solid, dense with a density beyond our imagining. There is nothing ‘iffy’ about God; but there is a great deal that is ‘iffy’ about you and me.” Dumbfounded at the spiritual assault (albeit benign) from a world-class philosopher, I was still reeling when he launched the next salvo. “Shepherd, in view of the

 

horrific depredations of our century – crowned by the Shoah – there are huge question marks above humankind.       But concerning God there is no question whatever.  Never forget”, he concluded, “We do not demythologize God; God demythologizes us as God exposes the groundless myths by which humankind is enthralled.” I staggered out of his office, the topic of my philosophy essay all but lost in the aura without, and the awe within, that have never evaporated and that continue to keep Fackenheim’s name fragrant.

 

III: Fackenheim was born in Halle , midway between Wittenberg and Berlin . Halle was the birthplace of Handel, immortalized by his oratorio, The Messiah. More significantly for the life and work of Fackenheim, Halle was also the birthplace of Reinhard Heydrich, Heinrich Himmler’s assistant. (Himmler was head of the dreaded SS, the branch of the Nazi military machine charged with implementing Nazi ideology. The death camps were administered and policed by the SS.) When Czech partisans assassinated Heydrich, Hitler retaliated by liquidating every inhabitant of their town, then bulldozing and burying every building in sight, finally planting grass on the tree-less, human-less landscape, reminding everyone that the Fuehrer could not only kill but also blot out of living memory, leaving no trace that any human being had lived or worked or built in that place.

The above-mentioned incident was all the more jarring inasmuch as Germany had been “ Mecca ” for post-Enlightenment Jewry. Admittedly the town church in Wittenberg (where Johannes Bugenhagen, Luther’s friend from Greifswald, preached every week), only a few kilometres away from Halle, still had on its outer wall a frieze depicting a sow nursing her piglets while a Jew sat at the pig’s rump with his head in its anus (one of the offensive mediaeval myths maintained that Jews ate pig excrement.) The church had been erected in 1120. Much had happened since then. In 1743 the fourteen-year-old Moses Mendelssohn had walked into Berlin through the Rosenthaler Tor, the sole gate, among the city’s several, that admitted cattle and Jews.  In two decades Mendelssohn had become a literary colossus, to be succeeded by German Jewish dramatists like Schiller and poets like Heine. The ghetto had disappeared in Germany before it did anywhere else in Europe . When Fackenheim’s grandfather died, the entire town – thousands of people – turned out to honour the memory of the local rabbi.  All the more shocking, therefore, was the accession of Hitler in 1933, an Austrian interloper who could not even claim to be German. The gains for which German Jews had struggled for 190 years were rescinded in a heartbeat. In the same year Fackenheim’s high school teacher of Greek, at grave personal risk, invited Fackenheim to his home. He gave the seventeen year-old a signed copy of Martin Buber’s Kingship of God, published one year earlier, and charged the adolescent: “If you don’t leave now I shall never forgive you, for your help will be needed in the reconstruction of Germany .” Fackenheim thanked the man for the book even as he knew he had no interest in the reconstruction of the nation that had betrayed its Enlightenment heritage and now tormented his people.

Upon leaving high school Fackenheim enrolled in the Academy For the Scholarly Study of Judaism. Subsequently he studied at Halle ’s Martin Luther University , the last Jewish student permitted to enrol. Kristallnacht cut short his studies. On 9th November 1938 synagogues, together with Jewish-owned stores and factories, were trashed and torched throughout Germany . The same night Fackenheim was arrested and incarcerated in Sachsenhausen. It was not an extermination camp; Hitler had not yet implemented the “Final Solution”. It was, however, a forced labour camp where inmates were worked to death. Fackenheim found friends in the camp, including Ernst Tillich, a Lutheran pastor and nephew of the renowned Paul Tillich. The latter had been expelled from Germany and was residing in the U.S.A. , teaching at Union Theological Seminary in New York City . Ernst Tillich, non-Jewish, had been arrested and imprisoned for his political opposition to Naziism. By Christmas Eve, seven weeks later, Tillich was manifestly depressed. Fackenheim asked him the reason for his woebegone mien, and Tillich replied lugubriously, “Today is Christmas Eve. It’s the biggest celebration in the Lutheran Church calendar. All day long I have been thinking of what I would preach to my congregation – if I had one.       But I don’t have one, and therefore I have no one to hear my sermon.” “I can fix that,” Fackenheim rejoined, and promptly rounded up all the rabbinical students in the camp. “Whatever it is you would say to a Lutheran congregation on Christmas Eve,” he continued, “you tell us, in Sachsenhausen, concerning the One whose mercy endures for ever.”

Several months later Fackenheim was released.  Hitler thought it less bothersome simply to have Jews out of the country. While awaiting a country that would receive him (several had declined), he was ordained rabbi in an underground seminary in Berlin . “It was,” he said years later with a twinkle in his eye, “like sitting on a powder keg while smoking a cigar.” Eventually Britain allowed him entry and he moved to Aberdeen . Once in the “ Granite City ” he immersed himself in philosophical studies, financing his academic work by preparing for Bar and Bat Mitzvah the children of the two-dozen Jewish families in the Reform synagogue.  It was an auspicious undertaking, for subsequently he would teach the confirmation class at Toronto ’s Holy Blossom Synagogue for forty years.

In September 1939 Britain , in response to Germany ’s invasion of Poland , declared war. Fackenheim, ironically, was now an “enemy alien”. Next day a police officer knocked at his door and informed him that he was to be deported.       He placed a few personal effects in his suitcase, saving room for his precious books, tomes on Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Mediaeval Philosophy (Christian, Jewish and Islamic), plus his Arabic dictionary – since he planned to write a thesis on Mediaeval Arabic philosophy.

Fackenheim landed in Sherbrooke, Quebec. Among the scores of German Jewish refugees there were, besides himself, two who would become widely known in Canada . One was Gregory Baum, a physicist who eventually embraced Roman Catholicism, who was ordained to the priesthood (and laicized decades later), and who taught at McGill University and the University of Toronto ; Baum was awarded the Order of Canada in 1990.  The other was Eric Koch, who liked to say he was deported to Canada because the British could not distinguish between a German refugee and a Nazi spy. He moved quickly to the highest echelons of CBC radio programming.

Sherbrooke ’s denizens did not know how to view the new arrivals.  One the one hand they were Germans, and therefore were citizens of the nation with which Canada was at war. On the other hand they were refugees from Hitler, the tyrant Canada was bent on defeating. A Canadian military officer lined up the inmates on the parade ground and barked, “Even if you are Jews you still have to wash every day.”   Next the detainees were told “There is to be no monkey business.” Fackenheim, possessing high school English, knew what a monkey was and what business was; he had no grasp, however, of “monkey business”.   Finally the inmates were told, “You play ball with us, and we play ball with you.” “Play ball” was no less mystifying.

The experience of being a refugee from Hitler, yet having to live behind barbed wire in a compound guarded by machine-gun posts, was a terrible experience. Campmates elected Fackenheim to speak to military officialdom about it all, hoping that a rabbi would prove least offensive and be able to gain a favourable hearing.  Fackenheim relayed his friends’ request to “Major Balls” (as they now spoke of the officer.) It availed nothing. Barbed wire and machine guns would remain daily reminders of the ambiguity of the refugees’ situation and of the ambivalence with which the townspeople viewed them.
In December 1941 Fackenheim was released.  He boarded a train in Montreal , sped to Toronto , and by early afternoon of the same day was standing in the office of the philosophy department chairperson, apologizing for the fact that he had only the rabbinic training his exposure to the Hochschule (the post-secondary Jewish educational institution) had given him.   The interviewer quizzed him briefly, saw that while he was self-taught he was remarkably erudite, and brilliant. Without prescribing any remedial work the University of Toronto admitted him to the PhD programme, halving the residence requirement as well. Fackenheim set to work right away, enrolling simultaneously in the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (St.Michael’s College.)   By 1945 he had been awarded a doctorate, his thesis Substance and Perseity in Mediaeval Arabic Philosophy with Introductory Chapters on Aristotle, Plotinus and Proclus.

Meanwhile he had become rabbi at Temple Anshe Shalom, a Reform congregation in Hamilton . He appeared to be more serious than the congregants; at least they and he were coming from different perspectives and were advancing different agendas for congregational life. He insisted on bringing to bear on the congregation the Word of the One who loomed before them and who was every bit as dense as the “thick darkness” that Moses knew and of which the Bible spoke repeatedly.  He exuded the conviction that God’s presence was palpable.   He exposed them to the Jewish theological giants who had been instrumental in his own spiritual formation: Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, Leo Baeck. So far from quieting the grumbling of the disgruntled, everything he was about appeared to magnify it. In light of a “discerning of spirits” that occurred in 1948, the congregation dismissed him. Immediately Toronto ’s Department of Philosophy hired him.  His career as iconic philosopher and professor had been launched.

Preoccupied with the history of metaphysics, Toronto ’s Department of Philosophy had long insisted that there be at least one professor possessing expertise in the work of each major thinker.  No one had yet been found for German Idealism in general and Hegel in particular. Fackenheim volunteered, thinking it would be a way of rendering his teaching position secure.

He startled people from the start.   Always a Jewish theologian, his first published work was an article on Kierkegaard, a Christian philosopher.  He had already established his reputation concerning mediaeval philosophy. Soon he was publishing material and supervising doctoral students in Avicenna, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Husserl, Dilthey, Buber, Heidegger, Sartre and Arendt.

While his reputation swelled largely because of his work in the German idealist tradition, his earlier work in mediaeval thought gave him a versatility that Toronto treasured. Throughout his working life he supervised graduate students in mediaeval Jewish philosophy (Isaac Israeli, Judah Halevi, Abraham Ibn Daud, and of course Moses Maimonides.) No less time was given to mediaeval Arabic philosophers (Al Kindi, Al Farabi, Avicenna, Avenpace, and Averroes.)

In 1955 Fackenheim married a former student.   Rose was a Christian and a member of Bathurst Street United Church , Toronto . (The date is crucial. It is still whispered that he was fired from the Hamilton synagogue on account of his having married a non-Jew.  This is a myth that should be exposed and allowed to perish.)   Together they had four children.  The eldest, Michael, was born brain-damaged and now lives in the Ontario Provincial Hospital in Orillia . The youngest, Yossie, was born when Emil was 63 and Rose 45. Yossie was born on Yom Kippur. With yet another twinkle in his eye Fackenheim liked to say, “A male child born on Yom Kippur? According to Jewish legend, he could be the Messiah.”

The Fackenheims moved to Israel in 1986. Rose embraced Judaism. The children were confirmed in their Yiddishkeit by an orthodox rabbi. When she was 55 Rose was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease; she died seven years later.

Fackenheim died 19th September 2003 . I was at my computer when a colleague relayed to me the notice from the Jerusalem Post.  I mourned the loss of someone whose stamp is on me everywhere, someone who exemplified simultaneously the radical detachment required of scholarship and the radical commitment required of biblical faith.  In the next instant I anticipated my eschatological reunion with the Abrahamic figure who convinced me 45 years ago that while there is much that is dubious about me and others, there is nothing that is dubious about the One whose glory leaves us prostrate, whose voice can crack rocks, and whose faithfulness to the people of God is never attenuated.

 

IV: Fackenheim was the acclaimed luminary in a philosophy department that was stellar even apart from him. The range of his philosophical competence was vast, as has been noted already.  Had Hitler not arrived on the scene, he said, he would have been a professor of ancient philosophy in a German university.   As it was, his expertise included ancient, mediaeval and modern philosophy (especially German Idealism), as well as existentialism. Analytical philosophy, he maintained, was something would-be philosophers had to “have under their belt”. In other words, those who wanted credibility with the philosophically sophisticated had to have mastered it.  At the same time analytical philosophy, he was convinced, could never be more than a tool in the service of a philosophical quest that was more substantive, more profound and, above all, life-altering.  The question Fackenheim constantly posed, implicitly where not explicitly, at the conclusion of much philosophising, was simple yet searching: “What difference is it going to make?”

Yet his greatest contribution, according to many, was not simply the exposition, amplification and criticism of major thinkers in the history of metaphysics. Rather it was his juxtaposing of the logic of philosophy and the logic characteristic of Hebrew thought. In this endeavour his Encounters between Judaism and Modern Philosophy is priceless. The chapter headings indicate accurately what is going to be attempted – as reading the book confirms that faith in God, and the understanding inherent in faith, are vindicated. The first chapter, “Elijah and the Empiricists: The Possibility of Divine Presence” is followed by “Abraham and the Kantians: Moral Duties and Divine Commandments” and “Moses and the Hegelians: Jewish Existence in the Modern World.” In each case he exposes the strengths of a philosophical school, comments critically on the school’s deficiencies, and non-triumphalistically establishes biblical conviction concerning truth – better, concerning reality, the reality of the living God, together with reality’s claim upon humankind. In every case the God who is self-revealed at Sinai and who is continually self-bestowed through prophet and seer; the God who looms over and leans upon “the apple of his eye”, seeming to burden them unendurably yet also sustaining them when they are abandoned in world-occurrence; this God is re-presented to the reader as Fackenheim draws on the vast treasury of Midrash to highlight the dialectical nature of Jewish thought.

A similar approach is found in the book that many regard as his greatest, To Mend the World: Foundations of Future Jewish Thought.       Once again the chapter titles reflect the manner in which he exposes the most erudite philosophy to the most impassioned Jewish faith: “The Shibboleth of Revelation: From Spinoza beyond Hegel” or “Historicity, Rupture and Tikkun Olam (‘Mending the World’): From Rosenzweig beyond Heidegger.”

Fackenheim knew that argument is persuasive only if the parties to the argument stand on the same ground, admit the same presuppositions, share the same universe of discourse.  Where they do not, argument is unavailing; what is operative in this situation is witness. His own undisguised testimony appears throughout his writings, yet seems to shine with unusual radiance in the concluding lines of his “Elijah and the Empiricists”. Having exposed the shallowness of empiricism as a philosophy (i.e., having exposed the illegitimate move from science to scientism), and having exposed the indefensibility of its principal exponent; namely, A.J. Ayer and his Language, Truth and Logic, Fackenheim declares,

 

The believer, all along aware of subjectivist reductionism, embraces that position not when he ceases to hear but when he turns away from listening.  The unbeliever, too, may turn….For the author of Language, Truth and Logic to accept the voice heard at Sinai – or his urge to worship in the Messianic age – he would have to be converted.  But conversion is both a turning and a being turned. (Encounters, 29)

 

His book Jewish Philosophers and Jewish Philosophy anticipates a major shift in Fackenheim’s orientation.       The chapter on Leo Strauss relates a conversation he had with Strauss in New York City , when Strauss had remarked “We all know it is our duty to survive as Jews. Jewish philosophy will tell us why.” (105)

The shift occurred in 1967. For the past three weeks Egypt ’s Abdul Nasser had threatened the destruction of the state of Israel and the annihilation of every living Jew.  The Holocaust was on the point of being re-enacted.       The catastrophe was averted only as the Israeli air force devastated Egypt ’s air force before the latter’s planes could take off.   Neither a Zionist nor an anti-Zionist up to this point, Fackenheim announced that someone else could investigate the subtleties of philosophy for their own sake; from now on he would give his attention to the study of the Holocaust and what it, as a novum, portended for Jewish thought, faith and life.  In a word, while the Holocaust as radical evil cannot be understood (one aspect of radical evil’s evilness is its sheer incomprehensibility); while it is blasphemous to speak of “meaning” with respect to the Holocaust, it is imperative that there be a response.  The response is multi-faceted; and one facet, the maturer Fackenheim came to say, was the survival not only of the Jewish people but of the Jewish state. Not surprisingly he insisted, “Quite indefensible to me is the view that Judaism would be unaffected if the state of Israel were destroyed.” (What is Judaism?, 10)

While no Jew regards the Shoah (“catastrophe”) as insignificant or anything other than a challenge to faith, Fackenheim went farther. In his God’s Presence in History: Jewish Affirmations and Philosophical Reflections he distinguished between “root” events/experiences and “epoch-making” events/experiences.   The latter were the Jewish response to occurrences that tested the faith; e.g., the destruction of the first Temple , the Maccabean Revolt, the destruction of the second Temple , the expulsion from Spain . Root events, on the other hand, are historical occurrences in which the faith originated; e.g., the deliverance at the Red Sea and the commanding presence at Sinai.       Here a past event – public, historical – can legislate to future generations. And such root experiences allow the present access to the past.  Root experiences are normative for the formation and continuation of Jewish faith while epoch-making experiences can only test the faith so formed and normed.

Undeniably the Holocaust is an epoch-making experience. Fackenheim, however, frequently appeared to lean toward regarding it a root experience. As soon as he “leaned”, the outcry reminded him that he had stepped outside normative Judaism.  And of course if the Holocaust was a root experience then it had to be revelatory. This notion, needless to say, was both absurd and offensive: absurd in that the content of revelation is a presence that guarantees a future, when the Holocaust appeared to attest an absence (a radical God-forsakenness that found Buber speaking of an “eclipse of God”) that guaranteed non-existence; offensive not least because the Nazis would then be said to be doing God’s work. Yet if it was merely epoch-making, had it been denied that the Jewish people were singled out at Auschwitz (albeit for destruction) no less than they were singled out at Sinai (albeit for life)? Fackenheim refused to move away from his conviction, regardless of the disagreement he mobilized, that the Holocaust was unprecedented not only in Jewish history but in human history. (In fact, he maintained that not only was the Holocaust the greatest disaster to befall the Jewish people; it was – albeit for a different reason – the greatest disaster to befall the church.) For this reason he agonized over the reputation of the Jewish community in Lublin , Poland , for of them it was said that with their dying breath they gave the Torah back to God.

In light of the foregoing Fackenheim maintained that while Jewish tradition has always maintained that 613 commandments were given to Moses at Sinai (this includes the oral Torah), there has latterly been added the 614th: Jews are forbidden to deliver to Hitler the conquest that he coveted but was denied. For this reason Fackenheim asserted,

 

Jews are forbidden to hand Hitler posthumous victories. They are commanded to survive as Jews, lest the Jewish people perish.  They are commanded to remember the victims of Auschwitz , lest their memory perish. They are forbidden to despair of man (sic) and his world, and to escape into either cynicism or otherworldliness, lest they cooperate in delivering the world over to the forces of Auschwitz . Finally they are forbidden to despair of the God of Israel, lest Judaism perish.  A secularist Jew cannot make himself believe by a mere act of will, nor can he be commanded to do so….And a religious Jew who has stayed with his God may be forced into new, possibly revolutionary relationships with Him. One possibility, however, is wholly unthinkable. A Jew may not respond to Hitler’s attempt to destroy Judaism by himself cooperating in its destruction. In ancient times, the unthinkable Jewish sin was idolatry.  Today, it is to respond to Hitler by doing his work. (Fackenheim: German Philosophy and Jewish Thought,, 28)

 

Two days after Kristallnacht, one of the twenty-odd Jewish men in a jail cell meant for six railed at the twenty-two year-old rabbinical student, “You tell us what Judaism has to say to us now.”  Fackenheim, however, according to his own report, said nothing.

Ever since then he has said much.  He has even attempted to answer the question he declined to answer in the jail cell through several different vehicles directed towards differed readerships. His What is Judaism? An Interpretation for the Present Age is his love-letter to non-philosophers, amcha, ordinary Jewish folk.  Ordinary people (so-called) were always dear to him.  It was for them that he delighted in expounding the Midrash concerning the giving of the Torah at Sinai.   There it was said when the Israelites heard God say “I” (the first word of the Decalogue) their souls left them, as it says, “If we hear the Voice anymore…we shall die.” (Deut. 5:22)  Yet Rabbi Shim’on bar Yochai taught, “The Torah which God gave to Israel restored their souls to them,” as it says, “‘The Torah of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul.’” (Ps. 19:8) (What is Judaism?, 135)

 

Epilogue:

In 1985 The United Church of Canada commissioned me to write the denomination’s annual Lenten devotional book.  Since then the second and third editions of Ponder and Pray have appeared. The dedication of the current (third) edition reads

In gratitude for

Emil L. Fackenheim

philosopher, professor, rabbi, friend

-and survivor of Sachsenhausen-

from whom I learned,

“Prayer is the quintessential human act.”

 

In him I found intellectual brilliance combined with resilient faith in the Holy One of Israel. My debt to him is unpayable.

 

 

Victor Shepherd
January 2008

Reformers, Philosophers, Kierkegaard and the Akedah Yitzakh

Reformers, Philosophers, Kierkegaard and the Akedah Yitzakh

Professor Victor A. Shepherd

Tyndale University College & Seminary

 

I: — Whether or not philosophy and theology are deemed irreconcilable appears to depend on where one stands in the theological spectrum.  The Papal encyclical, Fides Et Ratio, promulgated by the late John Paul II on 14 September 1998 , stated unambiguously the relationship between philosophy and theology that John Paul himself upheld and expected others in his denomination to uphold as well.  As a student of the Magisterial Reformation, on the other hand, I am aware that the Reformers regarded philosophy – by which they frequently meant Mediaeval scholasticism – as an encroachment upon theology that denied the gospel’s inherent integrity, militancy and efficacy.

Martin Luther, for instance, voiced this notion as nascent Reformer. In early autumn 1517 (perhaps earlier even than his putative nailing of the Ninety-Five Theses to the door of the Schlosskirche in Wittenberg on 31st October 1517 ) he published the ninety-seven theses of his Disputation Against Scholastic Theology. The anti-scholastic, anti-philosophic tone is unmistakable.  Discussing the understanding of the human will that mediaeval philosophers typically advanced, Luther writes “We are not masters of our actions, from beginning to end, but servants.  This in opposition to the philosophers.” [1]   The Disputation is replete with similar references. Consider the following. “Virtually the entire Ethics of Aristotle is the worst enemy of grace.  This in opposition to the scholastics.”[2]   “It is an error to say that no man can become a theologian without Aristotle. This in opposition to common opinion.”[3]         “The whole Aristotle is to theology as darkness is to light.   This in opposition to the scholastics.”[4]   Lest we think that Luther has targeted Aristotle only, we should hear Luther on someone in the tradition of Plato.   “It would have been far better for the church if Porphyry (233-303) … had not been born for the use of theologians.”[5]         (“Better…if [he] …had not been born” points unambiguously to the biblical reference to Judas; Porphyry is no less spiritually treacherous, with his philosophically compromised theology, than the one Christian tradition deems arch-traitor.  Philosophy is no little threat to faith in the gospel.)   Luther concludes his 1517 Disputation, “In these statements we wanted to say and believe we have said nothing that is not in agreement with the Catholic church and the teachers of the church.”[6]

Soon Luther rendered more specific his objection to philosophy as he developed his Theologia Crucis or “Theology of the Cross” in the years that remained to him.  Since Luther wrote no systematic theology, his Theologia Crucis is found in no single place but rather recrudesces in fragments throughout his work.[7]

Luther developed his Theologia Crucis in opposition to a Theologia Gloriae in its many forms. One form of it was the attempt at reading the truth and nature of God off the face of world-occurrence, off the face of history.         Another form was the attempt at arguing for the truth and nature of God from nature. Another form, perhaps more subtle, was the church’s triumphalistic self-promotion (which is to say, the church’s persecution of others) inasmuch as the church confused its triumphalism with the triumph or victory of the crucified one, the church having forgotten that the crucified one is raised crucified, with wounds still gaping.  When the church confuses its triumphalism with the victory of its Lord who suffers still, the resurrection ceases to be the effectiveness of the cross; instead the resurrection becomes the supersession of the cross, matched by the church’s superiority to its crossbearing.         While this distortion was a matter of ecclesiology, Luther insisted that ecclesiology is a predicate of Christology, and a distorted ecclesiology could therefore be traced to a Christology warped by philosophy.

All of which brings us to the last form of Theologia Gloriae, the identification of God with metaphysical speculation.   Here Luther has two principal objections in mind.

One objection is his insistence that the Holy One of Israel is qualitatively distinct from the God of the philosophers: being, being-itself, “ground of being”, etc.   The living God is to be understood not as the ens realissimum of the philosophers, the static “that which is”, but rather in terms of the dynamic personalism of the Hebrew bible: God is He who acts. (Thomas Aquinas’ reading of Exodus 3:14, where Moses asks for God’s ‘name’ and God replies “I shall be who I shall be”; Aquinas’ reading of this text as declaring the aseity or self-existence of God the Reformers found utterly wide of the mark and an instance of philosophical corruption.)

The second objection is Luther’s insistence that the God who acts is not the only actor; Satan acts too.  God, however, defines himself at the cross, and only at the cross. For this reason Luther maintained that apart from the cross God is indistinguishable from the devil.[8]

On account of its espousal of metaphysics, philosophy remains wedded to the Theologia Gloriae.  Metaphysical speculation never terminates in the God who humbles himself in the manger and humiliates himself at the cross.         Philosophy forever remains an aspect of that ‘wisdom of the world’ that the gospel has inverted.

Consider the discussion of power, including omnipotence.  At the cross God not only acts most characteristically (he loves to the uttermost, love exhausting his nature); at the cross God also acts most effectively (he reconciles a wayward world to himself.)   To say that the cross, therefore, is God’s mightiest work is to say that the cross alone determines the meaning of “almighty” or “omnipotent.” Since power is the capacity to achieve purpose, God acts “almightily” when he overcomes all impediments to the fulfilment of his purpose, and does so precisely where, from a human standpoint, he cannot do anything.  God’s power can never be understood by means of an argument that begins with finite, creaturely power and concludes with infinite, divine power. No philosophical argument for God – let alone for God’s omnipotence – terminates in the God-forsakenness of a bedraggled Jew (someone the world loves to hate) executed at a city garbage dump.  Luther has spoken.

What about John Calvin? Calvin, to say the least, is cautious concerning the theologian’s deployment of philosophy. In the course of expounding the doctrine of the Trinity he writes laconically, “Here, indeed, if anywhere in the secret mysteries of Scripture, we ought to play the philosopher soberly and with great moderation…..For how can the human mind measure off the measureless essence of God according to its own little measure….Indeed, how can the mind by its own leading come to search out God’s essence…?”[9]   More characteristically, however, Calvin speaks critically of the “Sophists”, scholastic writers whose hybrid theology has accommodated philosophy so as to distort the biblical message.   In this regard, when Calvin discusses the will of God (which for him is the will of God made manifest in Jesus Christ), Calvin contrasts this with “that absolute will of which the Sophists babble.”[10]

Not every philosophical predecessor is equally evil, however.  Calvin thought more highly of the “Schoolmen”, the older, more notable mediaeval thinkers, than he did of theological opponents temporally proximate to him. In his assessment of the distinction between operative grace and co-operative grace, for instance, Calvin writes “how far I disagree with the sounder Schoolmen [note that regardless of how sound these thinkers may be, Calvin still finds ample scope for disagreement] I differ with the more recent Sophists to an even greater extent, as they are farther removed from antiquity.”[11]   He has in mind here principally Ockham and Biel .

Regardless of Calvin’s approach to philosophy, and particularly Aristotle, the fact is that Scholastic theology never disappeared in the Reformation era. Alongside the Humanist flowering, which flowering had no little effect on most Magisterial Reformers (here we need only recall that Calvin’s first published work was a commentary on Seneca’s De Misericordia), Scholastic theology thrived in the “old church” even as Reformers denounced it. It was soon to thrive in the “new church” too as both Lutheran and Reformed Orthodoxy soon wrote theology in a scholastic mode.  It triumphed in the work of Jacob Arminius, the Remonstrant in whom philosophy looms much larger than his followers appear to appreciate. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that Arminius is chiefly a philosopher whose Thomistic theology (Aquinas is the most frequently quoted thinker in Arminius’ work) happens to use a Protestant vocabulary.  And of course the English Puritans returned to a use of philosophy that was more than merely illustrative.  Jonathan Edwards, New-World Puritan theologian, remained the ablest philosopher in America until the advent of Charles Sanders Peirce.

Over the centuries the relationship between philosophy and theology has varied in the details of the respective disciplines, even as the disciplines sometimes appeared to wed each other, at other times act as necessary foil to each other (and therefore still need each other.) If theology announced itself divorced from philosophy, the divorce appeared not to last.

 

Hegel

In Hegel there occurred what may be regarded as one of philosophy’s larger-scale “takeover bids” of theology; namely, Hegel’s notion of the Absolute or Mind or Spirit.  Ultimate reality is Spirit, but such Spirit is not an exclusive or monistic claim to reality. Neither is Spirit that God of scripture whose Being is utterly distinct ontically from the being of the world, Creator and creation being linked only by grace. Spirit is not that God whose infinite self-transcendence is categorically distinct from the self-transcendence of philosophical thought.

Hegel maintains that it is possible, by means of philosophical thought, to rise to the Absolute Standpoint where the distinction between subject and object is overcome and the thinker becomes one with cosmic Mind, which Mind is nothing other than self-thinking thought, or Mind thinking itself. Mind thinking itself, it must be remembered, is not some sort of flight into solipsism or fantasy, let alone the self-referential world of the deranged. Mind thinking itself is the philosopher’s ascent to that standpoint, that of the Absolute or the Idea or God, in which all the dichotomies of the universe are acknowledged to be non-imaginary yet are overcome in a higher synthesis. Since philosophy aims at a rational apprehension of reality as a whole (and in Hegel’s opinion, his own philosophy has succeeded at this), evil, and that aspect of evil which is sin, have to be seen as aspects of or stages on the way towards that mediation which overcomes the ontic distance between God and humankind.  (In other words, evil has been denatured as evil; radical evil – evil for the sake of evil, evil subserving no good whatsoever, rendered inherently impossible.) The God of biblical faith who utterly transcends the creation is manifestly penultimately “God”, since such a deity is necessarily limited by what it precludes.  According to Hegel, then, God is most profoundly that which gathers up in a higher ontic unity what has heretofore been regarded as ontically distinct. In connection with this notion Hegel speaks of two forms of the infinite, one adequate and the other inadequate.   The inadequate infinite is simply the non-finite.         If the infinite is defined as the non-finite, however, then the infinite is limited by what it is not, and to this extent is not infinite at all. Then the adequate infinite must be that infinite which includes both the finite and the infinite.

Where has this development been illustrated?   (Note that the question is not “Where has this occurred?”)   It has been illustrated in the Incarnation, where the God who up to that time had been viewed as transcendent only – albeit infinite – is now acknowledged to include precisely what it had previously excluded. The infinite, in short, is the sum of infinite plus finite.

Who needs the illustration? Hegel maintains that Christianity is the pictorial representation of truth helpful for those who cannot, or to date have not, risen philosophically to the Absolute Standpoint. Hegel intends no disparagement. At the same time, what is depicted as biblically substantive – Incarnation, atonement, resurrection, Spirit-suffusion – are philosophically less than ultimate.    They remain pictorial representations of a reality that has moved beyond them even as it includes them.

 

 

Kierkegaard

Kierkegaard objects. He denies that there can ever be mediation of Hegel’s sort between God and humankind. He denies that the Absolute’s knowledge of itself and humankind’s knowledge of the Absolute are two aspects of the same reality.   He denies that the creature (if such a word is still appropriate) can rise by means of philosophical thought to the standpoint of the Absolute so as to render human self-consciousness ultimately the same as God’s self-consciousness. He insists that there is an “infinite qualitative distinction” between God and humankind that cannot be overcome.  The God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob is never to be confused with Hegel’s Spirit or Absolute.  We may encounter the God who forever remains GOD, but we are never ontically “one with” that God.

Whereas Hegel insists that “The Truth is the Whole”, Kierkegaard maintains that “Truth is subjectivity.”  This assertion, of course, has nothing to do with subjectivism or make-believe or even post-modernism’s denial of truth.         “Truth is subjectivity” means that the real is the relational. Whereas Hegel had insisted “The Real is the rational and the rational is the real” (presupposing his own carefully delineated sense of “rational”), Kierkegaard anticipates Martin Buber’s notion that the real is the “between”; the real is the existent’s encounter with, engagement with, the God who infinitely transcends us yet who accommodates himself to us and therefore whom we may meet and know.

To exist, insists Kierkegaard, is qualitatively different from to think – however pregnant Hegel’s notion of thinking may be and regardless of what it may include. For this reason, Kierkegaard does not hesitate to say “Existence cannot be thought.” Rejecting the “thought experiments” of metaphysicians as the approach to truth, Kierkegaard insists that the real is apprehended only by means of a commitment that forsakes all earthly securities and “leaps” in faith at incalculable risk.

The paradigm of such commitment is Kierkegaard’s “knight of faith”, Abraham of old; and the story concerning Abraham that overwhelms Kierkegaard is the Akedah, the “binding” of Isaac as Abraham offers up his son, his only son, in obedience to God’s command.

Abraham and Isaac

Abraham, the prototype of the person of faith, has been promised spiritual descendants as numerous as the sand on the seashore.  If the promise is to be fulfilled, two conditions must be met: Abraham must persevere in faith (or else he cannot be the foreparent of descendants-in-faith), and Isaac must survive (or else there will no descendants-in-faith.)   The dilemma is plain: If Abraham obeys God and offers up his son, then God’s promise is null and void, since Isaac has not survived; on the other hand, if Abraham second-guesses (i.e., disobeys) God and preserves Isaac, then God’s promise is null and void, since Abraham’s disobedience exemplifies unfaith.

 

In short, Abraham’s obedience and his disobedience nullify the promise alike. What is he to do? Abraham decides to stake everything on obeying God’s command, trusting God to fulfill God’s promise in ways that Abraham cannot foresee or even imagine.   He will obey God even though such obedience, from a human perspective, ensures the non-fulfillment of the promise.

Precisely at the moment of the knife’s descent God forbids the dreaded act. God’s unaffected awareness and candid acknowledgement, “Now I know that you fear God” ( 22:12 ), dovetails exactly with Abraham’s utter surprise at the provision of the ram. Abraham’s surprise is no more feigned than his intent to obey God at any cost.   Both dimensions must be underscored: it is true simultaneously that Abraham never doubts that “God will provide” (or else he has abandoned faith’s trust in the promise-fulfilling God) and that he is genuinely astounded at the appearance of the ram (or else the trial of faith was no trial at all, trial presupposing the inability to foresee in any way how promise can be fulfilled when faith must heed a command that guarantees cancellation of the promise.)

 

Kierkegaard and Hegel

Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling targets Hegel unambiguously.   Hegel’s understanding of religion, of course, includes his understanding of faith. And since philosophy “goes further” than religion, philosophy necessarily goes further than faith – only, says Kierkegaard, to turn wine into water.[12]

Philosophy, meanwhile, is not aware that it denatures faith, for philosophy insists that it comprehends faith even as it supersedes faith. In all of this, says Kierkegaard, theology is seemingly unaware that its mandate is theos, God. The result is that theology, or what’s left of it, “sits all rouged and powdered in the window and courts its favours, offers its charms to philosophy.”[13]    Theology has prostituted itself to philosophy while preening itself on an intellectual sophistication superior to the crudeness of Abraham and Isaac. After all, “it is supposed to be difficult to understand Hegel, but to understand Abraham is a small matter.”[14]   With mordant irony Kierkegaard turns the vocabulary of “further” back upon his opponent: overwhelmed at Abraham, Kierkegaard glories in the fact that in 130 years the patriarch “got no further than faith.”[15]   While “got no further” waggishly suggests that Abraham was stalled, Kierkegaard knows that Abraham, not the philosophical speculators, had alone moved ahead to existence.         Existence cannot be gained or entered upon by means of the “thought experiments” of the metaphysicians, but only as the detachment of “worldly understanding” is left behind in favour of radical commitment.[16]

The radical commitment is to God; not the “God” of philosophical constructs but the One who summons every would-be believer to Abraham trial. Such trial consists in enduring, in utter anguish, the contradiction between promise and command. This contradiction is nothing less than “absurd.”   As faith paradoxically embraces the absurd (in all of this the “this-worldliness” of Isaac and promised blessing must be kept in mind), faith is vindicated and confirmed not in an ethereal eternal but in the temporal. By way of reminder of the link between the absurd and the temporal Kierkegaard adds, “Only he who draws the knife gets Isaac.”[17]

Needless to say the loneliness of Abraham (and therefore of any believer) is his inability to make any of this understandable to even one other human being. Since no one can foster the understanding requisite for faith, no believer can help someone else into faith: “either the single individual himself becomes the knight of faith by accepting the paradox or he never becomes one.”[18]

In light of philosophy’s non-comprehension of all that Kierkegaard has said, together with the human horror that surrounds the particular absurdity pertaining to Isaac, he does not hesitate to say that not only is Abraham’s life the most paradoxical that can be thought; it is so paradoxical that it cannot be thought.[19]   Still, the foregoing must never be regarded as unique to Abraham.   He is prototype, to be sure, but as such is always to be imitated by those who have never settled for the cheap edition of him that the church is forever trying to sell. He remains the “guiding star that saves the anguished.”[20]

Kierkegaard’s point is that Hegel’s category of self-consciousness, even a self-consciousness that is one with an eternal self-consciousness is still only consciousness; it is not yet existence.  Faith alone embraces existence, and does so only by means of a “leap.” Such a radical commitment is always a qualitative transition that nothing can precipitate or effect incrementally.

The single individual knows that we can be saved only as faith, itself a paradox, grasps the absurd.   Such faith is forever the antithesis of the detachment of philosophy and forever the antithesis of the immediacy of the heart’s spontaneous inclination.[21]   Such faith is always the paradox of existence.

In light of all that has been said concerning the absurd, paradox, leap, existence – together with the fact that the single individual can be neither understood nor admired – Kierkegaard is correct when he contends that the believer is finally a witness, not a teacher.[22]    A teacher, after all, teaches what others with the requisite philosophical equipment can understand.   A witness, on the other hand, attests precisely what is found in common with nothing else. Existence, contra Hegel, is indeed “beyond” all philosophical thought-experiments.

 

A Reprise

And yet it appears philosophy will always be necessary – at least if theological impasses are to be dealt with.         One such impasse was the Christological dispute between Arius and Athanasius in the Fourth Century. In his understanding of Jesus Christ Arius had managed to combine the worst of two heresies, Ebionitism and Docetism.         While his Christology never hesitated to speak of Jesus as the Son of God, his “Son of God” was a tertium quid, something that was neither divine nor human.  For if the Son of God is less than God in any sense, then the Son is not God. And if the Son of God is more than human, then neither is the Son human.

When Athanasius attempted to rebut Arius he realized that both he and Arius were using the same biblical expression, “Son of God,” but were ascribing antithetical meanings to it.  Athanasius insisted that nothing less than the gospel was at stake here. While Arius insisted that the Son was homoiousios with the Father – of similar substance, Athanasius insisted that Son and Father were homoousios – of the same or identical substance.   The difference between homoousios and homoiousios is an iota, the smallest letter of the Greek alphabet (in Greek it lacks even a dot), and subscript as well. (How much hangs on such a distinction is indicated in English by the difference between asking someone to run your business and asking her to ruin it.) Athanasius understood that if the crucial difference between him and Arius was to be identified, he would have to resort to non-biblical, philosophical language. Homoousios is not a biblical word.  Athanasius defended his use of it by insisting that it exuded the spirit of scripture; in other words, homoousios locates the meanings of biblical words and the realities to which they point.[23]

What did Athanasius do for the church through his deployment of a non-biblical, philosophical expression?         No less a figure than Karl Barth maintained that the Athanasian homoousios was the most significant theological statement since the apostles.

It is not difficult to multiply instances where philosophical concepts and vocabulary are crucial in theological articulation.  Despite Calvin’s protestations against the divagations of schoolmen and sophists whose Aristotelian encroachment upon theology Calvin finds objectionable, Calvin resorts to Aristotle in expounding his understanding of justification.[24]  Concerning Romans 3:24, “[All who believe] … are justified by his [God’s] grace as a gift, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus.” (RSV) Calvin maintains this verse to be “perhaps the most remarkable place in the whole of Scripture for explaining and magnifying the force of this righteousness.”[25]   Here Calvin writes, “He [Paul] shows that the mercy of God is the efficient cause; that Christ, with his blood, is the material; that the formal, or instrumental, is faith conceived from the Word; and the final is the glory of the divine righteousness and goodness.”[26] Elsewhere Calvin readily acknowledges philosophy as servant of Christian understanding: “…we see that there was good ground for the distinction which the schoolmen made between necessity, secundum quid, and necessity absolute, also between the necessity of consequent and of consequence.”[27]

In none of the above is it suggested that the substance of philosophy determines the substance of theology.         It is to say, however, that theology appears to need philosophy – or at least to find it highly useful – to deploy philosophical concepts in theological exposition.

Karl Barth makes this point in his exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. Barth regards as short-sighted those who are impatient with the doctrine on the grounds that it appears to rely for its articulation on the philosophy current at the time of the Council of Nicaea (ca. 325.) Barth acknowledges the

…indisputable connexion of the dogma [of the Trinity] with the philosophy of the age.  By proving philosophical involvement we can reject the confessions and theology of any age and school, and we can do his more effectively the less we see the beam in our own eye.  For linguistically theologians have always depended on some philosophy and linguistically they always will.  But instead of getting Pharisaically (sic) indignant about this and consigning whole periods to the limbo of a philosophy that is supposed to deny the gospel – simply because our own philosophy is different – it is better to stick strictly to the one question what the theologians of the earlier period were really trying to say in the vocabulary of their philosophy.[28]

Theology cannot be articulated apart from philosophical concepts and vocabulary. At the same time, the content of philosophy and theology are not identical.  Therefore theology must adapt its proper content to the forms of discourse in its immediate environment.  If theology fails to adapt then it speaks to no one, however rich its content may be. On the other hand, if in seeking to adapt, theology adopts the substance described by the forms of discourse in its immediate environment, it will find that however well it communicates it has nothing to say, theology now being able to do no more than reflect the world back to the world.

The line between “adapt” and “adopt” is finer than a hair and harder than diamond. In truth, most of the time Christian witness finds itself now on one side of the line and then on the other, trusting that on balance it tiptoes down the boundary. The option that theology never has is to “play it safe” and make no effort at adapting for fear of adopting, for to “play it safe” is to guarantee the disappearance of witness.

Kierkegaard knew as much. While remaining an unrelenting foe of philosophy’s disdain for Abraham who, unfortunately, “got no further than faith,” Kierkegaard concludes his criticism of Hegel and Hegel’s “Absolute” by conscripting Hegel as Kierkegaard tells the reader that Abraham – everywhere the prototype of philosophy-defying faith – is lost unless “…the single individual as the single individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute.”[29]

Since it appears philosophy will always be essential to theology, is the difference between philosophy and theology an irreconcilable difference? In some respects there may continue to be an irreconcilable difference.         Years ago my chief philosophical mentor, Emil Fackenheim, commented to me that radical evil, evil for the sake of evil, evil enacted for no other reason than perverse delight in evil, is precisely that surd over which metaphysics finally stumbles – “surd”, in mathematical parlance, being that which can never be made to fit an expression that is mathematically elegant.

At the same time, within the realm of truth or reality that theology acknowledges, might there be room for philosophy in the form of a re-formulated natural theology? Within this realm cannot philosophy argue from the creaturely order to its “silent cry” for a sufficient reason?   This is not a philosophical attempt at supplanting, for instance, redemption as the content of revelation.   But it is to argue, from within the realm established by revelation; it is to argue philosophically that the truth of theology is not inherently philosophically impossible.[30]

In this light Hans Urs von Balthasar, in discussing the relation between philosophy and faith, appears to grasp the challenge that has convened this colloquium when he writes

…Ought one not … to say that the Christian, as proclaimer of God’s glory … takes upon himself – whether he wants to or not – the burden of metaphysics?[31]

 

Victor A. Shepherd  March 2007

 

 

[1]Thesis #39, “Disputation Against Scholastic Theology”, Timothy F.  Lull, ed.; Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings, (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989) p.15. Luther’s point is that humans can never be more than mere servants of their will, since their will, coram Deo, is governed either by sin or by Christ-in-his-righteousness.

[2]op. cit., #41, p.16.

[3]op. cit., #43, p.16.

[4]op.cit., #50, p.16. By “whole Aristotle” Luther means not only Aristotle’s metaphysical writings but also Aristotle’s scientific writings, newly uncovered in the burgeoning scientific exploration in the Sixteenth Century, and just as newly exposed as false by telescope-aided astronomers.

[5]op. cit., #52, p.17.

[6]op. cit., p.20.

[7]See, e.g., Walter von Loewenich, Luther’s Theology of the Cross; Herbert J.A.Bouman, transl.( Minneapolis : Fortress, 1976, passim.

[8]cf. Gerhard O. Forde, The Captivation of the Will, ( Grand Rapids : Eerdmans, 2005)p.45.

[9]Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ( Philadelphia : The Westminster Press, 1960. J.T. McNeill, ed.; F.L. Battles, transl.) 1.13.21.

[10]op.cit., 1.16.7.

[11]op.cit., 2.2.6.

[12] Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, transls. and eds.; (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) p.37.

[13] Kierkegaard, 32.

[14] Kierkegaard, 32.

[15] Kierkegaard, 23.

[16] When Kierkegaard speaks of faith’s leaving worldly understanding behind he is not advocating irrationality as such.   See C. Stephen Evans, Faith Beyond Reason: A Kierkegaardian Account, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998) chapters 6 and 7.

[17] Kierkegaard, 27.

[18] Kierkegaard, 71.

[19] Kierkegaard, 56.

[20] Kierkegaard, 53, 21.

[21] Kierkegaard, 47.

[22] Kierkegaard, 80.

[23]See T.F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith, (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1988) p.128,129.

[24]We might note that Calvin published his Commentary on Romans in 1540. Between 1532 and 1542 at least thirty-five commentaries on Romans were published, including many by Roman Catholic exegetes who disagreed with the Reformers’ reading of that epistle which Protestants cherish above all others.

[25]T.H.L. Parker, Commentaries on Romans: 1532-1542. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1986) p.198.

[26]op.cit., p.197.

[27]Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Henry Beveridge, transl. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953).

[28]Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, G.W. Bromiley, transl., (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1975) I,1, p.378.

[29]Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p.120.

[30]See Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian, (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1990) chapter 5.

[31] Hans Urs von Balthasar, My Work in Retrospect, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993)p.85.

The Torrances and the Logic of Reformation

(American Academy of Religion, November 2006)
The Torrances and the Logic of the Reformation

Victor A. Shepherd

 

When I was asked to speak at the 2006 meeting of the Thomas F. Torrance Theological Fellowship, I indicated that I would speak on “The Torrances and the Logic of the Reformation.”   To this I planned to speak on David Torrance and his appreciation of the Israel, both biblical and contemporary, with respect to God’s covenant faithfulness, comparing his appreciation of Israel to that of the Reformers, especially Calvin; on James B. Torrance and seeming deficits in his theology with respect to faith, contrasting his under-attention here to the biblically-delineated understanding of faith found in the Reformers; on Thomas F. Torrance, with respect to extending to a consideration of the homoousion of the Spirit the theological trenchancy that Torrance displayed concerning the homoousion of the Son.

I began with TFT, only to find that with him alone I had exceeded the time-limit assigned me by the Theological Fellowship. For this reason I shall not speak on David or James B., but rather restrict myself to TF.

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Thomas Torrance has become notorious for his insistence on the homoousion as essential to any sound doctrine of the Trinity, arguing that the homoousion safeguards the Incarnation against Arianism and any of the ingredients of Arianism (e.g., Docetism and Ebionitism), even as it safeguards the Trinity against any form of sabellianism or modalism, and the doctrine of God against any form of unitarianism or polytheism.  While TFT’s insistence can be found somewhere, however fleetingly addressed or alluded to, in virtually everything he has published (not least his sermons), his major discussions of the homoousion appear in three overlapping books on the Trinity; namely, The Trinitarian Faith (1988), Trinitarian Perspectives (1994), and The Christian Doctrine of God, One Being Three Persons (1996).

Unrelentingly TFT has shown that without the homoousion of the Father and the Son the gospel is forfeited.         While the difference between homoousion and homoiousion is iota subscript, the smallest letter of the Greek alphabet, this difference, I tell my students, is precisely the difference between asking someone to run your business and asking her to ruin it; namely, the smallest letter of the English alphabet, with catastrophic outcomes in the balance.  The homoousion estops any suggestion that the being of the Son is like the being of the Father, however elevated the degree of likeness.  As TFT has made plain over and over, it matters not whether the being of Father and that of the Son are a lot like or only a little bit like. No degree of similarity can substitute for identity.   Absent identity of being of the Father and the Son, the gospel disappears, leaving behind no more than religious mythology (the “gospel”, so-called, is now no more than tales humans spin in order to try to make sense of their existence) or no more than a human construct (here we could think of the constructs pertaining to the never-ending “quest for the historical Jesus”) that leaves us doing what the apostles never urge us to do; namely, infer a deity lying behind Jesus as the latter is reduced to no more than a “window” by which we may apprehend the deity that he himself is not.         In other words, while all docetic Christologies leave us mythologizing in the pursuit of truth, all ebionite Christologies leave us deducing truth, when the gospel announces itself as truth, reality, since it is God’s incursion, self-bestowal, self-communication, and self-interpretation. Therein the gospel eclipses all mythological speculation and all inferential processes. (Incidentally, with respect to the lattermost, the process whereby the nature of God is inferred from a Son who isn’t quite God, present-day Ebionites – e.g., the questers of the historical Jesus seem not to understand that the characteristic of the biblical God, the Holy One of Israel, is that he speaks.   When he speaks, those addressed know that they have been addressed by an “other”, by the Other; they know what has been spoken and therein know as well who has spoken. According to the logic of scripture, any deity who is inferred or deduced or concluded is ipso facto an idol.   In other words, the quest for the historical Jesus appears to be able to yield no more than an idol.)

All that TFT has brought forward concerning the homoousion of the Father and the Son is pregnant concerning the homoousion of the Son and the Spirit.   TFT has admitted this in many places, not least in his most recent work, The Christian Doctrine of God. Here, for instance, he has written, “…we must think of our being in the Spirit in the incarnate economy of God’s saving acts in Jesus Christ as deriving from and grounded objectively in the homoousial Communion of the eternal Spirit and the eternal Son in the Holy Trinity.” (149) Plainly the homoousion of the Spirit is as crucial as that of the Son in any Christian understanding of God and the participation in God’s own life that constitutes the salvation of God’s people.  In the same way TFT has recognized the manner in which the homoousion of the Spirit protects God’s infinite transcendence against a human encroachment wherein it is assumed that because such terms as “father” or “generate” are used of God, humans can co-opt God or domesticate God or even comprehend God.  In this vein TFT writes, “Let us recall further here the fact that classical Christian theology placed the homoousion of the Spirit alongside the homoousion of the incarnate Son. While the homoousion of the Son expresses the truth that what God is in Christ Jesus he is antecedently and eternally in himself, the bracketing of it with the homoousion of the Spirit has the effect of excising from our thought any projection into God of the creaturely, corporeal or sexist ingredients in the terms ‘father’, ‘son’, ‘offspring’ or ‘generation’ into God. (158) Educing yet another implication of the homoousion of the Spirit, TFT writes, “If the ontological bond between the historical Jesus Christ and God the Father is cut, then the substance falls out of the Gospel, but if the ontological bond between the Holy Spirit and incarnate Son of the Father is cut, so that there is a discrepancy between the economic Trinity and the ontological Trinity, or between the saving activity of the love of God in history and the transcendent activity of God in eternity, then we human beings are left without hope and can have no part or lot in God’s saving activity in Jesus Christ.” (197)   While TFT and others have given no little attention to homoousion with respect to the Son, little work appears to have been done with respect to homoousion of the Spirit. The result is that while the deity of the Son has been highlighted in such a way as to forestall Christological speculation, projection and non-biblical deduction, neglect of the deity of the Spirit has allowed a non-Christologically normed, non-Christologically formed, non-Christologically informed notion of the Spirit to arise. It should be no surprise, then, that the Spirit is invoked to legitimize pantheism, panentheism, the salvific significance of “the world’s great religions” (even as greatness seems to be defined by no more than the number of adherents), the salvific significance of religiosity-in-general (as much of the current preoccupation with “spirituality” suggests), or the salvific significance of irreligion (even though such thinkers as Calvin would deny that humans can ever be irreligious, the fallen human heart and mind remaining a ceaseless factory of idolatry).

The question, then, “Do the Son and the Spirit possess the same nature or merely similar natures?” is no less urgent than the question concerning the Son and the Father. TFT has alluded to this briefly in several places of The Doctrine of God (e.g., pp. 61, 72, 148.) I wish now to propose several considerations concerning the homoousion of Son and Spirit that parallel, where possible, the points that TFT has made passim concerning the cruciality of the homoousion of Son and Father.

 

 

[1] If Son and Spirit are only ontically similar, then there is no protection against that rationalism which appears to be the Achilles heel of the Reformed tradition. The Christo-logic of the Reformation (which Christo-logic, we should note, always entailed a Pneumato-logic) maintained that as Jesus Christ surges over people in the power of the Spirit, this one action of God forges within them the capacity to understand God’s incursion, the categories by which to understand it, and the vocabulary with which to speak of it.  Reformation understanding of the nature of God’s action upon people rendered unnecessary, even counterproductive, any rationalist precursor that qualified the beneficiaries of God’s salvific action to understand it and speak of it. Herein the classic Sixteenth Century Reformers differed from what Calvin called the “schoolmen” and their rationalist apparatus.   Quickly, however, the logic of the Reformation gave way to the logic of Protestant Scholasticism. Aristotelianism returned and occupied the place in Reformed theology that it had occupied in late Mediaeaval scholasticism.   We need only recall the aftermath of Calvin wherein post-Calvinism, Arminianism, and Roman Catholic thought appeared incommensurable on the surface while more profoundly all were aspects of an Aristotelian commonality. While Arminius, for instance, was execrated by post-Calvin Calvinists, few of the latter appeared to understand that the most frequently quoted thinker in Arminius remains Thomas Aquinas, whose Aristotelianism is never in doubt. Post-Calvin scholasticism recrudesced in several manifestations: Roman Catholic and predestinarian (de Baie and Banez), Roman Catholic and non-predestinarian (Suarez and Molina), Protestant and predestinarian (Beza, Gomarus and Junius), Protestant and non-predestinarian (Arminius, Episcopus and Limborch). Regardless of apparent divergences or even apparent theological incommensurables, all of the aforementioned presupposed an Aristotelian substratum in their theology.

As the classic Sixteenth Century Reformers were aware, however, the logic of the substratum alters the logic of the stratum. Despite the theological differences between Arminius and his Calvinist neighbours (e.g., the doctrine of election and the reading of Romans 7), they were one in the foundation of their thought.

Rationalism remains the “default” position of the Reformed tradition (although not of the Reformed tradition only). Rationalism in some form arises when the homoousion of the Spirit is overlooked. While Jesus Christ is acknowledged to be the Son Incarnate without qualification with the result that the nature of the Father isn’t inferred or deduced from scripture’s portrait of the Son, now to be inferred is the effectual presence of this deity. Now effectual presence is what’s to be humanly supplied.  Now a deity lying behind Jesus of Nazareth isn’t concluded; rather, an activity of a spirit lying behind Jesus is concluded, which activity isn’t one with the activity of the Son, and therefore which spirit is less than holy. At this point speculation or mythologizing pertains not to the Son (as happened in the Arian controversy) but instead pertains to the Spirit.  Here there is an “orthodox” acknowledgement of the Son (acknowledgement but not understanding, since a proper understanding of the Son entails the homoousion of the Spirit) that is accompanied by a human projection of the Spirit’s work. Not infrequently one finds in the church an uncompromised acknowledgement of the Son – without qualification or hesitation – even as this acknowledgement is now co-opted for a purpose that diverges from the purpose of scripture. In this situation the Son Incarnate is conscripted to support aspects of liberation theology or feminist theology (or patriarchal theology) or ecological theology or religious pluralism or psycho-spiritual theses that fall short of scripture’s portrayal of the Spirit.

At this point the Spirit is the principle whereby the Incarnate Son is deemed to energize or empower an agenda of transformation where that agenda of transformation isn’t entirely congruent with scripture’s depiction of the definitive, eschatological transformation wrought by the Spirit as the effectual presence of God.  A formally correct acknowledgement of the homoousion of the Son now fuels social or sexual or religious programmes that bear some relation to that “new heavens and a new earth in which righteousness dwells (2nd Peter 3:13) – that is, the acknowledgement of Jesus Christ subserves the correction of what the church rightly pronounces unrighteous – even as, absent the homoousion of the Spirit, what Wesley called “the general tenor” or scripture is truncated. Often church members who resist all such agendas are disdained, subtly or frontally, as lacking theological sophistication when in fact (as TFT never tired of saying, thanks to his reading of Michael Polanyi, and not least the latter’s Personal Knowledge) these “simple” church members know more, vastly more, than they can articulate. In other words, without being able to state it precisely or defend it cogently, in fact that they have “scented” a newer unrighteous that is proffered as the proper redress of what is widely admitted to be an older unrighteousness or injustice. A properly articulated homoousion of the Spirit, needless to say, would strengthen immeasurably those who possess what TFT called a theological “instinct”, however little they are able to articulate it at present.

Where the homoousion of the Spirit isn’t operative, effectiveness in the church’s teaching, preaching, and evangelism are sought elsewhere; not only sought, but found to the detriment of church and world alike.         Frequently my students in Introductory Systematic Theology, rightly zealous for the gospel, protest, “But shouldn’t the church be concerned with converting people, concerned with seeing them converted?” These questions, however, are not identical.  Witness, proclamation, evangelism – this is always the church’s business. Throughout the book of Acts no one comes to faith apart from the mission and ministry of the Christian community.   And in Acts no one comes to faith apart from the ministry of the Holy Spirit, that activity of God whereby he alone renders the church’s ministry saintly effective just because he alone can.

Throughout its history the church has shown itself to lack the patience of God as well as an agenda-free grasp of the purpose of God, with the result that the church overreaches itself and attempts to do God’s work in the face of God’s unendurable slowness, even negligence. The result, as the world is aware where frequently the church isn’t aware, is that the church persecutes. Whenever the church upholds the homoousion of the Son but fails to uphold the homoousion of the Spirit, the church turns its unexceptionable recognition of the Son into a weapon that it wields against people whose recalcitrance has imperilled them spiritually, such coercion being able to move them along to a saving confession. The coercion can be physical, social or psychological; but it remains coercion, and it arises through a defective understanding of the relation of the Spirit to the Son, as the vulnerability of the crucified Son is contradicted by the non-vulnerability of a coercive church.

Tragically, pathetically, in the name of its Lord the church advertises its unbelief in its Lord, for plainly its resorting to coercion announces that it doesn’t trust God to do what God insists God alone can do; namely, quicken faith in the sin-ravaged heart by means of the Holy Spirit. Not to put too fine an edge on it, non-recognition of the homoousion of the Spirit issues in a seeming Christological zeal that merely publicizes the church’s atheism. To be sure, in his dispute with Erasmus on the bondage of the will Luther said that apart from Jesus [i.e., apart from the cross] God is indistinguishable from the devil. Luther was aware, without mentioning it in this one instance, that it is only as the Spirit renders us beneficiaries of the cross, only as the Spirit quickens faith in the crucified, do we know the God who is forever distinguished from the devil.

While much has been said about Luther’s theologia crucis and his disavowal of theolgia gloriae, little attention has been paid to the cruciality of the identity of the crucified and the Spirit.  Briefly, a theology of glory occurs whenever it is thought that God can be derived from metaphysical speculation, whenever it is thought that the truth and nature of God can be read off nature or read off the face of history, and whenever the church becomes triumphalistic. Concerning the church’s confusion between its triumphalism and the true triumph of the crucified (triumphant in that he is raised from the dead, as the church correctly notes, but is raised wounded, suffering still, vulnerable yet in the suffering of the world, as the church too often fails to note) enough has already been said.  Concerning the first point of Luther’s theologia crucis, the derivation of God from metaphysical speculation, Luther, eschewing all forms of rationalism (his vehement “faith seizes reason by the throat and strangles the brute” must be kept in mind), was always aware that only that Spirit whose activity is the action of God, and therefore the action of God the Son according to Luther’s conviction, could bring humans to a knowledge of God by means of the crucified. Beneficiaries now of the mercy of the crucified God, they can recognize assorted theologies of glory for what they are.  Apart from Spirit-wrought living faith in the crucified God, however, biblically orthodox theology remains an ideational construct and therein akin to philosophical speculation, from which one must infer or deduce God. The difference in content between biblically orthodox theology and philosophical speculation doesn’t of itself protect the former from an ideational construct whose lack of Holy Spirit renders its “miss” as good as a mile.

In a somewhat “softer” form of rationalism there isn’t a conclusion or inference to be drawn entirely naturalistically; instead the Spirit is said to facilitate illumination.   The Spirit operates at the level of mind, but at the level of mind only without reference to the heart.   Here the truth of God can be known without the knower herself being brought into the orbit of the “new creation”, without the knower herself being rendered a new creature within the new creation.  The Spirit is little more than the influence of a Deistic deity who provides the conditions for a humanly engendered knowledge of God; i.e., there is an outer structure of “grace” (admittedly a soft, dilute “grace” that is less than scripture’s understanding of grace as the living God’s uncompromisable faithfulness to his covenant). The outer structure of “grace” is complemented by an inner content of human possibility and human achievement. The Spirit, then, is the divinely-supplied condition by which human achievement occurs. This notion, of course, is epistemic semi-Pelagianism.

Where such Spirit-facilitated illuminationism is said to operate, “knowing” is closer to the outlook of the Enlightenment than to that of scripture. In scripture, to know God is to participate in the reality of God and therein, thereby, be rendered forever different.   Our knowledge of God is the precisely the difference our engagement with this “Other” has made to us when we meet this “Other” as Person.   Only as the Spirit is admitted to be God is the activity of the Spirit that act of God whereby God renders us participants in God’s own life. Only as the Spirit is God (i.e., homoousially identical with Father and Son) is the activity of the Spirit that act of God whereby the God who knows himself includes us in his self-knowing.

 

[2] In what follows I aim at tracing item-by-item with respect to the homoousion of the Spirit some of the points that TFT has emphasized with respect to the homoousion of the Son

[a] Whatever we say of the Son we can say of the Spirit except “Son”.   To deny this is to deny the deity of the Spirit, and therefore to deny the eternal Tri-unity of God. To deny the eternal Tri-unity of God is to deny the immanent or ontological Trinity. The result is that there remains only an economic Trinity, an economic Trinity ungrounded in an immanent Trinity. The problems that arise here are legion.   Whereas the non-identity of being between Father and Son means that we can no longer be certain that the “face” of God that we know by revelation is one with the heart of God in God’s innermost, intra-triune life, the parallel non-identity of being between Son and Spirit means that the “face” of God that we seen in the Son might not be one with the act of God whereby the Spirit supposedly brings us to Christ and Christ to us. What, then, is the work of the Spirit? Where might the Spirit be taking us? To what end? And how shall we be able to “discern” or test the spirits if the nature or being of the Holy Spirit is that which is most in question?   Plainly the denial of the homoousion of the Spirit is no less catastrophic than the denial of the homoousion of the Son. (Non-congruence between economic and immanent Trinities for any reason, i.e., whether on account of the Son or the Spirit, lands theology in all the problems Paul Molnar has discussed in his Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Trinity and David Lauber in his Descent into Hell.)

[b] TFT earlier pointed out that any detraction from the Son detracts from the Father; i.e., whatever the Father as giver might give, he doesn’t give himself, with the result that giver and gift aren’t identical.  The consequence of this has to be that while God gives, he withholds himself. The apostle’s cry “He didn’t spare his own Son” has the force of “God didn’t spare himself” – and this is now denied.

In the same way detraction from the Spirit detracts from the Son since the gift (the Son) is now willed by the Father yet fails to accomplish the purpose for which the Father gives it even as the Son longs to be given effectually.  (See John 12:27: “Now is my soul troubled.  And what shall I say? ‘Father, save me from this hour’?  No, for this purpose I have come to this hour.”   Here the Father grants the Son’s profounder request [profounder, that is, than “If it be possible….”].)  In short, where the homoousion of the Son is upheld but that of the Spirit is denied, giver and gift are one but they remain ineffectual.  God can be said to be alive, even be said to merciful (he spares not his own Son) but ultimately ineffectual in that his Word “goes forth from [his] mouth” but in fact does “return to me empty”, since it did not “accomplish that which I purpose, and prosper in the thing for which I sent it.” (Isaiah 55:11)         Only as the disobedient sinner is brought to faith by God the Spirit, and rendered a new creature is the purpose of Incarnation and Crucifixion accomplished.

[3] Just as the Father isn’t Father in that he is the Father of believers (therein requiring something creaturely in order to be who he is) but rather is Father in that he is the Father of the Son and is therefore eternally, intrinsically Father, so the homoousion of the Spirit means that God is eternally, intrinsically the ceaseless activity, the “doing”, of the Father loving the Son and the Son reciprocating that love in the bond of the Spirit. In other words, the homoousion of the Spirit is essential if love as “doing”, act (rather than mere attitude) is to remain operative. This truth is freighted concerning Christian discipleship. For instance, Leviticus 19:2 can be defended as the “root” commandment of scripture (in contrast to the “great” commandment): “You shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy.”   One the one hand, God’s holiness is his unique Godness and therefore he alone is holy. On the other hand, God’s people are commanded to be holy, the “root” commandment of scripture gathering up all others.  Since God is love eternally in the sense of ceaseless activity or “doing”, God’s people are holy inasmuch as the “root” commandment is seen to be related to the “great” commandment”: we are to love the Lord our God, together with our neighbour. We love God and neighbour alike, however, not through adopting an attitude or assuming a posture; we love God and neighbour by being “doers of the Word” (James 1:22 ). We are not to “love in word or speech but in deed and in truth.” (1st John 3:18)   What’s real is not merely to be apprehended; what’s real (ultimately God and his claim upon us and our concrete obedience in the sphere of his love and in fellowship with him) is to be done. (John 3:21) Love as ceaseless activity expressing one’s nature characterizes God’s people inasmuch as it first characterizes God himself.

[4] The homoousion of the Spirit is a bulwark against all forms of unitarianism.  Absent the Spirit, a unitarianism of the Father arises wherein the God who is infinitely transcendent is one-sidedly “high and lifted up” so as to be inaccessible – and unknowable, since if God were only infinitely transcendent, humans couldn’t even know this much.  Absent the Spirit, a unitarianism of the Son arises wherein Jesus is rendered our “chum”, lending himself to all our agendas, never challenging us or correcting us. Absent the homoousion of the Spirit, a unitarianism of the Spirit arises wherein God is indistinguishable from a subjectivism that has surrendered all appreciation of truth and has elevated religious “inwardness” uncritically.  The homoousion of the Spirit means that the Spirit is Holy Spirit only in conjunction with the Father and the Son.  A profounder grasp of this point would do much to spare the church charismatic distortions that arise from a unitarianism of the Spirit, even as the charismatic dimension of the church has highlighted the frigid unitarianism of the Father and the naturalistic unitarianism of the Son.

Similarly the homoousion of the Spirit is a bulwark against polytheism, for the Spirit isn’t a second deity or a different sort of deity or a subordinate deity. The Holy Spirit is simply God.

And of course the homoousion of the Spirit is a bulwark against dependency on the church.  Earlier it was noted that the Father needs nothing creaturely in order to be Father. In the same way the Spirit, whose activity is related much more closely to the church than to the creation, needs nothing ecclesial in order to be Spirit. (This point is to be noted with respect to those theologies that suggest the Spirit to be tied to the church or to inhere the church or to be anything other than lord of the church.)

 

[5] In his discussion of the homoousion of Father and Son TFT has highlighted its gospel-significance by asking “What is implied if Father and Son are not of one being?” The same question must be put concerning the homoousion of Son and Spirit: What is implied if this latter truth ceases to remain embedded in the church’s consciousness?

[a] God is utterly unknowable. Arius had said that no creature (e.g., the Son) can mediate knowledge of God.  If the Spirit isn’t God, without qualification, then God isn’t known in the biblical sense of “know”, where knowledge isn’t characteristically the acquisition of information by means of mastery but rather is transformation through engagement with an “other” who is person, and all of this by means of surrender.  If the Spirit isn’t God, our knowledge of God is no more than a matter of “reading off” God from the face of Jesus, not necessarily “advancing” to a God behind a Jesus who is no more than a window to him but nonetheless confusing everyday knowledge as the accumulation of information with that biblical “knowing” which is transmutation.  Human knowledge of God, it must be remembered, is precisely the difference, the transformation, arising in the knower through her self-abandonment to the Person of God.  Where the homoousion of the Spirit is neglected, knowledge of God (so-called) is a one-sided cerebralism or “informationism” where orthodox truths (abstractions by definition) are assimilated even as the heart remains unaltered by the concreteness of that Truth which is reality.

It can reasonably be proffered that an operative denial of the homoousion of the Spirit underlies evangelicalism’s preoccupation with apologetics. Few Christians would object to the heuristic apologetics that helps doubters past those matters that appear to impede people from embracing the gospel (e.g., naturalistic, reductionist arguments against faith, which arguments can readily be exposed as lacking cogency).  Entirely different is the apologetics that establishes, and maintains there needs to be established, the conditions for the possibility of God, then for the possibility of incarnation (for instance), then for the possibility of faith, the actuality of faith, and finally for the assurance of faith.  In its commitment to apologetics has much contemporary evangelicalism tacitly denied the homoousion of the Spirit, assuming that philosophical demonstration can do what the Spirit ought to do but seemingly fails to do?   In the same vein, does the preoccupation with apologetics deny that the integrity (albeit not the structure) of reason is compromised in the Fall? All of this is undercut by the efficacy of that Spirit who is God; specifically God working to bring the human putative knower into the sphere of God’s self-knowing. None of this can be accused of countenancing faith as no more than an exercise in irrationality. Faith reasons as surely as faith trusts. It is, however, to admit that while the structure of reasoning survives the Fall, the integrity of reasoning concerning God and humankind’s relationship to God is compromised by the Fall.   Such compromised integrity can be restored only by means of grace, in faith. In other words, grace/faith restores reason to reason’s integrity.  (Hans Urs von Balthasar’s articulation here is a salutary reminder:

“…the word of God is not of this world and hence can never be discovered in the categories  and accepted patterns of human reason.”(Prayer p. 61)

“I was appointed by God from all eternity to be the recipient of this…eternal

word of love, a word, which, pure grace though it be, is…more rational than

my reason, with the result that this act of obedience in faith is in truth the

most reasonable of acts.” (p. 62)

 

[b] TFT has pointed out that absent the homoousion of the Son it can’t be held that there is oneness between what the gospel presents as the revelation of God and God himself.   Absent the homoousion of the Spirit it can’t be held that there is oneness between what the gospel presents as the revelation of God and that appropriation without which “revelation” as such hasn’t occurred, since revelation is revelation only if there is a human participant.  Absent the homoousion of the Spirit, “revelation” would be no more than rationalistic ideation or non-rationalistic emotion stimulated by human proximity to a depiction of the Son, however orthodox.  In other words, apart from the homoousion of the Spirit the apostolic portrayal of Jesus Christ becomes the stimulus to concepts and affects to which the Holy Spirit is applied as a means of sanctifying what the apostolic depiction of Jesus Christ arouses naturalistically but doesn’t in truth generate as a concomitant of apprehending Christ as the One who bears and bestows that Spirit who magnifies him. In short, it appears that to overlook the homoousion of the Spirit is to find even scripture, and specifically its depiction of Jesus, advancing a religious paganism within the church.

[c] TFT has stated that absent the homoousion of the Son the gospel can’t be God’s self-bestowal or self-communication; i.e., God may be said to bestow and communicate, but now necessarily something less than, other than, himself – and all of this on account of a deficiency in the Son.  Absent the homoousion of the Spirit the gospel can’t be God’s self-bestowal, God’s self-communication. Here there is a frustration in God in that what God wills in himself and accomplishes in the Son, God can’t effect in us.  Such divine “frustration” leaves the church looking elsewhere for effectiveness.

The Protestant Reformation, aware of the deity of the Spirit, didn’t undervalue the experiential dimension of faith; indeed, the Magisterial Reformers, concerned with the correction and re-articulation to be sure, nonetheless gave far greater place to “the Word in the heart” than they are commonly thought to have done. One need only read Luther, where he speaks of “hearing the voice” together with grasping the doctrine; the bridegroom saying ‘you are mine’, and the bride saying ‘you are mine’; etc., or read Calvin and the latter’s use of “feel” (Calvin’s Institutes and Commentaries abound in “feel” and similar terms as Calvin ever remains a theologian of the heart.) The Reformation’s concern for assurance, the assurance of faith (i.e., the assurance of one’s salvation) is attestation enough.  For this reason the Reformers acknowledged the experiential aspect of crucial biblical texts; e.g., Galatians 3:2 – “Let me ask you only this: Did you receive the Spirit [an unambiguous reference to an event in their lives whose vividness was undeniable and therefore could serve as the foundation of the point Paul wanted to make with them] by works of the law or by hearing with faith?”   In other words, was the startling vividness of their Spirit-wrought immersion in Christ the result of their appropriating the gospel in faith or the result of having endeavoured to conform themselves to a lifeless code? What they could never deny or forget was the vividness of the Spirit within them.

In light of the normative place of scripture in the thought of the Magisterial Reformers, there is no stepping around, e.g., the force of Paul’s experience: the Damascus Road arrest, subsequent visions and voices and trances.   And then there are his “revelations”.  On the hand he doesn’t preach them, content to preach only Christ crucified. On the other hand, apart from his revelations, he wouldn’t be an apostle at all and therefore would have nothing to say.         The apostle candidly admits the “abundance of revelations” (2nd Cor. 12:1, 7; cf. Gal. 1:12 ; 2:2). They have all left him as one of those who “love our Lord with love undying.” (Eph. 6:24)

In the history of the church Roman Catholics appear to have visions while Protestants do not.  Does a tacit neglect (to say the least) of a homoousion of the Spirit result in large areas of scripture remaining closed to Protestants?         Abraham is the prototype of faith in older and newer testaments.  We are told “…the word of the Lord came to Abram in a vision” (Gen15:1). To be sure, the vision was given to convey the word. Still, the vision can’t be discounted. Yet Protestants, rightly Word-oriented, do little with other scriptural depictions of God’s approach and self-impartation.         Why? (Recall Jean Brebeuf, Jesuit missionary to the Huron aboriginal people of Georgian Bay . Just as visions had been crucial in the spiritual formation and vocation of Loyola one hundred years earlier, vision would be no less crucial in the spiritual life of missioner and people, for Jean de Brebeuf was privileged to “see”, one night amidst his comfortable life in France, a flaming cross suspended above the Huron encampment in the New World.         Thereafter he never doubted what he was to do or why.  How is his vision/dream different from mere fantasy or wishful thinking?

Jonathan Edwards spoke much of “Religious Affections”: a felt response to an object grounded in an understanding of the nature of that object. Edwards distanced all such affection from emotion or passion. Emotion presupposes no understanding whatever of anything supposed to have aroused it. Passion, said Edwards, is problematic in that its passivity contradicts the act and event that faith and obedience are; in addition, passion entails loss of self-control, whereas the fruits of the Holy Spirit include self-control. Nonetheless, while religious affection (Edwards’ way of speaking of faith) presupposes an understanding of the nature of God, affection ever remains affective, as Edwards never tired of pointing out in his exploration of the phenomenon of Spirit-wrought faith.)

Similarly John Wesley, in his landmark tract “The Almost Christian”, maintained that unbelievers are characterized by lack of faith in God, while believers are characterized by – faith in God?   By love for God, insists Wesley, even as he immediately goes on to speak of their faith. Wesley can never be read hereby as upholding justification by love.         From the moment of his Aldersgate awakening he never ceased to insist on justification by faith, even as he praised the Book of Common Prayer for insisting on it and faulted Quakerism for neglecting it.  Wesley’s point, rather, is that faith in Christ and love for Christ presupposed and imply each other.  Without love for Christ, faith in Christ degenerates into “beliefism” where the assimilation of doctrine is equated with living engagement with the living Lord.  Without faith in Christ, love for Christ denies the necessity of the atonement and hinges justification on the quality of the believer’s love.

The Pauline corpus is where Protestants customarily look first; certainly where the Magisterial Reformers looked first – even as their descendents, post-Reformation Protestant scholastics, overlooked a major dimension of Paul himself.

What can be vouchsafed to the apostle can be vouchsafed to anyone. The question the church must ask is “How are genuine revelations to be distinguished from religious ‘boilovers’?” In truth, the Spirit-formed, Spirit-informed, Spirit-normed affective or experiential aspect to faith is a matter the church neglects only at is peril, for deficits in the church spawn the sects.

As a pastor (for 36 years) I have come to see that people suffer enormous affective deprivation; specifically, Christians suffer from affective deficits related to faith.  It is little wonder that needy, vulnerable people are thereby exposed to the blandishments of psycho-religious nostrums that don’t deliver what they hold out. Always to be kept in mind are two facts: human affective need, both natural and spiritual, and the affective, experiential dimension of genuine gospel faith.

[d]         TFT had intimated that absent the homoousion of the Son, then in Jesus Christ God has not condescended to us, and his love (so-called) has stopped short of becoming one with us.  TFT’s point is incontrovertible.   The Father would have given us something to fix us, even given us the “fix-me-up” out of love, but it would have remained a fix that allowed him to fix us at arm’s length – not unlike a surgeon who remedies a patient, to be sure, yet who always does so by not undergoing himself the surgery he prescribes for the patient.  (Here we need to recall psychiatrist Gerald May’s insight: “Something deep inside us knows we can’t love safely; either we love defencelessly or we don’t love at all.”)

Absent the homoousion of the Spirit none of the foregoing would apply, in that God would have loved us defencelessly; but this time his love would have stopped short of saving us as his self-giving remained finally ineffective.  Self-giving to the point of self-immolation would have remained self-inhibiting, even self-defying as the self-giving failed to result in a people that lives for the praise of God’s glory. (Eph. 1:12)

[e] Once again, TFT insisted that absent the homoousion of the Son, there is no ontological, and therefore no epistemological, connexion between the love of Jesus and the love of God. God could be said to love us in Jesus even as God isn’t actually that love in himself.  This being the case, there might be a dark, unknown God behind the back of Jesus Christ. (Surely this is one problem with Calvin’s doctrine of reprobation: there is an act of the Father that isn’t an act of the Son.) The giver of grace and the gift of grace are not the same. In other words, while God can be said to love us, does his love exhaust his will and way and work concerning us?  Or does God love us as an act of his even as there remains (or might remain) some other attitude/act wherewith God visits us, whose nature or purpose we don’t know, even can’t know?

Absent the homoousion of the Spirit, there is no ontological connexion, and therefore no epistemological connexion, between the Son and that “spirit” which may infuse us and inspire us to lofty human heights, even as that spirit has to be less than holy, since such a spirit has to be less than God, creaturely by definition.  While giver and gift may remain one, the “giving” of grace isn’t one with giver and gift. Then who or what effects the giving? And what are the implications of this for giver and gift?   Plainly “another spirit” has to be operative.  Then what is ultimately the nature and purpose of such a spirit?  Spirits abound, to be sure, yet absent the homoousion of the Spirit we can only regard them as self-defined (rather than, as is the case of the Holy Spirit, the power that Jesus Christ bears and bestows and therefore the power in which Jesus Christ acts); we can only plead our ignorance of what such spirits intend or what they achieve.

It must never be forgotten that spirits abound not only in the world but in the church, perhaps especially in the church, since the idolatry of religion appears to be a greater problem in the church, given the church’s chronic difficulty in distinguishing religion and faith. In addition, in light of the greater problem religion poses for the church, the spiritual discernment needed in the church is now inherently impossible. Martin Buyer’s perceptive remark – “Modernity is open to religion but closed to faith” – appears to go unheeded in the church, if it is even understood. Not only is the lack, now the impossibility, of such discernment in the church tragic, it is puzzling in that the book of Acts depicts discernment as the principal manifestation of the Holy Spirit in the nascent church – which discernment, of course, is possible only if the Spirit is homoousially identical with Father and Son.

[f]         TFT has indicated that absent the homoousion of the Son the acts of Jesus Christ are not the acts of God, and there is no final authority for anything he said or did.   Absent the homoousion of the Son “spirituality” can’t be distinguished from self-indulgence. Faith always presupposes Jesus Christ as author, as he acts in the power of the Spirit; faith also always presupposes Jesus Christ as object, as he effects in the spiritually inert both the capacity and the desire to embrace the One who has first embraced them.   Apart from the homoousion of the Spirit, faith is reduced to a natural, intrapsychic capability that we “choose” to vest here or there.  Such a notion renders the Holy Spirit entirely superfluous.   (The church today, intoxicated with “spirituality” and its inherent naturalism, hasn’t yet seen that the contemporary church’s deity is bi-une and its soteriology pelagian.)   The result of viewing faith as a natural, human capability is to render faith a human virtue, to render faith in Christ a subset of “faith-in-general”, and to say that it is faith as contribution, albeit faith correctly vested, that saves.

Stung by the world’s accusation regarding its putative narrowness, the church attempts to redress its reputation by means of a non-Christic Spirit. It forgets that the effectiveness of a knife depends on the narrowness of its cutting edge, and therefore only a precisely delineated Christology and Pneumatology add up to an effective theology.         That surgery required for the most profound heart transplant (Ezekiel 36) can’t be performed with something as broad and therefore as blunt as a crowbar. In addition, the church today appears in danger of forgetting that only a Christological exclusivity is Pneumatologically comprehensive and therefore salvific. If faith ceases to be quickened only as the risen, victorious Crucified acts on people in the power of the Spirit, and if faith is thereby reduced to a natural talent or virtue, then the predicament of those lacking such a talent is hopeless. To say the same differently: if Jesus Christ, risen from the dead, brings with him a renewed cosmos and therefore a renewed humanity, and if this is ours only as we are rendered participants in it through the power of the Holy Spirit, then only the exclusivity of Incarnation, Cross and Pentecost are salvifically inclusive.

[g] TFT maintains that absent the homoousion of the Son we shall be judged by a God who is arbitrary in that he bears no relation to Jesus Christ and all that the latter stood for.

Absent the homoousion of the Spirit we shall be judged by a God who made provision for us, admittedly, but merely made provision for us; in the course of which made himself proximate to us in our fallen humanness, but merely made himself proximate. By whom, then, are we to be judged? Plainly by someone who left it to creaturely spirits, left it to us to “make the connexion”. We shan’t be judged by a God who is arbitrary in that he bears no relation to Christ, but rather now by a God who in effect teased us, tantalized us with the sufficient provision he made and placed before humans with their “freedom of choice” that, of course, is no freedom at all but simply the randomness of indeterminism as the fallen creature continued to flounder.

—————————————–

The last word today has to be given to Thomas F. Torrance himself: “…unless the Being and Activity of the Spirit are identical with the Being and Activity of the Father and the Son, we are not saved.” (The Christian Doctrine of God, 169)

John Calvin and the Life of Prayer

John Calvin on the Life of Prayer[1]

 

[1]         What do you believe?   What do you really believe?   Please note that I haven’t asked you to tell me what you say you believe. We all like to think that there’s no discrepancy between what we say we believe and what in truth we do believe. But as a matter of fact there exists in all of us a discrepancy – smaller in some people but larger in most – between what we believe and what we say we believe.

For a long time now I’ve been convinced that what we really believe about God, about the gospel, about ourselves is indicated by what we pray for. If others could peer into our heart they would see immediately how we understand God, what we expect from him, what we hope for concerning ourselves and the church and the world.

Many of Calvin’s prayers have been preserved.   They admit us to his heart. What we are privileged to see of Calvin’s heart through perusing his prayers we find reflected repeatedly in Calvin’s head.   In other words, Calvin’s theology of prayer and his practice of prayer are far more consistent than we find in most Christians.

There’s something else we should know about Calvin and prayer: our beloved foreparent in the Reformed expression of the faith has written more on prayer than anyone else in the history of the church.  While no one has written as much, many have written at length.  Few, however, come close to him in sensitivity and profundity.         This shouldn’t surprise us, in view of the inner and outer situation from which Calvin wrote everything; namely, the situation of the refugee. From the time of his conversion in 1534 until his death in 1564 Calvin was haunted by his awareness that he was a refugee.   Like any refugee, he knew that life is precarious; political rulers are treacherous; betrayal at the hands of the church is ready-to-hand. Above all, the refugee is possessed of an inner and outer homelessness that will disappear only in the eschaton as the City of God , long promised God’s people, is made theirs eternally.

 

[2]         “Prayer”, writes Calvin, “is an intimate conversation of the pious with God.”  Intimate, yes, but never presumptuous; intimate, yes, but never sentimental or saccharine. “An intimate conversation of the pious with God”? Yes, but the piety of the pious isn’t religiously “smarmy” or sickly sweet.  While “piety” is a pejorative term today, it’s one of Calvin’s richest words, for everywhere in his theology piety is “that reverence [or fear] joined with love of God which the knowledge of his benefits induces.”[2]   In other words, just because we are the beneficiaries of all that God has wrought on our behalf in the cross of his Son, we are constrained to love God in gratitude, and reverence (fear) God in adoration. Piety, then, has nothing to do with religious sentimentality or “palsy-walsyness.”         At the same time, the force of “intimate” should never be reduced: through prayer believers do meet God himself – “in person”, says Calvin. Thereby they “experience” (another rich word in Calvin’s vocabulary that the Reformed tradition reads past too quickly in its headlong flight into near-rationalism); they “experience” that God’s promises are more than a verbal declaration. Categorically Calvin states that “prayer is the chief exercise of faith”, and by means of this chief exercise believers “receive God’s benefits.”

Calvin knew that we shall ever need God’s benefits or blessings, for we are “destitute and devoid of all good things.”   When Calvin speaks of “all good things” we must be sure to understand that he isn’t speaking moralistically.         He’s always aware that fallen humankind, “totally depraved” for sure, nonetheless remains capable of that moral good essential to the preservation of the social order.  Not speaking moralistically, Calvin everywhere speaks theologically: he denies that fallen humans are capable of the good, Kingdom-good, the righteousness that is nothing less than right relationship with God, which right relationship pleases God and glorifies him.   For these “good things,” says Calvin, we must go “outside ourselves” and receive them from “elsewhere.”

“Elsewhere,” of course, is Jesus Christ.  Christ alone is that “overflowing spring” given us for our eternal good. Since Christ alone is this, the “good things” of which Calvin speaks aren’t things at all. Rather they are all the promises of God vouchsafed to believers, which promises are gathered up in the one, grand promise that comprehends them all and guarantees them all. This one, grand promise, of course, is Jesus, the One who has fulfilled God’s covenant with humankind on our behalf.  Believers can count on “good things” through prayer in so far as they continue to acknowledge that Jesus Christ is the good, the blessing, who comes to his people as the fulfilment of all the Father’s promises.

While Calvin characteristically insists that Christ is the overflowing spring and therefore sheer gift, the fact that Christ is gift never diminishes our need to seek in him what we have learned through the gospel to be stored up in him. Calvin is unyielding here. While Christ remains gift, prayer is anything but lackadaisical passivity or cavalier sleepiness. Believers must resolutely “dig up” by prayer the treasures of God’s promises as surely as someone, informed of treasure buried in a field, will profit from such treasure only if she pursues it.  While “dig up” never has, for Calvin, the force of pry out of or coax from a grudging and reluctant deity what desperate people need and crave, prayer nonetheless remains a human activity that believers must undertake with unrelenting ardour.  To be sure, we don’t badger God or pester him; still, we must importune him relentlessly – otherwise it can only be concluded that we aren’t serious. Reflecting yet again the seriousness of persistent prayer, Calvin speaks of prayer as a “sacrifice of worship,” insisting prayer to be what the God-appointed sacrifices of old were; namely, a human activity that is yet the vehicle of God’s blessing descending upon us.   Unless we importune God unrelentingly, says Calvin, our faith can legitimately be suspected of being “sleepy or sluggish.”

Calvin, as is his custom, reads scripture so very closely as to note that while prayer is God’s appointed means of meeting our needs, our needs are never the ground of prayer.  Prayer is grounded in the command of God.         Ultimately we are to pray not because we are ceaselessly needy, but rather because God’s command and claim are ceaselessly operative.   Moreover, since the God who commands us to pray is never a tyrant or an ogre but is rather “easily entreated and readily accessible,” not to pray is simply to advertise ourselves as disobedient and distrustful.

In addition, not to pray would also be the height of folly in light of our frailty and fragility in the midst of a turbulent world.   Any slackness in prayer could only mean that we had stupidly imperilled ourselves. Such peril, Calvin notes, has to be intuited or sensed rather then taught, since “words fail to explain how necessary prayer is.”         As is the case with mystery of any sort, words may point to a profundity whose depths forever find such words insufficient, but words can never do justice to the profundity they attempt to describe.   The peril of prayerlessness, then, is a peril sensed by the spiritually alert rather than a peril taught by the verbally adept.  A refugee like Calvin characteristically sensed the peril of prayerlessness, and for this reason could write, tersely and plaintively in equal measure, “The only stronghold of safety is in calling upon [God’s] name.”

Whenever we do call upon God’s name we “call upon him to reveal himself as wholly present to us.”  Calvin’s expression here is intriguing as he struggles to persuade us of prayer’s efficacy.  Since God is omnipresent, could he ever be absent?  Since God is indivisible, could he ever be partially present?   What Calvin is struggling to say, however awkwardly, is that we may be assured that as we pray, God will become startlingly vivid to us, and more vivid to us through prayer than through any other means, however vivid. The outcome of our vivid awareness of God’s presence will be nothing less than “an extraordinary repose and peace to our consciences” – in the midst of all the insecurities and treacheries, it must be remembered, that continue to harass God’s people.

 

[3]         We have seen Calvin ground prayer in the command and promise of God. We have seen Calvin highlight the human frailty and fragility that renders slackness concerning prayer folly. We have noted Calvin’s insistence that the heart senses or intuits the folly of indifference concerning prayer before the head reasons about all of this. At the same time, Calvin is never one to neglect the head.  And so now we turn to the six reasons Calvin brings forward concerning the place of prayer in the Christian life.

Reason One: We are to pray in order “that our hearts may be fired with a zealous and burning desire ever to seek, love and serve [God], while we become accustomed in every need to flee to him as to a sacred anchor.” Plainly Calvin regards prayer as a habit to which all believers should aspire.   And plainly there is but one anchor, the sacred anchor, despite the plethora of human needs.

Reason Two: We are to pray in order that our hearts, preoccupied with the Kingdom and its righteousness, might never be distracted or deflected, might never be co-opted for anything less than the King himself. As long as our hearts desire him, says Calvin, our hearts will desire nothing that would render us ashamed before God.

Reason Three: We are to pray in order that our hearts may ever be attuned to thanksgiving, since we know that every blessing comes from God (and since, of course, we are grateful above all for the blessing, our eternal salvation given to us from the One who didn’t spare his own Son.)

Reason Four: We are to pray in order to enhance our spiritual alertness as we are increasingly enabled to recognize answers to prayer. What’s more, as we recognize answers to prayer we shall subsequently come to meditate “more ardently” on the kindness that alone supplies our need. (“More ardently,” of course, underlines Calvin’s insistence that prayer is a vigorous activity requiring resilience, perception and persistence; anything, in other words, but a “Now I lay me down to sleep” thoughtlessness undertaken at day’s end when we are too fatigued to do little more than mumble mindlessly before weariness renders us unconscious.)

Reason Five: We are to pray in order that we may delight still more in all that we know our praying has obtained for us.   (Once again, delighting in God is a feature of Calvin’s theology that has found its way into his Puritan successors but has not found its way, it would appear into his successors in many other areas of the Reformed tradition. Two hundred years after Calvin, John Wesley maintained that of all the privileges that unbelievers forfeit, one of the greatest privileges they renounce is sheer, simple, delight in God. If Calvin had been heard characteristically promoting believers’ delight in God, the word “dour” wouldn’t come to mind as soon as the word “Presbyterian” is heard; and if Calvin had been heard characteristically promoting our delight in God, a more charismatic expression of the faith would have found a home in the Presbyterian tradition, and such charismatic expression would thereby have been preserved from an inherent tendency to unbiblical one-sidedness and shallowness.)

Reason Six: We are to pray in order that we may confirm God’s generosity and care for us “by use and experience.”         Here Calvin means that our heart-discerned and heart-owned experience of God’s answer to prayer, together with the use we make of our experience of God; all this in turn authenticates and endorses the efficacy of prayer and the promises of God, even as it confirms us in the truth and reality of our being “in Christ.”

Calvin sums up the six reasons for prayer by insisting that as we pray, even amidst circumstances dreadful enough to find us groaning (in other words, amidst circumstances that allow for no natural conclusion that God loves us), our praying becomes the occasion wherein we are persuaded afresh – all “evidence” to the contrary – that God loves us more than we can say but not more than we now know.

 

[4] Having articulated the six reasons for prayer, Calvin proceeds to develop his four “rules” of prayer.

Rule One: When we pray we must be reverently single-minded. Calvin, of course, is always realistic (refugees, we must remember, aren’t permitted the luxury of fantasy or escapism of any sort.)   Realistically, then, Calvin is aware that God’s people are attacked by assaults from without and by anxieties from within.  He’s aware that we can never rid ourselves of all anxieties and distractions, only thereby and only then creating “open space” wherein we may contend with God. Our inescapable assaults and anxieties will have to become the “stuff” (or at least part of the “stuff”) of our daily prayers.  Even so, our minds should aspire to a “purity worthy of God” as we endeavour to contemplate him.  Such contemplation is possible only if the mind is “raised above itself.”

The mind can’t raise itself above itself, however, in light of the assaults and anxieties that harass us – unless we behold the “majesty” or grandeur of God. As we apprehend the grandeur of God we are taken out of ourselves, above ourselves. So very realistically and profoundly are we lifted above ourselves that it’s entirely appropriate for us to lift our hands in prayer, says Calvin in a Pentecostal recognition the Reformed tradition appears not to admit, for raised hands help us in turn to raise our mind yet higher to him whose holiness is enthralling and whose grandeur frees us from our captivity to our mundane predicament with its relentless pain, even as all this occurs without neurotic denial of our pain.

What Calvin has just stated we should linger over; we should savour its cumulative dynamic. We who are God’s people cry out to God in our burdened state, pleading with him to fulfill in us the promises he has made to us and guaranteed for us in Christ. As God answers prayer, we are moved to greater eagerness and ardour in seeking him. Our newly intensified zeal and fortified confidence find him in turn dealing with us “more generously.” It all swells into an upward spiral that leaves believers ever more ardent, blessed and grateful.

At no time, however, are we ever to think that we have God on a string, that prayer is a ready-to-hand means of manipulating God, that we have discovered the tool whereby we can render God the means to our end. God doesn’t answer prayer simply on account of our petition; he answers prayer, rather, only in conformity to his name (that is, his nature) and in accord with our need for sanctity. God never confirms his people in those desires that are childish or ungodly.

Calvin, we have seen already, always maintains prayer to be a vigorous human activity; he always deplores any suggestion of passivity, indolence or inertia. For this reason he maintains that our engagement with God presupposes “keenness of mind” followed by “affection of heart.”   Several matters are to be noted here.

[a] Keenness of mind is essential since prayer is an exercise of faith, and faith presupposes an understanding of the gospel, some understanding of the gospel, however elemental.  “Faith” so-called, that is devoid of understanding is no better than superstition or idolatry.   What’s more, keenness of mind is crucial with respect to our awareness of the nature of God’s promises and our discernment of answers to prayer.

[b] Affection of heart is no less needed than keenness of mind, for without affection of heart “faith” so-called will be reduced to ideation, something that Calvin quaintly says “flits about in the top of the brain”, the mere shuffling of intellectual furniture, however doctrinally correct. Our heart must always be “affected” or else the mere assimilation of doctrine (doctrine being abstract by definition) will become a substitute for the concreteness of loving God “in person.”

[c] Affection of heart, we must note, can only follow keenness of mind. If affection of heart were to precede keenness of mind, “faith” so-called would be no more than sentimentality.  God can be loved (love being the affective dimension of faith) only as God’s nature is apprehended, however rudimentarily.

Calvin’s insistence on this exquisitely fine balance of mind and heart anticipates one of the strengths of the Seventeenth Century Puritan movement even as it exposes the one-sided cerebralism of post-Calvin Reformed Scholasticism and the equally one-sided romanticism of Reformed Neo-Protestantism (specifically, the theological liberalism of Schleiermacher, who, we should remember, was Reformed, not Lutheran, and who spawned an ever-burgeoning theological liberalism that reduced the church to nothing more than the world talking to itself albeit with a religious vocabulary.)

Calvin admits that if our mind is to be “raised above itself” with appropriate keenness and the heart is to be genuinely affected, the Holy Spirit must come to our aid. Calvin, as noted earlier, never loses touch with the harshness of human existence, and therefore he is always quick to acknowledge that the godliest people, when afflicted with atrocious suffering, are overcome with “blind anxieties” that so consume them as to leave them unable to voice in prayer what God’s people should be articulating.  Even when they “try to stammer they are confused and hesitate;” their pain beclouds their understanding and stifles their cry. Only the Holy Spirit can help them – even though the Holy Spirit never substitutes for them.

Calvin is adamant on this point.  The Holy Spirit is God; the saints are human; however Spirit-assisted prayer may be, prayer is always our activity. In short, while the assistance of the Holy Spirit can be counted on to foster and facilitate in us what we can’t achieve ourselves, the Spirit is never given so as to “hinder or hold back our effort.”         Once again the picture Calvin gives of the Christian at prayer is anything but a hands-folded hibernation.  Rather it’s the picture of Abraham, of Job, of Jacob contending with God, wrestling in such a way as to exemplify the patriarch’s “I will not let you go unless you bless me.” (Genesis 32:26)

 

Rule Two: When we pray we must be aware of our insufficiency. How aware must we be? Calvin says we must possess “a burning desire to attain” what we most sorely lack.  Calvin’s vocabulary here says much: his use of “burning” in the second rule and “groaning” in the first reminds us of the ardour and anguish found in true prayer. Calvin’s vehemence is telling. Whether prayer be free or liturgical, it must never be casual or indifferent or perfunctory “as if discharging a duty to God.”    Merely “discharging a duty” is light-years removed from prayer’s characteristic intimate conversation with God in person.   Calvin simply abhors the non-reverent, tuned-out practice born of a “cold heart” and an equally non-reverent mindlessness wherein people “do not ponder what they ask.”         In other words, slackers may recite prayers frigidly and thoughtlessly but they fall short of praying.

Such slackers, Calvin is quick to point out, may possess a vague sense of their need, but they lack the gospel-quickened focus to target “the relief of their poverty.” He illustrates his point by referring to ersatz worshippers who ask for pardon for sin while secretly thinking that they aren’t sinners – or while not thinking that they are sinners.         Calvin’s subtlety here is noteworthy: both spiritual ignorance (‘thinking they aren’t sinners’) and spiritual drowsiness (‘not thinking they are sinners’) are alike reprehensible, and reprehensible to the same extent.

Like all able theologians, Calvin is thoroughly acquainted with human psychology. He knows that moods fluctuate in God’s people as much as in others.  Therefore our constancy in prayer is governed not by our mood but rather by our recollection that however strong we may appear to ourselves at times, in truth we are weak; we never get beyond the neediness that forever keeps us beggars before God.   If we are prone to doubt this, we need only recall the dangers that beset us on all sides, not to mention the temptations that never cease to molest us – including the temptation to slacken in prayer.   If we quibble over the necessity of praying constantly we are most surely exposing ourselves to “hypocrisy and wily falsehoods before God” – if we haven’t already succumbed to such hypocrisy and falsehood.

One feature of the burning awareness of our insufficiency is our awareness that new creatures though we are in Christ, the “old” man or woman still clings to us. In light of the truth that we are new creatures in Christ definitively even as the old creature still haunts us, we need always to repent.  And in fact, says Calvin, only the repentant can rightly be said to pray. Self-examination, then, born of Spirit-quickened self-perception, can bring us to that penitence which Calvin maintains to be both the preparation for prayer and the commencement of prayer.

 

Rule Three: When we pray we must ever recall our residual depravity (the “old” creature of sin who continues to dog the “new” creature in Christ); and recalling our residual depravity, we must divest ourselves of our own glory.         We must cast away all notions of our own worth.  We must give glory to God alone.   Putting aside all self-assurance, we must content ourselves with the one assurance of God’s never-failing care for us.

At this point in his major exposition of prayer Calvin returns to a theme found in Rule Two; namely, confession of guilt and the forgiveness from God by which we are reconciled to God.  For only as we are reconciled to God shall we receive anything from God; only as we are pardoned shall we find God propitious.

“Propitious”: few words in Calvin’s theology loom larger than this word. When Calvin speaks of God as propitious he means that God is fatherly, benevolent, merciful. Believers know God to be propitious inasmuch as we have benefited from propitiation. Propitiation, a word sadly out of fashion in the church today despite its frequent occurrence in scripture, is simply the averting of God’s wrath at God’s initiative. Propitiation must be distinguished from expiation, the bearing of sin and the bearing of it away. Expiation presupposes propitiation. Or to say the same thing, propitiation grounds expiation.  God can bear sin away only because his anger has first been dealt with. Calvin never suggests anything else. In his major exposition of prayer Calvin repeats a theme that is found everywhere in his theology; namely, Christ’s death has “appeased” the Father.  Calvin’s theology is steeped in the nature and force of propitiation, and his Commentary on Hebrews is a sustained amplification of it.

In this regard Calvin maintains that as often as we, Christ’s people, pray, we should recall before God not only the atomistic sins we’ve committed but even the sinnership that continues to infect us systemically. Quoting Psalm 51:5 – “Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me” – Calvin insists that only God’s mercy, received and enjoyed, allows us to approach God confidently and plead with him as Father instead of cowering before him as just judge.  The forgiveness of sins underlies our commerce with heaven at all times. Only our conviction of God’s mercy – his propitious fatherliness born of propitiation – assures us that our prayers are going to be heard.

 

Rule Four: Knowing that God is propitious, merciful, fatherly, we must always pray with confident hope.  Once again, our confidence here has nothing to do with an unrealistic and therefore ridiculous denial of the upheavals that harass us. While Calvin insists that prayer isn’t prayer unless it is undertaken in confident hope, he never pretends that Christ’s people are to work themselves up into pretending that suffering hasn’t engulfed them.  Calvin is too wise ever to hint, however slightly, that confident expectation in prayer means that people are left expecting themselves to be superhuman – a psychological burden, we know today, that keeps therapists and pharmacists forever employed.  Calvin admits that believers can be “troubled by the greatest unrest;” so very troubled, in fact, as to be “almost out of their senses.” Even here, however, our apprehension of God’s goodness fosters hope for our deliverance. In fact godly prayer arises from the twofold awareness of both our predicament and God’s promised provision. Not only does prayer arise from this twofold awareness, all genuine prayer contains this twofold awareness: honestly we lay before God our predicament in its perplexity and horror, while expectantly we look to God to “extend his helping hand.”

Scoffers, of course, are always nearby.  Scoffers relish pointing out that prayer must be pointless since the results appear meagre when compared to the ardour and expectation of those who pray. Wisely Calvin avoids being drawn into playing any game on the territory that scoffers have staked out. Instead he insists there to be no point in disputing with the “empty imagination” of detractors. There is simply no common ground between believer and scoffing sceptic that can serve as the starting point of an apologetic argument for prayer.  To be sure, all believers have undergone apparent frustration in prayer. While unbelievers shout “Reason enough to abandon the entire economy of faith,” such apparent frustration merely finds believers praying still, and praying with undiminished expectation.

Always a theologian of the heart (a feature of Calvin’s thought too readily overlooked not only by foes but even by friends who one-sidedly depict him as a theologian of the head), Calvin maintains that believers “perceive the power of faith” just because they “feel it by experience in their heart.”   More to the point, believers feel the power of faith by experience in their heart more deeply than they feel the seeming contradictions of faith. Because their experience of God’s promise and fatherly care is deeper than their experience of outer torment at the hands of the world and inner torment at the hands of sin, an apologetic argument for prayer would only be superfluous for believers and unpersuasive for unbelievers.   While prayer is rightly such only if it is “grounded in unbroken assurance of hope”, Calvin points out that assurance of hope is precisely the orbit and atmosphere in which Christ’s people live and struggle, look to God and rejoice in him.  Absence of hope, Calvin concludes, would only point to absence of faith; which is to say, absence of hope would only mean that prayers, so-called, are “vainly cast upon air.”

 

[5] Is there any Christian, anywhere, who claims to exemplify everything that Calvin prescribes for Christ’s people?         Can even the godliest claim that their praying displays a confident expectation without trace of secretly harboured dubiety?   While Calvin, following scripture, insists that the line distinguishing believer and unbeliever is absolute (albeit known only to God), Calvin also insists that the prayers of even the godliest are in truth “a mixture of faith and error.”   Our apprehension of God and his way with us, while certainly real and adequate, is never exhaustive. Our apprehension of God, in other words, while trusting and true, never approaches comprehension (as if we had mastered God and his way with us.) Our repentance, while certainly sincere (i.e., as sincere as we can make it), remains riddled with self-interest; and in any case, our repentance is never commensurate with our depravity. While Spirit-sensitized believers “feel the depths of evil” within them, in truth the sin that still lurks in us more hideous than we can imagine. In short, even the godliest person’s faith remains shot through with unbelief.         Therefore it is a singular instance of God’s mercy that he promises to hear us even when finds in us “neither perfect faith nor repentance.”

Plainly even the most ardent believers can present themselves to God only as they cling to Jesus Christ as advocate and mediator.  Only the propitiating mediator can “change the throne of dreadful glory into the throne of grace.”   More specifically, says Calvin, “the power of [Christ’s] death avails as an everlasting intercession in our behalf.…[Christ] alone bears to God the petitions of the people.”

In the mediator all the intercessions of Christ’s people are gathered up and rendered effectual. He who is the promise of God and in whom all God’s promises are fulfilled is the sole, sufficient guarantor that these promises are now operative among God’s people.   Not surprisingly, then, Calvin climaxes his exposition on prayer with the insistence that the saints must ever embrace Jesus Christ “with both arms.”

 

A Prayer of Calvin’s on the Matter of Prayer[3]

Grant, Almighty God, that as you not only invite us continually by the voice of your gospel to seek you, but also offer to us your Son as our Mediator, through whom an access to you is open, that we may find you a propitious Father, – O grant that relying on your kind invitation we may through life exercise ourselves in prayer; and as so many evils disturb us on all sides and so many wants distress and oppress us, may we be led more earnestly to call on you, and in the meanwhile be never wearied in this exercise of prayer; until having been heard by you throughout life, we may at length be gathered to your eternal kingdom where we shall enjoy that salvation which you have promised us, and of which you also daily testify to us by your gospel, and be forever united to your only-begotten Son of whom we are now members; that we may be partakers of all the blessings which he has obtained for us by his death.  Amen.

 

 

Rev. Dr. Victor Shepherd                                                                                                                                                                                                                     July 2006

 

[1] Unless indicated otherwise, all quotations are from Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960) 3.20.16.

[2] Ibid, 1.2.1.

[3] Devotions and Prayers of John Calvin, Charles E. Edwards, ed., [ Grand Rapids : Baker Book House, 1976] p. 39

Evangelical Fellowship of Canada’s Statement of Faith.

What are the essential beliefs that Evangelicals hold in common?  Faith Today asked Victor Shepherd to look at the seven doctrines of the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada’s Statement of Faith.

The Evangelical Fellowship of Canada believes:

The Holy Scriptures as originally given by God are divinely inspired, infallible, entirely trustworthy, and constitute the only supreme authority in all matters of faith and conduct.

There is one God, eternally existent in three persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

Our Lord Jesus Christ is God manifest in the flesh; we affirm his virgin birth, sinless humanity, divine miracles, vicarious and atoning death, bodily resurrection, ascension, ongoing mediatorial work, and personal return in power and glory.

The salvation of lost and sinful humanity is possible only through the merits of the shed blood of the Lord Jesus Christ, received by faith apart from works, and is characterized by regeneration by the Holy Spirit.

The Holy Spirit enables believers to live a holy life, to witness and work for the Lord Jesus Christ.

The Church, the body of Christ, consists of all true believers.

Ultimately God will judge the living and the dead, those who are saved unto the resurrection of life, those who are lost unto the resurrection of damnation

 

Hospitality and Friendship: Wesleyan Perspectives in an Ecumenical Setting

Hospitality and Friendship: Wesleyan Perspectives in an Ecumenical Setting

Dr Victor Shepherd
Meetings of Wesleyan Theological Society
Kansas City , Missouri
4th March 2006

 

We can exercise hospitality, and the sort of friendship that pertains to hospitality, only to the extent that we have been freed from self-preoccupation, only to the extent that we have been freed from living in ourselves, from ourselves, for ourselves.  The ecumenical figure who has probed this truth most profoundly is Martin Luther. Luther stated that Christians have been released from the anxieties of living in themselves, the anxieties of trying to justify themselves before God and establish themselves before their neighbours, insofar as they live in “another”; specifically, live in two others: Jesus Christ and the neighbour. Christians, said Luther, live in Christ by faith and in the neighbour by love.

While there is only one level or dimension to living in Christ by faith, there are three levels to living in the neighbour by love. At level one, we share in the neighbour’s need.  Specifically, we address the neighbour’s need by meeting her scarcity with our abundance. Luther points out that this is very important, likely isn’t done as often as it should be, but at the same time isn’t difficult and requires little of us. After all, our abundance means we can address the neighbour’s scarcity and still remain privileged. Even so, we shall likely be commended for our generosity.

At level two (i.e, the matter has been “notched up”) we share the neighbour’s suffering.  Doing this is considerably more difficult, since proximity to someone else’s suffering entails our own suffering.  In other words, the difference between level one and level two is evident: sharing the neighbour’s suffering entails a suffering on our part that sharing her need does not.  At the same time, society recognizes the kind of self-renunciation required of intentional proximity to suffering, recognizes the freely-adopted suffering of the helper herself, and rewards it. Society congratulates those who share in the neighbour’s suffering.

At level three (now “notched up” yet again) we live in the neighbour by sharing the neighbour’s disgrace.  The difference between levels one and two is quantitative; that between two and three, qualitative it would seem, for at this level the self-renunciation couldn’t be greater, while at the same time societal recognition has disappeared. To share the neighbour’s disgrace is to be identified with her disgrace, and therefore, in the eyes of the society, to be in disgrace oneself.  No one is congratulated now.  Instead the helper is “numbered among the transgressors” herself. In the eyes of the public she is in disgrace. There will be no social recognition for her sacrifice, no congratulation, no public adulation. There will be, however, contempt and ostracism.  Nonetheless, said Luther, we exercise the most helpful hospitality and self-forgetful friendship; we live in the neighbour by love most profoundly when we move from sharing her need to sharing her suffering to sharing her disgrace.

While Wesley doesn’t develop the same theme in the same way, he would disagree with nothing that Luther has said.         However Wesley would, and did, ask why Christians are so very reluctant to do all this.  He hints at his own answer in his 1768 Sermon, The Good Steward. He asks why we spend so much time, energy and anguish acquiring what is going to crumble or rot but in any case disappear, only to answer in effect, “Because we think we have to establish our ‘self’, preserve our ‘self’, forge our own identity.”   He recognizes that this is no more than unbelief, however religiously cloaked or legitimized.  In the final part of the sermon he makes three points that aim at having us rethink the notion of having to forge a self, live out it, and struggle to maintain it. Wesley’s three points are: [1] Today is all we have; i.e., life is short, death is sure, and we should be about something else.   [2] All of life is spiritually significant; in other words, what we do by way of sharing everything about us with the suffering neighbour and absorbing everything about the suffering neighbour into ourselves – this is what matters ultimately.  [3] We are servants who owe God everything and therefore can claim nothing. Plainly, if we can claim nothing in the first place, we lose nothing finally.

The question must still be asked: since Wesley’s people were aware in 1768 of the points just made (aware, that is, after the Awakening had been at full flood for 30 years), why were they still reluctant to extend the self-forgetful hospitality that he not only commended but required for himself in the course of his itinerating?   Why do Christians in any era “ice up” when faced with human need that hospitality and friendship could relieve?   Wesley appears to answer this question, albeit implicitly, in his 1781 Sermon The Danger of Riches.   There he states that while the love of money is insanity, more than a few are insane concerning an appetite that, unlike lust and gluttony, isn’t a God-given appetite run amok but is rather a preoccupation unnatural and so very bizarre as to defy all understanding. While the appetite for riches may defy understanding, he stresses, what this appetite does is readily understood: the aspiration to affluence begets and exacerbates other unholy and unhelpful desires.   “Tasting”, for instance, is a “genteel, regular sensuality” that undoes one’s head and heart.   While such “tasting” is indiscernible to the world, it is deadly in the Christian. Soon the Christian apes genteel society and everything about it, including its respectability (forget sharing the neighbour’s disgrace) and its spiritual inertia. Desire for riches, continues Wesley, issues in a desire for ease, and the latter crowns itself in avoidance of crossbearing.  Amplifying the lattermost point Wesley contends that as we become more affluent we acquire greater self-importance; in turn we are more easily affronted (i.e., there’s a super-sensitivity related to snobbishness); and as we are more easily affronted, we are more prone to revenge. Affluence, in other words, kills self-forgetful hospitality.

The cure for all this – which is to say, the recovery of hospitality and friendship – is to possess Wesley’s awareness of the scope of human suffering, his zeal to address it, and his Spirit-wrought deliverance from the love of money, ease, and self-important social ascendancy.

There’s one thing more.  As a pastor for thirty-six years, I have noted that Christians are often slow to exercise hospitality simply because they are afraid. Afraid of what? Afraid simply of meeting and engaging strangers; afraid of becoming known; afraid of having privacies rendered public – simply afraid.  In other words, perfect fear casts out love.  Wesley’s beloved 1st Epistle of John, of course, reminds us that perfect love casts out fear.   Then hospitality and friendship are going to be recovered only as love is perfected in Christ’s people; which is to say, as our awareness of the neighbour’s suffering is more vivid than our anxiety over risking self-exposure to a stranger.

 

What’s an Evangelical?

What’s An Evangelical?

The Cruciality of the Cross

 

What’s an evangelical? Better, who is an evangelical? Simply put, evangelicals are those who glory in the cross of Christ.  Our faith arises from it; our thinking converges on it; our life radiates from it.

Evangelicals are aware that the cross has made atonement for all humankind as God made “at one” with Himself disobedient, defiled sinners who were otherwise hopelessly separated from Him by a gaping chasm they were never going to be able to bridge.

Evangelicals know that while God is love [1st John 4:8 ] and can therefore do nothing but love, when God’s love encounters human sin his love “burns hot”, as Luther liked to say.  God’s anger or wrath, then, is never the contradiction or denial of his love. (Indifference is always the antithesis of love. After all, the people with whom we are angry we at least take seriously; the people to whom we are indifferent we’ve already dismissed as insignificant.) God’s anger “heats up” only because He loves us so very much and so very relentlessly that He can’t remain indifferent to us and won’t abandon us. Profoundly He loves sinners more (or at least more truly, more realistically) than we love ourselves, since our self-love, perverted by sin, issues only in self-destruction. And as the cross on which He “did not spare his own Son but gave Him up for us all” [Romans 8:32 ] makes plain, He longs to spare us torment more than He longs to spare Himself.

We must make no mistake. Because God is holy, sin breaks His heart. More than merely break His heart, however, sin also mobilizes His anger and provokes His revulsion. Then what is God to do with women and men whose ingratitude and insolence have grieved Him, angered Him and disgusted Him?  One option is to resign them to what they deserve – except that it’s no option at all, since love is all God is and therefore all He can do. For this reason He sets about recovering and restoring those who were created in His image.  Meant to mirror his glory, they now glorify themselves, therein rendering His image unrecognizable.

If the predicament of sinners is to be relieved, then those living in the “far country”, so very far from the Father as to be pronounced “dead, lost” [Luke 15: 24 ] have to be reconciled to Him.  Since they are currently in the far country, why don’t they just get up and “go home”? There’s more to it than this. In point of fact they are where they are not on account of their sin (a misunderstanding heard too often) but on account of God’s judgement. Our foreparents, we should recall, didn’t cavalierly sashay out of the Garden of Eden or confusedly stumble out or defiantly parade themselves out. They were driven out. Who drove them out?   God did. He expelled them by a judicious act. Sin, contrary to much popular thought, does not estrange us from God. Sin mobilizes God’s judgement, and God’s judgement ensures our alienation from Him. Therefore the invitation to be reconciled to Him can’t be issued until His judgement has been dealt with. The cross is that love-fashioned deed of mercy wherein the just Judge absorbs His righteous judgement upon sinners, thereby allowing them to “come home” without in any way “fudging” His holiness or compromising His integrity or submerging His truth.  Only because “in Christ God was reconciling the world to Himself” can the apostle urge, “We beseech you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God.” [2nd Corinthians 5:19, 20]

God’s tireless pursuit of people who persist in fleeing Him culminates in the cross, wherein He finally overtakes them and wraps them in the arms of the crucified.  But of course the cross doesn’t appear out of nowhere and insert itself in the year 27 C.E. It was anticipated through the God-appointed sacrificial system of the Older Testament. For centuries God had been schooling a people, Israel , in the necessity, meaning and ethos of sacrifice, always preparing for the Advent of Israel’s greater Son.

Reflecting the outlook of the Older Testament, the Newer reflects the priority of the cross on every page.         One-half of the written gospels is given over to one week of Jesus’ life, the last week wherein His cruciform earthly ministry (John Calvin maintained that the shadow of the cross fell on Jesus’ life and ministry from the day He was born) crescendos to the climax of the cross. The first half of the epistles announces the gospel of the cross; the second half unfolds the nature and pattern and rigour of Christian discipleship in the light of the cross. All evangelical understanding, then, emanates from the cross, as do all evangelical faith and obedience.

Evangelicals, then, are those who cherish the “word of the cross”, grounded in the atonement, as the “word of truth, the gospel of your salvation”. [1st Corinthians 1:18 ; Ephesians 1:13]

 

The Place of Proclamation and the Necessity of Decision

Evangelicals characteristically find themselves constrained to proclaim this message just because the message itself is inherently missiological.  In other words, the proclamation isn’t an “add-on” or an after-thought. Proclamation remains an aspect of the message itself: “gospel” defines itself as “gospel announced”.  So far from resembling proselytizing or even propaganda, the proclamation of the gospel belongs to the logic of the gospel.  Evangelicals, then, are aware that mission is to God’s people as burning is to fire. Burning characterizes fire; apart from burning, fire has no existence.  Mission establishes the church and characterizes it, for God’s people are created by the revelation of the cross.  We cling to it. We exist for the purpose of announcing a crucified and risen Lord who “fills all things” [Ephesians 4:10; 1:23] Indeed, since Christ “fills” every nook, crevice and corner of the universe; since Christ therefore laps everyone’s life at all times, evangelicals understandably continue to point to and point others to the One whose coming to them spells only blessing.

Such proclamation, needless to say, isn’t announced in a “Who cares?” attitude, as if the hearer’s response were of no significance, or at least of no eternal significance. What’s at stake in any announcement of the gospel is always more than a “response” that is little more than whim or preference or even prejudice. What’s at stake is nothing less than the hearer’s salvation.  For this reason the declaration of the gospel always elicits a particular decision from the hearer, that “U-turn” which scripture labels repentance. With appropriate sobriety and suitable solemnity – yet also with unrestrained joy – the decision the gospel elicits is an “about-face” from darkness to light, from indifference or hostility to love, from death to life. The lattermost point must be given its full weight: the decision to which the gospel summons the hearer has everything on earth and in heaven hanging on it.

This decision, we should note, need not be made in an instant; in fact more often than not it isn’t made in an instant.   The fact that the process of deciding is protracted in most cases doesn’t detract in the slightest from its veracity.   Nevertheless, at some point the decision needs to have been made as the rebel surrenders, the icy heart is thawed, and the spiritually inert is resurrected and Love is loved.

 

Covenant Faithfulness and Lifelong Repentance

The God who has promised ever to be our God, God for us, never rescinds His covenant with us.  In turn He longs for us ever to be His people as we own our covenant with Him. Finding us to be covenant-breakers with Him, however, He gives us His Son and directs us to the Nazarene as the one instance of human covenant faithfulness to the Father. For this reason the decision of faith and obedience that we make, we must make not once only; rather the decision has to be renewed every day.  Every morning we must recommit ourselves to our Lord, to His truth, to His way, and – no less, even perhaps hardest of all – to His people. In Luther’s famous tract, The Ninety-Five Theses that he nailed to door of the Wittenberg church in 1517, the first thesis sets the tone for all that follows and suffuses it. Luther’s first thesis will ever remain the “bass note” for all of us: “The Christian life consists of daily, lifelong repentance.” In other words, every morning we have to re-orient ourselves to our Lord, determined to identify ourselves with Him and follow Him today amidst all dangers, deceptions and distractions.

Yet the decision we make, while it’s unquestionably the inception of the Christian life, isn’t the termination of that life. Much arduous discipleship lies between commencement and completion.  More than a few trials will have to be resisted.  Barnabas and Paul, eager not to misrepresent the rigours of discipleship, are found “strengthening the souls of the disciples, exhorting them to continue in the faith …saying that through many tribulations we must enter the kingdom of God .” [Acts 14:22 ] If evangelicals uphold justification by faith as the beginning of the Christian life and its stable basis, no less ardently do they insist that sanctification, holiness of heart and life, must be pursued at all times and in all circumstances.

Holiness

Holiness is simply the believer’s conformity to the will and way of the Master.  Holiness is God’s purpose for His people.  While the word-group in scripture referring to election or predestination occurs approximately fifteen times, the word-group pertaining to holiness occurs 833 times.  Plainly the category of holiness dominates scripture and should therefore be the Christian’s preoccupation.

Cherishing the Great Commandment (“You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, soul, mind and strength….” [ Mark 12:30 ]) as well as the Great Commission (“Go therefore and make disciples of all nations….” [Matthew 28:19]), evangelicals remain convinced of the “Root” Commandment: “You shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy.” [Leviticus 19:2] This “root” commandment reverberates like a bell throughout the length and breadth of the bible. Like all commandments, however, the predominant commandment is at the same time the predominant promise: not only must God’s people be holy; God will see to it that His people are holy. God will guarantee for people consecrated to Him everything that He requires of them.  Then God’s people may and must obey Him in matters great and small as they are conformed to that “… holiness without which no one will see the Lord.”   [Hebrews 14:12]

Such holiness, John Wesley liked to say, pertains to “heart and life”. Holiness of heart (i.e., a supposedly grace-wrought disposition) not giving rise to holiness of life is no more than a religious self-indulgence, a pietistic trip “inward” that sceptics rightly see to be rationalized selfism. Holiness of life not grounded in holiness of heart, on the other hand, is no more than self-righteous legalism, and exhausting as well.  Holiness of heart and life together attest a simple yet glorious truth that evangelicals will never surrender: God can do something with sin beyond forgiving it.  What can He do?   Not only can He relieve us of sin’s guilt; He can also release us from sin’s grip. Deliverance from both the guilt and the power of sin remains a vivid conviction in the evangelical consciousness.

 

Constant Conversion

The decision for faith, then, with concomitant inner and outer holiness, might appear to be an end in itself.  In truth it is and it isn’t.  It’s an end in itself in that faith binds us to Jesus Christ, and our union with Him is an end in itself.  Any utilitarian consideration or motive here merely attempts to use Him, rendering Him a means to end, a tool we can exploit for some “goody” apart from Him.  He is our greatest good, our eternal good.  He gives us His unique gifts only in the course of giving us Himself.  Therefore He can never be a means to anyone’s end.  At the same time, the decision for faith invariably binds us not only to Jesus Christ but also to that body of which He is head; namely, the church. Since believers are bound to Jesus Christ, head and body, we must daily renew our commitment to Christ’s people even as we admit with our Puritan ancestors that the church is a “fair face with an ugly scar”. And since in Christ God has “so loved the world” [John 3:16 ] as never to abandon it, the conversion of which evangelicals speak must be a daily-renewed conversion to Christ, His people and the world.

 

Kingdom of God

To say we must love the world as Christ loves us it is to say that we shan’t adulate it uncritically or fawn over it or seek to profit from it; rather we shall long for the full manifestation of its redemption.   To this end Christians understand that they have been commissioned to render visible that kingdom which Jesus Christ brought with Him in His resurrection from the dead.  When we pray “Thy kingdom come…” we are praying for the coming manifestation of a kingdom that has to be in our midst just because the King is in our midst.  A king – anywhere – without a kingdom is no king at all.  Jesus Christ, risen from the dead and present with His people, meets us again and again, not infrequently startling us as He acquaints us with Himself afresh. Since He has promised to abide with us until history is concluded, His kingdom has to have arrived. While it is discerned through the eyes of faith to be sure, it remains invisible to all others. Then one of the church’s tasks is to render indisputable and undeniable that kingdom which is simply the entire creation of God healed.  Not surprisingly, then, evangelicals have been at the forefront of the abolition of the slave trade, the amelioration of working conditions in factories and mines, the expansion of literacy, the providing of medical assistance, ministries to the incarcerated, the elevation of women, and the relief of human distress of every kind.   Believers’ holiness of heart and life lends visibility to a world from which Christ’s victorious cross has already seen “Satan fall like lightning from heaven”, heaven being the invisible dimension of the creation. [Luke 10:18]

 

Evangelicalism’s Vulnerability

Honesty compels us to admit that evangelicalism is susceptible to distortion and prone to unravel. Rightly emphasizing Christian experience as the gospel “opens the heart” (as happened with Lydia , Acts 16:13 ], the evangelical consciousness is always in danger of confusing experience of the Spirit with experience-in-general, especially where experience-in-general is riddled with romanticism or nostalgia or religious sentimentality. In other words, despite evangelicalism’s insistence on orthodoxy (correct thinking about God and the proper glorifying of Him), evangelicalism remains susceptible to heterodoxy (i.e., false belief and erroneous glorifying of an other-than-Christ).  Evangelical zeal must always be balanced by the tested wisdom of Christians who lived and learned, suffered and witnessed before us.   This great weight of Christian wisdom, found in the church’s tradition, is commonly known as “catholicity”.

 

 

Evangelicalism and Catholicity

Two things are to be noted here. One, the word “catholicity” is spelled with a lower case “c”.         Upper case “C” normally refers to Roman Catholic. Roman Catholicism is one denomination within the Christian family.   The catholicity of the church, however, is the accumulated wisdom of Christian memory that is found in all denominations.

Catholicity preserves both identity and universality.[1]   Identity is that which distinguishes the church from the world; universality, that which impels the church to give itself for the world. Needless to say, only that church which is self-consciously different from the world can ever exist for the world.

The missionary enterprise of the early church attests its catholicity. (We should note here that the missionary thrust of the church isn’t the church’s invention, the church somehow arriving at an insight that the church’s Lord somehow lacked. While Jesus told the Canaanite woman, “I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel ” [Matthew 15:24 ], unquestionably the seeds of the Gentile mission are found in Jesus’ ministry, particularly in His appearances to His followers during the “forty days” between His resurrection and His ascension.)   At first Peter opposed this expression of catholicity, Peter maintaining that all Gentile Christians first had to become Jews.         Plainly Peter thought that the church’s universality threatened its identity – and he had to be helped to a new perspective.

From a different angle of vision, it’s evident that the unique message of the church guarantees its identity; the assorted converts to the church guarantee its universality.   Both identity and universality have to be held in exquisitely fine balance if the catholicity of the church is to be preserved.  Evangelicals who are properly catholic balance evangelism with training in discipleship and Christian nurture.   We balance outreach with worship.  We balance contemplation of our reigning Lord and commitment to the world’s grief.

Evangelicals who are aware of their catholic heritage balance justification (a new standing before God) and sanctification (a new nature from God); the decision for faith and growth in faith; the call to repentance and the call to sainthood; the Reformation (doctrinal restatement) and revival (the Spirit’s flooding over large numbers of people who have not yet welcomed the gospel offer). Evangelicals who know the true meaning of “catholic” embrace both specially endowed leaders and ordered ministry; both spontaneous exclamations of praise and sacramental practice.

In all of this, theologians (including those who amplify the doctrinal statements of such bodies as the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada!) preserve catholicity by defining the faith so as to combat heresy arising from within the church, and also by defending the faith so as to combat misinterpretation arising from outside the church.  By defining the faith, theological statements preserve identity; by defending the faith, theological statements preserve universality.  The first sentence of the Apostles’ Creed exemplifies both.  “I believe in God the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth” plainly speaks of universality; “and in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord…crucified under Pontius Pilate” speaks of identity.   Doctrine, adequately articulated, always fulfils both purposes.

 

 

[1]I am glad to acknowledge my debt to Jaroslav Pelikan, The Riddle of Roman Catholicism, and Donald Bloesch, The Future of Evangelicalism.

Jacques Ellul – The Judgment of Jonah

Jacques Ellul – The Judgment of Jonah

 

Repeatedly Ellul’s brief book reflects his characteristic love/grief relationship with the church, the church’s lack of discernment, and an ecclesiastical agenda that finds the church somnolent, feckless and desultory. As sad as he is scathing, Ellul notes, “A remarkable thing about even the active Christian is that he (sic) never has much more than a vague idea about reality.   He is lost in the slumber of his activities, his good works, his chorales, his theology, his evangelizing, his communities.   He always skirts reality….It is non-Christians who have to waken him out of his sleep to share actively in the common lot.” (p.31)

More foundationally Judgment exudes Ellul’s characteristic conviction concerning the effectual pre-eminence of Jesus Christ. While the book of Jonah is deemed “prophetic” among Jewish and Christian thinkers, Ellul understands prophecy strictly as an Israelite pronouncement fulfilled in Jesus Christ, this pronouncement henceforth subserving Christ’s unimpeded militancy throughout the cosmos.

As readers of Ellul know from his other books (e.g., Apocalypse and The Political Illusion, extended comments on the books of Revelation and 2nd Kings respectively), Ellul has little confidence in the expositions of the “historical-critical” guild of exegetes insofar as their preoccupation with speculative minutiae blinds them to the substance of the text; namely, the service the text renders the luminosity of Him who is the light of the world.  Unlike the exegetical guild, Ellul sees the risen, sovereign (but not controlling) One proleptically present in the Older Testament, manifested to the apostles, and surging effectually everywhere now.  More to the point, Ellul regards the guild’s preoccupation with the history of the formation and transmission of the text as a nefarious work wherein the guild “dissects Scripture to set it against Scripture”.(p.74) Exegetes typically perpetrate this abomination, therein deploying their “expert” misuse of Scripture exactly as the tempter deployed his in his assault on Jesus in the wilderness.  In other words, Ellul regards the work of most commentators, in their Christ-ignoring and world-denying “scientific” approach, as nothing less than Satanic. In light of this it’s no surprise that only three-quarters’ way through Judgment Ellul left-handedly admits that the book of Jonah was “rightly composed to affirm the universalism of salvation” (p.77), when exegetes customarily insist that the sole purpose of the book of Jonah was to protest the shrivelling of post-exilic Israel’s concern, even to protest the apparent narrowness, exclusiveness and concern for self-preservation found in the books of Ezra and Nehemiah.

If what is crucial to most is peripheral to Ellul, then what is the epicentre of the book of Jonah?  It is certainly not a compendium of moral truths, let alone a test of credulity (which test Christian apologetics paradoxically attempts to eliminate). Neither is the book an extended allegory; nor even an instance of the prophetic literature found in Scripture, since the book shares few of the concerns of the prophetic books (e.g., no prophetic address is spoken to Israel) while features of the book aren’t found in prophetic literature (e.g., the books named after Jeremiah and Amos don’t feature biographical portrayals). The core of the book lies, rather, in its depiction of Jonah himself as a figure, a type, of Christ. Having argued for this position, Ellul brooks no disagreement: “If one rejects this sense, there is no other.” (p.17)

As Judgment unfolds it reflects the major themes of Ellul’s social and theological thought as well as aspects of his own spiritual development. With respect to the latter, Ellul’s understanding of Jonah’s vocation – “Everything begins the moment God decides to choose….We can begin to apprehend only when a relation is set up between God and us, when he reveals his decision concerning us” (p21) – pellucidly mirrors Ellul’s self-effacing, autobiographical statements in In Season, Out of Season and What I Believe.

As for characteristic aspects of Ellul’s thinking, Judgment re-states and develops them on every page.         For instance, those whom God summons are freed from the world’s clutches and conformities in order to be free to address and spend themselves for a world that no longer “hooks” them even as the same world deems them “useless” to it.  In this regard Ellul writes of Jonah, “The matter is so important that everything which previously shaped the life of this man humanly and sociologically fades from the scene….Anything that might impel him to obey according to the world has lost its value and weight for him.” (P.21) In other words, any Christian’s commission at the hand of the crucified is necessary and sufficient explanation for taking up one’s work and witness.

While vocation is sufficient explanation for taking up their appointed work, Christians cannot pretend their summons may be ignored or laid aside, for in their particular vocations all Christians have been appointed to “watch” in the sense of Ezekiel 33. Disregarding one’s vocation is dereliction, and all the more damnable in that the destiny of the world hangs on any one Christian’s honouring her summons: “Christians have to realize that they hold in their hands the fate of their companions in adventure”.(p.35)

Readers of Ellul have long been startled at, persuaded of, and helped by his exploration of the “abyss”, the virulent, insatiable power of evil to beguile, seduce, and always and everywhere destroy. (See Money and Power and Propaganda. It should be noted here that Ellul’s depiction of evil in terms of death-as-power – rather than in terms of “a kind of lottery…turning up as heart failure (p.51) — finds kindred understanding and exposition in the work of William Stringfellow and Daniel Berrigan.)  The “great fish” sent to swallow Jonah (God uses evil insofar as he is determined to punish) is a manifestation of such power. While in the “belly of the great fish” Jonah is subject to God’s judgment upon his abdication as he is confronted defencelessly with the undisguised horror of the abyss. Awakened now to his culpable folly, Jonah understands that even as he is exposed to “absolute hell”(p.45) he hasn’t been abandoned to it.  At no point has he ceased being the beneficiary of God’s grace.  Now Jonah exclaims, “Thou hast delivered me” – i.e., before the “great fish” has vomited him to safety.  Deliverance for all of us, Ellul herein announces characteristically, occurs when we grasp God’s presence and purpose for us (and through us for others) in the midst of the isolation that our vocation, compounded by our equivocating, has brought upon us.  Percipiently Ellul adds, “[T]he abyss…is the crisis of life at any moment.”(p.52)

Typically Ellul points out ersatz means of resolving the crisis: we look to “technical instruments, the state, society, money, and science…idols, magic, philosophy, spiritualism….As long as there is a glimmer of confidence in these means man prefers to stake his life on them rather than handing it over to God.”(p.57) While these instruments can give us much (especially as anodynes), they can’t give us the one thing we need in the face of the all-consuming abyss: mercy.  No relation of love exists between these instruments and us; they merely possess us. The person who “loves” money, for instance, is merely owned.  The crisis is resolved incipiently when we “beg in any empty world for the mercy which cannot come to [us] from the world.”(p.58)   The crisis is resolved definitively as we hear and heed the summons to discipleship and thereafter obey the one who can legitimately (and beneficently) claim us inasmuch as he has betaken himself to the abyss with us. Here Ellul’s Christological reading of the book of Jonah surfaces unambiguously: “The real question is not that of the fish which swallowed Jonah; it is that of the hell where I am going and already am. The real question is not that of the strange obedience of the fish to God’s command; it is that of the resurrection of Jesus Christ and my resurrection.”(p.63)

Just because the book of Jonah is a prolepsis of Jesus Christ, the book is fragrant with hope and quickens hope in readers.  To be sure, signs of grace come and go in all of us – even as grace never disappears. (Recall the gourd given to provide shade for Jonah, even as the gourd soon withered.) While God’s people frequently and foolishly clutch at the sign instead of trusting the grace therein signified, the day has been appointed when the sign is superfluous as faith gives way to sight and hope to its fulfilment.  At this point the “miracles” that were signs of grace for us will be gathered up in “the sole miracle, Jesus Christ living eternally for us”.(p.67)

The note of hope eschatologically permeating the book of Jonah (and Ellul’s exposition of it) recalls the conclusion to The Meaning of the City. There Ellul invites the reader to share his vivid “experience” of finding himself amidst a wretched urban slum in France yet “seeing” the city, the New Jerusalem.

 

While Ellul’s “exegesis” of the book of Jonah will be regarded as idiosyncratic in several places, its strength is its consistent orientation to the One who remains the “open secret” of the world and of that community bound to the world.

 

For decades Ellul’s own life illustrated a statement he made in Judgment concerning the prophet Jonah: “Everything circles around the man who has been chosen. A tempest is unleashed.”(p.25) Ellul’s writings indicate passim that as much characterizes all who discern their vocation and pledge themselves to it without qualification, reservation or hesitation.

 

Victor Shepherd
Professor of Systematic and Historical Theology, Tyndale University College & Seminary, Toronto
Professor Ordinarius, University of Oxford

John Paul II: An Assessment

John Paul II: An Assessment

John Paul’s resilience was exemplary. He saw first-hand the Nazi occupation of his beloved Poland , only to witness, without letup, the Communist takeover and brutal suppression of his people. Throughout the decades of totalitarian savagery visited upon the nations of Eastern Europe he never softened in his recognition of and resistance to a godlessness no less wicked because it came from the political left. (Many people naively assume that the left is less monstrous than the right.) Amidst it all he continued to hope for the day, in God’s own time, when Communism would finally expose itself as unambiguously cruel and deceptive. His support of Lech Walesa and of the Polish populace leavened public awareness and fortified private conviction until Marxist leaders had to admit they could no longer manage the people.

Even as he discerned evil in the world-at-large when other appeared not to, John Paul was just as quick to discern sin in the “heart-at-small” as he confessed the arrears of sin in himself and repented it. No one questioned his outpouring to the priest he named his confessor and through whom he sought to hear the Word of pardon from the crucified. No one regarded as poor taste, or worse, poor theatre, his protracted periods of lying prostrate, face-down, when he deplored the innermost shame and guilt he never attempted to deny.

Yet while he knew the church to consist of penitent sinners, he was always aware that the powers of death will never prevail against the church (Matthew 16:18 ) not because of the church’s inherent virtue (he had no illusions here) but because of God’s promise and patience. God has pledged himself to the people who are his “peculiar treasure”. (Exodus 19:5 KJV) Only by grace, yet assuredly by grace, the church remains a “chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, God’s own people” – and all of this precisely for the purpose of declaring the truth and mercy of the God who still calls us out of darkness and into his marvellous light. (1st Peter 2:9) Trusting God’s faithfulness to God’s own promises, John Paul exhibited a patience that always found him diligent in his work with an appropriate urgency, yet never frenzied or frantic. He rooted himself in the church, that ship that could ride out the worst storms of sin, treachery and disgrace.

Disgrace trumpeted itself during his tenure. The sex-scandals involving priests, all of whom were sworn to celibacy, became increasingly notorious as clergy betrayal and exploitation of children surface first in Newfoundland, was heard of in many venues (including aboriginal schools in Canada’s north), and came to most concentrated attention in Boston , where dozens of historic Roman Catholic church buildings had to be sold in order to defray the lawsuits of disillusioned and outraged families. John Paul was unyielding; resolutely he insisted that there is no place in the priesthood for sexual exploiters. Whereas ecclesiastical officialdom had falsified itself shamefully in a vain attempt at keeping skeletons closeted, John Paul frankly owned the perfidy of fellow-priests and pledged assistance to their victims.

No less movingly he recognized victims of a different sort with a different history; namely Jewish people. As a pole he was singularly equipped in this regard, for Poland had had the highest concentration of Jewish people of any country in the world, only to have ninety percent of them liquidated (4.5 million). In addition John Paul’s detailed reading of history allowed him to grasp what few North Americans have yet; namely, that for the Jewish people the Middle Ages was one, dark, endless, night of suffering visited on them by Christians both ignorant and learned, indifferent and devout. His frank acknowledgement of the church’s centuries-long abuse gained him the admiration and affection of Jews around the world. His overture in this area continues to bear fruit as Roman Catholic Christians have re-owned the Jewish root of the faith, as well as the place in God’s economy of the Jewish people as Jews (i.e., not merely as potential converts to the church). The pope built bridges between church and synagogue that continue to bring blessings to both.

A learned theologian and philosopher (see his encyclical, “Faith and Reason”), he had additional gifts that erudite people frequently lack. One such gift was an ability to handle the media. Never gullible concerning the “power of the press” and its capacity for misrepresentation, John Paul knew that his “management” skill concerning the print and electronic vehicles was an opportunity for him to commend gospel, kingdom, church and papal office.

His ability to relate to young people was a similar gift. Whenever he spoke, wherever he appeared, young people “fell” for him. No one can forget the aged man winsomely attracting and addressing young people in Toronto on the steamiest day of the summer while radio and TV interviewers sought (unsuccessfully) to dilute young Catholics’ ardour by interjecting reminders of the church’s shadow side.

Yet there is “another side” to John Paul that has to be noted. Whereas Pope John XXIII had spoken of Protestants as “separated brethren”, John Paul never acknowledged us to be brothers of any sort. He never recognized us as part of the body of Christ.

While his stand against homosexual behaviour and abortion was encouraging, his intransigence on the ordination of women was not.

While Protestants of orthodox conviction uphold the virginal conception of Jesus, John Paul’s Mariology threatened the sole, saving sufficiency of Jesus.

Worst of all, his Millennial Indulgence, promulgated in 2000, recalled the occasion of the Sixteenth Century Reformation in Germany when Luther nailed his Ninety-Five Theses to the church door in Wittenberg (1517), challenging readers to his “Disputation on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences”. Luther gave ninety-five reasons why he deemed it utterly anti-gospel to think that temporal punishment for sin is remitted in exchange for a fee. In 2000 John Paul’s Indulgence decree, signed by a subordinate cardinal, confirmed Protestants in their understanding of the battle-cry of their Reformation ancestors: Ecclesia Reformata Et Semper Reformanda. The church – reformed by the gospel, ever stands in need of being reformed at the hands of the selfsame gospel.

God is to be praised for the witness of the late Pope John Paul II, even as Protestants will invoke that gospel whose purity alone can – and will – fashion the church, the Bride of Christ, whose splendour is ultimately “without spot or wrinkle or any such thing, that she might be holy and without blemish.” (Ephesians 5:27)

 

 

Victor Shepherd

Reflections on Paul Molnar’s Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity

Reflections on Paul Molnar’s Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity

Dr Victor Shepherd

 

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

M speaks everywhere of the need to root the Economic Trinity (e.t.) in the Immanent Trinity (i.t.).

 

E.T.: Father, Son and Holy Spirit are interrelated forms in which divine revelation functions.

I.T.: F, S and HS constitute the being of God eternally, regardless of creation or revelation.

 

Background: God is known to Israel as the transcendent one. He is not a human projection.

This God is one; i.e., unique among the deities. Eventually Israel recognizes God to be one in the sense of sole: there are no other deities. God is one eternally.

 

The Nazarene appears, and repeatedly makes at least an implicit claim to do what are prerogatives of God: e.g., forgive sins (when only God can since God has been victimized), provide definitive interpretation of the God-given Torah (which Torah pre-existed the world), be the judge at the last day, satisfy the human heart as God alone claims to do, speak to his Father in an intimacy he recognizes in no-one else, accept worship as his right.

In all of this the transcendent one remains transcendent; i.e., God hasn’t collapsed himself into the Nazarene (as in pagan incarnations).

 

The God ‘above’ and God ‘among’ is recognized to be God ‘within’ as well. What God has done extra nos, pro nobis in Christ is now done in nobis as well. The result is that God manifests himself to us as giver, gift and the act of effectual giving. Giver, gift, and effectual giving are identical. [F, S and HS are alike God.]

 

Question: Is this merely how God manifests himself, or is this who God is in himself? Do we need to move beyond the e.t. to the i.t.?

Question (the same): is God’s revelation merely the “face” God wears as he turns to us, or is it who God is in himself? Is his face something he merely displays, or does his face unambiguously disclose his heart?

 

Humans frequently wear false faces. The face, e.g., can be benign when the heart is treacherous. God’s face and God’s heart are always one: he is as he manifests himself, and manifests himself as he is. There is no dissimulation or inconsistency in him. Otherwise the economic t. isn’t a faithful and true revelation of the transcendent communion of F, S and HS – which transcendent communion the eternal being of God is in himself.

 

The i.t. is the e.t. – or else God himself is ultimately unknowable (and therefore can’t be known as eternally F, S and HS.)

The e.t. is the i.t. – or else the e.t. is an act of God that may be merely what God has done without in any way reflecting who God is, his “heart” or identity; that is, an act of God unrelated to the eternal purpose of God.

 

The e.t. and the i.t. interpenetrate each other and regulate each other.

 

MOLNAR: (preface)

ix: the purpose of the doctrine of the i.t. is to uphold God’s freedom. Note the understanding of “freedom” here: there is no impediment, inner or outer, to God’s acting in accord with his true nature. (This understanding of freedom has nothing whatever to do with philosophical indeterminism, “freedom of choice.”) As will be shown later, God is eternally self-sufficient: God is love in himself, requiring nothing creaturely to love in order to be love. God is life; he lives in the ongoing dynamic of F, S and HS as the Father eternally begets the Son and the Spirit. God needs nothing creaturely to be who he is.

 

While we can speak of God only in terms of human categories (they are the only categories we have), it isn’t our human experience that prescribes who God is or what he is toward us. I.e., while we know God only in faith (faith is unquestionably a human event) we can’t read our experience and concepts of God back into God. [Rather, as Molnar will say later, once we are admitted by grace/faith into the orbit of God’s self-knowing, we thereafter think God from a centre in God, not from a centre in ourselves.] Athanasius, therefore, is sound when he says it is more devout and more accurate to signify God from the Son and call him “Father” than it is to signify God from the creation and call him “Unoriginate.”

 

x: We speak of God ultimately as “F, S and HS” rather than as “Creator, Mediator and Redeemer” since God is F,S and HS even if he never creates anything. [“Creator, Mediator and Redeemer” describes God’s relation to the creation.]

 

xi: Grace, faith and revelation therefore always remain grounded in God and not in (a compend of) God and the creation. We know God only by God. The Holy Spirit (that by which we know God) is God.

 

xii: Where the e.t. isn’t seen to be grounded in the i.t., one-sided attention is given to the e.t. and this in turn gives rise to the following distortions:

[1] God is made dependent on history and (at least in part) is indistinguishable from history.

(E.g., the surge of history is the power of God, and God never fully – if at all –                    transcends historical process.)

[2] A naturalistic Christology arises wherein humans have a natural capacity to apprehend              the truth and reality of Jesus Christ. (Needless to say, the “Christ” therein                            apprehended is never exactly the Christ whom the apostles confess.)

[3] The Holy Spirit is rendered indistinguishable from human spirit.

[4] The human phenomenon of self-transcendence becomes the starting point and the norm                       of theology, wherein God is “allowed” to be, do and speak only in conformity with                 the human experience of finite self-transcendence.

(Molnar maintains that the rest of the book discusses the aforementioned four points.)

 

 

Chapter One

1: Kaufman and McFague illustrate the declensions found in a theology that doesn’t think God from a centre in God but rather from a centre in ourselves, and doesn’t allow the nature of God to determine what can properly be said of God (and what not.)

K and McF insist that speech about God is reducible without remainder to our attempt at giving meaning to human existence; i.e., theology is no more than a way of describing human depths.

2: When they speak of theology as an “imaginative construction” [Shepherd they have confused “imaginative” with “imaginary.”] K. is obvious: God is not an extra-human reality of which our theological language speaks, however ineptly. What is real is the meta-myth that theological language articulates.

4: LaCugna maintains that the doctrine of the Trinity says nothing about God but rather about our life in God and our life with each other. [We can’t speak of ‘our life in God’ unless we know the nature of God.]

5: When she speaks of “divine life as all creatures partake and literally exist in it” she is thoroughly pan(en)theistic: she has blurred the ontic distinction between God’s being and the being of the world.

6: McF. makes the same error in speaking of God as dependent on the world and intrinsically related to the world.

7: Ultimately McF’s theology indicates we can’t know God at all; we can know only our own experiences.

8: Result: unknowingly she’s sabotaged human freedom, since human freedom presupposes God’s freedom. [Unless God is free from the world – i.e., is ontically distinct from it – then “humans”, so-called, are emanations from God or extensions of God and therefore lack human freedom.]

Feminist Theology: God is named from the matrix [=womb] of women’s experience. They forget something crucial: nowhere in the Christian tradition does God’s self-declared name – F, S and HS– mean that God is male.

13: Molnar’s warning: whenever the humanness of Jesus is set aside as essential to revelation, God is defined not by himself [i.e., in the Son] but by our experience. Rather, God is to be defined by himself, albeit through our experience [since revelation is known only in faith, and faith is a human act/event/affirmation/experience.] Lost here is the logic of scripture: God can by known only by God.

15: Warning: the error of thinking God from a centre in ourselves – Karl Rahner will later be seen to have written this error LARGE. [1]

16: Elizabeth Johnson confuses the mystery of human (creaturely) depths with the mystery of God. Result: the experience of one’s self is the experience of God. [God is women’s experience of themselves projected onto a cosmic screen.] E.g., conversion is self-acceptance.

19: Johnson maintains that Jesus is the paradigm of “Christ” for many, but can (and should) be substituted; modernity must be allowed to adopt multiple redemptive role models.

[In all of this a redemption myth replaces the sole mediatorship of Jesus of Nazareth.]

20: Result: the door is opened to gnosticism, dualism, pantheism, polytheism. (22: Women can represent Christ because they are other Christs.)

 

 

Chapter Two

27: Barth: to think accurately about revelation is to begin neither with our own ideas nor with our own experiences. Beginning with our ideas yields a Docetic Christology (wherein history is ignored); with our experiences, an Ebionite Christology (wherein God as the Lord of history is ignored).

28: Still, Jesus’ humanity as such doesn’t reveal [since history doesn’t yield a knowledge of God]. While Jesus’ humanity is essential to revelation, it isn’t sufficient: only the Holy Spirit, the power in which the Resurrected One acts, can acquaint us with the truth and reality of the Incarnate One. I.e., revelation is the unveiling of the God who remains veiled to all but the eyes of faith. Revelation therefore is always and everywhere a miracle.

29: Molnar contrasts Barth with Moltmann, Pannenberg and Jenson, for whom Jesus is Lord not because this is who he is but because God raised him from the dead. [This entails adoptionism.]

30: Barth maintains that the Resurrection doesn’t give something new to the Incarnate One, but it does make visible what is proper to him: his glory. [JC is the Son regardless of any impression he makes on us.]

31: Moltmann commits the [Bultmannian] error of denying the Resurrection to be an event in the life of Jesus and affirming it to be (only) an event in the lives of the apostles, a “visionary” episode.

33: MacQuarrie: ‘Christ’ shouldn’t be restricted to Jesus of Nazareth; it should be predicated of the ‘Christ event’ – Jesus and the community. [This, of course, makes humankind its own redeemer and the church its own Lord.]

35: Barth’s point: the power of the Resurrection is the power of the Word and Spirit evident in Jesus from Christmas to cross to Easter to Ascension – a power over which we have no conceptual, existential or ontological control. [If true, this point ends all attempts at rendering God’s acts, ultimately God himself, human extrapolations or projections or aspirations.]

36: Barth: the Resurrection discloses who Jesus is. Molt, Pann, Jen: the Resurrection constitutes Jesus’ being as eternal Son. [See above comment re: Adoptionism.] Pann advances another distortion: thanks to the Incarnation, Christ’s Sonship must be perceivable in his human existence. [This renders the truth and reality of JC naturally intelligible – thereby rendering rev. superfluous.] Little wonder Barth viewed Pann “with horror.”

 

In Docetic Christology Jesus’ historicity is dispensable – leaving only his [discarnate] deity? No. The God-man is the only true deity. The core of the NT isn’t incarnation (found everywhere in paganism) but rather that Jesus of Nazareth is the eternal Son of God Incarnate, and that the Son of

God Incarnate is Jesus of Nazareth.

41: To say this is to say that God can be known only where God ‘tabernacles’ with us and acts: J of N. To say this is to say that God can be known only by grace, never by us alone. Therefore God can’t be known on the basis of an analogy with something already known to us. Therefore ransacking human experience of self-transcendence yields neither the knowledge of God nor the possibility of it. [This point will loom huge in Barth’s repudiation of the analogia entis and Molnar’s recognition of the a.e. throughout Rahner’s work.]

45: Those who deny this affirm myth; e.g., John Hick: “Incarnation” speaks not of the truth re: Jesus but rather of our ascription and attitude concerning him.

48: In the same way ‘Christ’, says Kaufman, points to the complex of events that grew up around J of N. Christians were wrong in using “Christ” to speak of J as the God-man, and Jewish/Muslim critics were correct in faulting Christians for it. J of N is not “the only begotten Son of God.”

50: Rahner is famous for reorienting Roman Catholic theology to the doctrine of the Trinity. Yet he doesn’t begin thinking about it from a centre in God but rather from humankind’s transcendental experience. All experiences of human hope, fear, goodness, aspiration, wonder, mystery, love are unthematic experiences of God. [This is paganism.]

51: To confess Jesus Christ is ultimately to confess the mystery that human beings are. Theology is reducible to anthropology. Jesus is the ultimate instance of self-tr’ce. [Schleiermacher: Jesus is the most elevated instance of God-consciousness.]

Note what is forfeited here:

F1: revelation as God’s act, and therefore miracle.

F2: the R’n of Jesus as that which governs our theology. The tra’l exp. of hope does. (54: The R’n         is “the realisation and crystallisation of man’s deepest aspirations.”)

F3: the biblical truth that rev. causes offence. [How could it?]

F4: the biblical notion of faith. Faith [that by which we have fellowship with God] is ‘owning’     one’s experiences of mystery, wonder, etc; i.e., all the experiences of creaturely mystery        and depth.

F5: the Immanent Trinity as the God who is for us. [God is now the world in its aspirations.]

F6: redemption as the content of revelation. [Since revelation is knowledge of ourselves,                         redemption is ultimately self-wrought.]

 

 

Chapter Three

Logos asarkos: the notion that the Word is the eternal second person of the Trinity. To be contrasted with the notion that the Word occurs as it is enfleshed; i.e., an e.t. isn’t grounded in an i.t.

62: McCormack: if election is an eternal decision, then election is part of God’s being.

Molnar: God exists eternally as F, S and HS. Therefore the covenant of grace can’t be the ground of God’s triunity. God’s essence in no way depends on his works ad extra. [Q: Has Molnar read McCormack correctly? Q: Would McCormack question whether election is only ad extra?]

64: Molnar maintains that according to McC God is triune only because of God’s self-determination to be our God. There i.t. and e.t. are the same. For this reason we always need the logos asarkos to preserve the eternal, ontic triunity of God.

 

66: Farrow: “That he {Jesus} goes {ascends} makes him the way {to the Father.} “Makes”? Molnar: The Son is homoousion with the Father apart from the Ascension. Therefore logos asarkos must be upheld.

67: Concomitantly Farrow omits any affirmation of Christ’s active Lordship, wherein the Ascended One encounters his people now. If this is lost then so is human freedom, for our freedom is being claimed for and freed by this One for obedience to him.

 

70: Jenson: Jenson appears to blur the distinction between events in history and acts of God, with the result that history is deemed able to reveal the Incarnate One. Once again e.t. and i.t. are identical. Molnar rightly recognizes that if history can reveal JC, then the truth, reality, presence and significance of God are naturally intelligible.

72: Once l.a. is rejected, history constitutes God’s eternal being, and God is dependent on history.

73: Once the eternality of the l.a. is denied, God becomes the process of divine self-realization. [Here we have Hegel’s understanding of God as the Infinite that ‘others’ itself in nature and history and returns to itself as Absolute Spirit. Incarnation is a stage in the process of God’s self-realization.] Molnar denies Jenson’s Hegelian presupposition and with it the notion of God’s becoming anything in the course of Incarnation and Ascension.

76: Molnar also disagrees with Jenson concerning Jesus’ own glorified body. For Jenson, church and sacraments are that body; i.e., Jesus rose into the church and its sacraments. Jenson’s omission of the HS here is crucial [the HS binds Christ to his people], with the result that Christ needs the church to be who he is.

79: Molnar disagrees when Jenson maintains that God’s eternity isn’t his self-sufficiency as F, S and HS but his faithfulness to history. For Jenson God isn’t eternally self-sufficient but is becoming [Hegel] who he will be because of his relation to the world.

 

 

Chapter Four   (Rahner)

84: R develops his doctrine of God from his concept of mystery. [This is idolatry.] The human self is the point of departure for knowing God. [“God” is no more than a projection of human experiences, replete with pagan immediacy. Note how seldom R speaks of faith.   There is no need for the Mediator, since God is apprehended through human experiences of self-transcendence.]

86: R’s assumption is that an experience of one’s ‘horizon’ is an experience of God.   This assumption is rooted in a prior assumption: 88 – Humans are “a being oriented towards God.” [In the wake of the Fall, humans are oriented away from God.]

[Forfeited: any notion that God is the sole originator of our knowledge of God; that God ever remains Lord of his own revelation.] Here the transcendence of God, and therefore the freedom of God, is abandoned.

88: “Man is forever the articulate mystery of God.” [This reduces all theology to anthropology. Jesus Christ alone is the articulate mystery of God, and this is because he is God.]

95: The God who is identical with our experience of mystery [is posited] as identical with the i.t.

97: Result (says Molnar): R can’t distinguish between philosophy and theology, reason and revelation, nature and grace. [There is no theology or revelation or grace.]

107: R synthesizes creator and creature under the phil’l category of “absolute being.” [Herein God is subordinate to metaphysics, God being ontically indistinct from the creaturely.]

[In speaking of aspects of human experience w.r.t. the “infinite” R has confused indefinitely large with infinite.      True God, utterly transcendent, alone is infinite. The ‘horizon’ of our experience is indefinitely large and          impenetrably mysterious, but forever creaturely. Creatio ex nihilo – always to be distinguished from creatio ex Deo       – preserves the truth that God is LORD over the creation, not on a continuum with it.]

112: R: Christ is the ‘pure form’ of an experience of God that all religions describe.   [This contradicts scripture on so many fronts there’s no point in listing them. Cf. Elijah and Baal.]

113: R: God’s ‘universal will to save’ is a constitutive element in human experience. [God’s will is God himself (willing.) God is never a constitutive element in the human.>> pan(en)theism]

 

 

Chapter Five

— an illustration of what happens to Trinitarian thinking when “relationality” is substituted for the Triune God.

126: once the i.t. is denied as the ground of the e.t., then humankind’s relationship with God is one of mutual conditioning. Result: [see xii.]

128: La Cugna: persons in communion are substituted for Jesus Christ, and the HS is an aspect of creaturely relationships. Result: 130 — an ontology that includes both the being of God and the being of the human. [See 8 and 107.]

132: Molt: The Spirit is God’s immanence in human experience and the transcendence of humans in God. [paganism]

132: Kaufman: God and Christ are symbols [mythological constructs] that we invent to help us transform or ‘humanize’ our society. [paganism]

139: Peters: “God is the process of becoming Godself through relationship with the temporal creation.” [To be sure, how God achieves his purposes is affected by the world’s evil and human recalcitrance; but the nature of God is not. The manner in which God achieves his purposes is flexible; his essence is not. What could God ‘become’ except non-God?]

144: All such notions suggest that God’s relations ad extra eventually become God’s relations ad intra. [God is in the process of becoming what he isn’t at present through the relationships he undertakes. Since the e.t., in this model, becomes the i.t. in the eschaton {if there’s still point to using these terms}, then who God is going to turn out to be remains in doubt.]

160: R: “Man is the event of God’s absolute self-communication.” [Hegel is unmistakable here.]

162: R: “Wherever man posits a positively moral act in the full exercise of his free self-disposal, this act is a positive supernatural salvific act.” [Overlooked (1) religion and morality as antithetical to faith in the gospel – see 191, where to be a person of “morally good will” is to exist in grace, (2) self-salvation (Grace has been made the condition by which we can thereafter save ourselves; grace facilitates self-salvation.) (3) “free” – what became of the bondage of the will?]

 

 

Chapter Six

172: TFT: the r’n is the “primal datum” of theology and can’t be abstracted [i.e., into something symbolic or mythological.]

173: neither nature nor history produces the r’n. The r’n in turn is its own validation.(194)

174: while our concepts concerning God don’t allow us to speak of God exhaustively (TFT says elsewhere) they do allow us to speak of God truly and adequately. A concept-less knowledge (experience) of God is impossible.

175: w.r.t. the NT, theology is interested in the different layers of tradition only as they are correlated and controlled by God’s self-revelation. [Here TFT opposes “Q fundamentalism,” the latter being the notion that a NT stratum – neither Mark nor M nor L but merely a ‘sayings’ source (and only hypothetical at that) yields a knowledge of God.]   [Note the Jesus Seminar.]

178: TFT’s disagreement with liberal theology and with R: TFT’s ‘repentant thinking’, wherein such thinking submits to God’s self-rev. Such thinking is not found 1st in experience but first in Jesus Christ and subsequently in experience.

180: On account of the r’n of JC and the eternal Sonship of JC, our human nature is set in the F-S relation. [i.e., there is no natural knowledge ultimately of what it means to be a human being. Our knowledge of the human is a predicate of our knowledge of the humanness of JC. Here TFT opposes R on all fronts. R, beginning with an unthematic human exp. of mystery, longing, hope, etc. has a deity that can never be more than projected or inflated or religionized humanness. It never seems to occur to R that such humanness is fallen as well.]

193: TFT doesn’t deny we have the experiences of which R speaks. [Who would want to deny this?] TFT does deny that we can build a logical bridge from these to rev., since only God can reveal God.

 

 

Chapter Seven

198: Moltmann begins with Rahner and then moves beyond him. Note Barth’s criticism that Molt’s Theology of Hope reduces God to the principle of hope, indistinguishable from Marxist Bloch’s principle of hope.

199: Molt’s deity is mutually conditioned by and is never completely independent of human beings – as attested by the fact that God and the world are involved in a cosmic redemptive process (208). [Since both God and the world are on their way to redemption, Molt’s God is never LORD of the creation, but rather is finite and as needy as any creature.]

200: Molt’s theology of suffering renders human suffering the measure of God. The fact that God needs to suffer explains [somehow] the how of Trinitarian self-revelation. Father and Son couldn’t be selfless unless they suffered (211). [F and S are utterly selfless eternally in their self-giving to one another. This does not entail suffering. God’s suffering arises only through God’s self-giving to a tormented world.]

202: Note: Barth regarded panentheism as more dangerous than pantheism. [In pantheism God is the essence of everything. If God is of the essence of everything (panentheism) it becomes impossible to distinguish what is of God from what is not.]

204: w.r.t Molt’s panentheism, God’s indwelling makes “the whole creation the house of God.” [JC is where God ‘houses’ himself.]

208: Molt insists that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity “integrates the truth in monotheism and pantheism.” [What is the truth of pantheism? Monotheism as such is idolatry.]

209: Molt: “a non-creative God would be imperfect.” [Then God creates out of inner necessity and God’s creating is not a free act.]

221: Molt’s assertion that God’s love logically entails suffering eliminates the i.t.

222: Once God’s Spirit is identified with cosmic spirit, the doctrine of sin is lost.

231: In short, God needs creatures in order to be God. God is no longer sovereign as the catholic tradition understands the term; God’s sovereignty is “his sustaining fellowship with his creatures and his people.” [God’s sovereignty as his non-dependence on his creation has been forfeited. Only the God who is free from the world can act upon the world in love.]

 

 

Chapter Eight

Alan Torrance

235: recapitulation: the distinction between the i.t. and the e.t. means that God’s works ad extra are not necessities grounded in our transcendental experience or a principle of relationality (communion.).

237: Alan Torrance thinks that Rahner made explicit problems that are implicit in Barth. Molnar disagrees.

240: AT’s strong point: grace draws us into the Trinitarian relations by the Spirit so that Christ living in us doesn’t cancel or compromise the fact that we are agents in our own thinking and doing, even as our own thinking and doing are brought to completion in Christ.

242: AT’s criticism of Barth: Barth’s “revelation model” obscures our communion with God.

243: Molnar’s criticism: AT fails to grasp that for Barth knowledge (of God) and fellowship (with God) are inseparable. For B, knowledge of God is born of fellowship with God (i.e., faith in God.) [Bible passim] [When AT speaks of “communion” he appears to mean “continuity”.]

247: M’s criticism: AT’s und’g of our inclusion by grace in the Son’s eternal communion with the Father is rendered constitutive of our personhood. [Doesn’t this divinise us? Isn’t this a reappearance of the nature-grace continuum?]

248: M: “ Torrance finds the continuity between God and the creatures in semantic thought forms that he believes have become integral to the Christ event.” [Could any thought form be the continuity between God and creation? Is there such a continuity at all?]

248: Such a continuity occurs in that communion takes primacy over revelation. [Redemption is always the content of revelation. Therefore communion [=fellowship, not continuity] between God and [sinful] creatures can never take primacy over rev. We know God only as we are reconciled to God in faith. Note the absence of a discussion of faith in AT.]

250: AT’s notion of communion obscures God as the acting subject in his relations with us. Result: AT has reintroduced a form of the analogia entis.

251: AT’s description of revelation as “epistemic atonement” distorts the meaning of revelation; i.e., revelation is a result of communion rather than of God’s act. This in turn suggests that Christ’s humanity as such reveals.

 

Jungel

262: Jl seems to understand God not merely from revelation but also from the human context of theological statement; e.g., an experience of gratitude is at the same time an exp. of God [[Rahner has returned.] Jl herein blunts experience of God as our knowledge of God born by the Spirit’s ‘introducing’ us to the Son – and all of this as God’s soteriological act.]

264: One problem arising from this: humanity is part of the Godhead. [Human love is not an aspect of God’s love. [Hegel]]

268: A FATALITY: the i.t. is merely the summarizing concept of the e.t.; i.e., the i.t. is merely a way of speaking of the e.t. This renders impossible the i.t. as the ground of the e.t.

 

 

Chapter Nine

274: Note Gunton’s warning that we understand the e.t. as scripture does [revelationally/soteriologically] not as the foundation of an agenda for socio-political alteration wherein Christ becomes a principle subserving, e.g., cultural transformation.

277: M’s disagreement with Gu: Gu undervalues the noetic damage of the Fall [w.r.t. God], and therefore Gu undervalues the extent to which revelation is offensive. E.g., rev. doesn’t merely “liberate energies that are inherent in created rationality.” [M’s implicit point: fallen rationality needs to be restored to its integrity (since Fallen reason is devastated with respect to knowledge of God), not merely ‘released.’ In this context M points out that “faith” appears infrequently in Gu’s theology of the Trinity.]

278: Barth doesn’t undervalue the noetic damage of the Fall.

270: M on Gu: the Virgin Birth doesn’t suggest that Jesus isn’t fully human.

295: Note M’s detection of a naturalistic element in Gu: relationality as such – “the relations in which we stand” (Gu) – acquaint us with who we are. [Human self-knowledge is a predicate of our knowledge of God – and therefore must be revealed.] [Shepherd finds a naturalistic element in many places throughout Gunton’s work; e.g., Gu’s insistence that humans need to be perfected, rather then redeemed/corrected and then perfected. What lurks here once again is the nature/grace continuum.]

 

Chapter Ten: Conclusion

311: M’s book has been (i) a sustained protest against the tendency to allow experience “to dictate the meaning of theological categories”; (ii) a sustained insistence that while our experience of God gives rise to our articulation of the e.t., the same experience directs us away from experience to the Word and Spirit (i.t.) as the source of our theological knowledge.

 

311: Recapitulation: the four indicators of contemporary theology’s failure to discern the need for a doctrine of the i.t.:

i) God is made dependent on and indistinguishable from history;

ii) the humanity of Jesus itself reveals [implicit denial of the Incarnation and Holy Spirit;
explicit marginalizing of faith.

iii) Holy Spirit is confused with human spirit;

iv) experience and self-transcendence are made the origin and substance of theology.

 

313: M: “God sets the terms for theological insights.” [=God is the author and object of revelation. As God acts upon us he forges within us the capacity and desire for knowing him and the categories whereby we may speak of him.]

313: If Trinitarian life is no more than our life, we are doomed. However – our real life is hidden with Christ in God.

The bottom Line: Either the Immanent Trinity – or We Are Still in Our Sins.

 

[1] Rahner in nuce: “Rahner explores human self-transcendence assuming that we have an obediential potency for revelation and a supernatural existential which identifies revelation and grace with our transcendental dynamisms.     But these very assumptions blur the distinction between nature and grace.” P.165

Pursuing Freedom in the Body of Christ

This article appeared in “Pathway in Process”, the magazine of New Direction for Life Ministries. www.newdirection.ca/home.htm

 

Pursuing freedom in the Body of Christ

Forward

Dr. Shepherd, a former professor of mine at Tyndale Seminary, has been an enthusiastic supporter of the work of New Direction. When he offered to help the ministry, I immediately knew what to ask of him: “Please write an article for our newsletter.” As you read it, I trust you will understand my request. In Dr. Shepherd’s exposition of John Wesley’s development of the integration of holiness and community we see some of the foundational principles that undergird our work here at New Direction.

Those who struggle with homosexuality need to discover the authentic hope, practical application, and tangible results that Wesley’s adherents found. In our support groups we seek to apply the same principles: to love the same-gender attracted struggler unconditionally, and to create a safe, trusted environment of confidentiality, where strugglers can be transparent and truthful. The goal of our ministry is to support same-gender attracted individuals “to obey that command of God, ‘Confess your faults one to another, and pray for one another that ye may be healed.”.

Some of our readers who are same-gender attracted may reconsider their need for consistent support and accountability after reading this article. If you live in Ottawa , Windsor , Guelph , St. Catherines, Sarnia , Winnipeg or Toronto we can get you connected with a support group. If you are too far from these cities, contact us anyway. We are increasing our contacts throughout the country. We would be honoured to explore with you the best place to get connected and to begin experiencing new freedom, healing and growth. Don’t go it alone. God gives you the gift of His Body – the Body of Christ.

wg 

I shall never forget the man who found the courage to pour out before me his heart-wrenching confession of sin. He was able to articulate it despite his shame and humiliation only because he trusted me to help him. Aware of his predicament and his fragility, I summoned up all the pastoral wisdom I could find within me and pressed upon him as persistently, patiently and convincingly as I could that forgiveness of God whose immensity comprehended the length and breadth, height and depth of human self-contradiction. After all, if God’s people are to forgive “seventy times seven,” would God himself ever do less? To my dismay the fellow remained unaffected. After a few seconds of anguished silence he blurted, heart-brokenly, “I don’t want forgiveness; I want deliverance.”

The man meant, of course, that he didn’t want mere forgiveness. John Wesley would have concurred. For Wesley knew that the early-day Methodist communities thrived on a truth that had lain dormant too long in the church at large; namely, God can do something with sin beyond forgiving it (as glorious as forgiveness is.) Specifically, God can release people from its power over them. Forgiveness or pardon relieves us of sin’s guilt, Wesley insisted; newness of life releases us from sin’s grip. Wesley knew that to offer people relief now, only to tell them that release awaited them at life’s end (all Christians agreed that release was guaranteed post-mortem) was to consign them to despair for this life. He insisted that there was no limit to the scope of God’s deliverance in this life. Years later he noted that where this truth was upheld the Methodist communities flourished; where it was submerged they withered.

The addictiveness of sin

At the same time Wesley’s people were anything but naïve concerning sin’s grip. They knew that all sin is addictive. (If it were less than addictive wouldn’t all sinners – which is to say, everyone – have long since given it up?) And they had in their midst people whose addiction was notorious: public, pronounced, undeniable and undisguisable. Either such people would find the gospel merely a pronouncement of pardon that meanwhile left them victims to their addiction or they would come to know that there is indeed One “who can break every fetter” – and do so now.

Since Wesley insisted there to be “no holiness but social holiness,” he gathered his people into small groups or “bands” of four or five individuals; these bands were the context for and occasion of his people’s deliverance. These bands were effective only if people were utterly honest at the weekly meeting, withholding nothing. For this reason, then, the bands were segregated by gender.

Since there were temptations and traps peculiar to people in particular jobs, there were bands for coalminers, bands for shopkeepers, bands for homemakers, bands for soldiers, and so on. In addition there were bands for those struggling with a particular habituation: bands for “drunkards,” for “whoremongers,” for abusers of drugs such as laudanum and opium. In addition there was a group for people who were afflicted with no notorious, besetting sin but whose spiritual maturity had brought them to see that darkness of every sort still lurked in them, and had brought them as well to crave deliverance from it as they single-mindedly craved nothing else.

You shall be holy….

In all of this Wesley had in mind the “root” commandment of scripture: “You shall be holy as I the Lord your God am holy.” (Leviticus 19:2) Yet in the wake of his Puritan ancestry (both his paternal and maternal grandfathers had been outstanding Puritan ministers) he knew that all God’s commands are “covered promises:” what God requires of his people God will unfailing work in his people. Linking the “root” commandment of Israel (and the church) with the “great commandment” of Jesus – “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, soul, mind and strength, and your neighbour as yourself” – Wesley’s “band” aimed ultimately, for everyone regardless of the expression of one’s sin, deliverance from every impediment and inhibition right here. In other words, the bands aimed at a deliverance that began in release from one or another, more or less dramatic, addiction, only to end in release from a “selfism” that found someone self-abandoned in self-forgetful love of God and neighbour. Wesley knew this alone to be the “freedom” that the gospel promises.

Never naïve about the grip with which sin grips us, Wesley was aware that several things were essential if the bands were to operate effectively. (Needless to say, if the bands weren’t effective they would disappear overnight.) In the first place, those who tentatively, tremblingly stepped into one had to know they were loved and would continue to be cherished. In the second place they had to know that those before whom they disburdened themselves could be trusted – trusted not to be affronted by what they heard, trusted not to ridicule the suffering of someone whose habituation was as painful as it was embarrassing, and above all trusted not to betray anyone by blabbing on the street what had to remain in the meeting. In the third place band-members themselves had to be without disguise and without dissimulation but rather transparent and truthful.

Rules of the Band Societies

On Christmas Day, 1738, Wesley drew up the “Rules of the Band Societies.” He stated the band’s purpose unambiguously: “The design of our meeting is to obey that command of God, ‘Confess your faults one to another, and pray for one another that ye may be healed.” Then he specified the “rules.” For instance,

Rule #1: To meet once a week, at the least.” Rule #4: To speak, each of us in order, freely and plainly the true state of our souls, with the faults we have committed in thought, word or deed, and the temptations we have felt since our last meeting.” Then Wesley wrote, “Some of the questions proposed to every one before he is admitted amongst us may be to this effect:” – and proceeded to list some such questions. For instance,
Question #6: “Do you desire to be told of your faults?” Question #7: “Do you desire to be told of all your faults, and that plain and home?” Question #11: “Is it your desire and design to be on this and all other occasions entirely open, so as to speak everything that is in your heart, without exception, without disguise, and without reserve?”Wesley, however, wasn’t finished. While the preceding questions “may” be asked, the “five following [must be asked] at every meeting.” For instance,

Question #4: “What have you thought, said or done of which you doubt whether it be sin or not?” Question #5: “Have you nothing you desire to keep secret?”Plainly the self-disclosure asked of the band-members was stark and startling. Wesley knew, however, that only such searing honesty and accountability in a context of pledged support would suffice as the environment for the One who could and did “break every fetter.”

Small groups thrive on self-disclosure

The “small group movement” in the church today owes everything to Wesley. And so do the para-church groups, such as Alcoholics Anonymous. They thrive on the frankest self-disclosure, self-abandonment to the group and the group’s “Higher Power,” accountability that is near-brutal in its confrontation, and a willingness to endure any inconvenience at any hour for the sake of a fellow-sufferer whose pain has become unendurable and who cries out desperately for a deliverance whose alternative is despair.

At one point in my theological education I studied under a psychiatrist who related to the class a simple experiment that has been documented many times over. Ten people are placed in a room. Nine people have been “clued in” beforehand as to what’s going on. The tenth, however, has been told nothing. A box is brought forward containing twenty marbles. Everyone is asked to count the marbles. Then each person is asked to state how many there are. One after the other says “Nineteen; exactly nineteen.” The “not-clued” person, having carefully noted that there were twenty, begins to doubt himself. Soon he capitulates, admits he must have miscounted, and agrees: nineteen.

My psychiatrist-instructor pointed out that sooner or later everyone capitulates; we differ only in how long it takes different people to capitulate. Then the experiment is changed slightly: there are two people in the “game” who haven’t been clued in. When they count the marbles and announce “Twenty” they hold out far longer in the face of those who insist “Nineteen.” When a third person is added, the three together don’t capitulate.

The experiment, of course, operates merely at the level of the natural. How much more is promised a group of sufferers when the power of “Our great God and Saviour” is added.

Victor Shepherd

 

 

Egerton Ryerson

Egerton Ryerson

 

“No community can thrive without a journal,” insisted Mahatma Gandhi as he led his followers in shedding their British overlords and the “glass ceilings” that Britain ’s class system had reinforced among India ’s people. Ryerson knew that the Methodist people of early Nineteenth Century Upper Canada needed their own journal if they were to forefend discouragement, fragmentation and ultimate capitulation to the financial, social and religious tyranny of the “Family Compact.” Agreeing with their young leader (he was 26 years old) the Methodist Conference of 1829 established the Christian Guardian, a weekly paper Ryerson was elected to edit. It first distributed 500 copies. In three years it was producing 3,000. Soon it was the most widely read and influential paper of any in the province. The Guardian articulated Methodist theological concerns, religious issues of everyday life, discussions of the nature of the public good and the sort of government needed to advance it, educational reform (always a priority with Ryerson), and practical advice in household economics. (While the Methodists opposed the production and consumption of distilled spirits, one issue at least of the Guardian informed readers of the subtleties of beer-brewing.) The paper’s circulation eclipsed the official Upper Canada Gazette. The foreparent of The United Church’s Observer was campaigning militantly.   Ryerson had known it had to be effective if shocking social inequities that were nothing less than cruel iniquities were to be overturned.

Ryerson was born March 24, 1803 in Vittoria (near Port Dover,) Ontario . His parents, Dutch Protestants who had wearied of the suffocation born of Europe’s social confinement, had migrated to the New World for the sake of the opportunities it afforded. His oldest New World ancestor, Martin Reyerzoon, had landed in New Amsterdam before the British conquest renamed the settlement New York in 1664. With the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, the “United Empire Loyalist” family, Anglican now, migrated once more.

Egerton farmed and studied until he was eighteen, when he identified publicly with the Methodists, the movement through which he had been spiritually awakened. “Leave them or leave home,” his outraged father fumed. Ryerson left home, supporting himself as a student teacher in the local grammar school.

Moving from school teaching to the ministry, the Methodist Probationer managed to absorb both the best of classical literature, theology and contemporary philosophy. Now qualified for ordination, Ryerson was appointed to the Yonge Street Circuit, a triangle that gathered up far-flung people from Pickering to Weston to the south shore of Lake Simcoe . It took him a month to visit all the preaching points within it. Sunday alone found him riding thirty miles, preaching three times and addressing two classes.

Then it happened: the event that brought him unprecedented opportunity, altering forever his public image and fixing his name in Canadian history.

In 1825 Toronto ’s Bishop John Strachan preached at the funeral of a fellow-prelate. The sermon adulated the Church of England while vilifying the Methodists. For years Strachan had been the power broker of the Family Compact, a handful of rich families who monopolized business, finance, and education. It aimed at perpetuating the social stratification that allowed the privileged to exploit the New World’s version of Britain ’s class structure, the worst in Europe . Strachan sought to punish any who didn’t support the Compact’s constellation of power, piety, prestige and privilege.

Strachan accused the Methodist people of being crypto-republicans whose zeal for democracy amounted to mob-elevation. He sneered at their preachers (only Anglicans could be called “clergy”) as intellectual mediocrities unfit to announce the gospel. He supported the legislation that forbade Methodists to solemnize marriages or hold title to church buildings, parsonages and cemeteries.

Ryerson, now 25 years old, championed his people and penned their reply. The pseudonymous riposte voiced Methodism’s disgust at the Anglican Church’s political prostitution. It listed the academic rigours required for Methodist ordination. It recalled John Wesley’s insistence that all Methodist preachers study five hours per day. It pointed out that the Wesleyan Methodist Church (one of the two major Methodist bodies in Upper Canada ) had never known an American root, while the Methodist Episcopal Church (admittedly of American origin) had virtually no American-born preachers.

However Ryerson has become a household name in Canada , with churches, streets and schools named after him, on account of his colossal achievement concerning public education. Heartbroken to see one-half of school-aged children with no formal education and the remaining half averaging only a year’s, and horrified at the poor training and brutal disposition of the “teacher” in too many villages, Ryerson crusaded to establish high-quality public education that required no means tests, whether religious or monetary. Thinking ill of a British school system that preserved the worst class division in Europe, he visited public schools in Holland , Italy and France , twice examining the education system that the Protestant Reformer Philip Melanchthon had implemented 300 years earlier in Germany . As early as 1524, when only 27 years old, Melanchthon had pioneered the pedagogical methods in which teachers were trained.

Recognized now, Ryerson’s sphere of influence ballooned when he was appointed at age 41 as Chief Superintend of Common Schools for Canada West (1844,) and two years later promoted to Chief Superintendent of Education, an office he occupied until his retirement.

As expected, the socially privileged objected. George Brown, editor of Toronto ’s Globe newspaper, ranted that Ryerson had imported “Prussian” education into Ontario . Most people knew, rather, that Ryerson had elevated teaching from a miserable job to a calling akin to that of the ordained ministry.

Ryerson knew that the life of the mind was a good in itself. Still, he never denied education’s utilitarian significance. The public good would always be served by better quality public education. Not to be overlooked was his conviction that public education was essential to social democracy. While political democracy – each citizen is allowed to vote – was easy to achieve, social democracy occurred only as all citizens had equal access to opportunity. Apart from social democracy, class stratification would deny people all socio-economic mobility and freeze them in frustrating private and public “prisons.” Different clusters in the society would then turn inward for support and subsequently outward in hostility.

Ryerson’s educational vision, then, entailed vastly more than schooling: it entailed a vision for a nation, its people and its future.

On the 500th Anniversary of the Birth of Heinrich Bullinger, Reformer

On the 500th Anniversary of the Birth of Heinrich Bullinger, Reformer

1504 – 1575

Unlike the first generation of Reformation “pioneers” (e.g., Martin Luther, born 1483 and Ulrich Zwingli, 1484) Bullinger was a consolidator. While adding his own perspective to Protestant theology it was his genius to be less an innovator than someone who could gather up and “package” the gospel riches that hungry people craved in Switzerland and elsewhere. Apart from him the theological “shape” of late Sixteenth and early Seventeenth Century England is unimaginable. Without him the first waves of English Puritans wouldn’t have thrived.

His output is prodigious. Luther’s written work fills fifty-five large volumes. Calvin’s 2000-page Institutes of the Christian Religion (penned as a primer for first-year students of theology) represents only 6.8% of the Genevan’s output. Bullinger’s writings are greater than both Luther’s and Calvin’s together.

Born in Bremgarten, a town twenty kilometres west of Zurich , Bullinger was raised for the priesthood. His father, a priest sworn to celibacy, followed scores of other clergy in Switzerland in living common-law with the woman who bore him five sons. Heinrich sr. annually paid the area bishop whatever it took to have ecclesiastical officialdom look the other way.

Like the majority of Protestant thinkers, young Bullinger knew that a humanist education was important for anyone pursuing ordination; essential if one was to provide both theological and institutional leadership in the church. Departing from his father’s Catholicism, Bullinger moved to the University of Cologne ( Germany ) where he would be immersed in the work of Erasmus and Melanchthon. Erasmus was regarded as the paragon of the Renaissance. Melanchthon, the first systematic theologian of the Reformation and “packager” of the riches that the Lutherans had mined, was deemed the best Greek scholar in Europe upon the death of Erasmus.

Graduating with his B.A in 1520 and his M.A. in 1522, Bullinger was invited to teach at the Cistercian monastery in Kappel. In the mixed-up state-of-affairs that riddled so very much of Reformation-era Europe , the young instructor brought the monastery into the fold of the Reformed expression of the faith, even as the abbot encouraged and assisted him.

In 1523 the nineteen-year old met Zwingli, the brilliant inaugurator of Reform in Switzerland . Glad of the opportunity to be Zwingl’s theological apprentice, Bullinger left the monastery and plunged into his mentor’s intellectual orbit. The older man recognized Bullinger’s ability and invited him to accompany him to the major disputation at Berne in 1528. Tragically Zwingli would die defending his homeland at the Battle of Kappel in 1531. The eight-year apprenticeship would soon bear immense fruit.

Soon much unfolded quickly. In May 1529 Bullinger (still officially Roman Catholic, bizarrely) replaced his father as priest in Bremgarten. In June 1529 the town sided with the Reformation. Since the Protestant expression of the faith was now government-sanctioned, the clergy could marry instead of lurking in the clandestine relationships wherein they had sought connubial comfort and consolation. Bullinger lost no time: two months later he married Anna Adlischwyler – whereupon his father espoused Reformed doctrine and married the woman he had known for decades. In 1531 Bullinger moved to Zurich in order to succeed Zwingli as Cathedral preacher.

Bullinger’s “stamp” is evident principally in a major confession and a theology that underlies everything he wrote. The theology is marked by the notion of covenant, and after him Protestant thought, when faithful to the gospel, has always exemplified “Covenant Theology.” (See the work of Karl Barth.) God’s covenant is his promise to us that he will ever be our God. He has pledged himself irrevocably to us, and asks us to pledge ourselves to him: “I shall be your God and you shall be my people.” God unfailingly keeps the covenant he makes. We sinners, however, are inveterate covenant-breakers. In Jesus Christ, the Son Incarnate, there has appeared that one (the only one) who is the human, faithful covenant-partner with the Father. As Christians are bound to Jesus Christ in faith we are identified with our “elder brother” and therefore are recognized as covenant-keepers with him.

The major work bearing Bullinger’s handprint is the 1566 Second Helvetic Confession. ( Helvetia is Latin for “ Switzerland .) Knox’s Church of Scotland endorsed this document without qualification. It is Bullinger’s single greatest triumph. Over sixty pages long, it articulates comprehensively and comprehensibly that Word-fostered faith which attempted to shed the non-gospel accretions that past centuries had accumulated. While the Second Helvetic Confession is a model of theological succinctness and profundity, its best-known line is Bullinger’s Praedicatio verbum Dei verbum Dei est – the preaching of the Word of God is itself the Word of God. In other words, when the gospel is preached by fumbling, stumbling humans, the risen, sovereign Jesus Christ adopts the event, owns it and vivifies it by the power of the Spirit so as to loom before hearers and acquaint them with himself as surely as he “leaned” on hearers during the days of his earthly ministry.

There was more to Bullinger. He corresponded with leaders throughout the Protestant world. Archives currently hold 15,000-plus letters to and from him, including 300 that Calvin alone addressed to him. Preaching at least six times per week, he distilled his sermons into an “essence,” several Decades (so named in that each Decade contained ten items) that fuelled Reformation lighthouses guiding those otherwise on theological shoals. The Latin Decades were immediately translated into Dutch, German, French and English. They helped immensely English clergy struggling to understand and expound the Reformed faith. Eventually they were reprinted seventy-seven times.

A pastor first (as were all the Reformers,) Bullinger’s House Book, a treatise on pastoral theology, was reprinted 137 times. The pastor and his wife extended hospitality to several leaders among the Marian exiles, those men and women whom “Bloody” Mary (1553-1558) had hounded out of England . Steeped now in Bullinger’s theology and ecclesiology, as soon as Elizabeth allowed them to return they infused the nascent Puritan movement and the Presbyterianism that emerged from it.

Bullinger ministered in Zurich for forty-four years (1531-1575,) a period that “bookends” the whole of Calvin’s theological existence. His contribution to the Reformation is immense.

Fellowship Magazine is right to recognize Bullinger and therein fulfil the Fifth Commandment. For it is no small matter to honour our parents – including the theological.

Victor Shepherd

Psalm 30: The God Who Restores

(address given at Knox Presbyterian Church, Toronto, 21 July2004)

Psalm 30: The God Who Restores

 

I: — Prosperity: is it bane or blessing? Scripture speaks with one mind: prosperity is blessing. Abundance is good. Scarcity, on the other hand, is evil. Poverty is a curse. The Messianic Age will see the end of poverty and the conditions that promote poverty; it will see as well the end of the consequences of poverty; namely, the shrivelling of the human good that occurs in the wake of distress and destitution.

God, who is good himself, fashions a creation that is only good itself. God’s creation is fashioned so as to bring forth everything needed to sustain the creaturely good; sustain it, enhance it, magnify it. Only in the wake of the Fall does scarcity occur. Such scarcity is a blight in nature that leaves its victims blighted humanly.

For this reason our Lord Jesus Christ, everywhere in his earthly ministry, overturns the evil one’s molestation of the creation. He restores those who have been victimized by a creation that hasn’t fostered the human good God intends for them. It’s no wonder, then, that Jesus feeds hungry people. He knows that hunger is more than a physical problem. Hunger warps people’s thinking quickly and pervasively; hunger distorts the human psyche hideously. Famine is a horror, scripture recognizes, that could scarcely be more horrible.

How horrible? And what horror does it work in the human heart? We are told [2nd Kings 6:25 ] that because of a military siege there was a great famine in Samaria . People were scrambling to eat the head of a dead donkey or a handful of bird poop. Two women, out of their minds on account of their hunger, made a pact with each other: “Today we’ll eat your baby; tomorrow, we’ll eat mine.” Whereupon they boiled an infant and ate it.

Silly romantics may sentimentalize poverty, but as I learned a long time ago, they can romanticize poverty just because they’ve never been poor themselves. No poor person has ever thought poverty glorious.

When our Lord commands us to pray, “Give us today our daily bread,” no doubt there are many layers of meaning to his pronouncement. But in our haste to find many subtle layers we shouldn’t overlook the most obvious meaning: “daily bread” means exactly what it says: bread, the physical sustenance we need, and without which we can’t do anything else; can’t work, can’t think, can’t worship, can’t pray. To be sure, we don’t live by bread alone; just as surely, without bread we don’t live at all.

Jesus unlocks paralysed limbs. He comes upon a woman who’s been bent double for eighteen years. For two decades the horizon of her life has been filled with dirty feet. What kind of a perspective on God’s good creation is that? Jesus doesn’t speculate blasphemously about “God’s will.” He knows that her condition contradicts God’s will. Angrily he hisses, “Satan has done this.” And then he frees her as she lives henceforth in the abundance of her restoration. Deprivation is bane. Prosperity is blessing.

 

II: — And yet prosperity, paradoxically, is the occasion of temptation. Prosperity readily gives rise to spiritual complacency. Having pleaded with God for daily bread, and having been granted daily bread, we are preoccupied now with bread, cake and cream puffs as we cease to pray at all. We become spiritually indifferent, complacent, even presumptuous. Prosperity quickly finds prosperous people gloating in their fancied superiority. The psalmist knew this. In Ps. 30:6 he recalls that he became prosperous even as he confesses to us, “I said in my prosperity, ‘I shall never be moved.’”

“What arrogance,” we say; “What folly. ‘I shall never be moved.’” Plainly the psalmist thought himself invulnerable. “I’ve got it made. I’ve arrived. And now I’m untouchable, impregnable. I couldn’t be toppled in view of the security my prosperity provides me.”

In the entire history of the church I think there are few people who consistently reminded each other of the dangers of prosperity as much as the Seventeenth Century Puritans did. They were uncommonly prosperous people. They sensed their uncommon vulnerability. They knew they had to keep before them the danger their prosperity brought them.

The Puritans had judiciously distanced themselves from other Christian traditions that idealized poverty. They knew, for instance, that poverty is never spiritually meritorious. They never thought poverty to be an instrument of sanctity. They were aware that scarcity, so far from promoting sanctity, more frequently fostered envy, bitterness, hopelessness. The Puritans believed that God commanded work and blessed it. They regarded gainful employment as a form of stewardship.

Yet they were never naïve concerning wealth. On the contrary they knew that prosperity brought temptation as little else did. John Robinson (widely known for his aphorism, “God has yet more truth and light to bring forth from his holy Word”) wrote, “Both poverty and riches have their temptations. And of the two states the temptations of riches are the more dangerous.” The Puritans recognized an inverse relationship between wealth and godliness: the more prosperous people became the less zealous they were for God.

The Puritans saw three great dangers in prosperity. (i) In prosperous people there is a tendency for wealth to replace God as the object of ultimate devotion. (ii) Prosperity leads people to rely on themselves instead of on God. (iii) Prosperity is lethal because addictive: prosperity generates an appetite that prosperity can never satisfy. In other words, prosperity, so far from satisfying people, leaves them profoundly discontented. At the same time it fosters a mood of self-sufficiency and invulnerability. Exclaimed the psalmist, “I said in my prosperity, ‘I shall never be moved.’”

One hundred years after the Puritan era John Wesley rode forth. Wesley picked up where his Puritan foreparents had left off. (I want to say in passing that there is much, much more Puritanism in Wesley than most Wesleyans are aware of.) But whereas the Puritans had been careful and cautious concerning prosperity, Wesley was scathing. He was scathing because he had to witness first-hand over and over how prosperity sapped his people’s spiritual ardour and attenuated their kingdom-commitment and turned sacrifice into selfism.

Here’s what Wesley saw.

Stage one. His people had been drunken and dissolute, impoverished and suffering from all the ills that poverty brings.

Stage two. His people had heard the gospel and had abandoned themselves to Jesus Christ as the Holy Spirit torched them. Now they were sober. Because they were sober they were employable. Because they were industrious they profited. Because they no longer gambled away money or boozed it away or whored it away or simply frittered it they accumulated money. As their bank account swelled their social position rose. Wesley and his people agreed with the psalmist in Ps. 30:6: “By thy favour (what greater favour is there than the gospel?) thou hast established me as a strong mountain.” In other words, like the psalmist their new-found strength and stability came from the gospel, came from God’s favour.

Stage three.   As their social position rose their spiritual zeal fell. Now they were indifferent to matters of the kingdom. They no longer made any sacrifice for the cause of Jesus Christ. They no longer inconvenienced themselves in assisting the suffering neighbour. They gave up their pursuit of holiness.

Wesley’s frustration drove him near-mad. He was frustrated inasmuch as his people had prospered on account of the gospel. But then their new-found abundance blunted their spiritual hunger. Whereas Wesley had said to them, “Earn all you can; save all you can; give all you can,” he now lamented that his people were very good at the first two and woefully deficient at the third. In his frustration he wrote nine tracts, each one sharper than the one before.

In 1781, at the age of 78, Wesley addressed this issue yet again. He noted that when his people had been drunken and dissolute they had an appetite for vulgarity. Now they had a taste for refinement. This taste for refinement Wesley called “genteel sensuality.” There was nothing gross or lurid about it; on the contrary it was the soul of social sophistication. Whereas at one time they had lacked bread, now they were discussing the merits of caviar. Whereas at one time they had stupefied themselves on gin, now they were comparing notes on flavours of tea (tea was frightfully expensive in Eighteenth Century England and was sipped by the socially elevated.) Wesley noted that spiritual inertia invariably accompanied a taste for refinement.

Then, in his 1781 “scorcher,” he put his finger on something I have read nowhere else. He traced a horrifying process:

-as we become more affluent we assume greater self-importance;

-as we assume greater self-importance we become more easily affronted (in other words, snobbishness invariably gives rise to touchiness 😉

-as we are more easily affronted we are more prone to revenge.

In other words, prosperity magnifies our self-importance; and this increases our touchiness; and this renders us cruelly vindictive.

“As for me, I said in my prosperity, ‘I shall never be moved.’’ “I’m a mean-spirited, super-sensitive snob who can’t be shaken. Just try shaking me.”

 

III: — And that is exactly what God did. The psalmist couldn’t be moved? What an arrogant, cocksure, self-important fool – as he was soon to admit himself to be.

We do think ourselves Herculean, don’t we. But it takes only a nerve, finer than a hair, pinched between two vertebrae and our arm will dangle uselessly or our leg will drag lamely, all of this accompanied by excruciating pain. We think ourselves impregnable, don’t we. But it only takes a bacterium, too small to be seen with the naked eye, and we are sick unto death. We think ourselves invulnerable, don’t we. But it takes less pressure than we imagine to break us psychologically.

In Ps.30 the psalmist had become ill.   Since he thanks God for healing he must have been ill. And it was when he’d been brought low through his illness that he floundered. No longer did he crow, “I shall never be moved.” Now he was fragmented and was wondering if he could ever be put back together. Wholly vulnerable now, wholly defenceless, he looked in God’s direction, as it were, only to discover that there was no one to be seen. “Thou didst hide thy face.” (Ps.30:7) When his cocksureness had given way to desperation (it had never occurred to him to look to God when he was self-important) and he was floundering he decided he should look to God and find comfort in God’s face, since everywhere in scripture God’s face reflects God’s heart, a heart of mercy. To his horror he looked, and didn’t see God’s face; didn’t see anything – for, he tells us himself, God had hidden his face. If he had been able to voice his desperation in the words of Charles Wesley he could have cried out,

Oh, disclose thy lovely face.

Quicken all my drooping powers.

Gasps my fainting soul for grace

As a thirsty land for showers.

 

If he had had Wesley’s words wherewith to voice his desperation he might have cried out, “Lovely face? I can’t find any face.” “Thou didst hide thy face,” he laments in Ps.30, and then adds, “I was dismayed.”

Dismayed. The English word “dismayed” is derived from the Latin, dis-magare, to be denied all strength. Debilitated, destitute, defenceless. Invulnerable? He is nothing but vulnerable now. Can’t be moved, shaken, jarred or crushed? He’s pulverized now.

The psalmist’s suffering, and only his suffering, has brought him to his senses. His sickness has made him aware of his fragility; more importantly, his sickness and its attendant suffering has made him aware of God’s wrath, God’s judgement upon him. “Thou didst hide thy face.” Until he was sunk in suffering he never cared a whit about God’s face. Now he’d give anything to see God’s face, for if he could see God’s face he’d know God’s heart, know how things stood between him and God, know whether God was going to embrace him or flick him off, know whether God was going to smile upon him or grimace at the mention of his name. And at this moment God’s face is nowhere to be seen. His external affliction (whatever it was that had made him sick, together with the suffering this entailed) is now matched by an internal horror. Looking for God’s face, he sees nothing.

How bad was it? He tells us in verse 3: he had gone all the way down to Sheol, all the way down to the Pit. Sheol is the Hebrew expression for that realm of deadliness, deathliness, vacuity, so grim it couldn’t be grimmer. Sheol, the Pit, is “the pits.” It’s the sphere of icy, isolated bleakness so very icy, isolated and bleak that words can’t speak of it; just to think of it chills one. Sheol is that realm of existence where someone who used to think himself substantial now knows he’s but a shadow, no substance at all. He used to think himself clever; now he knows, if he knows anything for sure, that he knows nothing. He used to face life confidently; now he dreads the dregs of what used to be “life.” When the psalmist had sunk down into Sheol, the Pit, he was aware that he was so very low he couldn’t sink lower. He had hit bottom. His life lacked all brightness, all warmth, all vibrancy. It wasn’t even worth calling “life.” Now the psalmist was so very miserable that he feared he might not die.

 

IV: — There and then he blurted out, he tells us in verse 8; blurted out to the God whose face he couldn’t apprehend. Perhaps we are unimpressed by his “outblurt” since he wailed, “What profit for you is there in my death? How are you going to gain, God, by my everlasting misery? Is my sentence going to benefit you in any way? What will it do for you to leave me unrestored?” There’s something about the psalmist’s outblurt that irks us just because he appears not to be contrite yet; he appears to be a country mile away from genuine penitence. He says he’s in Sheol; he says he couldn’t be more devastated; he says he couldn’t sink lower, and yet there remains in him that residual pride that still thinks it can bargain with God somehow. He appears not to be like the publican in Luke 18 who can only plead, “God be merciful to me a sinner.” And yet so vast is God’s mercy, so incomprehensible his kindness, that God will accept any and all who turn to him out of any motive at all. William Temple, former archbishop of Canterbury and an acknowledged spiritual giant, used to say that God’s mercy is such astounding mercy that his mercy pardons even those who turn to him out of shabby motives still riddled with self-interest.

On second thought maybe we shouldn’t be too hard on the psalmist, because for sure he has one thing right: “If I go down to the dust (he’s starting to hear “dust to dust”,) will the dust praise thee? Will it tell of thy faithfulness?” What does he have right? He knows that the purpose of life, everyone’s life, is to praise God. The vocation to which all humankind is summoned is the vocation of bearing witness to God’s faithfulness. On the surface the psalmist is saying, “You’ve got to restore me, God, or else your own cause won’t look good and your own purpose will remain unfulfilled. If you restore me then you and I both gain.” On the surface he seems to be saying something as crass as this. More profoundly, however, in his suffering he has recalled what he’d forgotten in his prosperity; namely, that only as he is restored will he be able to do once more what he should never have ceased doing: praising the God who is creator and redeemer, bearing witness to the unimpeachable faithfulness of God, announcing to any and all that there is none like the Holy One of Israel who cherished him the moment he was conceived and will watch over him for ever. The psalmist climaxes his cry to God with the plea, “Hear, O Lord, and be gracious to me. O Lord, be thou my helper.”

His change of heart is evident: he is a self-confessed sinner standing in the need of a grace he can never merit. Only God’s undeserved mercy can restore him. Only God’s sovereign kindness can resurrect him. “Nothing in my hand I bring” a hymnwriter was to pen for him centuries later, “Simply to thy cross – mercy – I cling.” “We have no other argument,” sang Charles Wesley, “We have no other plea; it is enough that Jesus died, and that he died ‘for me.’” Regardless of how self-serving the psalmist might sound to us, his outcry, “Be gracious to me,” means “I have nothing to plead, no excuses to make; ‘Nothing in my hand I bring.’”

“O Lord, be thou my helper.” Contrary to what the English might suggest the psalmist isn’t asking for help, assistance, aid. Help is just that: help, boosting, abetting. “Be thou my help” doesn’t mean “Give me a hand and I can do the rest myself.” “Be thou my help” means “I am utterly helpless, and as long as I am helpless my predicament is hopeless.” “Be thou my help” doesn’t mean he needs a hand; it means that like Lazarus his fellow Israelite he needs nothing less than resurrection, resurrection from the dead. After all, he’s in Sheol, isn’t he?

 

IV: — What was the result of his cry to God? The psalmist tells us in the exuberant exclamations that begin and end Psalm 30. The section of the psalm we began with tonight – the blessing and bane of prosperity – is found in the middle of the psalm. This middle part is “book-ended” by his praise and gratitude. Myself, I’m convinced that the horror of his dismay was so very horrible that he dares to think about it only if “book-ends” a recollected dismay with a present awareness, throbbing awareness, of God’s mercy and patience, of God’s effectual restoration. “I will extol thee, O God” (verse 1), “for thou hast drawn me up.” (RSV) More simply, “You lifted me.” (NIV) His imagery here is that of a bucket being drawn up from a well.   To be drawn up from a well is to be delivered from a predicament which we can’t escape by ourselves; it’s also to be delivered from a predicament that threatens to engulf us.

The psalmist knew his prosperity-quickened cocksureness had plunged him into the well. He had only himself to blame. He knew just as surely that while he alone had gotten himself in, he couldn’t get himself out. He had to be drawn out, lifted, as surely as our Lord Jesus Christ had to raise Lazarus from the dead and was himself resurrected from the dead for our sakes. The primary result of the psalmist’s cry is that God reached down into the Pit and lifted him up.

Accompanying this event were three collateral results.

[1] The psalmist becomes aware that God’s anger is but for a moment, while his favour is for a lifetime. We mustn’t misread these words and trivialize them, as if the psalmist were saying, “Do you know what I found out? God’s anger is real to be sure, but he’s over it quickly. All we have to do is let him blow off a little steam for a few seconds and we’ll find him as benign as ever. He storms up quickly, but the storm blows over just as quickly.” The psalmist is more profound than this. He means, “God’s favour is his eternal purpose. His anger – real, severe, never to be trifled with; his anger always serves his favour.” In scripture the purpose of God’s anger characteristically is to educate and correct. Luther used to say that God’s anger is his love burning hot. In other words, God’s anger is the expression his love takes when God wants to get our attention and therefore needs to shake us up, all for the sake of correcting us.   This is what the psalmist means by “His anger is but for a moment, his favour for a lifetime.”

With the same force he says, “Weeping may tarry for the night, but joy comes with the morning.” Weeping is what God quickens in us when we need to repent but see no need to repent, until his anger gives us reason to weep. But weeping is never God’s ultimate purpose for us. He causes us to weep only for the sake of his ultimate purpose: to make our hearts rejoice.

[2] Another collateral result: because God has restored him the psalmist’s enemies haven’t been allowed to gloat over him. He is sure, as is the older testament as a whole, that our ultimate enemies aren’t the people who are hostile to us; our real enemies are those who are hostile to God and who endeavour to subvert his kingdom. Elsewhere the psalmist cries (Psalm 139) “Your enemies are my enemies.” Please note this carefully. The psalmist doesn’t say, “My enemies are your enemies; therefore please clobber them for me.” Instead he knows that real enmity is defined by the kingdom of God . The psalmist’s real enemies are first God’s enemies and are the psalmist’s enemies only because they are God’s enemies.

When the psalmist says that God has drawn him up from the Pit; God’s stabbing him awake, bringing him to his senses and thereby inducing his repentance; God’s doing this prevents God’s enemies from gloating over the fact that they now have the psalmist in their clutches and in fact have captured him forever. In restoring the psalmist, God has defeated God’s own enemies; in defeating his own enemies God has defeated the psalmist’s enemies. The real force of “Thou hast not let my foes rejoice over me” is “In restoring me, O God, you have deprived your enemies of all grounds for snickering and sneering at you. In restoring me you have vindicated yourself. And because you have vindicated yourself, your enemies can’t rejoice at you. And since I am your child, the same enemies, now mine as well, can’t rejoice at me.”

[3] A third collateral result: the psalmist’s restoration gives rise to his elation, and as his elation overflows in thanksgiving and praise the entire community is summoned to thank God and praise God together with the psalmist. To be sure, it’s the psalmist specifically whose prosperity took him down and it’s the psalmist specifically whom God seized and shook and restored. Nevertheless, the entire community should understand that it is as vulnerable as the psalmist was vulnerable. Moreover, the entire community is always in danger of being infected through the sin of one its members. Therefore the psalmist’s repentance and restoration can only have farthest-reaching consequences for the entire community. “Sing praises to the Lord, O you his saints [plural – ‘All of you!’], and give thanks to his holy name.”

True faith never claims experiential privilege. True faith never says, “I have been spiritually where you haven’t been, even where you can’t come, and I’ve been admitted to spiritual intimacies and wonders that you know nothing of. Therefore I can glow and you can’t.” True faith, rather, is always aware that any one individual’s engagement with God has profoundest implications for the entire community. Yes, Moses alone ascended Sinai and endured for forty days a visitation from God that was appalling and appealing in equal measure, an immediacy whose intimacy and intensity no vocabulary could ever capture. Nevertheless the Sinai event is pregnant for the entire community. For when Moses descended the mountain the Sinai event (together with the Exodus that preceded it) thereafter became the “root” event in Israel ’s life in which every last Jewish person remains rooted to this day. And when Moses descended the mountain he brought with him the Ten Words without which the subsequent history of the world is unimaginable.

The apostle Paul was admitted to the “third heaven,” as he puts it, where heard things “that cannot be told, what man may not utter.” There was vouchsafed to him an “abundance of revelations.” Vouchsafed to him simply for private enjoyment? Never. This intense intimacy with God wasn’t an experiential privilege devoid of significance for anyone else. His admission to the “third heaven” has everything to do with his apostolic commission. His immersion in “what cannot be told” equips him and fortifies him for that apostolic work which is undertaken in the cruciform “weakness” that Paul was stuck with all his life and in the midst of which he had to prove over and over that God’s grace was sufficient for him. Ultimately, of course, it’s the entire Gentile church that joins with Paul in thanking and praising God as surely the entire community joined with the psalmist.

Only Peter, James and John were with Jesus on the mount when they were admitted to wonders and mysteries and ecstasies that no vocabulary can comprehend. But the point wasn’t that they were merely to glow in it as if inwardly lit by a never-failing Duracell battery. Rather by it they were equipped to descend the mountain and immerse themselves in human strife and suffering, not the least of which was a young man whose convulsions deranged him repeatedly, threatened to kill him, and tormented his helpless father.

The psalmist, in Psalm 30, knows that his restoration impels his thanksgiving and praise to God, even as it impels the same response from the entire community. For the psalmist, now restored, is thereafter commissioned a witness to God’s power to restore. And the community, now a witness to the restoration of one of its members, is also commissioned a witness to God’s power to restore.

 

V: — The last point to be made tonight: as we ponder together the theme of restoration, and think particularly of the God who restores, we must probe the relation between restoration and rest. Prior to the Fall of humankind “rest” was rest. God rested on the Sabbath. Even so, prior to the Fall, we mustn’t think that “rest” thereby meant “vegging,” utter inactivity. We are often told (incorrectly) that God created the universe in six days. At the end of day six he was finished creating, with the result that on the seventh day he did nothing. This notion is wrong. The creation story in Genesis one tells us that God finished creating on the seventh day. God finished creating on the Sabbath, not prior to the Sabbath. God completed his work of creating on the seventh day. God climaxed and crowned his work on the seventh day, and for this reason hallowed the Sabbath. In other words “rest” in scripture never means “vegging;” “rest” never means “doing nothing.” “Rest” means “completing, crowning, bringing to fulfilment.”

In the wake of the Fall, however, it isn’t a good creation, unqualifiedly good as good from God’s hand, that is to be completed. In the wake of the Fall a good creation now devastated on account of sin has to be restored. Therefore in the wake of the Fall “rest” means “restoration.” “Rest” is now “fulfilment by way of restoration. “Rest” means a restoration that is essential if the creation’s God-intended fulfilment is to be recovered.

In Matthew 11 Jesus says, “Come unto me all who are weary and worn, sick and tired, frazzled and frantic and fed up; come to me and I will give you rest.” Give us utter inactivity? Give us room to “veg?” “Come to me and I will restore you so that God’s intention for you, the fulfilment of his purpose for you; all of this will be recovered.

In Hebrews 4 we are told, “There remains a Sabbath rest for the people of God.” God has promised his people that restoration which is nothing less than the fulfilment of his purpose for us recovered in the wake of our fallen condition. If such restoration is his promise to us and is therefore guaranteed; if this is what we are awaiting, why not anticipate it? Why not begin to live in it and delight in it now?

The psalmist’s suffering brought him to his senses. Now “smartened up,” he sought and was granted that restoration which left him and his congregation rejoicing, praising, singing. Then you and I should pray that God will seize us and shake us until we too come to our senses. For in our prosperity have not you and I said, and said more than once, “I shall never be moved”? And in God’s merciful providence, haven’t we been dismayed? And shouldn’t we now look to God and plead his help?

As we do, we shall find ourselves exclaiming with our 3000 year-old friend, “You have turned my mourning into dancing,” even as we invite the entire congregation to which we belong to join us in the praise and adoration of our great God and Saviour who invariably does all things well.

 

The Reverend Dr. V. Shepherd                                                                                               July 2004

Marriage

 (FAITH TODAY October 2003)

Marriage

 

“Is it a boy or a girl?” The first question asked concerning a newborn seems pointless since we do nothing with the answer but immediately discuss something else about the babe. But in fact the question is profound, for everybody knows, deep-down, that gender-specificity is essential to our humanness. If the question, “Boy or girl?”, were answered, “Neither”, the questioner would wonder if the neonate were actually human.

A careful reading of Scripture’s creation narratives informs us that the distinction between male and female is the only distinction (among all that differentiate people today) that God has embedded irrevocably in the creation itself. Other distinctions — alienating differences, for instance, of economics, learning, social position — can be overcome and should. For this reason the distinction between learned and ignorant is overcome by socially-sanctioned public education; that between rich and poor by government-mandated income tax and financial redistribution.

In the Genesis accounts the creation of land, water, vegetation, planets and animals is pronounced “good”, whereas the creation of man and woman is pronounced “very good” and is “blessed.” In other words, the man-woman complementarity (“complementarity” by definition restricted to two, and therefore always different from a “mutuality” that accommodates more than two persons of the same gender) is built into the creation, cannot be eradicated, and must not be denied or disdained. This complementarity isn’t an accident of history or a social convention.   Neither is it evil or inherently inhibiting. Marriage, rather, is a God-ordained relationship that can’t be duplicated. It penetrates to our innermost core as no other human bond can. Its companionship is uniquely our creaturely comfort and consolation.

According to God’s plan and purpose marriage is the union of one man and one woman in a lifelong bond that death alone terminates. Marriage is God’s provision for that utterly intimate and intense, consistent and constant human community that humankind craves. Many alternatives for this community may be pursued unwisely even as no substitute for it can be found. While married people are certainly part of a wider community (church, friendships, society) that presupposes inclusivity, exclusivity remains essential to marriage: “open” marriage is a contradiction in terms, since “complementarity”, unlike mutuality, permits only “two” to become “one”, “one flesh.” (“Trial marriage”, like “trial parachute jump”, is a contradiction in terms. The parachutist is either still in the plane — in which case she hasn’t jumped at all — or else she’s in the air — in which case “trial” is inappropriate. “Trial marriage” is simply no marriage at all. As much could be said about common law “marriage.” Marriage entails a legal bond that is publicly attested.)

In a mystery that, like all mysteries, is a commonly experienced reality so very profound as to be beyond explanation, sexual intercourse between a man and a woman not merely expresses such a union but effects it. Scripture’s horror at sexual promiscuity is rooted in its conviction that sexual intimacy is far more than appetite and its relief; sexual intimacy pertains to the binding of two persons to each other, not simply to the linking of body parts. Scripture, of course, concomitantly recognizes the absurd yet sad polygamy/polyandry that promiscuity occasions. For this reason marriage requires an exclusivity apart from which there is no “coupled” unit that simultaneously participates in the inclusivities that God has ordained.

“One flesh” means one, unitary organism of body, mind and spirit. It doesn’t mean that we become clones of each other or mere functions of each other. It doesn’t mean that personality and individuation have been surrendered. Yet neither does it mean that our new union can be likened to two blocks of wood now glued together. For regardless of how tightly glued they might be they never interpenetrate each other. A “one flesh” union, rather, must be likened to a tree-graft. The graft occurs when two living organisms are opened up to each other, are allowed to pervade and suffuse each other, immerse themselves in each other — and thereafter are fused forever. As this occurs a fruitfulness appears that otherwise never would. (Lifelong friendships may appear similar but of course lack crucial features: gender-complementarity, public attestation, legal sanction, and “one flesh” specifically.)

When two trees are grafted together each is first slashed sharply, thereby exposing what was previously hidden and laying bare the innermost substance of each. In this development what each possesses uniquely is made available inimitably to the other. At the same time the slash undeniably renders each tree vulnerable. Plainly, vulnerability is the condition of any union worthy of the description, “one flesh”. If two people are to be married in that union of which our Lord speaks then there must be defenceless openness and self-forgetful self-exposure, together with the sober recognition that the fearsomeness of this rent is the condition of the fusion’s fruitfulness. And at the same time it must be recognized that once a tree-graft has occurred, separation of the parties to the graft is nothing less than dismemberment. Divorce, even when necessary, remains a manifestation of death.

  Everyone’s marriage is molested by sin. Individually and collectively our humanity is distorted by depravities within and dangers without. Then marriage remains resilient, in the face of such depravities and dangers, only as it “borrows from” God’s undiscourageable, undeflectable love for Israel, which love God speaks of as “marriage. Christ himself speaks of his self-renouncing bond with the Church as the model and inspiration of marriage. And since when the faithfulness of the Triune God meets our sin it assumes the form of forgiveness, marriage thrives as we extend a pardon that has been quickened by the greater pardon we’ve already received. We must recall God’s covenant-faithfulness to us whenever our proximity to each other fosters friction and magnifies irritability.

Then marriage endures by self-renouncing faithfulness. The current myth is that it endures by sentiment. Marriage must continue to thrive even on those occasions — whether short-lived or protracted — when two people are feeling less than enraptured.

A corollary to faithfulness is patience. When grass turns brown in the summer sensible people don’t tear up the lawn; they know that in another month the heat will pass and the lawn become green again. Impatience here is not only inappropriate but destructive; it indicates not so much silliness as folly.

   Finally we must remember that while marriage promises what is to be found nowhere else in the creation it cannot provide what it was never meant to; namely, that profoundest contentment found only in God. To expect husband or wife to provide what no human partner can; to expect husband or wife to give what only God supplies is to burden marriage unrealistically.

And we should remember too while unmarried people are deprived of marital intimacy, their deprivation of this creaturely intimacy in no way disadvantages them before God or renders them less usable in his kingdom. Their singleness, offered to God in the spirit of self-renunciation, is a sacrifice he most surely honours.

The truth is, all of us, married and unmarried, always need to hear and heed and cling to him whose burden is light, whose yoke is easy, and whose name is the only name given to us whereby we may be saved.

 

Funeral Address forThe Reverend Mr. Brian Robinson

       Funeral Address

                                                                                                      for

                                                                       The Reverend Mr. Brian Robinson

 

   – I –                                                                        

Earlier this week I arrived home from teaching at Tyndale Seminary, after supper, and Maureen informed me of the death of my friend and fellow-minister, Brian Robinson. I was stunned. Because of the way the intra-psychic grooves are worn in my “noodle” I found myself thinking immediately of the untimely death of George Whitefield, the powerful 18th Century evangelist and colleague of John Wesley. Wesley was born in 1703, Whitefield in 1714. Wesley would die by slipping away quietly, over several days, at the age of 88. Whitefield would die very suddenly of heart trouble at age 56.

Whitefield had crossed the Atlantic thirteen times. The odd number — thirteen — tells you that he died in the New World and was buried there. He went to his reward on September 30, 1770. Because Whitefield died in the New World (Newburyport, Massachusetts) Wesley didn’t learn of his friend’s death until November 10 — six weeks later. Wesley was asked to preach at a memorial service in England; at three of them, in fact.

Finding myself thinking of Wesley’s reaction to the news of Whitefield’s death, I turned up Wesley’s “funeral” sermon (as he called it) for his friend. I was startled, upon reading it again after not having read it for several years, at how much it gathered up exactly what I wanted to say in commemoration of Brian Robinson.

In order to prepare his “funeral” sermon Wesley retreated from his itinerant ministry and secluded himself for a week, writing in his journal, “It was an awful season” — in every sense of “awful.”

The day of the funeral Wesley appeared, sermon in hand, and told the congregation that a major purpose of his address was to “inquire how we may improve (18th Century English for “profit from”) this awful providence, George Whitefield’s sudden removal from us.”

As I re-read Wesley’s address I noted that his depiction of Whitefield fitted Brian Robinson over and over.

[1] Wesley’s first point: although in the pulpit Whitefield didn’t shrink from reminding hearers of the “whole counsel of God,” including the judgement of God, still, said Wesley, “George had nothing gloomy in his nature, being singularly cheerful, as well as charitable and tender-hearted.” Cheerful (I never met Brian when he wasn’t cheerful), charitable, tender-hearted.

[2] “George had a heart susceptible of the most generous and most tender friendship.” I met Brian in 1988, knew him for fifteen years, and counted him a tender, generous friend.

[3] Whitefield’s demeanour was “frank and open,” but not frank with the frankness that is simply rude, said Wesley; yet frank and open so as never to be cunning or false.

[4] Whitefield’s frankness and openness, continued Wesley, were the both the fruit and the proof of his courage. Brian and I stood shoulder to shoulder in the most turbulent days of our denomination, and I noted that Brian never lacked courage.

[5] Whitefield was flexible, insisted Wesley, pliable, accommodating — but “immovable in the things of God”, immovable in matters of “conscience.”

[6] The foundation of George’s “integrity, sincerity, courage and patience” wasn’t his education (although he was educated;) and it wasn’t his friendships (although he benefited from many); rather it was, said Wesley, “no other than faith in a bleeding Lord.”

Having said this much about Whitefield (as I have said in equal measure about Brian), Wesley asked his hearers, “But how shall we improve (profit from) this awful providence?” — and answered, “By keeping close to Whitefield’s doctrines, and by keeping close to Whitefield’s spirit.”

What were Whitefield’s doctrines?

  1. humankind’s total inability to save itself, its total lack of merit by which it would deserve to be saved.
  2. Jesus Christ as the sole meritorious cause of our blessing, “in particular of our pardon and acceptance with God.”
  3. Justification, by which we are given new standing before God and are restored to God’s favour.
  4. The New Birth, by which we are given a new nature from God and are restored to God’s image.

Don’t Whitefield’s doctrines square with Brian’s? They certainly do with the Brian I knew and loved.

Still, said Wesley, if we keep close to Whitefield’s doctrines only we merely increase our condemnation. Therefore we must keep close to Whitefield’s spirit as well. And Whitefield’s spirit, said Wesley, was catholic love. For decades Whitefield had embraced Christians who were zealous for their Lord and his gospel regardless of denominational affiliation. Whitefield was an Anglican, but he was always at home among Presbyterians and Congregationalists and Baptists, at home among any and all who loved their Lord “with love undying”, in the words of Paul. Wesley spoke of Whitefield’s “catholic love” as “that sincere and tender affection which is due to all those who, we have reason to believe, are children of God by faith; in other words, all those in every persuasion who ‘fear God and work righteousness’…of whatever opinion, mode of worship, or congregation.”

Only two weeks ago Brian contacted me concerning his visit to the USA on behalf of the Association of Church Renewal, the organization whose meetings he had attended for years and in which he cherished and was cherished by Christians from every branch of the church catholic.

                                                                          – II –

I met Brian at an early meeting of the community of the Community of Concern in May, 1988, in the wake of the single largest crisis to come upon The United Church of Canada. He won my heart instantly, for Brian knew that conflict, both theological conflict and institutional conflict, couldn’t be avoided however distasteful conflict always is.

If conflict is inevitable for all Christians at some point then the most important matter facing the Christian is the matter of armour. With what are we to arm ourselves? The apostle Paul discusses the armour suitable for Christ’s people in Ephesians 6. The only offensive weapon he mentions is “the sword of the Spirit.” He lists several items of defensive armour, one of which is the “shield of faith.” This shield, he insists, is able to nullify “all the flaming arrows of the evil one.”

In Paul’s day arrows were dipped in tar and then ignited. A soldier without a shield would be skewered and burnt immediately. The apostle knew that life hurls countless “flaming arrows:” we are exquisitely vulnerable creatures. “Flaming arrows”?   We need think only of sudden and intense affliction, protracted illness, crushing disappointment, betrayal, knee-shaking temptation. In all of this faith, and faith alone (i.e., our bond to Jesus Christ in his presence and power) is our defence, our security, our life.

All of us have had to contend with major stress or threat looming at us from one direction only to be speared and seared by something coming from another direction. We weren’t looking for the second assault, didn’t expect it, and weren’t equipped for it on account of our preoccupation with the frontal adversity. Confusion and disorientation — panic even — were soon upon us.

Yet, exclaims the apostle, faith is the shield that nullifies all flaming arrows. He has in mind the Parthian army’s defeat of a Roman army in 53 B.C.E. The Parthians, under General Surenas (a military genius), fired arrows in a high trajectory upon their Roman foes. The Roman soldiers held their shields above their heads while the projectiles rained down upon them — at which point the Parthians fired a second salvo straight ahead, chest high. While their opponents were still reacting to the second salvo, a third, in a high trajectory, fell down on them once again. Their shields couldn’t protect them against attack from two directions simultaneously. Moreover, because all these arrows had been dipped in pitch and then ignited, as soon as an arrow stuck in a shield it set the shield on fire. Attack from above, attack from in front, the soldiers’ protection aflame: they were helpless, and their situation was hopeless. Demoralization soon guaranteed one of the worst military defeats Rome would ever know. With this item of recent history in mind the apostle repeats yet again, “Faith in Jesus Christ is sufficient in the face of all life’s flaming arrows.”

When the apostle spoke of the shield of faith he was drawing even more from his treasure-store of military lore. As a Roman army advanced, each soldier’s shield, carried on the left arm, protected two-thirds of his own body and one-third of the body of the man on his left. Every soldier counted on the man on his right to protect the right-most one-third of his body that would otherwise be fatally exposed. How many people profited from the spiritual protection that Brian’s faith-shield afforded? And what a privilege it was for some of us to afford him the protection we were commissioned to provide.

There is one thing more we need to know about the shield of faith. When the mothers of Sparta sent their sons off to battle their last word was, “Come home with your shield, or come home on it; but don’t come home without it.” If their soldier-son came home without his shield then plainly he had surrendered. In disgrace now, it would be better for him not to come home at all. If, however, he came home with his shield, then he had triumphed gloriously. And if he came home on it, then he had fallen nobly in battle and was now borne home with honour. The same shield that equipped the soldier in life brought him home, with honour, in death. Faith is the shield on which Christ’s soldier is carried home.

 

– III –

When I learned of Brian’s death earlier this week I had been thinking of Easter Sunday and what I was going to say then. Several weeks ago I had decided that I was going to preach on the text from 1st Corinthians 15: “If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile and you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished… and we are of all men most to be pitied.”

Paul’s logic is faultless. If Christ hasn’t been raised, then death has the last word; death is the last word, for everyone. Romantics may disguise death romantically and pretend any number of silly things about death, but such people are mere romantics: they invent groundless fantasy.

But Christ has been raised from the dead. The trust that you and I have placed in him isn’t misplaced, can’t be misplaced. We can entrust our departed loved one, Brian, to the care and keeping of God who now preserves him as surely as he has preserved his own son.

Christ has been raised from the dead. We are not deluded folk living in an illusion. We live in truth, and will never have to be pitied, let alone pitied above all others.

 

– IV –

Wesley again. At the service where he spoke of his departed friend, Wesley reminded hearers that his own heart had been drawn to Whitefield 35 years earlier as he came to love Whitefield with uncommon affection. Wesley’s terse comment on the love that Whitefield had awakened in him was, “Can anything but love beget love?”

Years earlier Whitefield himself had anticipated his own passing. His remark concerning his own death and that of others was equally pithy and profound: “For the Christian, instant death means instant glory.”

Anticipating both Wesley and Whitefield and all who love Jesus Christ with love undying the apostle Paul had cried, “Be sure to take the shield of faith.”

Faith is still the shield on which the saint is taken home, taken home with honour. And taken home how quickly? “Instant death, instant glory.” And what has brought you and me to this service today? Love. Love for Brian who also loved us. Above all, love for our Lord who first loved us. For — “Can anything but love beget love?”
Victor Shepherd        April 2003

NEW ZEALAND TRIAL

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
AUCKLAND REGISTRY

                                                                                              CP NO. 183/SW01

BETWEEN     VILIAMI ‘AKAU’OLA

First Plaintiff

AND                VILIAMI PALU

Second Plaintiff

AND               THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE METHODIST CHURCH OF NEW ZEALAND

First Defendant

AND               THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION OF THE METHODIST CHURCH OF NEW ZEALAND INCORPORATED

Second Defendant

AND                REVEREND PESETI TUKUTAU

Third Defendant

 

 

OPINION OF VICTOR SHEPHERD

 

 

VALLANT HOOKER & PARTNERS
Barristers & Solicitors
Ponsonby,
Auckland

Solicitor Acting: R J Hooker
PO Box 47 088; DX CP30015, Ponsonby
Ph:   (09) 360 0321
Fax: (09) 3609291

l:\docman\docbase\shepherd.opinion.doc

I, VICTOR SHEPHERD state:-

  1. I was instructed by Counsel for the plaintiffs in these proceedings to provide expert testimony to the court on one of the issues before the Court namely whether  a decision by the conference of the New Zealand Methodist church to admit a person into full connexion as a minister  a person who was a practising homosexual is to alter or change the doctrines of the Methodist Church of New Zealand as found in the standard sermons of John Wesley and his notes on the New Testament. For the reasons set out in this opinion I conclude that the decision of the New Zealand Conference is to change or alter doctrine.
  2. I was provided with the following passages of the Laws and Regulations of the New Zealand Methodist Church :-

“AUTHORITY
1.1       The Conference is the governing body of the Methodist Church of New Zealand and has vested in it final authority on all matters of the
Church.  Its decisions are accordingly final and binding on both Ministry
and Laity.

1.2       Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 5-1.1  Conference shall have no power:-
(a)        To revoke, alter or change any doctrines of the Church as
contained in the Standard Sermons of John Wesley and his notes on
the New Testament, nor to establish any new doctrine contrary thereto;
(b)       To revoke “The General Rules of the Societies”;
(c)       To make such changes in the discipline as to do away with the
itinerancy of the Ministry;
(d)        To do away with the right of trial and appeal of Members and
Ministers of the Church;”

Property
3.2(h) Seeing that the property in the Parish is not used for
any purpose forbidden by the Laws if the Church or for any purposes,
entertainments or amusements which conflict with the purpose for
which the Church was called into being, or contrary to what is contained in the Standard Sermons of John Wesley and his Notes on the New Testament.”

 

  BACKGROUND & EXPERTISE

  3.    I currently occupy the Donald N. and Kathleen G. Bastian Chair of Wesley Studies, Tyndale Seminary, Toronto . It is the only Chair of Wesley Studies in Canada . At Tyndale Seminary I am also Professor of Historical Theology. I am also Adjunct Professor, Toronto School of Theology, University of Toronto . I attach my full curriculum vitae. I have been accepted by a Court in Canada as an expert witness on the doctrines of the Methodist Church found in the writings of John Wesley.

 

REFERENCES

  1. In formulating my opinion it is necessary to have regard to the following notes sermons and writings of John Wesley:-

ROMANS 1:26-28

Therefore God gave them up with vile affections; for even their women changed their natural use to that which is against nature: (27)And likewise also men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust toward each other, men with men working filthiness, and receiving in themselves the just recompense of their error. (28)And as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them up to an undiscerning mind, to do the things which were not expedient: Filled with all injustice, fornication…….

Wesley comments on Romans 1:26 , “Therefore God gave them up to vile affections—To which the heathen Romans were then abandoned to the last degree; even the emperors themselves.”

Here Wesley is plainly referring to the well-attested fact that several Roman emperors behaved sexually in a way that was not exclusively heterosexual (if at all). Their behaviour was known and noted among Christians in that Christians were notorious for an understanding of human sexuality that repudiated any and all sexual expressions except marital intercourse. Wesley mentions women as well as men, since any non-marital (and therefore non-heterosexual intercourse) was understood throughout the Church as falling outside what God has ordained as proper sexual expression and therefore pertaining to the human good. Note that Wesley speaks of same-gender genital intimacy as “vile” and an instance of “filthiness”(27).

Wesley comments on 1:27 , “Receiving the just recompense of their error—Their idolatry: being punished with that unnatural lust, which was as horrible a dishonour of the body, as their idolatry was to God.”

“Unnatural lust” plainly refers to same-gender sexual craving, and Wesley maintains that it dishonours the body (implying that it thereby dishonours the Creator of that body) and as such dishonours god. Here he associates idolatry with “men with men working filthiness”. “Working” indicates what these men do. In calling it “error” he does not mean that it is non-culpable or a trifle or an inadvertence.

Wesley comments on Romans 1:28 , “God gave them up to an undiscerning mind (treated of, ver.32)to things not expedient–Even the vilest abominations: treated of, ver.20-31.”

Then Wesley continues, in his exposition of 29-31, to list “Every vice contrary to justice”. He mentions fornication first. “Fornication here includes every species of uncleanness.” Plainly the “vile affections”(26) and “that which is against nature”(26) and “men…burned in their lust toward each other, men with men working filthiness” is gathered up in “uncleanness”.

Romans 1:28 he discusses in his comment on Romans 1:32 , “But have pleasure in those that practise them — This is the greatest wickedness. A man may be hurried by his passions to do the things he hates. But he that has pleasure in those that do evil, loves wickedness for wickedness’ sake; and hereby he encourages them in sin, and heaps the guilt of others upon his own head.”

Here Wesley, with pastoral wisdom and sensitivity, distinguishes between the unguarded person whose surge of desire overtakes him in the very thing he knows he should hate and the person who finds pleasure in others who do evil, loves the wickedness itself, thereby encourages perpetrators in their wickedness, and brings the guilt of others upon himself. To be sure, Wesley is not restricting the application of his comment to “uncleanness”, but he certainly includes such “uncleanness”.

– – – –

In his Sermons Wesley amplifies Romans 1:26, wherein same-gender genital intimacy is referred to, “The will…was now seized by legions of vile affections”. [4:298]

ROMANS 2:14

For when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these not having the law, are a law to themselves;

Wesley comments, “Do by nature–That is, without an outward rule; though this also, strictly speaking, is by preventing [i.e., prevenient, anticipatory] grace. The things contained in the law–The ten commandments being only the substance of the law of nature….”

By “Being only the substance of the law of nature” Wesley means “not less than the substance of the law of nature.” (For Wesley’s understanding of relation of the ten commandments to Jesus Christ, see V.Shepherd’s document below.) Wesley is aware that the ten commandments explicitly forbid adultery. He insists too (see V.Shepherd) that the ten commands are but the “heads” of the law of God; i.e., the commandment forbidding adultery comprehends all of the Old Testament precepts pertaining to sexual behaviour, including those that forbid homosexual genital intimacy. (E.g., “You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination.” Leviticus 18:22 RSV) Wesley’s understanding of the ten commandments as but the “heads” of the law or God precludes any suggestion that adultery is forbidden but homosexual intimacy is not.

In his comment on Romans 1:28 Wesley speaks of any and all “uncleanness” as “vilest abominations.” He cannot be understood to endorse or even permit homosexual behaviour.

ROMANS 2:16

In the day when God will judge the secretes of men by Christ Jesus, according to my gospel.

Wesley comments, “According to my gospel–According to the tenor of that gospel which is committed to my care. The gospel also is a law.”

His lattermost remark, “The gospel also is a law”, is crucial. The gospel is the good news of salvation, and as such exercises no less a claim upon people than the explicit claims of the law. Since the gospel aims at saving humankind from every kind of uncleanness, the gospel has the same force here as the promulgation of the law. Accordingly, all references to “gospel” or “Jesus Christ” in the Wesley corpus carry with them the implicit claim that all beneficiaries of the gospel (i.e., all who make a profession of Christian faith) repudiate all expressions of “uncleanness”.

1ST CORINTHIANS 6:9

Know ye not that the unjust shall not inherit the kingdom of God ? Be not deceived: neither fornicators, nor idolators, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor Sodomites.

Here Wesley explicitly mentions sodomy as disqualification for the kingdom of God . To be sure, he reads “effeminate” idiosyncratically as those who “live in any easy, indolent way, taking up no cross, enduring no hardship”. His point is that these latter people are no less disqualified than “idolators and Sodomites”.

He comments on this verse, “But why are these good-natured, harmless people ranked with idolators and Sodomites? To teach us that we are never secure from the greatest sins, till we guard against those which are thought least; nor indeed till we think no sin is little since every one is a step towards hell.”

Evidently he intends here the following: [1] all self-indulgence is sin; [2] only vigilance against lesser sin will safeguard us against the “greatest sins”; [3] every sin is a road whose destination is hell.

Notwithstanding his idiosyncratic reading of “effeminate” he states [1] sodomy is sin, and (among) the “greatest”; [2] lesser and greater alike, undiscerned, unrepented of, unrepudiated will issue in eternal loss.

1ST CORINTHIANS 6:11

And such were some of you: but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God.

Wesley comments, “And such were some of you: but ye are washed from those gross evils; and inwardly sanctified, not before, but in consequence of, your being justified in the name, that is, by the merits of the Lord Jesus, through which your sins are forgiven; and by the Spirit of our God, by whom ye are thus washed and sanctified.”

Wesley includes adultery and sodomy as “gross evils”. He emphasises, “not before, but in consequence of”, the fact that the cleansing of the sodomite Corinthians presupposes and in fact is intrinsically related to their having been justified (for Wesley, this means pardoned or forgiven). Pardon, of course, always presupposes guilt; forgiveness always presupposes relief from merited condemnation. The person who is pardoned has already been pronounced guilty. In his “through which your sins are forgiven” Wesley obviously includes sodomy as sin.

– – – –

In his Sermons Wesley amplifies 1st Corinthians 6:9, “And we know that not only fornicators and adulterers, but even the ‘soft and effeminate’, the delicate followers of a self-denying master, ‘shall have no part in the kingdom of Christ and of God’.” [3:150]

Elsewhere in the Sermons Wesley, again amplifying the biblical text mentioned above, faults the abuse of “the imputed righteousness of Christ” wherein someone who stands indicted by the catena of sins in 1st Cor. 6:9 claims the righteousness of Christ “as a over for his unrighteousness. We have known this done a thousand times. Such a person “…replies with all assurance, ‘…I pretend to no righteousness of my own: Christ is my righteousness”…. “And thus though a man be as far from the practice as from the tempers [Wesley characteristically uses this word to mean “dispositions’] of a Christian, though he neither has the mind which was in Christ nor in any respect walks as he walks…”. Again, Wesley regards all non-heterosexual expression to be inconsistent with Christian discipleship (“walk”). [1:462]

In speaking of life-change effected in the Corinthians through gospel as they repudiated their former behaviour, Wesley comments in the Sermons, “So the Corinthians were. ‘Ye are washed,’ says the Apostle, ‘ye are sanctified:’ namely cleansed from ‘fornication, idolatry, drunkenness’, and all other outward sin.” Wesley regards what the Corinthians had been about to be sin. [1:326]

1ST TIMOTHY 1:8-10

(8)We know the law is good, if a man use it lawfully; (9)Knowing this , that the law doth no lie against a righteous man; but against the lawless and disobedient, against the ungodly and sinners, the unholy and profane, against killers of their fathers or their mothers, against murderers, (11)Against whoremongers, sodomites, men-stealers, liars, perjured person, and if there be any other thing that is contrary to wholesome doctrine.

In his comment Wesley says nothing about “whoremongers” and “sodomites”, in his taste to denounce the practice of slavery (“men-stealers”). Still, his comment on verse 8 is noteworthy: “We grant the whole Mosaic law is good, answers excellent purposes, if a man use it in a proper manner. The ceremonial is good, as it points to Christ; and the moral law is holy, just and good, and of admirable use to convince unbelievers, and to guide believers in all holiness.” It is to be noted here that [1] the moral law includes the prohibition against sodomy; [2] sodomy is a sign of unbelief; [3] since sodomy is a contradiction of holiness, those aspiring to holiness repudiate it by using the law lawfully. (1:8)

In his comment on 1st Timothy 1:9 Wesley says, “The law doth not lie against a righteous man, (doth not strike or condemn him,)but against the lawless and disobedient — They who despise the authority of the Lawgiver, violate the first commandment, which is the foundation of the law, the ground of all obedience. Against the ungodly and sinners, who break the second commandment, worshipping idols, instead of the true God. The unholy and profane¸ who break the third commandment by taking his name in vain.” Wesley includes sodomy in the “lawless and disobedient”, and he goes on to show that the perpetrators mentioned in 1:10 violate the first three commandments. Sodomy is an instance of lawlessness, disobedience, ungodliness, unholiness and profanity.

In his comment on 1st Timothy 1:11 he insists that the gospel, so far from voiding the law, establishes it. In other words, anyone who claims to be a beneficiary of the gospel (i.e., a Christian) is thereby pledged to uphold the law.

JUDE 7

Even as Sodom and Gomorrah, and the cities about them, which in the same manner with these gave themselves over to fornication, and went after strange flesh, are set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire.

Wesley comments on Jude 7, “The cities who gave themselves over to fornication — The word here means, unnatural lusts: are set forth as an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire — The vengeance which they suffered is a type of eternal fire.” “Fornication” means “unnatural lust”. What this denotes is not in doubt in light of his comment on Romans 1. (See above.) The vengeance the cities suffered they suffered inasmuch as God avenged himself; i.e., judgement was rendered and enacted. Prefatory to all of this is Wesley’s comment on Jude 6: “…eternal displeasure toward the same work of his hands…because he ever loveth righteousness and hateth iniquity.”

2ND PETER 2:7-10

And delivered righteous Lot , grieved with the filthy behaviour of the wicked…them that walk after the flesh in the lust of uncleanness.

Wesley translates the Greek word “aselgeia” as “filthy behaviour. Thayer’s Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament puts forward “sensuality”, “indecency”, “vice”. The same Greek word is used in several places, together with similar descriptors: e.g., “uncleanness and wantonness” (Romans 13:13 , Wesley’s translation), “uncleanness, and fornication and lasciviousness” (2nd Corinthians 12:21 , Wesley), and “adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness” (Galatians 5:19 , Wesley).

– – – –

In Galatians 5:19 Wesley uses “aselgeia” again, and adds in the Sermons concerning this text, “‘They who are of Christ’…abstain from all the works of the flesh: from ‘adultery and fornication’; from ‘uncleanness and lasciviousness’;…from every design, and word, and work to which the corruption of nature leads.” [1:236]

Still amplifying Galatians 5:19 Wesley adds, “It is by him [the Spirit] they are delivered from anger and pride, from all vile and inordinate affections.” Wesley’s use of “vile” here denotes every expression of sexual “uncleanness”.

In his exposition of the Sermon on the Mount Wesley refers to Galatians 5:19 and therein speaks of the Christian, “This is only the outside of that religion which he insatiably hungers after…the being ‘purified as he is pure’ — this is the righteousness he thirsts after.”

REVELATION 22:11,14,15

He that is unrighteous, let him be unrighteous still; and he that is filthy, let him be filthy still….Happy are they that do his commandments, that they may have right to the tree of life, and may enter in by the gates into the city. Without are dogs, and sorcerers, and whoremongers, and murderers, and idolaters, and every one that loveth and maketh a lie.

Wesley speaks of “dogs” as “fierce and rapacious men, even as the term is widely taken, following Old Testament precedent, to mean “homosexual”. It is to be noted that the people spoken of in 22:15 are denied access to the tree of life and are not admitted to the city [the new Jerusalem].

EPHESIANS 4:19

Who being past feeling, have given themselves up to lasciviousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness.

Here Wesley translates “aselgeia” as “lasciviousness” and “akatharsia” as “uncleanness”. Elsewhere in his New Testament Notes Wesley deems “uncleanness” to include sodomy.

 

THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS AS WESLEY’S CURE FOR ANTINOMIAN AND MORALIST ALIKE

See “Appendix 2”

  1. IT should be noted that Wesley dreaded antinomianism (the notion that the moral law had been relaxed for Christians) as he dreaded little else. His denunciation of antinomianism and his caution to Methodists concerning it are found in his Works passim. One particular instance of his concern here is illustrated by his three sermons printed consecutively in his Fifty-two Standard Sermons (numbers 34,35, 36):-

            The Original, Nature, Properties, and Use of the Law,

            The Law Established through Faith, I,

            The Law Established through Faith, II.

Note his insistence in the lattermost tract, “`We establish the law’…when we so preach faith in Christ as not to supersede but produce holiness: to produce all manner of holiness, negative and positive, of the heart and of the life.”(p.38, Volume 2, Wesley’s Works.) It should be noted too that Wesley everywhere regarded “enthusiasm” (the elevation of experience above scripture) as the godless parent of its godless offspring, antinomianism. It is no surprise, then, to see him follow his three sermons on the Law of God with The Nature of Enthusiasm.

It should be noted in this regard that John Wesley explicitly condemned homosexual behaviour in his longest tract, The Doctrine of Original Sin (1757). The “pederasty” of which he spoke includes homosexual sodomy between adult males as well, more specifically, that between adult and juvenile males. In his Notes on the New Testament (one of the standards of Methodism) Wesley comments on the reference to homosexual behaviour in Romans 1:26-27, “Receiving the just recompense of their error — Their idolatry, being punished with that unnatural lust, which was as horrible a dishonour to the body, as their idolatry was to God.” Concerning the “base fellows” of Judges 19:16-30, men who were bent on homosexual indulgence, Wesley, following the English text of the Authorized (King James) Version of the bible, speaks of “sons of belial”, and adds, “Children of the devil, wicked and licentious men.” With respect to Jude 7, “Even as Sodom and Gomorrah , and the cities about them, which in the same manner with these gave themselves over to fornication…” (“the surrounding cities, which likewise acted immorally and indulged in unnatural lust…” RSV), Wesley comments on “fornication”: “The word here means unnatural lusts: are set forth as an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire — That is, the vengeance which they suffered is an example or a type of eternal fire.” The passage from the “Holiness Code” of Leviticus (“You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination” — Lev. 18:22 ) Wesley addresses by referring the reader to his comments on Romans 1:26 -27. He does as much with a similar passage in Lev. 20:13. He plainly thought that a point he had made unambivalently once he could make thereafter by referring the reader to it without the bother of rewriting it.   Several points need to be made here:- =

(i)              While Wesley says relatively little about homosexual behaviour, scripture as a whole says only enough to remind readers of what everyone is supposed to know: homosexual behaviour is an abomination to God and is to be shunned by men and women. (Jesus nowhere comments on spouse-abuse. No one would conclude, given the silence of Jesus on this matter, that he was in favour of it. Everything that Jesus says in the course of his earthly ministry militates against it. In other words, the explicit teaching of Jesus himself, together with his endorsement of the wisdom of Israel (he said he came not to abolish the law and the prophets [the Old Testament] but to fulfil them), provides the context that interprets not only what Jesus says but what he does not bother to mention in that it is indisputable. It cannot be imagined that in the primitive Christian communities a spouse-abuser could expect to be exonerated on the grounds that his Lord had not explicitly forbidden it.);

(ii)             In Wesley’s era it would not be contested that homosexual behaviour was immoral, even perverse, falling outside what God pronounces “good”, and therefore to be eschewed;

(iii)            Wesley’s civility and good taste (deemed desirable in an Oxford-educated, 18th century Anglican clergyman) would prevent him from amplifying a matter in which he knew everyone in the church catholic to agree with him in any case;

(iv)            There is nothing in Wesley’s theology or hymns or correspondence that suggests he approved in the slightest or regarded as permissible same-gender genital contact;

(v)             As someone ordained in the Church of England (and as someone whose Holy Orders were neither revoked nor surrendered), and as someone who always insisted that the theology, liturgy and governance of the Church of England were the finest to be found in Christendom, Wesley would unquestionably have rejected as a candidate for ordination or as a leader in local congregations anyone who engaged in homosexual behaviour;

Wesley’s laconic comment must be heard: “I allow no other rule, whether of faith or practice, than the Holy Scriptures.” (Wesley, Works, Vol. XIX, p.73).

 

DATED at Auckland this                 day of                                     2002.

 

……………………………………….

VICTOR SHEPHERD

Eight Canadian Martyrs

Eight Canadian Martyrs

 

Protestants who are quick to defend the Sixteenth-Century Reformation leaders — Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, Bucer, Bullinger, Beza — are equally ready to explain why these theological giants seemed completely unconcerned with mission. The usual explanation is that they were preoccupied with forging doctrine, doctrine that demanded to be re-written in view of some Roman Catholic teaching, at least, that appeared to obscure the gospel.

Everyone today admits that the Church urgently needed reforming. The extent to which doctrinal re-articulation had to match institutional cleansing, however, is a matter of opinion. Beyond dispute is the fact that other “families” within the Church at this time, such as the Anabaptists (whose descendants are Mennonites, Hutterites and Amish people), as well as Roman Catholics whose Counter-Reformation found them as concerned with doctrine as the most zealous Reformer; these groups never allowed controversy to eclipse their conviction concerning their Lord’s mandate. Always aware of Christ’s claim upon them and his command to “Go and make disciples of all the nations”, and newly aided by improvements in navigation, Anabaptist and Catholic went obediently to bear witness to their Lord.

It appears, then, that mainline Protestants can only admit and lament the puzzling blind spot that their Reformation foreparents alone possessed amidst all the parties who staggered through the Reformation’s upheavals. The Mennonites sent missioners into Central and South America. The Roman Catholics sent them everywhere, westward to the Americas and eastward to India, even farther to Japan. Ignatius Loyola, founder of the Jesuit order (“Society of Jesus”), had prepared his men to be the leading edge of the Church’s mission to areas that were always difficult, frequently dangerous, and occasionally lethal.

Just as visions had been crucial in the spiritual formation and vocation of Loyola one hundred years earlier, vision would be no less crucial in the spiritual life of missioner and people, for Jean de Brebeuf was privileged to “see”, one night amidst his comfortable life in France, a flaming cross suspended above the Huron encampment in the New World. Thereafter he never doubted what he was to do or why.

Modern anthropologists think it likely that the Hurons were originally an Iroquois tribe, albeit isolated from the five tribes comprising the Iroquois confederacy: Cayugas, Oneidas, Onanadagas, Senecas and Mohawks. Eventually the Iroquois and Hurons were at war.

When Etienne Brule, the eighteen-year-old who was the first Caucasian to visit the Hurons, came upon them in 1613, they were 30,000-strong. Slaughter at the hands of the Iroquois and devastation through European disease had reduced their number to 12,000 in 1639, the year the Jesuit missions commenced.

Unordained missioners (donnes) who devoted themselves to assisting the Jesuits erected Ste. Marie, the compound consisting of a chapel, a storeroom and a hospital. Soon the gospel radiated from Ste. Marie to four other mission outposts, the farthest, St. Jean de Baptiste, adjacent to Orillia. The work was exacting; the black flies and other pests oppressive; the summers hot and the Georgian Bay winters biting; and of course the threat from the Iroquois relentless. On account of the latter, the trip to Quebec City, the capital of New France, saw paddlers labouring upstream, north to French River, east to the Ottawa, then down the Ottawa and St. Lawrence. A one-way trip took 22 days.

Rene Goupil was the first of the eight Christian martyrs. Trained in medicine and surgery, Goupil withdrew from the Jesuit training program in France on account of his deafness. Offering himself as a lay missionary, he found himself assigned to Huronia. While returning from Quebec City he and his party were overrun at Trois Rivieres. Most of the men perished on the spot. The Iroquois took the remaining few to upstate New York and tortured them for days. A tomahawk ended his life in September, 1642.

The best-known missionary martyrs are Jean de Brebeuf and Gabriel Lalemant. Born in Normandy in 1593, Brebeuf began studying for the priesthood in Rouen, France. By 1626 he was ministering to aboriginal people in a village on Penetanguishene Bay (Ontario.) On account of treaty disputes between the French and the English he had to return to France, only to find himself, five years later, among the Huron people once again. Blamed for crop failures and Iroquois victories, Brebeuf was beaten repeatedly by the people to whom he had given himself. In March 1649, twelve hundred Iroquois capture the mission station at St. Louis (ten kilometres from Ste. Marie.)

Lalemant, born to the scholarly world of Seventeenth Century Paris, entered the Jesuit novitiate as a teenager and was ordained nine years later in Bourgues. His intellectual brilliance gained him a position as Professor of Philosophy at Moulins. Not content with academic life, however, the slightly built man begged his superiors to send him overseas to join his two uncles, Fathers Jerome and Charles, who were in charge at that time of all Roman Catholic missions in New France. An uncle posted him to Quebec City, eventually succumbing to Lalemant’s importuning and moving him to Huronia. Lalemant had been working alongside Brebeuf for only one month when he too was captured by the same raiding party. Both men were tortured repeatedly, one torment being a “baptism” in boiling water. In March 1649 the two men found release in death. As soon as the Iroquois returned home, French traders gathered up their remains and buried them at Ste. Marie.

None of what has been written above suggests in any way uncommon cruelty among the First Nations People. None of it denies the manner in which Europeans subsequently victimized the native people. It does confirm, nonetheless, a truth that Scripture announces on every page: all humans are alike creatures of the Fall. All are possessed of murderous hearts — as history attests time and again. The martyred missionaries knew something more: all without exception are beneficiaries the One whose outstretched arms embraced eight brave men, and through them embraced without reservation Huron, Iroquois, French, English; all who may now call, “Lord, remember me.”

Victor Shepherd

 

Adolphus Egerton Ryerson

(in  TOUCHSTONE, Sept. 2002)

Adolphus Egerton Ryerson

1803-1882

 

Egerton Ryerson was born March 24, 1803, in Vittoria (near Port Dover, Ontario), one of nine children of Joseph Ryerson and Mehetabel Stickney. His parents were descendants of Dutch Protestants who had wearied of the suffocation born of Europe’s class confinement and craved the opportunities the New World afforded. His oldest New World ancestor, Martin Reyerzoon, had landed in New Amsterdam before the British conquest rendered the settlement New York (1664.) In the wake of the British victory the family name was Anglicized to “Ryerson.” Joseph Ryerson, Egerton’s father, forsook Dutch Calvinism and embraced the Church of England.

In 1815, at the close of the War of 1812, Ryerson’s three older brothers, George, William and John, underwent that precisely demarcated shift “from darkness to light” by which Methodism had come to be identified. Soon the twelve year-old Egerton was listening with similar intensity to Methodist preachers. One such, a former blacksmith, unashamed to be known now as “The Old Hammer”, became the means whereby the youngster’s heart was heated white-hot and forged forever.

Ryerson continued farming and studying until he was eighteen, when he thought he should identify publicly with the movement through which he had been spiritually awakened. His father, upon hearing that Egerton had joined the Methodists, responded swiftly and surely: “Leave them or leave home.” Ryerson left home, supporting himself as a student-teacher in the local grammar school.

Rescinding the expulsion, Ryerson’s father pleaded with his son to return. Egerton’s prompt return indicated that he was now as unembittered and unresentful and as he had earlier been courageous — character traits would mark him throughout the struggle and strife soon to surround him for the rest of his life. Labouring on his father’s farm for one year, he left home for good, this time with Joseph’s blessing.

In August 1824 he began studying Latin and Greek with assistance from a near-by schoolmaster. Then in the midst of protracted, serious illness he found himself “addressed” once again in a manner no less turbulent than his spiritual awakening. This time he acknowledged not a summons to discipleship but a vocation to the ministry. One month later he was astride a horse, itinerating throughout the Niagara Peninsula as a Methodist Probationer. Although his formal education was restricted to a few months of instruction in the Classics, he immersed himself in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Locke was the principal English philosopher of the Enlightenment), Paley’s Moral and Political Philosophy and Blackstone’s Commentaries. (Ironically, the man who was to design and inaugurate public education in Ontario and whose work would be copied throughout the Canadian nation was almost entirely self-taught, and would continue to school himself for the rest of his life.)

Ryerson preached his first sermon in Beamsville, Ontario. (This village has become dear to many United Church clergy and their families on account of its Albright Gardens and Manor, the final earthly residence for ministers who retire without the means to house themselves.) Before long he was minister of the Yonge Street Circuit. The circuit gathered up the people in the triangle whose outermost points were Pickering, Weston and the south shore of Lake Simcoe. It took him a month to visit all the preaching points within it. On a typical Sunday the twenty-two year old Ryerson found himself riding thirty miles, preaching three times, and addressing two classes.

Then there occurred the momentous event that brought him unprecedented opportunity, altered forever his public image and fixed his name in Canadian history. In 1825 Bishop Mountain of Quebec died. Toronto’s Bishop John Strachan preached on the occasion of Mountain’s death, turning the sermon into both a panegyric lauding the rise and riches of the Church of England in Canada and a poniard aimed at the heart of all who declined the denomination, but with especial denunciation reserved for Methodists.

For years Strachan had been the power broker of the Family Compact, the “Compact” consisting of a handful of rich families who exercised a monopoly on business, finance and education. It aimed at petrifying the social stratification that allowed the privileged to exploit the New World’s version of Britain’s class structure, the worst in Europe. Earlier Strachan had candidated for the ministry of the Church of Scotland. Rejected by the Presbyterians, he had turned to the Anglican Church and then had turned on all who didn’t belong to it. Rising to episcopal pre-eminence, he sought to punish any who didn’t’ support the Compact’s constellation of power, piety, prestige and privilege.

Strachan denigrated the Methodist people, faulting them for a putative American origin and accusing them of American leanings. The Methodist clergy, however, he more than denigrated: he ridiculed them, his scurrility stooping to sneer at them as irremediably ignorant in view of their having inflated themselves into preachers when their intellectual mediocrity should have chained them to plough and shop. Following up his sermon with concrete designs to suppress Methodists, Strachan asked the government for exclusive Anglican access to the Clergy Reserves (the Clergy Reserves being land and the income it generated reserved for the sole use of the church), in addition to a large grant, thereby assuring a Britain made nervous by the nation to the south that Upper Canadian Anglicanism was loyal to the crown. In addition, of course, the inequity of withholding from Methodists the right to solemnize marriages as well as to hold title to church buildings, parsonages and cemeteries; this was to be perpetuated.

Methodists were outraged at Strachan’s vilification of their clergy and his accusation of political treachery and his enforced injustice. They looked around for someone to champion them. Ryerson, only twenty-five years old, penned Methodism’s reply. The pseudonymously written “Review of a Sermon, Preached by the Honourable and Reverend John Strachan” appeared in William Lyon Mackenzie’s paper, The Colonial Advocate. Ryerson voiced Methodism’s disgust at the Anglican Church’s political prostitution. Stressing again that he had no complaint with Anglican doctrine or liturgy, Ryerson noted that Strachan appeared unaroused on matters pertaining to the gospel yet implacably vehement and venomous when finances were at stake. Replying to Strachan’s assertion that a Christian nation without an established Church was inherently self-contradictory, Ryerson reminded readers that the gospel had thrived in the hands of the apostles even though the latter had been without state support. As for the “ignorance” of the Methodist clergy, Ryerson listed the books mandated for Methodist candidates for ordination, and recalled John Wesley’s insistence that all Methodist preachers study five hours per day. Concerning the imputation of American origin, Ryerson noted that the Wesleyan Methodists had never known an American root, while by 1825 there were scarcely any in the Methodist Episcopal Church (a denomination that had originated in the United States) who were American-born. He reminded his accusers that his parents had been United Empire Loyalists who had left the Republic out of loyalty to the British Crown. He argued conclusively that Strachan’s sly slander concerning “U.E.L.s” (they were not to be trusted since they might have absorbed unknowingly the worst of republicanism with its rejection of tradition and its elevation of the masses and its affinity for a government that Strachan’s echelon regarded as little more than mob rule); this innuendo was groundless. Methodists weren’t American sympathizers infested with republicanism.

Furthermore, why should the state favour the Church of England when only thirty-one of 235 clergy in Upper Canada were Anglican? George Ryerson, brother to Ryerson, weighed in with his written comment that non-preferential treatment shouldn’t be accorded the “temple of spiritual tyranny.” Father Joseph, now aware of his sons’ role in the dispute, cried, “We are all ruined.” Egerton himself relished none of this, finding that controversy, however necessary, issued in “leanness of soul.” Notwithstanding his fear of spiritual enervation, Ryerson’s gospel-engendered polemics bore incontestable fruit: within four years legislation appeared that permitted Nonconformist denominations to own land and their ministers to marry and baptize. The dissolving of the Clergy Reserves took another twenty-five years, when the land was sold off with revenues returning to the government, most of which were redistributed for education.

Ryerson’s concern to counter the Family Compact’s ascendancy, however, never acidulated his spirit or eclipsed all other aspects and implicates of the gospel. After the Methodist Conference of 1826 in Hamilton, he began living among the aboriginal people on the Credit River. Introduced to Peter Jones at a camp meeting of Mississaugas and Mohawks, Ryerson found a spirit-mate in the young native Methodist preacher who had evangelized his people and whose father (Augustus), like Ryerson’s, had been a United Empire Loyalist and whose mother (Tuhbenahbenahneequay), was an Ojibwa. Able now to elicit the help of the aboriginals who trusted him, and recognized precocious besides (within months he could preach to the people in their language), Ryerson’s linguistic ability saw him commissioned to produce a grammar and lexicon of the Mississauga dialect. Immediately he set himself to raising money to build a school and chapel for the natives. Knowing that the Credit River people could furnish few funds for the project, Ryerson returned to his former circuit and old friends, unashamed, like Wesley before him, to beg from door-to-door for an undertaking whose worth neither he nor they ever doubted. The structure was completed in six weeks. Drawing on his agricultural expertise he convinced the natives that fenced land and cultivated fields produced vastly more than either bartering hand-made goods or hunting and gathering in the wild. Their chief, understanding the restless nature of the Methodist itinerancy, dubbed him “A Bird-on-the-Wing.”

The Anglican hierarchy recognized the young minister’s talent and offered to finance a fine formal education if he consented to honour his vocation within the Church of England. Characteristically neither envying nor toadying, he graciously declined the offer, convinced that only crass opportunism would see him leave the people among whom he had come to know God for the sake of self-advancement. He insisted he believed the “Articles of Religion” of the Methodists; he agreed with their constitution; and he never doubted that they were “church” as depicted in Scripture. Never hostile to the Church of England, he would nevertheless remain immovably opposed to its efforts to get itself “established” (thereby making it an aspect of the state), its attempts at preserving its endowments, and its prerogatives that demeaned those less privileged. (When he came to marry, for instance, he and Hannah Aikman had to travel twenty miles to find a Presbyterian clergyman to preside, Presbyterians from the Church of Scotland being allowed some of the privileges denied all Methodists.)

By now the Methodists knew that they had to have their own journal if they were to forestall fragmentation. The Methodist Conference of 1829 minuted the founding of a weekly paper, the Christian Guardian. (All papers in Upper Canada at this time were weeklies.) Ryerson was elected its first editor. Initially distributing 500 copies, in three years it swelled to 3,000. In no time it was the most widely read paper and the most influential of any in the province. The Guardian gathered up Methodist theological concerns, religious issues in everyday life, discussions of the sort of government the people currently had or ought to have, educational reform (always a priority with Ryerson), as well as practical advice in household economics. (While the Methodists opposed the production and consumption of distilled spirits, one issue at least of the Guardian informed readers of the subtleties of beer-brewing.) The paper eclipsed the official Upper Canada Gazette.

Methodism’s successful venture into journalism expanded into book publishing. The Guardian‘s first editor opened a bookstore, selling chiefly books imported from Britain and the U.S.A. The seed was small yet the yield, as in the parable, unforeseeably huge as the Methodist Book Concern metamorphosed into the largest printing and publishing enterprise in Canada. Its sales of imported books underwrote the publishing and distribution of indigenous writers, among whom were Charles G.D. Roberts and Catherine Parr Traill. Renamed The Ryerson Press in 1919 in honour of its founder, it continued to support the work of Canadian writers, including that of two famous poets, Earle Birney and Louis Dudek. Surviving until 1970, it did much to shape the Canadian identity in the twentieth century through the novelists, poets, biographers and historians whose works it made available across the land.

Ryerson’s contribution to the Canadian people through literature developed into a related contribution through a major academic institution, Victoria College. Bishop Strachan had long campaigned for a charter for “King’s College” (later to become the University of Toronto), replete with Anglican privileges. All its professors, for instance, would have to endorse the Thirty-Nine Articles (Anglicanism’s normative doctrinal statement), while veto power over the institution’s council would rest with the Bishop of Lower Canada (Quebec.) The Methodists countered with their own college, situating it in Cobourg, Ontario, at that time the hub of Methodist strength in the province. (Non-Anglican “dissenters” of Calvinist persuasion supported Ryerson in his efforts to end Anglican hegemony in higher education.) In 1836 the Methodists erected Upper Canada Academy, expanding it into Victoria College (1841) and Victoria University (1865, when faculties of law and medicine were added.) Named Victoria’s first principal, Ryerson announced a curriculum as broad as it was deep. In addition to Classics (a mainstay at any university at this time), he added a science department offering courses in chemistry, mineralogy and geography, as well as new departments of philosophy, rhetoric and modern languages (French and German.) Always eschewing one-sidedness anywhere in life, he insisted that each student pursue a balanced programme of the arts and the sciences.

Indisputably, however, Ryerson became a household name, with churches and streets named after him in scores of cities and towns, on account of his colossal achievement concerning public education. Dismayed to see one-half of school-aged children with no formal education and the remaining half averaging only a year’s, and horrified at the poor training and brutal disposition of what passed for “teacher” in too many villages, Ryerson’s people had mirrored the prophet’s word, “precept upon precept…here a little, there a little” (Isaiah 28: 13) as they had pried open the grip of the Family Compact. Ryerson himself was handed unparalleled opportunity the day he was appointed Chief Superintendent of Common Schools for Canada West in 1844. (A “common” school was the social opposite of the elitist private schools.) He was only forty-one. Two years later he was promoted to Chief Superintendent of Education, an office he occupied for the next thirty years, leaving it only to retire. Ryerson persuaded the provincial government to assume responsibility for education. Soon common schools, aided by government grants, appeared wherever twenty students could be gathered. The arrangement was a quantitative leap over the log cabin schoolhouses whose instructors were frequently minimally literate themselves.

Thinking ill of a British school system that perpetuated the worst class divisiveness in Europe, Ryerson visited Continental common schools in Holland, Italy and France, “bookending” his trip with visits to Germany where he could observe the education system that Philip Melanchthon had implemented 300 years earlier.

Melanchthon (1487-1560) had been the first systematic theologian of the Magisterial Reformation. While Luther had penned theological tracts to respond to exigencies in church and society, Melanchthon had “bottled” Luther’s rich “geysering”, scripting his Loci Communes (“Commonplaces”) into a theological textbook that had seen eighteen Latin editions in a few years, as well as numerous German printings.

Yet Melanchthon had wanted to be relieved of his teaching responsibilities in theology in order to concentrate on the humanities. Superbly trained as a humanist (he was recognized the best Greek scholar in Europe following the death of Desiderius Erasmus), he was enormously gifted as linguist and philologist, yet equally at home in philosophy. He had always maintained there to be no substitute for schooling in the humanities and the sciences. (Physics, said Melanchthon, illustrated the harmony of the creation.)

As early as 1524 (he was then only twenty-seven years old) Melanchthon had begun developing public schools throughout Germany; he had reorganized the universities; he had fashioned the pedagogical methods in which hundreds of teachers were trained; and he had written school textbooks, subsequently used by countless pupils.

Germany’s system of public education seared itself upon Ryerson as holding greater promise for Canada than that of any other European nation. Upon his return to Canada he wooed the provincial government into marrying education and tax revenues, thereby providing free education for all. Of course the rich objected, arguing that they shouldn’t have to support the schooling of their social inferiors. Ryerson triumphed. His free education was soon compulsory as well. In it all he elevated teaching from a miserable job to a calling akin to that of the ordained ministry.

George Brown, editor of Toronto’s Globe newspaper, ranted that Ryerson had imported “Prussian” education into Ontario. Ryerson, cultured where Brown was crude, quietly immersed himself in French literature, having taught himself the language so well that he and the pope had conversed in it during his visit to Italy. (Ryerson was prescient in his awareness that all public figures in Canada would have to be conversant in French. In addition he was aware that everywhere in Europe — and therefore why not in Canada — French was the language of culture. No educated person boasted of being unilingual, and no one who aspired to the world of letters was inept in French. Earlier, while principal of Victoria College, he had taught himself Hebrew.)

Ryerson always knew that the life of the mind was a good in itself. The life of the mind was its own justification. Furthermore, it was his conviction that people are commanded to love God with their minds. While it wasn’t sin to be ignorant, it was sin to be more ignorant than they had to be. And it was sheer wickedness for a society to relegate the relatively disadvantaged to lifelong ignorance.

While Ryerson knew that the life of the mind was an end in itself, he also knew that the life of the mind was useful; it had utilitarian significance. People with greater education in fact could do more of greater social usefulness than those who had been unable to gain adequate education. Ryerson knew, then, that the public good was always served by better quality public education.

He knew something else; namely, education didn’t merely equip people to know more, it expanded the universe in which they lived. Education equipped them to live in a different world, a richer world, a world of greater complexity and greater wonder. Deprived of adequate schooling, people would be confined to a much smaller world outside and a commensurately smaller world inside.

Ryerson knew too that public education was essential to social democracy. Political democracy was relatively easy to achieve: each citizen was given the right to vote. Social democracy, however, occurred when all citizens had equal access to opportunities within a society. Ryerson knew that apart from a vibrant public education, social gains couldn’t be retained. The cruel class stratification, with its “invisible ceilings” that precluded socio-economic mobility and frustrated people in private and public “prisons”, would reappear as surely as Strachan and his supporters wanted it to reappear. Like any nineteenth-century thinker apprised of the French Revolution, Ryerson knew that if public education didn’t thrive and with it the release of resentment engendered by the limitations of the place on the social spectrum where one had been born, then different clusters in the society, now frozen into immobility, would turn inward for support and then turn outward in hostility. His educational vision entailed vastly more than schooling: it entailed a vision for a nation, its people and its future.

Ryerson struggled to give birth to, refine, and expand public education with his second last breath. His last breath, of course, was reserved for what was incomparably dear to him and his educational mentor, Philip Melanchthon. “Next to the gospel“, the multi-talented German reformer had exclaimed, “there is nothing more glorious than humanistic learning, that wonderful gift of God.”

Victor Shepherd, Th.D

Professor of Historical Theology and Chair of Wesley Studies

Tyndale Seminary, Toronto

The Trinity Against the Spirit of Unitarianism

The Trinity Against the Spirit of Unitarianism

(from The Trinity:  An Essential for Faith in Our Time, Evangel Publishing House, 2002)

 

Faced with cultural and religious pluralism the post-modern church in the west appears extraordinarily anxious or extraordinarily accommodating, depending on one’s point of view. The church regards its pluralistic setting as novel and is either tempted to panic and endeavour to preserve itself through a multi-faceted isolationism, or is tempted in its bold engagement with the world to squander the “deposit” (2 Timothy 1:12) which it has been charged to guard. Those prone to worry are more likely to insist on retaining a doctrine of the Trinity, if only to preserve continuity with their forebears in faith, not realizing that “if only” reduces the doctrine to an artifact in the museum of intellectual history. On the other hand, those eager to meet challenges are more likely to jettison any doctrine of the Trinity as an encumbrance which inhibits the church in its witness to the gospel and its exemplification of it in the common life of the world.

One issue facing the church, then, is this: is the doctrine of the Trinity baggage which is not only unnecessary but is actually a threat to the seaworthiness of the ship (church) as it appears to founder in the storms of modernity? or is it ballast in the ship’s keel apart from which the ship will capsize in even moderate winds?

I submit that apart from the doctrine of the Trinity “gospel” is rendered indistinguishable from religious aspiration or projection, while “Spirit” is reduced to a magnification of anything that the Fall-darkened heart and mind of humankind may conceive, and “church” becomes nothing more than one more social group (albeit in religious guise) which seeks to promote the agenda of its constituents. In short, without the doctrine of the Trinity the arch counter-miracle will occur: wine will be turned into water as the gospel is denatured.

In maintaining the doctrine of the Trinity to belong to the being of the faith rather than merely to its wellbeing I am not holding up as etched in stone the expression of any one thinker’s understanding; neither Augustine’s nor Aquinas’s nor Calvin’s nor Barth’s. Nonetheless, I am convinced that just as these thinkers were impelled to speak on behalf of the Triune God in order to forestall the acculturation of the gospel in their day, we must do as much in ours, all the while endeavouring to obey the fifth commandment; namely, to honour our parents (including our theological foreparents) in order that the days of the church may be long in the land which God gives us.

II: — I agree with those who maintain that a fully-articulated doctrine of the Trinity is not found in scripture. Nonetheless, the building blocks of the doctrine incontrovertibly are. Consider the following:

Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. (Matthew 28:19)

This Jesus God raised up…. Being therefore exalted at the right hand of God, and having received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, he has poured out this which you see and hear. (Acts 2:32f)

The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God, and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit be with you all. (2 Corinthians 13:14)

For through [Jesus Christ] we both have access in one Spirit to the Father. (Ephesians 2:18)

There is one body and one Spirit, just as you were called in one hope that belongs to your call, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of us all…. But grace was given to each of us according to the measure of Christ’s gift.  (Ephesians 4:4-6)

…God chose you from the beginning to be saved, through sanctification by the Spirit and belief in the truth. To this he called you through our gospel, so that you may obtain the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ. (2 Thessalonians 2:13)

Chosen and destined by God the Father and sanctified by the Spirit for obedience to Jesus Christ and for sprinkling with his blood. (1 Peter 1:2)

As scripture attests the incursion of the Word scripture impels us to an understanding that God is eternally Triune. A doctrine of the Trinity makes explicit what is everywhere implicit in the “the faith once delivered to the saints” and for which faith, the apostle tells us, we must ever “contend”. (Jude 3)

III: — Christian faith is rooted in the oneness of being between Jesus Christ and God the Father. In the gospel God has revealed himself to us as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. (Without the divine activity of the Holy Spirit we should not know of the deity of Father and Son.) In this self-unveiling God has revealed himself in such a way as to disclose that what God is in himself God is toward us, and what God is toward us God is in himself, throughout his saving acts in history. In other words, what God is eternally in himself, that is, in his internal relations as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, God is in his activity toward us through the Son and in the Spirit.

If the oneness in being between Jesus Christ and God the Father is cut, then the substance and heart of the gospel is lost. For if what Christ does is not what God does, then before God humankind’s predicament is unrelieved. Again, if God himself has not come among us in the Incarnation, then God’s love for us (despite God’s good intentions!) stops short of God’s full identification with us sinners; in truth it is not finally love (or at least is woefully deficient and defective love) and the redemptive activity of God is finally ineffectual.

Faith in this God is generated by God’s self-witness and self-interpretation (Holy Spirit) in God’s Word (Jesus Christ). In short, knowledge of God is the work of God himself. Since there is no intrinsic ontological similarity between the eternal being of God and the contingent being of us creatures, the fact of faith (that is, the presence of women and men who believe) attests the utter priority of God over all thought concerning him. We can think correctly about God at all only because God includes us in his self-knowing.

In conjoining “Spirit” and “Holy” scripture insists that God is the only fit witness to himself; only God can disclose God. And since God has given himself to us in the person of the Son or Word, then Spirit and Son (Word) are inextricably linked. Or in the idiom of the written gospels, Jesus Christ is the unique bearer and bestower of the Holy Spirit. This is but to say that one cannot pronounce “Spirit” except in reference to Jesus Christ. (In this way the apostles insist that while Christless spirits do indeed abound, they can only be less than holy!) This point is reinforced by scripture’s depiction of the Spirit as being sent from the Father in the name of the Son, never in the Spirit’s own name; the Spirit speaks only of the Father and of the Son, never of himself. Put simply, the Spirit is like floodlighting. Floodlights are positioned in such a way that one does not see the floodlight itself, only that which it lights up and to which it therefore directs attention. (Recall our Lord’s words, “He (i.e., the Spirit) shall glorify me”. John 16:14) The Spirit imports no new substance into faith’s knowing, but rather facilitates faith’s knowledge of the Son, who is the “substance” of the Father.

IV: — While the foregoing is formally espoused throughout the church catholic it is materially contradicted frequently in various “unitarianisms”, such as those outlined below.

(i) A UNITARIANISM OF THE FATHER This popular “unitarianism” certainly preserves the truth that God is exalted, “high and lifted up”; that God’s thoughts are not our thoughts nor our ways God’s ways. (Isaiah 6:1; 55:8) God is the sole, sovereign, eternal one. God is not an aspect of his creation-at-large (the cosmos) nor an aspect of his creation-at-small (humankind). God is irreducibly GOD, never one with whom we may trifle.

However, the God who is only “high and lifted up”, without differentiation, tends to be so exalted as never to humble himself, so far beyond us as not to render himself accessible, sovereign with more than a suggestion of severe, unknowable in the sense of arbitrary, a creator who is also (or may be) capricious.

Eighteenth century deism portrayed God as the creator who fashioned the universe and then effectively absented himself from it. Seventeenth century Protestant scholasticism portrayed God as capricious in its notion of double predestination. God, it said, has foreordained elect and reprobate as such even before they are born, and therefore before they have even had opportunity to sin. When confronted with the irrationality of this its proponents stated that there is a reason underlying the only-apparent irrationality of the decrees, but this “reason” is hidden inscrutably in the innermost recesses of God. Therefore it is not our place to enquire, only our place to adore. The more the hidden justice of this scheme was advanced, however, the more apparent the manifest injustice was to many. In view of the unqualified remoteness of God, or the arbitariness of God, or the injustice of God which a unitarianism of the Father seems to imply, this particular unitarianism, paradoxically, ends in the denial that God is parent in any sense.

(ii) A UNITARIANISM OF THE SON Undifferentiated transcendence is overcome as Jesus Christ is God-with-us. So far from disdaining the complexity of the human situation God has identified with it in its totality. Jesus Christ is bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, is tempted at all points as we are (Hebrews 4:15), even becoming one with sinners, as his baptism attests, by “being made sin” for us.(2 Corinthians 5:21)

At the same time, to collapse God into God the Son distorts even the truth of the Incarnation. For then God-with-us is demeaned as pal. The saccharine Jesus finds no paradigm in scripture. No one who met Jesus Christ in the flesh ever spoke of him in this manner. The written gospels, rather, customarily depict him as one whom people do not understand and cannot domesticate. Even disciples, newly made aware in his presence of their systemic sinnership, can only plead with him to leave them alone. The apostles never confuse proximity with presumption. So far from being aider and abettor of human schemes, Jesus is the one who does not supply answers to questions, for he will not confirm the standpoint or the perception or the purpose of the questioner. Instead he poses his own question, therein showing the speaker to dwell in spiritual unreality; i.e., suffer from spiritual psychosis.

(iii) A UNITARIANISM OF THE SPIRIT It is the Spirit who imparts vitality and vibrancy in believer and congregation alike. It is the Spirit who supplies zeal, warmth, boldness, effectiveness. It is the Spirit whose gifts equip the congregation for ministry and whose fruits adorn the gospel, in all of this exhibiting the truth of God as the power of God and not mere ideation.

One New Testament word for the Spirit, ARRABON — “down payment” or “pledge”, (in modern Greek it means a woman’s engagement ring) — plainly means that there is more to come. While the Spirit satisfies the restless human heart the satisfaction it yields never satiates; believers, contented as never before and nowhere else, are nonetheless “hungrier” than ever even as they know that one day they will be fed so as to leave them hungering no more. The entire experiential aspect of primitive Christianity (e.g., “Did you receive the Spirit by works of the law or by hearing with faith?” (Galatians 3:2) plainly directs the attention of readers of the epistle to identifiable experience) is much undervalued in most expressions of the church today.

Notwithstanding, when the Spirit is magnified disproportionately and experience put forward unnormed, then “Spirit” ceases to be the power in which Jesus Christ acts himself and which he pours forth on his people. “Spirit” instead lends itself to frenzy, the suspension of the intellect, and the identification of God with powers which may be nothing more than the intrapsychic proclivities and pressures of the devotees themselves.

It appears that whenever the Trinity is denied through the aforementioned unitarianisms redemption is denied as well. In the first instance God’s transcendence is upheld in such a manner as to render God remote, distant, inaccessible, with the result that the creation is left unaffected. In the second instance God is so identified with the creation as not to transcend it so as to be free for it. In the third instance God is so identified with human intra-psychic processes as to leave them deified. It is the Triune God who alone saves, for it is the Triune God who alone can.

V: — In many areas of the church catholic today the doctrine of the Trinity is denied not merely materially but formally as well. Such a denial occurs whenever, for instance, the deity of the Son is impugned. “Son of”, in scripture, has the force of “of the same nature as”; to modify “same nature” is to deny what the church has always confessed in terms of the Incarnation.

Formal denial need not be blatant; in fact it is no less a formal denial for being subtle. Whenever the question, “Is Jesus the Son of God?”, is answered, whether waggishly or sincerely, “Of course he is; all of us are sons and daughters of God”, Incarnation is denied and therefore Trinity as well. And since the being of God is intrinsically related to the knowledge of God, any departure from acknowledging the Tri-unity of God imperils the knowledge of God. The current preoccupation with “Creation Spirituality” is such a subtle yet formal denial.

The question, “Who is God?”, is a question which scripture answers only indirectly. It answers this question by first asking and answering two others: “What does God do (outside of us, yet for our sake)?”, and “What does God effect (in us)?” We can know who God is only as we first learn what God has done on our behalf, for our sake, in the Son, and only as we become beneficiaries of this work on our behalf through the power of the Spirit. In sum, we know God as we are included in God’s work for us and as we are illumined concerning this work. To become acquainted with the living God is to learn that the creation is not God. It is too frequently overlooked that the non-divine status of the creation has to be revealed — or else why should the creation not be assumed to be divine, as in fact it often is? As it is only by grace (i.e., by the action of God himself) that we learn that the Triune one is God, so it is only by grace that we learn that the creation is not God but rather is creaturely. “Creation Spirituality”, on the other hand, is predicated on the postulate that the creation either is God or mediates God, both of which prophet and apostle reject. Since God is God and we are but creatures of God, the order or logic of revelation generates the order or logic of our knowledge of God. And since the creation does not reveal the Triune God, the creation (itself fallen and in bondage to death) is not the vehicle of that life which the Spirit (who is God) alone effects.

Any diminution of the Son as one with the being of the Father is an explicit denial of the Trinity. Such diminution of the Son invariably fosters an idolization of the creation.

VI: — Any sundering of Spirit from Son is a similar denial with similar consequences. Sundering the Spirit from the Son means that the “Spirit” ceases to be holy, ceases to be intrinsically related to the Word (as the reformers, following the apostles, were careful to note), and becomes instead the religious legitimation of human fancy or fantasy. Since, as was seen above, it is only through the truth that truth is known and non-truth recognized, only by reality that illusion is discerned, then only through revelation can we gain proper perspective on and understand assorted claims to truth, reality, godliness and goodness.

(i) RELIGION Despite its apparently ascendant secularism our era is startlingly religious. It is assumed that religion is good and that Christianity is religious. Christianity may indeed be, but is faith “religious”? Prophet and apostle attest that the gospel exposes religion as non-gospel, non-faith; i.e., unbelief. Elijah on Mount Carmel does not suggest to the Baal spokespersons that they are religious, he is religious, and therefore they should all pool their religiosity, seeking out a common denominator, maximizing convergence and minimizing divergence. On the contrary Elijah maintains that shortly Yahweh will act in such a way as to expose Baalism for what it is. This is not to say that Israel’s faith remained free of religion; the prophets continually deplore the religious invasion of Israel and continually recall Israel to the God who displayed his outstretched arm in delivering them from slavery and formed them his people at Sinai, and now nurtured them like a mother with her child at her breast.

It seems that the church today thinks itself to be meeting religious pluralism for the first time, when in fact the faith of Israel and of Israel’s greater Son came to birth and had to survive in the context of competing religious claimants. To be sure, this pluralism always encroached upon the faith of God’s people and threatened to dissolve them. Significantly, while Paul begins his sermon on Mars Hill (Acts 17) by acknowledging the phenomenon of religions (the Greek word he uses — DEISDAIMON — also means “superstition”, it should be noted), he quickly moves to an unambiguous declaration of Jesus Christ, his resurrection, and the coming judgement. Nowhere do the apostles counsel seeking commonalities with contiguous religious manifestations.

Unless the church recovers its discernment of how revelation discloses itself as distinct from religion, how will the church recognize — and repudiate — the religious accretions to the gospel, and even the most subtle (yet no less deleterious) psycho-religiosities which attach themselves to our own believing? How will it distinguish between the truth that God, for the sake of his glory and our salvation, has freely justified us of his own free grace, and religion as the insidious attempt at justifying ourselves before a god whose mercy and pardon we plainly doubt?

(ii) CULTURE Again, as soon as Spirit is sundered from Word (Jesus Christ is the one Word of God we are to hear and heed in life and in death, according to the Barmen Declaration), the “Spirit” is co-opted as the legitimization and even the divinization of culture. Aesthetic enjoyment is then spoken of as “spiritual experience”. All experiences of the creaturely order in its own mysterious depths are denoted “spiritual” and are confused with the work of the Holy Spirit of God. The obvious conclusion from this confusion is that cultured people are spiritually superior and that culture saves.

The Germans, as usual, have a polysyllabic word for it: Kulturprotestantismus. The culture-religion which had permeated the German church left people unable to distinguish between God himself and the awesome depths of God’s creation, between having “God’s love poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us”(Romans 5:5) and being moved by natural beauty or artistic talent. When Kulturprotestantismus went beyond viewing aesthetics as the vestibule to the kingdom and affirmed culture and kingdom to be synonymous, the nazification of the land of Goethe, Schiller, Beethoven — not to mention the world’s leading medical research — demonstrated that culture can readily cloak the conflict between Holy One and evil one. It demonstrates too that Kulturprotestantismus supplies neither the ability nor the urge to remove the cloak.

(iii) SELF-INTEREST The spectacle of most television religious programming, replete with references to “God”, “Holy Spirit” and “faith” raises the issue of narcissism. Narcissism is preoccupation with oneself, preoccupation with one’s own comfort, advantage, recognition, advancement and reward. The televised “gospel” offers this more often than not. It is only as the Spirit is known to be always and only the Spirit of him who had nowhere to lay his head, of him who summons followers to leave all and shoulder a cross if they are to be his followers, that the spiritual counterfeit of narcissism can be identified.

(iv) PATHOLOGY In the same way once the Spirit is divorced from the one who is the guarantor of the kingdom (i.e., the creation healed), once pneumatology is separated from Christology, people are theologically/spiritually defenceless against psycho-religious pathology. Jonestown need not be recalled; suffice it to recollect those whose “faith” has rendered them ill, or rendered them more ill.

VII: — When Jesus Christ is confessed as the unique bearer and bestower of the Spirit; when the Spirit is known as the power in which Jesus Christ acts, to the glory of God the Father, then distortions which bedevil the church are avoided and Trinitarian doctrine preserves proper balances.

Reference has already been made to the question Paul put to the Christians in Galatia, “Did you receive the Spirit by works of the law or by hearing with faith?”. The question directs his readers to recall and reflect upon an aspect of their life in Christ which they cannot deny, an event (however protracted), moreover, which is so common as to provide an indisputable beginning-point for his subsequent reasoning with them.

As the church today recovers experience of God (for experience of God is the only experience the Spirit of Jesus Christ facilitates) the theological content of the gospel will never be arid intellectualism. It is the Spirit who prevents the gospel (so-called) from becoming the preserve of the intellectually gifted, from degenerating into a western philosophy which happens to employ a religious vocabulary. The gospel must not become one more abstraction to be assessed along with other “world-views”, when in truth the gospel, ultimately, is the presence and power of the living Lord Jesus Christ in his person.

When the Spirit is honoured as the power of God which renders Jesus Christ forever contemporaneous then living faith will always triumph over traditionalism. “I’m a Lutheran”, when uttered in the apparent absence of throbbing faith in the living Word, usually means that the Lutheran Church is the one someone stays away from! The same phenomenon is seen in those whose Protestantism consists in their anti-Catholicism.

When “Spirit” and “Word” are acknowledged to imply each other then institutionalism will not supplant adventurous discipleship. No longer subserving itself or an un-gospel agenda, the institution will subserve the community which lives for the praise of God’s glory. The institution will resist calling for that obedience which is owed God alone. In trusting the promise that the powers of death shall not prevail against Christ’s people who, like John the Baptist, point to him, it will soberly remember that institutional remains litter the landscape of history.

Where the Spirit is recalled as the Spirit of him who insists that harlots and tax-collectors enter the kingdom of God ahead of the “righteous” the placebo of moralism will be detected and dropped. The Christian life will not be impoverished until it becomes precisely what the world misunderstands it to be: conformity to a code, success at which enterprise breeds self-righteousness while failure precipitates despair. Evident instead will be glad obedience to the living person of Jesus Christ, out of gratitude for the deliverance he has effected.

Where the Spirit is trusted to lend effectiveness to proclamation in Christ’s name evangelism will not give way to assorted techniques for proselytizing or garnering adherents. To evangelize is to set forth the gospel of the Son in reliance upon the God whose Spirit is sufficient to empower the saints’ testimony. In other words, the outcome of our evangelism can be left in God’s hands.

A church which does not trust the Spirit to honour witness borne to the Son is a church which confuses evangelism with conversion; which is to say, a church which cannot distinguish between its work and God’s work. Moreover, a church which thinks that conversion (rather than witness) is its responsibility is a church which coerces; the harassment can be physical, social or psychological, but it remains coercion. Paradoxically, the church which thinks that it has to generate the fruit of its diligent “God-talk” announces to the world that it does not believe in God, since it cannot trust God to vivify God’s own Word! To trust that the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son or Word is to be freed from anxiety concerning the results of mission and therein spared the fear of failure and the concomitant temptation to coerce.

VIII: — A recovery of the doctrine of the Trinity would do eversomuch to assist The United Church of Canada concerning the catholicity of its mission. Despite our denomination’s protestations that it sides with the victimized, the marginalized, the oppressed, and those disadvantaged in any way, it remains virtually exclusively an occurrence of the ascendant middle class. That segment of the socio-economic spectrum from which the UCC draws its people is becoming smaller as it also becomes more affluent: we are attracting fewer and fewer people, virtually all of whom are more and more wealthy. We attract no poor people, even remarkably few who are not socially ascendant.

In times of economic turbulence the rich are cushioned against material misfortune and remain rich; the poor are not cushioned, but neither do they have anything to protect, with the result that they remain poor. The rising middle class, however, is unrelievedly vulnerable. In times of economic dislocation it is precipitated downwards. It collapses into that segment of the socio-economic spectrum with which our denomination has no credibility at all. In other words, simply as a result of uncontrollable economic convulsions the UCC would be deprived of its constituency. A recovery of Trinitarian faith, especially with respect to the appointment of God himself in the person of the Son, would commission us to re-examine our socio-economic exclusiveness. The Word of God is baptized in dirty water at the hands of someone who will be forever out of place among the socially slick. The pronouncement heard at this baptism — “Thou art my beloved Son; with Thee I am well pleased” — is a conflation of Psalm 2 and Isaiah 42. Psalm 2 is God’s appointment of the royal ruler, the one possessed of genuine authority. Isaiah 42 speaks of God’s approval of the “Servant of the Lord”, commonly known as “the suffering servant”, the one who “was despised and rejected by humankind…and we esteemed him not”. The mission of God himself in the Son will ever be effective (God is sovereign), but its effectiveness will materialize through a servanthood which entails hardship and sacrifice and social rejection. Then to be Christ’s follower is to be commissioned to a ministry of service, not domination; of self-forgetfulness, not personal advantage; even of social rejection rather than public congratulation. Would not a new appreciation of the Son’s mission, when the Son is one with the Father himself, be the recovery of our identification with the Son who cherished the very people to whom we cannot relate? In that Son who is of the same substance and nature as the Father God effectively loved the world — not merely one aspect of the world, i.e., social aspirants whose psycho-social needs church-affiliation appears to serve.

The recovery of the doctrine of the Trinity will foster the recovery of Trinitarian faith; this in turn will mean a return to the catholicity of the gospel. And such a return will spell recovery of mission and service on behalf of the all the “far off” who have been “brought near in the blood of Christ”.(Ephesians 2:13) For “through him we both [i.e., Jew and Gentile, which is to say all human beings equally despite apparently insurmountable barriers] have access in one Spirit to the Father.” (Ephesians 3:18)

The tetragrammaton, , contains no vowels. Lacking vowels, it is unpronounceable. Because it is unpronounceable it is untranslatable; for this reason there can be no substitute for it. There can be no substitute for the name of the God who has named himself Father, Son and Holy Spirit. To know God, honour and obey and adore God, is to find that the doctrine of the Trinity is neither the museum-like security-blanket of the nervous nor the jettisonable baggage of the naive. The doctrine of the Trinity, rather, will ever orient us to the living God whose love for a dying world commissions us to love it no less.

Victor Shepherd

 

My Spiritual Debt to Martin Luther

My Spiritual Debt to Martin Luther

in  THE CANADIAN LUTHERAN  October 2002

 

As a child, adolescent and university undergraduate student I had no exposure to Luther at all. Then in the course of preparing for ordained ministry within The United Church of Canada I immersed myself in the theology of John Calvin, where I heard Calvin described frequently as a “second generation Lutheran.” My work in Calvin found me reaching back to Luther to see where the Genevan was indebted to him and where he differed from him (e.g., on the manner of Christ’s presence in the Lord’s Supper.) Soon I found myself drawn to Luther not as background to Calvin but as a spiritual and theological giant himself. Always impressed by Luther’s grasp of the gospel, I was overwhelmed at the gospel’s grasp of Luther, at his heart, at the manifest “heart seizure” he had undergone at the hands of Jesus Christ.

Three words taken together describe Luther’s heart for me: truth, passion, compassion. Nothing ever eclipses the living Lord Jesus as truth and reality for Luther. To embrace Christ in faith is to love him, flooded by the love with which he first loved us, and in loving him find ourselves delighted and contented in him. And of course to embrace Christ in faith is to embrace as well all whom he embraces; which is to say, all of humankind in its sin, suffering, and self-contradiction. Luther’s heart broke as surely as his Lord’s at the sight of people whose wounds were undisguisable and undeniable.

Several years later I was appointed Professor of Historical Theology at Tyndale Seminary, Toronto. Here I teach a course in the theology of Luther every eighteen months. While I teach many courses in several different disciplines (e.g., philosophy), students tell me I’m at my best in Luther. I understand this, since Luther is the easiest Protestant thinker to love, and my love for him has admitted me to the deeper recesses of his heart. His influence upon me is inestimable, and my debt to him is unpayable.

Gospel definition

Luther’s definition of the gospel — “the promise of God fulfilled in our midst” — moves me as often as I reflect upon it. His way of putting the matter gathers particular associations around it and thereby creates a mood and an ethos that Lutheranism has always known and cherished. God has made promise after promise to his wayward creation; God gathers up his many promises in one grand, overarching promise to act for us and save us; God fulfills this grand promise amidst our earthliness and earthiness in such a way as to satisfy yet never satiate all who cling to the Son in faith. In other words to meet and know that Son whom God hasn’t withheld from us but has given up for us and now persists in giving to us; to meet and know this one is to want to look nowhere else. “At rest” in him, we are left plumbing riches we can never exhaust.

In the history of the Church few besides Luther have loved the living person of the Lord Jesus in such a child-like way. And for this reason few have unselfconsciously reflected the child’s wonder and excitement at Christmas. Like a child, Luther was awed that the Creator kept his promise of the gift, and is therefore a Father whom we can henceforth trust in dark days and difficult times. Before the Christmas gift (who, as the Incarnate One, is ultimately the giver himself) Luther stood speechless at the humility of the God who condescends to us as baby. Learning all of this through scripture alone, and knowing therefore that scripture is indispensable in the economy of salvation, Luther was yet aware that scripture and Incarnate One are categorically different. “Scripture is the manger,” he liked to say, “in which the child is laid.” Bible and baby ought never to be confused; yet they ought never to be separated, since it is only through the witness of prophets and apostles that we can apprehend the long-promised gift of God; better, only as we habitually revisit the manger do we find the Saviour apprehending us. Luther’s insight here — pithy, profound and memorable — would do much to spare the Church the family-quarrels over scripture that settle nothing yet scar everyone.

The babe in the manger thrived; he grew both in stature and in wisdom. As an adult the Son of God endured a humiliation in the cross that dwarfed the humility of the stable. Mesmerized by the cross, Luther gloried in the “exchange” (2nd Corinthians 5: 16-21) as the crucified took on our sin, guilt, degradation and death only to clothe us in his righteousness, acceptance, honour and life.

 

Christ defined

The “exchange” motif lies at the heart of Luther’s Christology. The “Christ” who is chiefly teacher (as if the root human problem were ignorance) or chiefly exemplar (as if it were the absence of a model we can mimic) or chiefly law-giver (as if edicts could eliminate our fatal self-contradiction) is useless in the wake of the Fall. In light of the Fall Luther always knew the difference between deprivation and depravity; he knew that our predicament arises not from deficits and deficiencies but rather from incomprehensible yet lethal perverseness. Only the heaven-sent Saviour can address our depravity. He does so not as he tries to “fix up” humankind but as he exchanges our heart of stone for his heart of flesh (Ezekiel 36:26), our inconstancy for his faithfulness, the condemnation we deserve for the approval we can only receive. Every time he gazed upon the crucified Luther knew that a life-crushing burden had been exchanged for life-giving blessing. To be the beneficiary of this exchange was to be freed.

Freed from what? In his unforgettable tract, The Freedom of the Christian (1521), Luther insisted we are freed from the law, from sin, and from death; that is, we are freed from having to justify ourselves (or thinking that we can), from disobedience as the determinative truth of our life before God, and from expulsion from God’s presence. We are freed for love to Jesus Christ and service to the neighbour. Freed (paradoxically) by our bondage to Christ, we no longer live in ourselves, out of ourselves, for ourselves; instead we live “away” from ourselves by living in the “other.” Specifically we live in two others: we live in Christ through faith, and we live in the neighbour through love. Taken out of ourselves, we are liberated from that anxiety which always marks the self-preoccupied. Aware that our frantic efforts at reducing anxiety merely feed it, Luther knew that the profoundest cure for anxiety is self-forgetful self-abandonment to those in whom we now live.

 

Living in the neighbour

Since the arms of the crucified embrace the neighbour, genuinely to live in Christ is always to live in the neighbour as well. Never shallow, Luther insisted we live in the neighbour by sharing her need. This isn’t especially difficult, since we are meeting her scarcity with our abundance. In the second place we live in our neighbour by sharing her suffering. This is considerably more difficult, since proximity to another person’s pain is itself painful for us. At the same time, we may feel rather good about sharing our neighbour’s suffering in that we may feel somewhat heroic, virtuous; we shall likely feel even better if we are recognized and commended for this. In the third place we live in our neighbour by sharing her disgrace. So far from being commended now we find ourselves despised. We are told that we have compromised our standards. We are reminded that that you can always tell a person by the company she keeps. Our only comfort here, says Luther, is to continue clinging to him who was himself numbered among the transgressors. He, after all, knew no sin yet was made to be sin in order that we whose sin can never be excused may yet know it forgiven and know ourselves rendered the righteousness of God.

 

Theology of the cross vs theology of glory

Everything noted so far is generated by Luther’s Theologia Crucis or “theology of the cross.” By “theology of the cross” Luther understood first that the God who remains hidden to human gaze (both physical and philosophical) reveals himself where the world never thinks of looking for him. Faith alone knows this God. For this reason Luther liked to say, “The gospel is aural”; it can only be “heard.” (In other words, the Spirit-sensitized heart recognizes the gospel as it is proclaimed.) The gospel can never be “seen.” Luther knew that what we can all see every day everywhere in the world — crime, war, starvation, betrayal, natural disaster — never persuades anyone of the Father’s love. We apprehend God’s love for us and thereupon entrust him with our lives only as we “shut our eyes and open our ears.” For only the faith-quickening Word that we hear can get beyond the resistance to God aroused by the doubt-quickening sights that we see.

Luther contrasted the “theology of the cross” with a “theology of glory.” The latter has four principal features. First, it confuses the living God of self-willed suffering with the “God” that philosophy infers: power, aloofness, impassivity; in short, everything but the God who empties himself of every divine prerogative yet doesn’t empty himself of sin-absorbing love.

Secondly, a theology of glory relishes the triumphalism of the church’s institutional life. It glories in social privilege, economic power, the capacity to coerce, all the while disdaining self-renouncing service.

Thirdly, a theology of glory ignores the consistent testimony of scripture, “This is my beloved Son; hear him“, and prefers to read God off the face of nature. Overlooked, of course, is the fact that nature is at best impersonal and at worst “red in tooth and claw.”

Fourthly, the same theology attempts to read God off the face of history. Luther knew that one nation’s military subjugation of another acquaints us with nothing concerning God. Luther’s “theology of the cross” was his relentless conviction that God does his most characteristic work (love) and his mightiest work (the redemption of the world) precisely when he appears, from a human point of view, to be utterly helpless and useless.

In the light of his “theology of the cross” Luther maintained that life’s “trials” (Anfechtungen), unavoidable in any case, can be understood as the occasion of God’s refining the faith of his people, purifying it, strengthening it, ever rendering it more attractive and more useful. Since the world hates the gospel and those identified with it, Christians can escape the world’s hostility only by renouncing faith — and this they will not do. For indeed, said Luther, faith’s worst trial is to have no trial, since trial keeps faith alive and vibrant.

Luther himself never lacked trials. For twenty-five years, from the Diet of Worms in 1521 until his death in 1546, he lived with a price on his head. Heartbroken at the death of Magdalena, his fourteen-year-old daughter, the death of Elisabeth at eighteen months devastated him. Nevertheless, when he was dying in Eisleben and he learned that his beloved Katarina was fretting in Wittenberg, he sent to her a word that will ever be my comfort: “I have a caretaker who lies in the cradle and rests on a virgin’s bosom, and yet, nevertheless, sits at the right hand of God, the Father almighty. Therefore be at peace. Amen.”

Victor Shepherd
Tyndale Seminary, Toronto

 

Reflection on “9/11” — Jewish-Christian-Muslim Trialogue

Jewish-Christian-Muslim Trialogue Sponsored by Jewish-Christian Dialogue of Toronto

Reflection on “9/11”

Rev. Dr. Victor Shepherd

February 19,2002

 

In the course of discussing informally Sept. 11 with many people I have always insisted on the need to hear afresh and honour anew the 9th Commandment of the Decalogue: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour.” When Muhammad Ali was taunted with, “How do you feel in view of the fact that the Sept. 11 perpetrators belonged to your religion?” he replied smartly, “How do you feel in view of the fact that Hitler belonged to yours?” I think it better that we move away from all such efforts at religious or ideational one-upmanship, for all such efforts sooner or later involve bearing false witness.

In the immediate aftermath of Sept. 11 I found myself not to be bent out of shape at all, while most people around me were. I hadn’t planned on preaching on the event the following Sunday, only to discover that I had to as parishioners wanted me to address their dismay. I wondered why I wasn’t distressed. It was not because I regarded the event as inconsequential; not because I was insensitive to the suffering it brought with it, especially the suffering of those who didn’t die immediately; not because I was unaware of what it portended in terms of public anxiety and financial downturn and rising unemployment and increased suspicion and even victimization for our Islamic fellow-citizens. Gradually I came to realize why other people were bent out of shape by the event and I wasn’t: their understanding of God had suffered a devastating blow that verged on a fatal blow, while my understanding of God had not.

The reason for this, I realized, is that unlike them I wasn’t surprised at the event, and wasn’t surprised just because such an event is congruent with the evil that I find surging over and coursing through the world at all times. I have long noted that I have a sense of evil that is far more vivid than most people’s. To be sure, I have always insisted that the goodness of the creation perdures despite the ravages of the Fall or the “yetzer ha-ra” or however we choose to speak of the fact that the goodness of the creation is contradicted. Nonetheless, the evil that now disfigures the creation is, in my opinion, hideously evil.

But not everyone agrees with me. My philosophy students, for instance, do not. Whenever my philosophy class comes to the work of Immanuel Kant I always find myself at odds with my students. I point out to my students that while the earlier Kant certainly admitted evil, albeit in terms of his rationalist ethic, and the later Kant admitted radical evil, his radical evil is never radical enough for me. While Kant may have been able to admit evil perpetrated out of woeful ignorance or misguided zeal or even the naïve assumption that evil may be a step toward a greater good, Kant seems unable to admit evil perpetrated for the sake of evil, evil perpetrated for the perverse pleasure of evil. My students aren’t Kantians, yet they too can’t admit radical evil, evil for the sake of evil. For years I have been puzzled at this and only recently have come to see the reason for their reluctance. They believe that God is great and God is good; therefore the world can’t be as evil as Shepherd makes it out to be. If it were, they would have to abandon their belief in the greatness and goodness of God. Myself, I too believe that God is great and God is good; for me, however, the evil of the world renders God not less believable but more. My students think that if radical evil existed it would leave God compromised; I think it leaves God magnified. My students continue to look for meaning in outbreaks of evil, seemingly unaware that part of evil’s evilness is its sheer irrationality. To the extent that evil could be understood it would thereby be less evil. Radical evil, then, will always be incomprehensible because necessarily incomprehensible. (Parenthetically, I think it should be asked, “If radical evil, unrelentingly horrific, were possessed of meaning, could any of us endure it?”)

The question in the hearts of so many people is “why?” It’s assumed that “why” is the profoundest question to be asked. But this question wasn’t deemed the profoundest in the biblical era, or in the patristic or mediaeval or early modern eras. Biblical thinkers didn’t first ask the question “why” just because they already knew the answer: the world lies in the grip of the evil one. The profounder question for biblical thinkers was “How long? You, God, have promised to resolve the contradiction we live with, and the contradiction is tormenting us, so how long will it be before you act definitively and relieve us?”

Then who raised the question “why”, and raised it, supposedly, as the soul of profundity? The French agnostics and atheists who came to the fore in the Enlightenment: they framed the question, and then the church, at least, took it over as the profoundest question, whereas Christians of an earlier era had asked an entirely different question. My reaction to Sept. 11 simply confirms that my Christian conviction maintains the pre-Enlightenment question to be profounder.

In view of what I have said concerning the presence and potency of radical evil, and in view of its magnification of the holiness of God, for me Sept. 11 magnifies God’s anger at sin (at the sin of all of us, I should add, not merely the sin of those who crumbled the World Trade Tower); it magnifies God’s mercy, for mercy is the form God’s love takes when his love meets our sin; it magnifies God’s heartbreak over a people that seems perversely bent on never being his “peculiar treasure”; it magnifies God’s patience (his patience, unlike ours, is immense; not infinite, as the fact of judgement attests, but immense nonetheless); it magnifies God’s persistence, without which his patience would be synonymous with indifference; above all it magnifies God’s faithfulness to the covenant he made with Abraham. The covenant with Abraham is foundational for everyone here tonight, regardless of religious persuasion. While we continue to advertise ourselves as covenant-breakers, he keeps faith with us who do not keep faith with him. It’s plain, then, that God’s covenant-keeping has found him not abandoning the world because it’s disgusting or renouncing it because it’s hopeless or dismissing it because it’s intractable.

I am aware that in the wake of Sept. 11 many people felt they that the understanding of God they had long cherished was no longer tenable. Once again I found that they and I were not of one mind. As I spoke with them I realized that they had had in mind a definite notion of what God can or cannot do, should or should not do. Myself, I have long ceased to ponder what God can/cannot do, should/should not do. I ponder now only what God has done, therein defining himself and rendering all speculation about him pointless. As a Christian I affirm that he has so thoroughly identified himself with us, our folly and our misery, our predicament, that he has given himself up in utmost vulnerability for our sakes; God’s omnipotence or almightiness means there is no limit to his vulnerability and no limit to the effectiveness of his vulnerability.

In light of my conviction here I am persuaded that what is required of us, in the first instance, isn’t that we pursue a solution to the perplexities that Sept. 11 may have raised for us. What is required of us in the first instance, rather is that we make a response. Regardless of what we think we can understand of Sept. 11 or fear that we can’t understand, the response we have to make is our first responsibility. All efforts at solution aim at an intellectual abstraction. Solutions are always of the order of disengaged, armchair abstraction, when what is required of us is committed, concrete response; a response, be it noted, that may require of us a vulnerability similar to God’s.

Our response may take many forms. There is a response we make to the victims of Sept. 11 and to any and all victims of like occurrences. There is a response we make to our Islamic neighbours lest they be victimized in a way no less evil. There is a response we make whenever and wherever we can do something, anything, about the injustices that wound and then fester and finally develop into raging systemic infections. For we agree with the prophets that peace without justice is no peace at all. Admittedly, not all inequities are iniquities, but some are, and therefore discernment is as essential as determination.

I have mentioned several times tonight that we like to put questions to God. There’s a question, however, that God has already answered: “Why?” There’s a question he delays answering: “How long?” There’s a question, finally, that he answers as often as we ask it, yet always answers by turning our question to him back upon us: “How can you allow this sort of thing to happen?”

Rev. Dr. Victor Shepherd

 

Thomas Oden

Article on
THOMAS ODEN
for
Biographical Dictionary of Evangelicals

 

Oden, Thomas Clark (1931), Methodist minister and theologian, professor at Drew University, was born on 21st October 1931, in Altus, Oklahoma. His father was a lawyer and his mother a music teacher. In 1949 he enrolled in the University of Oklahoma and graduated with a B.Litt. in 1953. He began studying theology formally at Perkins School of Theology (Southern Methodist University), graduating with his B.D. in 1956. Ordained by the Oklahoma Conference of the United Methodist Church (deacon, 1954; elder, 1956), he served in varied parish ministries. Beginning in 1956 he studied at Yale University, and was awarded his M.A. in 1958 and his Ph.D. in 1960. Hans Frei and H.Richard Niebuhr supervised his work. His doctoral dissertation, revised for publication, was published as Radical Obedience: The Ethics of Rudolf Bultmann. One year of postdoctoral study followed at Heidelberg.

In 1958 he began his professional teaching career as an instructor at Perkins School of Theology. From 1960 to 1970 he was associate professor and then professor at Phillips University. In 1971 he became the Henry Anson Buttz Professor of theology at Drew University, where he taught until his retirement.

Oden has also been a guest lecturer or visiting professor at Moscow State University, Oxford, Edinburgh, Duke, Emory, Princeton and Claremont. In addition he has been consultant to the Ethics and Public Policy Center of Washington, D.C., the White House Dialogue on Urban Initiatives (1985), and Public Information Office Briefings (1984-1986.)

Oden has published approximately forty books and 80 articles.

 

Following his Agenda for Theology (1978) republished as After Modernity, What? (1990) with four additional chapters and an introduction by J.I. Packer, Oden described himself as an “out-off-the-closet evangelical.” He has continued to distance himself from the ethos of the institutions, images and “isms” that earlier he wore as a badge. His Requiem: A Lament in Three Movements (1995) is anguished autobiography concerning the lethal stranglehold that totalitarian “liberals” have on denominational bureaucracies, church conferences, and seminary education. A former left-wing radical, he now affirms the genuine radix of the scripture-normed authority of the post-apostolic writers. His “new” radicalism, inspired and measured by the gospel, nevertheless finds him still espousing out-of-step causes, such as the utter unreformability of the seminaries unless the practice of tenure is overhauled.

Recently Oden has become a contributing editor of Christianity Today. His position there magnifies his influence enormously, as this magazine is the most widely-read evangelical journal in North America.

Never backing away from rendering the judgements that he deems gospel-fidelity to enjoin, Oden has made the rare move of publicly faulting another denomination in another country. The United Church of Canada (Canada’s largest Protestant denomination, formed in 1925 of Methodists, Presbyterians and Congregationalists), Oden has pronounced devoid of ecumenical identity, “and is no longer thought properly to be called an ecumenical communion”; i.e., is no longer the church in that it has abandoned consensual teaching on creation, sin, covenant sexual fidelity and the blessings of marriage.

By his own admission every turn that Oden took on his way to the theological position with which he is now identified was a left turn. The “turn” that “righted” him, however, was not a right turn or series of compensatory right turns but rather a turn back into the Fathers. Startled at the shallowness and virulence of 1960s radicalism, he looked for theological resources and discovered that Patristic thinkers exhibited a profundity and pertinence that few modern authors could rival.

Oden describes himself as an “orthodox, ecumenical evangelical”, where orthodoxy “is nothing more or less than the ancient consensual tradition of exegesis.” His work aims at articulating, in the spirit of Vincent of Lerins, the faith of the universal church.

Its focus is the consensus of the first five centuries, since “antiquity is a criterion of authentic memory in any historical testimony.” His preoccupation with antiquity means he refuses to renounce his “zeal for unoriginality….the apostles were testy with revisionists.”

Its mood is evangelical, reflecting throughout the gospel’s particularity and inherent militancy. This mood contrasts sharply with a theological modernity whose treachery has rendered evangelism impossible and orthodoxy unrecognizable. An evangelical invitation suffuses his work as he urges readers to decide for Christ, warning them tenderly yet solemnly about the peril of procrastination: “One who neglects an opportunity at hand may not have another.”

Its centre is the rediscovery of ancient ecumenical theology and the recovery of classical Christianity in his evolving Wesleyan tradition.

Its target audience is the working pastor, since Christian teaching is healthy only where living tradition is embodied by an actual community. (Vide his several books on pastoral theology.)

Its orientation is that for which he commends Arminius and those after Arminius; viz., “the gradual Protestant retrieval of the ancient ecumenical consensus on grace and freedom.” In this regard Oden consistently disavows the predestinarianism of the later Augustine (even as Augustine remains one of the ecumenical giants) that emerged so very strongly in the Magisterial Reformers. Oden regards this deterministic misunderstanding of election as a departure and declension from the received faith. Characteristically the church has upheld the inviolability of the humanness of God’s covenant partners. At the same time Oden discerns and denounces the error of Pelagianism, together with the more subtle seductiveness of semi-Pelagianism. His work incorporates everywhere a nuanced discussion of gratia operans/gratia co-operans that, while strange to Protestants who are unacquainted with Patristic thought, is crucial in any approach to him.

Its most recent expression is the project he is masterminding, Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture (forthcoming), whose purpose is the recovery of classical Christian exegesis. A major strength of this project, he maintains, is the reviving of texts so very old that they contain no trace of European imperialism (and therefore no inherent revulsion, for instance, for Asian and African Christians.) These texts will therein prove singularly significant as they are brought to bear on the cultural formation of both West and East. In addition ancient exegesis will expose readers to the intimate connection between prayer and study, to the relation of theology to vibrant Christian community, and to worship as the context in which scripture is read. Oden hopes that Protestants especially will peruse the Ancient Commentary. Their doing so will remedy the theological one-sidedness that arises on account of Protestantism’s neglect of pre-Reformation texts, and also reduce Pietism’s extreme vulnerability to modern consciousness. They can expect to be startled, for instance, by Nazianzen’s theological power and Jerome’s transparency to the Spirit’s energy.

Repeatedly Oden indicates why he has written polemically and prolifically. While theology as the inquiry into God is inherently the most engaging of all subjects, theologians have turned it “into a yawning bore”, boring just because it is so very destructive: heresy is treasonous, and when protracted, tedious. Aware, however, of the presumption that laps at anyone claiming to be a corrective, the stated motive for his three-volume Systematic Theology (1987, 1989, 1992) was an invitation for readers to test his own fallibility.

Everywhere Oden sees his work as setting a limit to the license of “guild” (i.e., academically appointed) theologians and exegetes whose perfidy has summoned him to be “someone to teach you the elementary truths of God’s word all over again.” (Heb. 5:12) For this reason his work as a whole and his systematic theology in particular repristinate the elemental, doctrinal “building blocks” of the faith; specifically, theological matters that are articulated in the creed and that appear in the standard regulae fidei. (Precise studies of more detailed matters such as anthropology, liturgy and ethics will be developed in subsequent works.)

Throughout his writings Oden looks first to the four great Patristic thinkers of the east and west: Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, John Chrysostom, together with Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, Gregory the Great. These exegetes consistently clarify the mind of the believing church; “we are more indebted to these eight exegetes than any since the apostles.” While Oden cites other thinkers frequently (especially Thomas Aquinas, Luther and Calvin) they are invoked where they amplify the aforementioned consensus, not where their work is idiosyncratic. Other thinkers deemed non-consensual (e.g., Menno Simons) are scarcely mentioned at all.

Oden’s single largest work is his Systematic Theology (1500 pages, 15,000 references to classical writings.) Its purpose is “to set forth an ordered view of the faith of the Christian community upon which there has generally been substantial agreement between the traditions of East and West, including Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox.” Unlike virtually all systematic theologians, however, Oden insists that the exposition of the traditional theological topics in his work serves primarily as an introduction to the annotations; i.e., the annotations embedded in the text are more important than the text itself. True to scripture, to his native Wesleyanism, and to the Fathers, he regards God’s holiness as the linchpin of the entire theological enterprise.

 

Oden’s theological “journey” brought him to this point after earlier starts that if not false were hesitant at least.

He names five theological instructors who shaped his thought: Albert Outler, Rudolf Bultmann, H.Richard Niebuhr, Karl Barth and Will Herberg. Despite the apparent neo-orthodoxy of these men, Oden subsequently criticized neo-orthodoxy for its non-interest in worship, sacrament, pastoral care, the concrete tasks of ministry, and the holiness of the church. His “best” teacher was Outler, who introduced him to Augustine and Wesley. Although his Ph.D. dissertation was a comparative study of Bultmann and Barth, he soon repudiated the favoured Bultmannism that had first brought him to theological prominence and concentrated on Barth. In the 1960s Oden was concerned chiefly with the relation of theology to psychotherapy. Attentive now to the necessity, nature and integrity of human agency, he came to regard the Eastern church fathers as a corrective to Barth’s one-sidedness.

Upon Oden’s appointment to Drew University his friend and colleague, Will Herberg, persuaded him to ground his thinking in classical sources. Ironically, says Oden, a conservative Jew was his chief mentor in classical Christianity. With the arbitrariness and weakness of his earlier liberalism now exposed, and himself repulsed by his former support of the abortion platform, he abandoned situation ethics and with it the entire liberal worldview. Rejecting too his earlier notion that novelty is the task of theology, he jettisoned “creativity”, now convinced, thanks to J.H. Newman, that his responsibility was to listen to the deposit of truth already sufficiently given. Intrigued by the decisions of the ancient Ecumenical Councils, he plunged into patristics. Quickly he identified himself in terms of “paleo-orthodoxy”, an expression coined to indicate the distance now between him and neo-orthodoxy. By his own admission modern psychology had taught him to trust his experience, whereas ancient writers now taught him to trust that scripture and tradition would transmute his experience.

 

Oden has endeavoured to honour his theological parents by means of two books related to Wesley. Doctrinal Standards in the Wesleyan Tradition (1988) assesses the nature, place and function of normative doctrine in the United Methodist Church specifically and in the churches of the Wesleyan family generally. It aims at healing the doctrinal amnesia that has largely afflicted mainline North American Methodists.

John Wesley’s Scriptural Christianity (1994) expounds Wesley’s theology on all major points, beginning in the time-honoured way with God’s attributes and concluding with eschatology. It is a contemporary exposition and interpretation of Wesley’s thought, aiming always at fidelity to Wesley’s text. Its subordinate purpose is to convey Wesley to other branches of the Christian family in view of the fact that non-Wesleyans are much less acquainted with Wesley’s thought than are non-Magisterial thinkers, for instance, with that of the 16th century Reformers.

Finding Wesley rooted in the patristic, Anglican, holy living and Puritan traditions, he sees Wesleyanism as a bridge between Protestants and Catholics, even as it has profound affinities with the Eastern Church tradition. He deems Wesleyanism’s characteristic resistance to co-optation at the hands of party or fad to be one of its major strengths.

Two areas that seem problematic for evangelicals are his seemingly uncritical espousal of the Fathers and an “ecumenical” view of baptism that some may find indistinguishable from sacramental regeneration.

Concerning the first matter Oden affirms repeatedly his agreement with the Fathers that in the “theandric” (sic) One the humanity suffers but never the deity. Specifically he denies that the Father suffers in the Son’s crucifixion. Nowhere does Oden acknowledge that the risen, exalted Lord continues to suffer. In the same vein the neo-Platonism of the Fathers is unchecked. Oden cites with apparent approval the patristic neo-Platonism concerning sexual matters, such as Nazianzen’s pronouncement that Christ’s birth “didn’t have its origin in weakness…for sensual pleasure did not precede the birth.” A similarly neo-Platonic argument is advanced as to why there will be no marrying in heaven. Circumcision is understood to consecrate “that organ…which…is most likely to be corrupted by idolatry and sin.” (His commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, relieved of uncritical support of the Fathers, upholds a more Hebraic understanding of sexuality.)

Concerning the second matter Oden, to be sure, insists “…it is not baptism of itself that saves”, yet he appears to undo this assertion throughout his discussion of baptism, as in his remark, “The Holy Spirit through baptism offers, calls forth, and elicits regeneration in a spiritually blessed water in which the whole triune God is by grace effectively present”, and “The Spirit remains in those who have received the grace of baptism, who remain indelibly known to God.” He appears impelled to speak this way inasmuch as the Fathers do.

Oden predicts that a sign of hope in 21st Century Christian thought will be its preoccupation with the rediscovery of boundaries in theology: “I would love to find a seminary where a discussion is taking place about whether a line can be drawn between faith and unfaith.”

A diligent student and teacher of Kierkegaard for decades, Oden’s mature work can be summarized in an item cited in his Parables of Kierkegaard (1978.) Faith disrupts, says the Dane, and where public disruption isn’t observable, faith hasn’t occurred. If as “believers” we nevertheless protest that we have faith, we are theologians; if we know how to describe faith, we are poets; if we weep in describing faith, actors. But only as we witness for the truth and against untruth are we actually possessed of faith.

 

Dr. Victor Shepherd
Professor of Historical Theology and Wesley Studies
Tyndale Seminary, Toronto

 

A Christmas Meditation on Mary

A Christmas Meditation on Mary

Mary is a key figure in the Christmas story, yet we say nothing about her compared to innkeeper, wisemen, shepherds, even angels. Her place in the birth of the Messiah, and subsequently in the Christian story, is much larger than these.

Protestants, reacting against Marian excesses in the mediaeval church, say nothing beyond sentimental niceties. Roman Catholics and Orthodox say much more: Mary is in essence the church’s response to Jesus Christ; i.e., mother of the Son of God is also a beneficiary of the Son of God, and typifies the response of all such beneficiaries. In a word, hers is the paradigmatic response, model response, to the Incarnate One.

 

I: — Mary models the response of all believers concerning the address of the triune God.

Luke 1:26-38

In the annunciation Mary is addressed three times, and each time she responds not with idle speculation (all Prot. Reformers disdained speculation) but concretely, appropriately, devoutly.

(i) with respect to the revelation of the Father: she responds with alarm, that fear of God (“greatly troubled”) which reflects the approach of God everywhere in Scripture. “Do not be afraid, Mary, for you have found favour with God.” And everywhere in Scripture “Fear not” is God’s command and assurance in the wake of that fear which his approach has rightly quickened in us.

She is ready for further response and any service she might be asked to render.

(ii) with respect to the revelation of the Son, the one she is to bear, and who will be God’s Son and David’s heir: “You shall call his name ‘Jesus'” — i.e., Yehoshuah, “God saves.” Mary is told what to do and she does it: she names the child she is to bear. (Name has the force of nature, person, presence, power, deserved reputation. The “name” of any person in S. is that person himself present in his nature or character, acting effectively.) She responds by asking a question of her visitor (as all God’s people interrogate him in Israel), “How shall this be?” As a result of her interrogating God she is given even greater revelation.

(iii) with respect to the revelation of the Spirit: “The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you; therefore the child to be born will be called holy, the Son of God.”

The episode concludes with that response which gathers up all her partial responses to date: “Behold, I am the handmaid of the Lord; let it be to me according to your word”; i.e., she consents to the word and submits to it.

Note: Mary is addressed by the triune God. In this address she is acquainted with every person of the Godhead. Her response is threefold: she fears God, she reverently questions God where she needs further illumination, and she embraces God’s will for her, submits to it, and contents herself in it.

She honours the Word addressed to her by submitting to it, but not in the submission of servility or resentment or self-belittlement. Rather her submission is a glad, grateful, eager, welcoming self-renunciation for the sake of a vocation and a commission. She has been visited by and addressed by God, knows it, is made aware of God’s will for her, and gladly does it. Her vocation is to discern the will of God and do it. Her commission is to be a handmaid of the Lord.

The church consists of those who are modelled after Mary.

[a] our response bears witness to the triune God: we believers “body forth” God’s son by being the body of Christ; in the course of bodying him forth (as did Mary) we too are overshadowed by the Holy Spirit or else we’d long since have ceased to be the church.

[b] in it all we are to obey God gladly, willingly, cheerfully, non-resentfully (or else we don’t obey him at all), declaring in it all, “Behold I am the handmaid of the Lord; let it be to me according to your word.”

 

II: — Mary models the church’s enrichment through recollection, the appropriation of memory.

Luke 1:29: “She was greatly troubled at the saying, and considered in her mind what sort of greeting this might be.”

-“considered in her mind”: diatarasso — to be agitated, troubled. Mary was agitated, troubled at the saying, but didn’t dismiss it or give up on it. She understood enough to know it was important, but not enough to understand it completely. She hid it in her heart.

Luke 2:19: “Mary kept all these things, pondering them in her heart.”

-sumballein lit. to throw together, to compare; i.e., to consider from all possible angles.

Luke 2:51: “Mary kept all these things in her heart.”

-diatereo lit. to keep continually, to keep carefully.

All three expressions point to the fact that Mary understood enough to grasp the rudiments of the point at issue and to be aware of its importance, but not enough to pronounce the definitive word about it.

Subsequently she could revisit what she had hidden in her heart, and in revisiting it find it ever richer, ever more fruitful, as she recollected it in different contexts. In other words, she doesn’t stumble ahead in total darkness; instead she is given a pinpoint of light, does what she can with that, and finds as she recollects, revisits memory, that ever greater light is shed upon what she first hid.


Mary is the model of the church’s nourishment and nurture and growth and illumination through recollection.

In the following I have found that revisiting something I learned years ago if not decades ago finds it yielding ever greater riches each time I recollect it. E.g.,

(1) Charles Wesley: “a charge to keep I have”

(2) Luther: the X’n lives not in herself but in another: in Christ through faith and in the neighbour through love (as she shares the neighbour’s need, suffering, disgrace.)

(3) Answer #1 to the Heidelberg Catechism (written in 1563, and surely the crown jewel of the shorter Reformation writings.) “I am not my own, but belong, body and soul, to my faithful Saviour JC”

(4) only ten years ago I came to understand that Jesus is raised wounded. The resurrection isn’t the transcending of the cross but the triumph of the one who remains in the reality of his crucifiedness.

(5) Martin Buber (Jewish philosopher and biblical scholar): to know another person is exactly to be altered through meeting him as person. (as opposed to gathering information about him.)

(6) Thomas Watson (my favourite Puritan thinker): “All Christian growth is finally growth in humility.”

 

 

III: — Mary models the church’s pain in giving birth to the Messiah and the church’s consignment to

the wilderness

Revelation 12:1-6

[1] Rev. 12:1-6 refers to Israel, who gives birth to the Messiah.

According to the psalmist the Messiah will rule over the nations absolutely: the Messiah’s power extends over the entire creation, over death, over every power, even over being swallowed by the dragon.

[2] Mary gives birth to the M. Her son is “caught up to God and to his throne” (12: 5), while she flees into the wilderness (12:6).

[3] Mary models the church as Messianic community. The church is always labouring to give birth to the Messiah in the sense that we are always endeavouring to render the visible the one we know to be within us. Yet in our turbulent, treacherous world the Messiah is seemingly always being snatched away by the dragon, and the Messianic community always finds itself amidst the harsh affliction and tribulation of the wilderness (the wilderness, in Scripture, being the venue of unclean beasts and unholy spirits.)

Then what are we to do as the church finds itself in pain in the wilderness? We are always and everywhere to render to God that Mary rendered and therein modelled for all of us:

Behold, we the church are the handmaid of the Lord;

let it be to us according your word.

Victor Shepherd

Advent, 2001

 

God and Gender: How Do We Address God?

from an address at Woodbridge Presbyterian Church, 28October 2001

God and Gender: How Do We Address God?

 

I: — Prostitution is tragic under any circumstances. Prostitution is demeaning. Prostitution, however, that is enjoined as a religious act and defended by a religious argument is more than tragic and demeaning: it’s disgusting.

In the city of Corinth one thousand women were attached as religious prostitutes to the temple of Aphrodite. Needless to say the Christian congregation in Corinth stood out starkly against the backdrop of the temple and its sordid traffic in devotees who did obeisance to Aphrodite and all that the goddess represented. At least the Christian congregation in Corinth largely stood out starkly against the backdrop of sexual irregularities. We know, however, that the spirit of Aphrodite always lapped at the Christian congregation and occasionally infected a member or two of it.

Centuries earlier the Canaanite nations that surrounded Israel had trafficked in religious prostitution too. The word to Israel that had thundered from Sinai, however, had repudiated such degradation. The prophets in turn denounced it unambiguously. Even so, the spirit of sexual irregularity always hovered over Israel, always had to be guarded against, and occasionally had to be exorcised.

Throughout the history of humankind, whenever a goddess has been worshipped as the arch-deity, wherever “Mother-god” has been held up, the final result has always been religious prostitution and widespread sexual promiscuity. For this reason Israel refused to call God “Mother”, and refused as well to speak of the deity as “goddess”.

Throughout the history of humankind goddess-worship (Mother-god-worship) has been associated with the worship of fertility. The worship of fertility includes fertility of all kinds: agricultural fertility, animal fertility, human fertility. A key element in such worship, a key element in the chain of events, has been “sympathic magic”. Sympathic magic means that when humans are sexually active the god and goddess are sexually active too. The sexual activity of god and goddess in turn ensures the fertility of animals and crops.

When Israel was led to call God “Father”, Israel didn’t think for a minute that the God of Israel was equipped with male genitalia rather than female. Israel knew that the true and living God is not equipped with genitalia of any kind; God is not gender-specific in any sense. In calling God “Father”, however, Israel was deliberately refusing to call God “mother”; Israel was deliberately repudiating everything that the fertility cults around it associated with female deities. Israel repudiated the notion that the deity is sexually active, the notion that human sexual activity is sympathically magical, the notion that the entire enterprise is sacramentally abetted by sacral prostitution, the notion that the concomitant promiscuity has any place at all in God’s economy. Israel repudiated all of it.

Yes, Israel did occasionally use female imagery to describe God. In scripture God is said to be like a mother or a nurse or even a she-bear not to be trifled with. But while God is said to be like a mother, for instance, God is never said to be a mother, never called “mother”. On the other hand God is said to be a father and is called “Father”. Why the difference? — because of everything detailed above.

As soon as we name God “mother” and “goddess” we play right into the hands of Canaan and Aphrodite where sexual intercourse among the deities creates the universe. (In the creation stories of the bible there is no suggestion anywhere that the universe came into being as the result of sexual activity among the deities.) We also play into the hands of the old notion that when a worshipper is sexually joined to a religious prostitute, worshipper and prostitute themselves become the god and the goddess. In other words, to speak of “Our Father and Mother” lands us back into everything that Israel’s prophets fended off on account of the character of Israel’s God. A contemporary hymn exclaims, “Mother and God, to you we sing; wide is your womb, warm is your wing.” This hymn squares perfectly with the fertility cults of old, together with their sacral prostitutes and their religiously sanctioned promiscuity.

II: — All of this denies the transcendence of God. By transcendence we mean the truth that God is “high and lifted up”, as Isaiah tells us. Later a Hebrew prophet, knowing himself addressed by the holy One Himself, finds seared upon his own mind and heart, “…my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, says the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts.” (Isaiah 55:8-9) God is radically different from His creation, radically other than His creatures.

The distinction between God and His creation is a distinction that scripture never compromises. “It is He that hath made us, and not we ourselves”, cries the psalmist. This distinction is the heart of God’s holiness. The root meaning of “holy” is “set apart” or “different”. God is holy in that He is radically different. God is uniquely God. His creation is other than He, different from Him. To be sure, His creation is good (good, at least, as it comes forth from His hand, even though it is now riddled with sin and evil); but while God’s creation is good it is never God. The creation is never to be worshipped. Idolatry is a horror to the people of God. The creation isn’t God; neither is it an extension of God or an aspect of God or an emanation of God. God remains holy, high and lifted up. He and His creation are utterly distinct. He alone is to be worshipped, praised and thanked. We who are creatures of God are summoned to trust Him, love Him, obey Him, and therein know Him. We are summoned to know God (faith is such a knowing); but we are never summoned to be God. Indeed, the temptation to be God, to be our own lord, our own judge, our own saviour — this is the arch-temptation. Any suggestion that any human activity can render us divine (as is the case with sacral prostitution) is a denial of God’s transcendence. The old hymn known as “The Doxology”, “Praise God from whom all blessings flow/Praise Him all creatures here below…”, reflects God’s transcendence. A modern version of the Doxology has been altered to “Praise God from whom all blessings flow/Praise Him all creatures high and low…”. “All creatures here below” affirmed the truth that God is above us; “All creatures high and low” makes no such affirmation. In the mother-goddess mind-set God is no longer radically other than His creation; God is no longer discontinuous with the world; God and the world are a function of each other. Here God is an aspect of the world — which is to say, God (so-called) is useless to the world.

The loss of God’s transcendence is reflected in the near-disappearance of “LORD” from contemporary hymnbooks. The reason given for this disappearance is that “LORD” is hierarchical and therefore oppressive. The hymnbook committee is correct concerning one matter here: unquestionably “LORD” is hierarchical; God is above us; He is “high and lifted up”; he does transcend us infinitely. But does this make Him oppressive? So far from making Him oppressive, the fact that God is above us is the condition of His being able to bestow mercy upon us. Only if God is above us, only if God transcends us, is He free from us and therefore free to act for us.

The loss of God’s transcendence shouldn’t surprise us in view of the fact that the New Age movement has infected everything in our society, the church not excepted. The New Age movement endorses pantheism (that heresy, says C.S. Lewis, which always tempts the church). Pantheism insists that God is the essence of everything or at least that God is in everything. If God is in everything or the essence of everything, then there is nothing that isn’t God. However, if there is nothing that isn’t God, then evil doesn’t exist, since evil is that which contradicts God and aims at frustrating Him, that which He in turn opposes. And if evil doesn’t exist, then neither does sin, since sin is that expression of evil that has overtaken humans. In other words, the loss of God’s transcendence plunges men and women into a confusion, a maze, where such crucial bearings as sin and evil are lost too.

Yet we are plunged into more than mere confusion; we are plunged into hopelessness. When God’s transcendence is denied, God is unable to judge us (the New Age movement finds this convenient). However, the loss of God’s transcendence also means that God is unable to save us. Only He who transcends the world so as to be able to judge it is also free from the world so as to visit it with mercy. Only the “hierarchical” God can finally be for us. Hierarchy is the condition of God’s helpfulness. The God who isn’t LORD is the God who has been handcuffed.

III: — As soon as God’s transcendence is compromised, the foundational doctrine of the Christian faith, the doctrine of the Trinity, is undervalued. God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. This is no surprise. After all, if God isn’t to be called “Father”, then God certainly isn’t going to be known as “Father, Son and Holy Spirit”.

Why is the doctrine of the Trinity important? How is it foundational to the Christian faith? The question “Who is God?” is a question scripture never answers directly. By way of answering the question “Who is God?” scripture always directs us to two other questions: “What does God do?” and “What does God effect?” “What does God do?” refers us to God’s activity on our behalf, what he does “for us”. “What does God effect?” refers us to God’s activity “in us”.

What does God do for us? He incarnates Himself in Jesus of Nazareth. He redeems His creation in the death of Jesus, restoring its access to Him. He raises Jesus from the dead, vindicating Jesus and declaring him to be sovereign over all, Lord and Messiah.

What does God do in us? He visits us with His Spirit and seals within us all that He has done outside us. He steals over our spiritual inertia and quickens faith. He forgives the sin in us that He had already absorbed for us on the cross. He brings us to submit to the sovereign One whose sovereignty He had declared by raising him from the dead. In short, the God who acts for us in His Son acts in us by His Spirit so that all the blessings provided in the Son may become ours as well.

What God does for us in the Son is known, in theological vocabulary, as Christology. What God does in us through the Spirit is known as Pneumatology. Christology and Pneumatology add up to theology. Who God is is made known through what He does for us and what He does in us. God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

In place of the Trinity (“Father, Son, Spirit”) we are hearing increasingly “Creator, Redeemer, Sustainer”. But the two expressions are not equivalent. “Father, Son, Spirit” speaks of God’s being, who God is in Himself eternally, as well as of God’s activity, what He does for us and in us in time. “Creator, Redeemer, Sustainer”, on the other hand, speaks only of God’s relation to the world in time. According to scripture God’s relation to the world means that He is also judge, sovereign and inspirer. Then instead of “Creator, Redeemer, Sustainer” we could just as readily say “Judge, Sovereign and Inspirer” — plus ever so many more. We could say them all with equal justification, even as we still wouldn’t be saying what is said by “Father, Son, Spirit”: namely, that God is for us and in us in time what He is in himself eternally, and He is in Himself eternally what He is for us and in us in time.

There is another point to be made here. “Creator, Redeemer, Sustainer” is sub-personal. But God isn’t sub-personal. God is Person in terms of whom we understand what it means for us to be persons. Again, for this reason, we must call God “Father” even as for reasons already mentioned we mustn’t call God “Mother”.

There is yet another point to be made here. When we speak of God (or speak to God) as “Father, Son, Spirit” we are calling God by that name wherewith He has named Himself. My name is “Victor”. I always introduce myself as “Victor” because I expect to be called Victor. I don’t care to be called “Vic” or “slim” or “mack” or “You, there”. I think it’s only courteous to call me by that name wherewith I name myself.

Surely we can be no less courteous to God. Yet more than a courtesy/discourtesy is at stake concerning God. According to our Hebrew foreparents name means nature. A change of name means a change of nature. “Jacob” means “cheater”; his name is changed to “Israel” — “he who wrestles with God”. Why the name change? Because the man himself has ceased to cheat and has become someone who will wrestle with God for the rest of his life.

To change the name of God from “Father, Son, Spirit” to anything is to repudiate the nature of the true God and to pursue a false god. To trifle with the name of God at all is to reject the One who is our only God and Saviour.

IV: — It’s only fair to admit that there are some modern hymns are very fine. The puzzling feature, then, is why the fine and the wretched are mixed up together in many contemporary hymnbooks.

On second thought I don’t think there’s a puzzle. I think the mix-up is the result of the age-old temptation of syncretism. We human beings are exceedingly uncomfortable when we face a fork in the road anywhere in life. We prefer to “have our cake and eat it too.” We don’t want to have to say “No” to anyone or anything. It’s always easier to include all the options and endorse all the alternatives. We are syncretists in our fallen hearts.

Syncretism is a temptation that has always tempted God’s people. When Joshua, successor to Moses, confronted the people with his ringing challenge, “Choose this day whom you will serve. The deities of the Amorites? The deities of the region beyond the Jordan? Choose! But as for me and my house, we will serve the LORD!” — plainly Joshua knew that his people could serve either the LORD or the Amorite deities but not both.

As a matter of fact Israel wasn’t customarily tempted to repudiate God; Israel was tempted customarily to combine God and Baal, God and Ashtareh, God and whatever deity the neighbouring nation was extolling. The temptation is easy to understand. God promised His people His fatherly care and protection; Baal promised the people unrestrained licence. Why not have both? Why not have holiness and hedonism at the same time? Holiness guaranteed them access to God, while hedonism guaranteed them endless self-indulgence. Why not have both? Why not have God and mammon? Why not? Because Jesus said it’s impossible. Because the prophets before him said it’s impossible.

All of which brings us to a refrain that reverberates repeatedly throughout God’s history with His people. The refrain is, “I am a jealous God.” God is jealous not in that He’s insecure and He needs to have His ego strengthened; neither is He jealous in that He craves what someone else possesses just because He lacks it. God is “jealous”, rather, in that He insists on our undivided love and loyalty. He insists on our undivided love and loyalty for two reasons. One, since He alone is truly God, He alone is to be worshipped and obeyed. Two, since He alone is truly God, He wants us to find our true wholeness in Him. He knows that since He alone is truly God we shall fragment ourselves if we don’t worship Him alone. He cares too much for us to allow us to fragment ourselves. If we persist in gathering up the gods and goddesses and add the Holy One of Israel for good measure we shall fragment ourselves hopelessly.

Everybody knows that exclusivity is of the essence of marriage. To say that exclusivity is of the essence of marriage isn’t to say that husband and wife live in a universe of two people, ignoring everyone else. But it is to say that at the heart of marriage there is that which can be shared with no one else. Two married people who relish the marvel and the riches their union brings them don’t then say, “Since marriage is so rich with the two of us in it, let’s make it richer still by adding a third person.” So far from enriching a marriage, adding a third person annihilates the marriage. To the extent that exclusivity is of the essence of marriage, then, there is a kind of jealousy that is necessary to marriage.

Israel always knew that “God and…” , “God plus…” meant “not God at all”. Syncretism is fatal to our life in God.

Some contemporary hymnbooks combine fine hymns and terrible hymns on the assumption, apparently, that “nothing should be left out; no one should feel left out; there should be something here for everybody.” For this reason what we call the “Lord’s prayer” has been re-written, “Our Father and Mother.”

But the one God we are to adore knows that if our hearts go after Him and after some other deity then we shan’t have Him and we shall fragment ourselves utterly. Apart from the folly of our self-fragmentation, He insists on being acknowledged for who He is: the One alongside whom there is no other God, even as the Hebrew language reminds us that the word for “idols” is the word for “nothings”. He is a jealous God, knowing that adding another deity will affect the marvel and richness of our life in Him exactly as adding another party affects the marvel and richness of marriage: it terminates it.

V: — What’s at stake in all that has been discussed tonight? Is only a matter of taste at stake (some people like old-fashioned hymns while others don’t)? Is only a matter of poetical or musical sophistication at stake? What’s at stake here is a matter of life or death, for what’s at stake here is nothing less than our salvation.

As soon as we understand what’s at stake here — everything — we understand the intransigence of our foreparents in matters of faith. Jude insists that we are to “contend for the faith once for all delivered to the saints.” (Jude 3) Why must we contend for it? Because the faith once for all delivered to the saints is under attack. It is assaulted from without the church and undermined from within the church. The assault from without isn’t unimportant; nevertheless, the undermining from within is far more dangerous. Unless we contend for, fight for, the faith once for all delivered to the saints, the truth of Jesus Christ will be cease to be known.

Peter cautions his readers against false teachers. Peter tells us that false teachers “secretly bring in destructive heresies, even denying the Master who bought them.” (2 Peter 2:1)

Paul accosts the Christians in Galatia who are already flirting with gospel-denial, “…there are some who trouble you and want to pervert the gospel of Christ….Who has bewitched you?” (Galatians 1:7; 3:1)

Jude, Peter and Paul aren’t horrified because an alternative religious opinion is being made known; they aren’t heartsick because disinformation is being disseminated; they react as they do inasmuch as they know that where the gospel is diluted, denied, compromised, or trifled with, the saving deed and the saving invitation of God can’t be known. Where the gospel is sabotaged through “destructive heresies”, the salvation of God is withheld from men and women whose only hope is the gospel.

We must be sure we understand something crucial. We don’t contend for the faith once for all delivered to the saints because we are quarrelsome people who relish controversy. We don’t contend because we are ill-tempered people are annoyed with anyone who disagrees with us. We don’t contend because we are doctrinal hair-splitters who wish to make conceptual mountains out of molehills. We contend, as apostles and prophets contended before us, because we can’t endure seeing neighbours whom we love denied access to that truth which saves.

Then contend we shall. But of course we can contend properly only if we are discerning. For this reason John writes, “Beloved, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are of God; for many false prophets have gone out into the world.” (1 John 4:1) Will our discerning, our testing, and our contending prevail, or are we going to be defeated? We shall prevail, for “faith is the victory that overcomes the world.” (1 John 5:4) Once again the apostle John writes, “…you are of God, and have overcome them [the false prophets]; for He who is in you is greater than he who is in the world.” (1 John 4:4)

Victor Shepherd     October 2001

 

The Methodist Tradition in Canada

(to appear in HarperCollins’ “Religion in Canada “)

The Methodist Tradition in Canada

 

The Methodist tradition arose chiefly from the activity of John Wesley (1703-1791), born to Samuel Wesley and Susanna Annesley, Dissenters in the Puritan mould who affiliated with the Church of England in their youth. John was nurtured in Anglicanism, was ordained priest and remained a life-long member of it. At Oxford University he, together with several others, formed a group derisively labelled the “Holy Club.” It met to encourage study of the classics and the Church Fathers, frequent attendance at Holy Communion, and assistance to the poor and imprisoned.

Still groping spiritually after ordination, in 1736 Wesley moved to Georgia hoping that his work among English colonists and aboriginals would imbue him with spiritual vitality. Upon his return to England in the wake of an unsatisfying ministry in the new world he came to the assurance of saving faith and of sins forgiven on May 24, 1738. Thereafter his ministry, formerly a not uncommon 18th century Anglican blend of mysticism and moralism, was grounded in the Reformation understanding of justification by grace through faith on account of Jesus Christ.

John recognized that “Scripture, from beginning to end, is one grand promise”; namely, salvation known and enjoyed as a present reality, as contrasted with the current Anglican understanding of blessedness in the life-to-come. With his theological emphasis on soteriology, John insisted that God had “raised up Methodism to spread scriptural holiness throughout the land.” Whereas his pre-1738 pronouncements (see his sermon, “The Circumcision of the Heart”) had declared that people became holy by means of humility, he now insisted — and never recanted — that holiness was a divine gift, owned in faith, and humanly exercised with unrelenting rigour. While classical Protestantism had stressed justification (pardon, remission of sins, free acceptance), Wesley retained this yet stressed deliverance: God could do something with sin beyond forgiving it; namely, release people not merely from its guilt but especially from its grip or power. In this vein he endorsed “Christian perfection”, maintaining that no limit could be set to the scope of God’s deliverance in this life. Herein he merged the Puritan emphasis on godliness that he found in his predecessors with the similar emphasis on sanctity found in the church catholic. Strenuously disagreeing with Calvinism’s notions of predestination and limited atonement, he maintained that Christ had died for all: all needed to be saved, could be saved, could know they were saved, and could be saved to the uttermost.

Since, Wesley insisted, “the New Testament knows nothing of solitary religion”, Methodism characteristically developed the communal dimension of its corporate life. Converts were expected to join in public worship weekly and to receive Holy Communion as often as possible. In addition they were formed into “societies”, “classes”, “bands”, and “select societies” in order to expose themselves to stringent examination from peers and thereby promote self-honesty, mutual correction, encouragement, edification, and service. The “societal” emphasis was marked too by a concern for every aspect of human well-being. To try to mitigate suffering Wesley wrote a textbook of primitive medicine, begged money to establish London’s first free pharmacy, developed schools for the disadvantaged children of coalminers, built houses for widows, gathered funds for start-up loans to Methodist entrepreneurs whom the chartered banks would not consider.

In all these endeavours John’s brother Charles (1701-1788) supported John, matching him in outdoor “field” preaching. Charles’ greatest contribution to Methodism, however, remained his hymn-writing (9,000 poems and hymns), as Scripture-saturated hymns rooted themselves in minds and hearts as often as Methodist people hummed the tunes amidst their daily work.

Following Wesley’s death, Methodism ceased to be “leaven” in the Church of England and became a separate denomination. One of its missioners, Laurence Coughlan, arrived in Newfoundland in 1766 and began working among Protestant English and Irish settlers. Five years later William Black, born in England but raised in Nova Scotia, commenced evangelizing in the Maritimes, his work falling under the supervision of British Wesleyans in 1800. In 1855 this body formed the Wesleyan Methodist Conference of Eastern British America.

Under the leadership of William Losee, meanwhile, the Methodist Episcopal Church (U.S.A.), established on Christmas Day in 1784, began work in 1791 among British immigrants to Upper Canada. By 1828 the Methodist Episcopal work in Canada had formally severed ties with the U.S.A. In 1833 most of it joined with the British Wesleyans to form the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Canada, adding to itself the Methodist people of Lower Canada in 1854. That part of it which absented itself from the union re-formed into the Methodist Episcopal Church of Canada (1834), eventually growing into the second largest Methodist body in Canada.

In turn the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Canada and the Wesleyan Methodist Conference of Eastern British America united in 1874, annexing as well the Methodist New Connexion Church in Canada (itself an amalgam of several small groups), thereby forming the Methodist Church of Canada.

In 1884 this body joined with the Methodist Episcopal Church in Canada, together with the Bible Christian Church of Canada and the Primitive Methodist Church in Canada, bringing to birth the Methodist Church (Canada, Newfoundland and Bermuda.) This lattermost union made the Methodist Church the largest Protestant denomination in Canada. It now included all Canadian Methodists with the exception of several very small groups: the British Methodist Episcopal Church (a development of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, serving chiefly people of colour), two German-speaking bodies (the Evangelical Association and the United Brethren in Christ), and the Free Methodist Church (a body that had begun in New York State in 1860 and extended itself into Canada.)

In 1925 the Methodist Church united with 70% of the Presbyterian Church in Canada and 96% of the Congregational Union of Canada to form The United Church of Canada.

 

Canadian Methodism distinguished itself on several fronts.

 

Methodists were committed to missions among aboriginals. The “first nations” had been exploited since the days of the fur trade, the exploitation manifesting itself in alcohol-abetted destitution. Eager to avoid paternalism, the Methodists sought to put mission leadership in the hands of aboriginals themselves. Peter Jones, Chief of the Mississaugas, was ordained the first aboriginal itinerant. Egerton Ryerson, soon to be the best-known Methodist minister, represented Canada in the Society for the Protection of Aboriginal Inhabitants of the British Dominions.

Missions overseas paralleled those in Canada. In 1873 the Wesleyans were the first of the Canadian Methodist “family” to begin working in Japan, concentrating on evangelism, medical assistance, post-elementary education and theological training for Japanese ministers. By 1884 Canadian Methodists had established a theological college in Azabu, supported by the Women’s Missionary Society’s efforts in training Japanese women for church work. Canadian Methodist missions commenced in China in 1891 amidst circumstances that were uncommonly dangerous.

In the meantime the social position of Methodists was changing in Canada. Earlier the Church of Scotland and the Church of England had formed social elites inaccessible to Methodists, the latter being poor and frequently despised. Zealous in evangelism and ardent in their pursuit of godliness, however, their sobriety, industry and thrift fuelled their social ascendancy. Some Methodist families became wealthy: the Goodherams from grain and railways, the Masseys from farm implements, and the Flavelles from meatpacking. By mid-18th century they were able to challenge the Anglican monopoly on education and political power.

From this position Methodism was able to make its unparalleled contribution to the public good, a system of high-quality public education. Insisting that education subserved not only the evangelical cause in particular but also the human good in general and the social good more widely still, Methodism’s educational architect, Egerton Ryerson, undid the Anglican Church’s exclusive control over education. Ryerson implemented the system operative in Canada today: high quality education available to all, without a religious or doctrinal means test.

In addition the Methodists built Victoria College, offering instruction in arts and sciences, later expanding it under principal Samuel Nelles to a full-fledged university by adding faculties of law, medicine and theology, eventually moving the institution from Cobourg to Toronto in order to federate it with the University of Toronto.

Aware of John Wesley’s legacy, Canadian Methodists dedicated themselves to the alleviation of human distress on any front, their vision here being no less than social transformation. They exerted themselves on behalf of convicts and ex-convicts, prostitutes and impoverished immigrants, all the while campaigning for better housing, improved public health, unemployment insurance, pensions, compensation for injured workers, the eight-hour work day, humane working conditions and homemaking skills. Salem Bland and James Woodsworth were the most visible exponents of the Social Gospel movement in Methodism, the latter eventually leaving the ministry in order to co-found the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. The prosecution of social justice, it was thought, would largely eliminate the sources of social disharmony. At the same time leaders such as Samuel Chown continued to uphold the necessity of personal regeneration.

Concern for education and social transformation naturally gave rise to a commitment to publishing. Books, magazines and pamphlets were produced in ever-greater numbers; even by 1884 the circulation of Methodist-backed publications stood at 160,000, excluding the materials produced for overseas missions. Under William Briggs and Lorne Pierce, Methodists became instrumental in promoting a Canadian literary tradition, producing vast quantities of Canadian fiction, poetry, history and textbooks for schools.

Since 1925 much smaller denominations such as the Wesleyan Church, the Free Methodist Church, the Standard Church, the Church of the Nazarene (extensions of American bodies), and The Salvation Army have endeavoured to maintain the spiritual tradition of Wesley. Collectively, however, these groups do not have the influence in public life that the Methodists exerted prior to church union.

Victor Shepherd June 2001

 

Jacobus Arminius

 (from Biographical Dictionary of Evangelicals, Inter-Varsity Press)

Jacobus Arminius

 

Arminius, Jacobus (c.1559-1609), Dutch Remonstrant Reformer, was born Jacob Harmenszoon in Oudewater near Utrecht. His middle-class family was devastated when his father, a maker of kitchen utensils, died during Arminius’ infancy and his mother, together with all his siblings, were slain during his adolescence in the Spanish massacre of Oudewater in 1575. Thereafter family friends raised him. Like most classically trained humanist scholars of his era, he eventually Latinized his name, recalling the “Arminius” who had been a 1st century Germanic leader noted for his resistance to the Romans.

In 1574 he began his studies at Leiden, venue for a tradition reaching back into the pre-Reformation ferment of the North Netherlands. The atmosphere included a biblically-informed piety, a sacramentarianism that viewed medieval sacraments as largely superstitious, and a humanist perspective that identified Roman Catholic corruption of the church. It would be anachronistic to speak of this movement as (proto-)Lutheran or Zwinglian, as these latter descriptions entail a doctrinal specificity that was not operative in what had flowed from the 14th and 15th centuries. Studies followed at Geneva, Basel, and Geneva again, culminating, after years of leadership in city, church and university, in a doctorate from Leiden in 1603.

Leiden accommodated the older reform as well as the precise Calvinism that Reformed refugees had brought with them. The ensuing conflict was less concerned with predestination (albeit never far from the surface) than with the relation of Calvinist consistory (an ecclesiastical court in Reformed churchmanship) and the city (reflecting the less doctrinally exact, humanist-informed piety indigenous to the Low Countries.) The consistory, for instance, in the spirit of Calvinist rigour, opposed observing Christian festivals (e.g., Christmas and Easter) that happened not to fall on Sundays.

Financed by Amsterdam merchants, Arminius began studying under Beza at Geneva on New Year’s Day, 1582. Beza, Calvin’s 62-year old successor, was venerated in Reformed constituencies everywhere. By rearranging Calvin’s emphases Beza largely retained the major tenets of Calvin’s theology while significantly altering its spirit. While Calvin, for instance, had spoken of the grandeur of God and the majesty of God but not of the “sovereignty” of God, Beza thrust into the centre of his thought a sovereignty that was to appear to Remonstrants indistinguishable from the arbitrary assertion of naked power. And where Calvin had focussed on the believer’s life or participation in Christ, with predestination merely the means whereby sin-deadened people come to be “in Christ”, Beza made predestination a controlling principle. Calvin’s emphasis on the living person of “Christ clothed with his gospel” gave way to assorted decrees and a preoccupation with their respective priority.

Having been graduated from Geneva, Arminius studied next at Basel, and then at Geneva once more. A trip to Italy in 1587 found him accused of compromising himself with Roman Catholic potentates and also of having “lost his [Calvinist] faith” through exposure to Jesuits.

Upon returning to Amsterdam he was ordained pastor to the “Old Church”, the focal point of church life in the city. In 1590 he married Lijsbet Reael, an aristocrat who thereafter ensured that he orbited among the most influential merchants and leaders of the city. Like all the Magisterial Reformers before him, Arminius would remain a pastor for virtually all of his working life, spending 15 years in the Amsterdam pulpit and six in the Leiden. (It is interesting to note his conviction that exercising the pastoral office, rather than theological wrangling, facilitates the holiness of the minister.) From 1603 until his death in 1609 he was professor of theology in Leiden, where he was also elected Rector (president) of the university even as a theological minority opposed him. In Leiden he gathered up the fruit of his writing in behalf of earlier controversies and in 1608 published his most mature work, Declaration of Sentiments.

While the notions pertaining to the name “Arminius” are commonly thought to suggest exclusive rejection of all things Calvin, his appreciation of Calvin’s Commentaries is noteworthy. They occupy, he said, second place only to Scripture: “I recommend that the Commentaries of Calvin be read…. For I affirm that in the interpretation of the Scriptures Calvin is incomparable, and that his Commentaries are more to be valued than anything that is handed to us in the writings of the Fathers — so much so that I concede to him a certain spirit of prophecy in which he stands distinguished above others, above most, indeed, above all.”

His preaching through Romans became the occasion of a theological controversy that he was never to escape. His first opponents were humanists who denied original sin. Uncompromisingly he replied to them, “I believe that our salvation rests on Christ alone and that we obtain faith for the forgiveness of sins and the renewing of life only through the grace of the Holy Spirit.” Opposition arose next from the Calvinists who differed from him on his insistence that Romans 7 describes the pre-Christian. Immediately he was accused of Pelagianism, Socinianism (unitarianism) and non-compliance with the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism. Not trusting the Calvinist clergy of the church courts, he defended himself on charges of doctrinal deviation only in the presence of civic officials whom he recognized as his assessors. They acquitted him.

Differing from Gomarus, his principal opponent in his latter days as professor in Leiden, he continued to claim that the “wretched man” of Romans 7 is not the apostle speaking autobiographically but is rather the unbeliever. He added in support:

– this viewpoint has been defended through the church’s history and has never been deemed heretical;

– no heresy, including Pelagianism, can be derived from it;

– the viewpoint of modern theologians (e.g., Beza) that Romans 7 speaks of the Christian is a viewpoint that none of the Church Fathers upheld — including Augustine, the Father dearest to the Calvinists;

– to say that Romans 7 describes the Christian is to slight the grace of God (grace appears impotent in the face of sin) and to foster wanton behaviour (even the regenerate cannot help doing the evil they do not want to do).

– the pre-regenerate person can possess an awareness of sin.

In his detailed exposition of Romans 9, another major area of protracted controversy, Arminius articulated a doctrine of grace that recognizes the irreducible humanness of the beneficiaries of grace and that unfailingly honours then as human agents, certainly not synergistic contributors to their salvation and therefore co-authors of it, yet just as certainly God’s covenant-partners made in God’s image. The “co-operation” implied in his understanding of faith as covenant-dialogue recalls the Patristic subtleties around the Fathers’ repudiation of co-redemption and their affirmation of gratia operans/co-operans. Arminius protested any suggestion that even sinful humans are entities like sticks and stones to be manipulated mechanically. Fallen humans, admittedly “dead in trespasses and sins”, are nonetheless fallen humans, and as graced by God, “response-able” and therefore “response-ible”. This notion underlies Arminius’ distinction between the act of believing as belonging to grace and the ability to believe as belonging to nature.

Concerning Romans 9 Arminius insisted

– the question that his opponents said predestination answered, namely, “Why do some individuals believe and others do not when all alike are dead coram Deo?”, is neither asked nor answered in the chapter;

– the chapter does not discuss individuals but rather classes of people: those who affirm righteousness by faith in the Righteous One and those who seek to merit God’s recognition;

– to speak of the predestination of individuals before they have been created, and therefore to speak of the reprobation of individuals before they could have sinned, is to render God monstrous;

– to postulate both a hidden and a revealed will of God is to falsify the New Testament’s declaration that in Jesus Christ (whom everyone admits to be God’s revealed will) “the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily;” (Col. 2:9 RSV)

– God’s command and God’s promise are co-extensive. It is not the case that God commands all to repent and believe but visits only some with the mercy that quickens both repentance and faith. God does not predestine who will or will not believe; rather God predestines to salvation in Christ all who believe in Christ;

– the position of Beza and his supporters can only mean that God is deemed to be the author of sin. (Cardinal Bellarmine agreed with Arminius, adding that the high Calvinist position rendered God the only sinner.) This notion undercuts human culpability and renders God’s judgement pointless.

Arminius’ chief writing during his pastorate in Amsterdam, Examination of Perkins’ Pamphlet, has often been judged his single best contribution to theological discussion. Perkins (1558-1602), the major spokesperson for English high Calvinism, maintained as a strong supralapsarian that creation and fall are (merely) the means whereby the decree of election or reprobation is implemented. Arminius’ arguments here are those found throughout his works. However, their exposition is more detailed and more nuanced in the Examination than anywhere else. Most pointedly Arminius insists that grace is the love of God meeting humankind as sinful; grace is not a synonym for “decree” or “will” or “sovereignty”; i.e., grace is God’s love addressing humans in their depravity rather than “affecting” them as creatures without reference to their sin.

While Perkins maintained that Christ died only for the elect, the parameters of the atonement being identical with the parameters of faith, Arminius countered that Christ had died (and thereby gained salvation) for all, but only some are saved; i.e., the cross is sufficient for all but effectual only in believers. Arminius’ distinction here reflected his convictions concerning the bondage of the will. He insisted that the will of fallen humans was “bound” in that of itself it can will only its depravity. He insisted too, however, that the fallen will is never merely “of itself”; grace attends all fallen creatures, with the result that the graced will is enabled to affirm or endorse the grace that has elevated it beyond mere (fallen) nature. The graced will is “free” in that it is the non-coerced act of a genuine human agent. In other words, the graced will does not contribute to its salvation yet necessarily concurs in it, or else it is not a human creature that is saved.

Consonant with his understanding of the free will, Arminius eschewed the notion of the Christian life as the “state” of grace (and therefore static), preferring to understand it as dynamic: graced concurrence acknowledges and appropriates greater grace in an upward spiral that also finds the believer advancing in godliness through greater immersion in grace. Whereas Perkins had denounced this position as Pelagian, Arminius maintained that Pelagianism predicated the will’s response to grace entirely of nature or partially of nature (in the case of semi-Pelagianism), whereas the will’s response to grace is grace-wrought without being grace-wrenched. A concomitant of his position is that believers can “make shipwreck” of faith. Yet they need not fear doing so, paradoxically, in that the gift of grace (and therefore of faith) includes a gift of filial fear that renders believers non-presumptuous and non-cavalier but ever spiritually vigilant and therein “kept” by the power of God.

While those who esteem Arminius frequently do so on account of his views concerning predestination, he must not be thought to be a one-issue thinker. Unlike the 1st and 2nd generation Magisterial Reformers, Arminius is a scholastic evincing immense affinities with the scholastic “family” whether Roman Catholic and predestinarian (Banez and Baius), Roman Catholic and non-predestinarian (Suarez and Molina), Protestant and predestinarian (Junius and Gomarus) or Protestant and non-predestinarian (his successors, Episcopius and Limborch). While the non-predestinarian, biblical humanism of the older North Netherlands is found in Arminius, it does not typify him. Rather he is indebted to late medieval and Renaissance Aristotelianism.

Like all scholastics Arminius has a metaphysical concern foreign to the earlier Reformers, and unlike the latter, a debt to Thomas Aquinas. In fact Aquinas is the most frequently quoted thinker in Arminius’ works, and the only scholastic whom he names as an ingredient. Certainly not a Jesuit, Arminius nonetheless preferred the Jesuit reading of Aquinas to the Dominican reading with its Augustinian cast of Thomas.

None of this is to suggest that Arminius is crypto-Roman Catholic. Still, he stands squarely in a tradition indebted to Thomistic metaphysics and Aristotelian logic (despite an appreciation for the bifurcationist logic of Ramus). Protestants typically are unaware that these features characterize the theologies of the 17th century.

Whereas the Reformed schools differed markedly on the issue of supra- or infralapsarianism, Arminius differed from both with respect to his understanding of God’s will and foreknowledge. Here he owed much to Molina’s scientia media: God foreknows future contingencies without thereby determining them. Molina furnished him with a matrix that included God’s foreknowledge, the efficacy of grace, and a freedom of the will that is genuine rather than seeming. In short, Arminius adopted the Jesuit-Thomistic tradition of scientia media that denied divine determination yet preserved the infinitude of the divine intellect and the scope of human freedom.

Arminius’ life unfolded amidst relentless conflict. Denied external tranquility, he was never distracted from the practical, non-speculative understanding of theology he absorbed from his reading of the medieval Duns Scotus, and credibly stated that his sole ambition was “to inquire in the Holy Scriptures for divine truth…for the purpose of winning some souls for Christ.”

Dr Victor Shepherd
Professor of Historical Theology and Wesley Studies
Tyndale Seminary
July 2001

 

Running the Race in the Pursuit of Excellence

(address to the graduates of Tyndale Seminary, May 2001)

Running the Race in the Pursuit of Excellence

 

I: — You have asked me to speak to you about excellence, the pursuit of excellence. I am glad to do so, for I relish excellence as much as I abhor mediocrity (mediocrity here defined as contentment with less than our best.)

Yet in eschewing mediocrity I am not advocating perfectionism. Perfectionists fall into two classes: those who neurotically pursue perfection yet bewail their inability to achieve it (these people can’t live with themselves); and those who neurotically pursue perfection and boast that they have achieved it (no one else can live with them.) Perfectionism, deep-down, is self-rejection born of self-contempt, even where the self-rejection masquerades as self-importance. Let me say it again: when I say I abhor mediocrity, I am not advocating perfectionism.

In the same way, in rejecting mediocrity I am not rejecting ordinariness. We should shun mediocrity; but we should cherish ordinariness. We should pursue excellence, but we should never aspire to be extraordinary. Extraordinary people are those think they have transcended their humanness, think they no longer put on their trousers one leg at a time, think they have risen above the earthbound humanness of inferior mortals. I’m convinced that people who want to be extraordinary, or think they are, are dangerous. Virtually all the damage wrought in the world is wrought by those who want to be extraordinary or think they are extraordinary.

We should aspire after humility. “Humility” is derived from the Latin word humus, “earth.” We are created earth-creatures and therefore glorify God by our earthliness, which earthliness, I am convinced, should always include more than a little earthiness. When I speak of excellence I never mean extraordinariness. I mean rather the utter repudiation of mediocrity, for mediocrity is sin.

II: — Let’s think for a moment about someone whose entire life bespoke excellence of many sorts, not the least of which was intellectual excellence, particularly intellectual excellence as it pertains to books. I speak now of the apostle Paul.

“I know a man”, says Paul, “who, 14 years ago, was caught up to the third heaven…. and this man heard things that cannot be told, which no one may utter.” The apostle is talking about himself. He was caught up to the third heaven. The “third heaven” was an ancient way of speaking of the most intimate, most intense, most vivid apprehension of God. At that moment, 14 years ago, the apostle wasn’t “seeing in a mirror dimly”. (1 Cor. 13:12) At that moment, rather, he was bathed in splendour and scorched by fire. Simultaneously he was transfixed by the purity of God and prostrated by the enormity of God and irradiated by the grandeur of God.

Isn’t it odd, then, that the fellow whose experience of God is so intense that he can’t speak of it then writes to the young man, Timothy, and asks for books? “When you come, bring the cloak that I left with Carpus at Troas, also the books, and above all the parchments.” (2 Timothy 4:13) “Be sure to bring me the books.” Books? Why would he need books? What could a book do for him?

Paul’s experience of 14 years ago wasn’t the only time he had had an astonishing encounter with God. Three years before he was “caught up to the third heaven” he had been crumbled on his way to Damascus when the risen Lord had arrested him. In addition to the Damascus road experience Paul had had a vision of the man from Macedonia who had pleaded with Paul to go there with the gospel. In addition to the Macedonian episode Paul had fallen into a trance while praying in the Jerusalem temple, and while in the trance had been told unmistakably to get out of Jerusalem. The apostle’s experience of God had been vivid over and over.

And now he wants books? Compared to his experience of God, reading a book sounds so flat, so pedestrian, simply so dull. Yet he wants books! Obviously he thinks he needs books. Books are essential to his discipleship as a Christian as well as to his vocation as an apostle. Obviously he thinks that his vivid experience of God doesn’t render books unnecessary; his startling apprehension of God doesn’t render reading superfluous.

In his novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell depicted a society crushed in the tentacles of cruel totalitarianism. One feature of such a society, Orwell insisted, was the banning of books. The oppressor would continue to oppress his victims by many means, not the least of which was the banning of books.

Aldous Huxley, in his novel, Brave New World, didn’t fear a society where books were banned. He feared something worse: a society where books weren’t banned simply because no one wanted to read a book.

Do we want to read one? read many? Some people who lived a long time before us, and who are foreparents in faith, certainly wanted to.

Like the Jewish people, in whose house all Christians are guests of honour. On Christmas Day in the year 800 Charlemagne was crowned emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. At the coronation he was supposed to sign his name to a document. But he couldn’t write — or read. However, he remembered having seeing his name written in Latin: CAROLINUS. He recalled that one letter (“U”) had two vertical strokes in it. Whereupon Charlemagne grabbed an instrument of some sort and made two crude strokes on the document. Meanwhile, the Jewish people were 100% literate. In whose house are Christians guests? Abraham and Sarah are our foreparents in faith, not Charlemagne.

And then there are the Puritans. Don’t listen to those who defame them wickedly! When persecuted Puritans left the old country and settled in New England, every Puritan minister was given 10 pounds with which to start a church library. Between 1640 and 1700 the literacy rate among men in Massachusetts and Connecticut was 93% — while it was only 40% in England. (The rate of literacy among Puritan women in the new world was 62%, 10% in England.) Six years after these people landed in Massachusetts they voted 400 pounds “towards a school or college.” The “school or college” they built was Harvard (1636).

By 1650 virtually all New England towns had developed grammar schools. As people there learned to read, the effect of the printed page was immense. People were released from the domination of the immediate and the local. People who don’t read live in a very small world, a world of the immediate (in time) and the local (in space). Books are vehicles that convey us to a different era, a different history, a different culture. Books free us from the domination of the immediate and the local. They free us not only from the domination of the horizontally immediate; they free us as well from the vertically immediate. On the one hand they free us for a deeper immersion in creaturely riches; on the other hand books — at least those which speak of the gospel — free us for a deeper immersion in the riches of the Creator himself.

Books have to do with a word-culture rather than an image-culture. The difference between a word-culture and an image-culture is huge. The word encourages critical reflection; the image encourages uncritical absorption. Words present us with ideas for thoughtful evaluation; flitting images provide for titillation and amusement. As soon as the politician goes on TV what he says is of no importance; what matters is how he appears. Is his tie knotted properly? If it isn’t, he can’t be elected. When Menachem Begin sought political office in Israel his media advisors told him he had to stop wearing shirts with oversized collars, since a shirt with an oversized collar makes a man appear terminally ill. John Turner’s media advisors told him he had to break his habit of licking his lips. Night and day they hammered him, “Who is going to vote for a man who looks like an anteater at a picnic?”

The word encourages thinking; the image, by and large, encourages emoting. Words present us with arguments that we have to assess; images present us with impressions that we merely blot up. Visual stimulation is a shabby substitute for thought, just as emotional manipulation is a shabby substitute for verbal precision.

A society given to mediocrity despises excellence. In resisting all mediocrity I am making a gospel-plea for intellectual excellence; particularly intellectual excellence fostered through books.

III: — Yet I should never want to suggest that intellectual excellence is the only kind. In fact it isn’t even the chief kind of excellence. What is? John Henry Cardinal Newman knew what is. Newman tells us that when he was a young scholar he realized one day that he had almost succumbed to the liberal heresy, namely, “prizing intellectual excellence above moral excellence.” Now when Newman speaks of “moral excellence” he doesn’t mean “moralistic” or “legalistic.” By “moral excellence” he means the excellence of a human being who is a spiritual/ethical agent. Our life in the Spirit is lived, lived out, in the integrity of our honouring Christ’s claim upon our obedience. This is the excellence.

The excellence of that life which has been apprehended by truth and thereafter aspires to do the truth; this excellence has an inherent winsomeness, attractiveness, appeal.

Have you ever pondered the Greek wording of our Lord’s self-description in the fourth gospel, “I am the good shepherd”? Ego eimi ho poimen ho kalos. “I am the good shepherd.” “Good”? There are two Greek words for “good”, agathos and kalos. Agathos often has the force of “correct, proper, upright.” It has the force of “good” in the sense that Mark Twain has Huckleberry Finn pray that God will make all the bad people good and all the good people nice. This isn’t quite the sense in which Jesus speaks of himself as the “good” shepherd.

Kalos, on the other hand, has the force of “good” in the sense of all that agathos includes PLUS attractive, winsome, appealing, compelling, comely, desirable, endearing, inviting, prepossessing, fine. That’s it: “I am the fine shepherd.” Malcolm Muggeridge found himself ravished by the comeliness of his Lord, and discovered the same comeliness in Mother Teresa of Calcutta. For this reason he titled his book about her, Something Beautiful for God.

What seized Muggeridge is precisely what has startled and moved the Israelite writers who speak of “the beauty of holiness.” Among our more recent spiritual foreparents no one grasped this, or was grasped by it, more profoundly than Jonathan Edwards. When Edwards has in mind what our Hebrew ancestors called “the beauty of holiness” he rarely uses these exact words. Instead he speaks of the “excellence” of God. And when he speaks of the excellence of God he is careful to distinguish those predicates which describe who God is from those which describe what God is.

What is God? God is spirit. But what if this spirit were demonic? God is infinite. But what if God were infinitely malicious? God is immense, omnipresent, inescapable. But what if God were everywhere lupine?

Who is God, on the other hand? God is infinite, yes, and infinite in mercy. God is eternal, and precisely eternal love. God is omnipresent, which is to say his judgement is inescapable; and his judgement is the only judgement in heaven or earth administered by a judge who is first and last our saviour.

Without any suggestion of saccharine sentimentality Edwards speaks of “the loveliness of God.” It is a sign of Christian maturity to love God for the sake of God’s inherent, compelling, irresistible loveliness. Edwards insists that when we are newer in the faith we love God because he first loved us; we love God on account of all that he has done for us and continues to do for us. Yet the day comes when the incomparable excellence of God transfixes us; our apprehension of it mesmerizes us and in turn reshapes our love for God. Now our love for God is transmuted as it assimilates to itself the excellence of God himself. The point to which Edwards returns endlessly is this: to apprehend God’s intrinsic beauty and glory is not only to love him out of gratitude for his mercy but even to love him out of self-forgetful adoration of his inherent worthiness.

In light of all that Edwards says in this regard we shouldn’t be surprised when he insists, “Holiness is the only virtue.” Why is holiness the only virtue? Edwards knows that any virtue (so-called) — chastity, for instance — can cloak and will cloak ever so much that has nothing to do with godliness unless holiness is its ground and guide. Am I a chaste person? Yes. Do you know why I am chaste? It might be because I’m afraid of contracting an S.T.D. It might be because sexual impropriety could issue in me, a clergyman, being defrocked. I might be chaste inasmuch as I’m neurotically averse to sex. Or I might be afraid my wife would otherwise leave me and thereby deprive me of access to her schoolteacher’s pension. It might be because I’m a moralist who, qua moralist, wouldn’t know Jesus from a gerbil. It might be because my distorted theology has left me believing that chastity merits “justification” before God.

There is only one adequate reason for being chaste, as there is only one ground and guide: an apprehension of a splendour in God that finds his winsome holiness fostering in me a holiness that I welcome. Holiness is the only virtue. There is a singularity to excellence, a singularity that is the profoundest simplicity.

Now I am as put off as you by an unrealistic simplicity that refuses to admit the enormous complexity of everything human. When genuine complexity is denied (likely because complexity is threatening) we speak of such simplicity as simplistic inasmuch as we know it’s false. Then we shouldn’t succumb to the simplistic. And I maintain that any simplicity “this” side of complexity is artificial and merely simplistic. But I want to maintain with equal force that on the “other” side of complexity there is a genuine simplicity that is the simplicity of the gospel.

According to two superb philosophers, Emil Fackenheim and Ludwig Wittgenstein, the greatest thinker to arise in Christendom is Soren Kierkegaard. Plainly Kierkegaard can never be accused of being simplistic. Yet just as plainly Kierkegaard knows the simplicity born of the gospel when he writes, “Purity of heart is to will one thing.” One thing. Simplicity and singularity ultimately coalesce.

While we are speaking of singularity and simplicity we should also speak of elegance. Elegance — plainly a manifestation of excellence — doesn’t mean here what it is usually taken to mean: showy, gaudy, ostentatious, pretentious. In the realm of mathematics or logic “elegance” describes an argument whose conclusion is generated from the fewest possible premises. If a conclusion is generated from three premises rather than from four, elegance is emerging. (Obviously the most elegant argument is one that generates a conclusion from one premise only.)

In this sense there is an elegance to excellence just because there is an elegance to simplicity.

“Purity of heart is to will one thing.”

“This one thing I do.”
“Where is your brother?”

“My sin is more than I can bear.”
“Once I was blind; now I see.”

Elegance, simplicity, excellence is found in many dimensions and expressions of the Christian life. In the early 1800s a French priest, from the town of Ars, a priest noted for his pastoral diligence, Jean Vuillamy, remarked, “If we knew, really knew, what it is to be a pastor, we couldn’t endure it.” I was a pastor for 30 years, and in that time I found pastoral work — excellent with all the meaning that only Jonathan Edwards could lend to “excellent”; I found such excellent work simple. I didn’t say easy. I said simple. “If we knew, really knew, what we pastors mean to people in their suffering and bewilderment and sin as we are transparent to the comfort and consolation and mercy of God, we couldn’t endure it.”

 

IV: — Remember, I said simple; I never said easy. Pastoral work isn’t easy. The Christian life isn’t easy anywhere at any time. Then for how long are we going to pursue excellence? “Pursue” suggests diligence, ardour, perspicacity. For how long are we going to maintain all this?

The author of Hebrews tells us that the Christian life isn’t a sprint that ends in 9.97 seconds; it’s a long distance race. A sprint ends so quickly that no runner has time to get discouraged. But discouragement can take any long distance runner out of the race.

In the Christian life all of us face disappointment, frustration, betrayal, unforeseen potholes and pitfalls and pit bulls. Who wouldn’t become discouraged amidst all these? Then our discouragement is as understandable as it is excusable.

“Not so!”, shouts the author of Hebrews. “Understandable, yes; excusable, no. What would be the excuse?” Then in Hebrews 12:3 this writer points us to what will always render our discouragement inexcusable. “Consider him, Jesus, who endured from sinners such hostility against himself, so that you may not grow weary or faint-hearted.” Or as J.B. Phillips puts it in his splendid paraphrase, “Think constantly of enduring all that sinful men could say against him, and you will not lose your purpose or courage.”

The Christian life, the pursuit of excellence, is a particular kind of long distance race; it’s a relay race. Each generation of believers passes on the baton to the next. The one thing we mustn’t do is fumble the baton. In the 1992 Olympic Games two women were running side-by-side in a relay event when suddenly one jabbed the other with a sharp elbow. The elbowed woman, in pain now, gasped and slowed up slightly; whereupon the nasty runner surged ahead; whereupon the victimized woman lost her temper and threw her baton at the woman who had fouled her. As soon as she threw her baton she threw the race away; she disqualified herself and her team. Years and years of preparation and training and sacrifice; it was thrown away in an instant. And it all happened because she allowed victimization to deflect her from her pursuit.

In our pursuit we are going to be victimized endlessly. But if it is ever the occasion of our quitting the race we had better not offer it as an excuse, for we are mandated to keep on looking unto Jesus lest we lose our purpose or courage.

The writer of Hebrews tells us that the relay race of the Christian life is an unusual relay race in that Christians throughout the centuries who have already run their leg of the race go to the finish line in order to cheer on those who are still running. These people, having run valiantly, make up “the great cloud of witnesses.” You and I and all God’s people have been appointed to be added to the great cloud. We shall be added as surely as we run with perseverance. For then it will be said of us as it was said of another Christian, now himself in the great cloud, “…fought the good fight; …finished the race, …kept the faith. “

Victor Shepherd    May 2001

 

It isn’t the size of the dog . . . .

It isn’t the size of the dog . . . .

 

Since I was only eight years old when the guest teacher spoke to my Sunday School class I can’t remember all the details. Still, I shall never forget Rufus Spooner, the tall, lean, fiery fellow who touched me and torched me that afternoon. He claimed to stand in the tradition of John Wesley, and he was telling us stories of how Christians in the Methodist heritage continued to “fight the good fight of the faith.” (1 Timothy 6:12) The gist of his story was that we must never waver on account of discouragement or capitulate in despair or surrender through fear. The illustration that gripped us was his vivid depiction of a gentle, small dog dragged unwillingly into contending with a slavering Doberman. The conclusion that climaxed it all and thereafter seared itself upon my mind and heart was, “Remember! What counts isn’t the size of the dog in the fight, but the size of the fight in the dog!” And I have remembered.

When John Wesley was asked what he needed to unleash the mission for which he believed God to have raised up Methodism (the mission being “to spread scriptural holiness throughout the land”) he replied, “I need only a dozen people who hate nothing but sin and fear no one but God.”

Only a dozen? Would so very few be enough to spread, or even begin to spread, scriptural holiness throughout the length and breadth of England? The people who gathered around him worked and witnessed and sometimes wept; still they won. The story of how they leavened English life and laws and church and populace has been told in history texts beyond number. When I was a teenager and beginning to read of the eighteenth century Awakening I thrilled to the accounts of the diminutive Englishman forthrightly addressing crowds that exceeded twenty thousand. Naturally enough I imagined the numbers gathered into the burgeoning movement to resemble a tidal wave. Decades later I learned that by 1750 the Methodist people totalled no more than 10,000 amidst Great Britain’s ten million. In other words, even after twelve years of unrelenting love and labour (he began in 1738) his people were only one-tenth of one percent of the general population.

“Only”? It’s the size of the fight in the dog! By 1790, one year before Wesley’s death, Methodist membership had swelled to 71,463 in a population of twelve million. On the one hand they were proportionately six times larger at six-tenths of one per cent. On the other hand, they were still far less than one per cent. Was Wesley dismayed? I have never read that he quit or ever thought of quitting. Did he abandon his convictions or sell his soul or hide the hardships of discipleship in order to attract hordes and allow him to boast a howling success? On the contrary he never slackened in his insistence on “doctrine and discipline.” His Journal tells us that when he visited the Methodist communities in Newcastle or Leeds or Bradford or Bristol he sat down with local leaders, queried them concerning the spiritual condition of the people, and then proceeded to delete names from the rolls. Members who had made a profession of faith at one time but who were never found now at worship or who flaunted their dissolute ways or who sneered at the gospel and its spokespersons — these people Wesley unhesitatingly pronounced as “no longer walking with us.” To be sure, upon repenting they would be welcomed without qualification. Until then, however, he would not use their names to pad rolls dishonestly. The truth is, as small as the Methodist movement was, Wesley never worried about making it smaller. In the wake of his visit, however, the same community was always stronger and more effective.

 

There are other Sunday School lessons I remember, especially the oft-told story of God’s rescuing the Israelite people from slavery in Egypt and bringing them safely through the Red Sea. The old flannel-graph lesson board always depicted the Red Sea waters piled twenty feet high like snowbanks in the Rocky Mountains. The portrayal was so very dramatic that those beholding the event would have to be startled, know that God alone had done it, and forever suspend their unbelief in the Holy One of Israel. Actually, the event appeared so very ordinary to the Egyptians that their annals record no more than that a relatively small group of slaves escaped during a storm and were never missed since they were never going to accommodate themselves to Egyptian ways in any case. Then what did happen? Something happened apart from which our civilization is unthinkable. Can you imagine our civilization without the Ten Commandments? Can you imagine public institutions or our social environment or our society’s “illumination by indirect lighting” in such areas as care for the marginalized or the value of the individual or the nature of the criminal justice system apart from what Israel has always called the “Ten Words”? And all of this from a handful of recalcitrant slaves so few in number and so despised in any case as never to be missed!

During the eleven years my father lived in Edmonton he visited the Fort Saskatchewan Penitentiary every Sunday afternoon in order to provide piano accompaniment at a service of worship and also to address the convicts. Years later when I was a temporarily frustrated clergyman I asked my dad if he had ever seen any fruit of his eleven-year sacrifice. “I didn’t do it because I expected to see fruit,” he corrected me, “I did it because it was right.” But of course there was fruit. (An ex-convict thanked him on an Edmonton streetcar in front of my mother.) And of course a vastly greater reward awaited him the day he was “sent home.”

Elijah came to know that there were far more than he once thought who had neither bowed their knee to Baal nor kissed him. (1 Kings 19:18)

“It isn’t the size of the dog in the fight, but the size….”

 

Victor Shepherd
(written for the Community of Concern Newsletter, March 2001)

 

Pentecost

PENTECOST

The tower of Babel was titanic, trivial and tragic all at once. Titanic, for its boastful “let us make a name for ourselves” attempted to erect a structure that elevated self-important braggarts to the heavens, letting them rival God. It was trivial, for their achievement turned out to be a pipsqueak; when God heard about it he couldn’t see it and had to “come down” (Gen. 11:5) just to have a look. It was tragic in that they succeeded in giving themselves a name, an identity: God-defiant, disobedient, contemptuous men and women whose ingratitude was as hard-hearted as their self-congratulation was silly. The tragedy was only compounded when God visited his judgement upon them, rendering them unable to understand each other, unable to communicate, unable to forge community. He scattered them abroad over the face of the earth (Gen. 11:8-9), enforcing their estrangement. Like magnets improperly aligned they could only repel each other. In one sense they triumphed, for they had rendered themselves “somebodies” irrespective of God’s will and way. In another sense they failed abysmally, their isolation giving rise to babbling no less hostile for being incoherent.

Yet since God’s judgement is the converse of his mercy (or as Luther liked to say, his judgement is his love burning hot), God immediately set about rescuing them from their folly and its consequences. Abram (“exalted father”) is summoned and obeys, the model of any and all who gladly allow themselves to be named by God. Now called Abraham (“father of multitudes”), he is blessed by God where the Babel/babblers were cursed. He is promised descendants in faith as numberless as the sand on the seashore and the stars in the firmament (Gen. 22:17).

Still, God’s rescue operation taxed him unspeakably. It took him centuries and cost him vastly more than it had cost even Abraham. (After all, at the moment of inexpressible anguish Abraham’s son had been spared while God’s had not.) Still, God couldn’t be discouraged or deflected. There finally appeared one who gloried in the name his Father had bestowed upon him, Yehoshuah, Jesus, “God saves.” God had designated him such “in power…by his resurrection from the dead.” (Rom. 1:4) Throughout the seven weeks between Easter and Pentecost the risen one had appeared to his followers, instructed them in the truth concerning himself and released them from the misunderstandings of him and his work that had dogged them ever since he had called them. He had directed them to remain in Jerusalem, hier shalem, “city of salvation”, until they were “clothed with power from on high.” (Luke 24:49) Then obedient disciples, honouring the risen one’s promise, found the promise fulfilled as the Day of Pentecost unfolded.

“Pentecost” was a word coined in Israel of old to commemorate the ingathering of the harvest. Later the Pentecost festival recalled as well the giving of the Torah at Sinai. Israel had been freed from bondage in Egypt, delivered through the Red Sea, and then fused into a people at Sinai as they were acquainted with God’s will for them. The events in Israel’s history all served the definitive rescue operation when Israel’s greater Son absorbed in himself humankind’s bondage to sin, made provision for its deliverance, and schooled disciples in the Way they were to walk (“walk” being the commonest Hebrew metaphor for obedience.) Regardless of what had been done already, however, something remained to be done in that Christ’s people were gathered in Jerusalem eager, expectant, but as yet unleashed.

As surely as the descent of the Spirit signalled the public ministry of him who was “sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel” (Matt. 15: 24), the descent of the Spirit at Pentecost signalled the world-wide ministry of those sent “to the end of the earth.” (Acts 1:8) Pentecost found the Spirit kindling them for a mission that included people from every tongue and tribe throughout the world. Pentecost conferred an identity no enemy could deny them. Pentecost commissioned them the hands and feet of the risen, victorious one whose victory now ruled the cosmos. Henceforth they would do in his name the work he had done prior to his ascension. (John 14:12)

While the disciples had obeyed their risen Lord and had waited in Jerusalem for the Spirit, they hadn’t been waiting around. They had praised God publicly in the temple and privately in their homes. On the day of Pentecost their conquering Saviour, himself the bearer and bestower of the Spirit, flooded them with the selfsame Spirit in whose power he had preached, taught, healed, and announced the coming “Day of the Lord.” Pentecost was the final act of God’s saving mission before the End. It equipped the disciples with all that they needed to fulfil their commission. It inaugurated the era of the Spirit, which era Hebrew prophets like Joel had foretold. (Joel 2:28) And not to be overlooked, it was the first instance of revival, revival occurring when the sovereign Spirit of God overtakes large numbers of people at once, convicts them of their sinnership, convinces them of the coming judgement, brings them to repentance and faith through vivifying God’s mercy, and admits them joyfully to the people of God.

Concerning this awe-full event Luke tells us that the disciples were aware of what sounded like hurricane-force winds. Hadn’t Jesus earlier likened the Spirit to wind? (John 3:8) Wind can’t be seen yet also can’t be denied. Uprooted trees, racing clouds, tumbling waves: the effects of wind attest its power.

And on the day of Pentecost there appeared to be fire licking at each of the 120 assembled in the upper room. Hadn’t Christ’s ancestors in faith found in the properties of fire a startling reminder of what God does when he draws near to his people and “torches” them? As fire illumines it dispels darkness and confusion. As fire refines it consumes corruption, even mere worthlessness, leaving what is pure, attractive and useful. As fire warms it dispels iciness and suspicion. Most characteristically, fire sets on fire whatever it touches.

At Pentecost the Spirit moved disciples to “speak in other tongues.” The significance of the proclamation in other languages of God’s mighty acts was epoch-making in view of the diverse people gathered at that time in Jerusalem. These God-fearing Jews happened to be in the city at this time but they weren’t native to Jerusalem, having been neither born nor raised there. They had come from the diaspora, “from every nation under heaven.” (Acts 2:5) Luke means, of course, the nations of his world, the Graeco-Roman world of the Mediterranean area where Jewish people had thrived for centuries. In speaking of the “other tongues” Luke lists the languages of five groups: people west of the Caspian Sea, Asia Minor, North Africa, visitors from Rome (Jews and converts to Judaism), and finally “Cretans and Arabs.”

This linguistically diverse, international crowd was transfixed by the simple Galileans. Galileans were known to lack cultural sophistication. (“Can anything good come out of Nazareth?” John 1:46) Permanent residents of Jerusalem looked upon the Galilean visitors as bumpkins. Miraculously, these unlettered people were now proclaiming Jesus in the visitors’ own languages at the centre of the city of salvation. A few sour-faced onlookers sneered, “They’ve had too much to drink.” Nervous about making a realistic assessment, they distanced themselves from the truth through self-excusing mockery.

Luke left no doubt as to his understanding of the Galileeans’ speech. In the power of the Spirit the gospel of Jesus Christ transcends and bridges every barrier that people bent on making a name for themselves erect and behind which they scoff in pretended superiority at those on the other side of the wall. Such barriers are legion: language, nationality, race, education, social class, wealth, gender, ethnicity. Luke knew that Babel had been reversed. At Babel God had descended in judgement and curse when he had had to descend in any case in order to see the tinker-toy trifle by which its builders had thought themselves giants who could rival him. Now at Pentecost God descended in blessing when he found obedient followers of Jesus who wanted only to exalt the name that is above every name (Phil. 2:9) Glad to have their lives, reputations, identities “hid with Christ in God” (Col. 3:3) they rejoiced in the “name” whereby God knew them. Babel pride gave place to Pentecost humility, a humility that is never self-belittlement but rather self-forgetfulness born of preoccupation with the one whose servants they were glad to be.

Since Pentecost forges and inflames Christ’s people (mission being as essential to the church as burning is to fire), Pentecost celebrates the birth of the church. Then could a day that celebrates its birth be followed eventually by a day that laments its demise? Never! No power can prevail against the church, for since the “Spirit isn’t given by measure” (John 3:34), the Pentecost-suffusion will always be adequate.

Pentecost was nothing less than a miracle. How could it be anything else? Creation had certainly been a miracle, creation ex nihilo. Then re-creation had to be no less a miracle too in view of the calcified perversity of the human heart. For Pentecost meant that life could begin again, but not “again” in the sense of déjà vu, one more time; “again”, rather, in the sense of the reversal of all that had distorted the creation into a hideous parody of what God had intended originally. The tower of Babel, remember, had been thought to be huge when in fact it was tiny. Now the new-born church was thought to be tiny but would quickly become huge. While the world regards the church as either stillborn or impotent (“How many troops does the pope have?”, Stalin had jested), it is precisely the church which the rightful ruler of the universe appoints to be his hands and feet. Henceforth it does that work which he will crown one day as he brings to perfection his work of cosmic restoration. Admittedly, the church has prostituted itself repeatedly, yet the bestowal of the Spirit ensures that it will ever be the bride of Christ. Admittedly, the church has often compromised itself inexcusably, yet the Spirit’s wind and fire will ultimately render it worthy to “judge angels.” (1 Cor. 6:3) Deformed at times to the point of being grotesque, the church lives by the promise of one day standing forth resplendent, without spot or blemish. It has been attacked but never slain, for it is more ridiculous than ghastly to think of the Lord Jesus Christ living with head and body severed.

The builders of Babel/babble had made a name for themselves, only to find themselves scattered and their name forgotten. Pentecost generated the ever-burgeoning cloud of witnesses, the gathering together of those whose names were now written in the book of life and would be remembered eternally. The Babel/babblers had boasted, “We did it our way.” Pentecost created a world-wide fellowship of those who continue to prove that “his commandments are not burdensome” but in fact are “sweeter than honey.” (1 John 5:3; Psalm 19:10) Where Babel’s frustrated communication was tragic, Pentecost was a triumph as it proved there is no communication problem, whether between God and us or between us and others, that the Spirit cannot solve.

Apart from Pentecost the 120 in a second-storey room in Jerusalem would have waited with hope haemorrhaging, one more heart-breaking instance of many false messianisms. Apart from Pentecost evangelism would be little more than propaganda and the church’s mission mere self-promotion. Apart from Pentecost our efforts at binding the wounds of a broken world would be indistinguishable from do-goodism. And apart from Pentecost, evangelicals should note next winter and spring, no Gentile would ever have heard of Christmas or Easter.

As it is, Pentecost is the only reason the gospel gives rise to “a great multitude which no man can number, from every nation, from all tribes and peoples and tongues, standing before the throne… crying out with a loud voice, ‘Salvation belongs to our God who sits upon the throne, and to the Lamb!” (Rev. 7:9-10)

Victor Shepherd

 

Abraham and Isaac in Genesis 22

(presented November 4 , 2000 at the Annual Sixteenth Century Studies Conference, Cleveland)

Hope as the Reconciliation of Command and Promise

Concerning the account of the akedah (“binding”) Gordon Wenham comments, “No other story in Genesis, indeed in the whole OT, can match the sacrifice of Isaac for its haunting beauty or its theological depth.”. With respect to its beauty von Rad maintains that “the narrative [is]…the most perfectly formed and polished of the patriarchal stories”, and cites this as evidence that the story existed independently long before it was gathered up into the redacted work. In other words, its literary beauty helped keep the story in the forefront of the people’s consciousness even as its theology informed and formed Israel for centuries throughout the people’s engagement with its God and the surrounding nations.

Yet the story does more than haunt. It overwhelms, and none more thoroughly than Soren Kierkegaard in his preoccupation with Abraham as the “knight of faith” (which knight is to be contrasted everywhere with the ethical hero, even the tragic hero.) Stricken by the story of Abraham and Isaac, Kierkegaard can only conclude, concerning the faith which any believer exemplifies, that “faith begins precisely where thought stops.” Just because thought stops at the inception of faith, no advice can be proffered those children of Abraham — believers — even at the outset of their journey. For in the nature of the case advice is not so much useless as impossible with respect to those whose faith is incomprehensible: “he who walks the narrow road of faith has no one to advise him — no one understands him.” Anyone who has pondered the story of Abraham and Isaac, the paradigm of scriptural faith, and still thinks she understands faith; anyone who thinks her new-found understanding enables or even impels her to “explain” it is no better than a “pious and accommodating exegete who by dickering in this way hopes to smuggle Christianity into the world.”

But of course only an ersatz Christianity can be smuggled into the world. Faith as exemplified by Abraham can never be. And since Abraham’s faith is not only the model for that of his spiritual descendants but also the condition for theirs as well (see section V), Abraham’s faith elicits unbounded admiration from Kierkegaard (“in a certain demented sense I admire him more than all others”), even as it elicits unprecedented horror as well (“he also appalls me”.) Kierkegaard knows that the faith that Abraham exemplifies and to which all others are summoned entails a confrontation with unprecedented horror and therefore the need for unparalleled courage in the face of it: “I have seen the terrifying face to face, and I do not flee from it in horror, but I know very well that even though I advance toward it courageously, my courage is still not the courage of faith and is not to be compared with it.”

I: The Story

Courage befits a test so very extreme. The “test”, of course, is not “temptation” in the sense of seduction into sin. It is Anfechtung (Luther), trial, that occasion of torment which discloses the nature, depth and scope of one’s faith; in a word, what is undeniably the state of one’s heart. In many respects the command is stupefying. Isaac, after all, has been granted to Abraham and Sarah when realistically no child could be expected. More to the point, Isaac’s survival is essential to the fulfillment of God’s promises to Abraham. Having cut himself off from his entire past — “Go from your country and your kindred and your father’s house to the land that I will show you” (12:1) — Abraham must now renounce his future, and with it the future of his people, including not only the future of his descendants but also that of innumerable nations who are to be blessed through his descendants.

The crux of the story is this. Abraham, the prototype of the person of faith, has been promised spiritual descendants as numerous as the sands on the seashore. If the promise is to be fulfilled, two conditions must be met: Abraham must persevere in faith (or else he cannot be the foreparent of descendants-in-faith), and Isaac must survive (or else there will not be descendants-in-faith.) Abraham, then, is racked with this dilemma: if he obeys God and offers up his Son, then God’s promise is null and void, since Isaac has not survived. If, on the other hand, he second-guesses God and preserves Isaac, then God’s promise is null and void, since his disobedience exemplifies unfaith. Abraham’s obedience nullifies the promise as surely as his disobedience nullifies it. Abraham decides to stake everything on trusting God to fulfil God’s promises in ways that Abraham cannot imagine at this point. He will obey God even though such obedience, from a human perspective, ensures the non-fulfillment of the promise.

God tests Abraham. By means of the definite article (lit. “the God”) the text forbids the reader from finding relief in such vagaries as “Perhaps Abraham merely thought he heard God speak, merely projected an intra-psychic oddity.” While “God” (without the article) is used in the story wherever the narrator refers to the deity, the article is added whenever God himself addresses Abraham. It is the one and only, true and living God who speaks to Abraham, the God whose address is as undeniable as it is unmistakable. It is little wonder that the text obviates all sought-after speculations concerning all reductionist psycho-religious “explanations”: the story has point and force only if the God has spoken unambiguously and Abraham has heard unambivalently.

Testing as such is nothing new for Abraham. He has been tested before; e.g., with respect to the famine (12:10ff) (at which he behaved ingloriously), and again with respect to the three visitors (18:1ff.) New here, however, is the agenda of testing in the very first verse of the story, as well as the severity of a test that appears wantonly destructive.

Yet the severity of the testing does not preclude sensitivity on God’s part. “Take (your son)” has the force of “Please take.” The enclitic (“please”) is rare in a divine command, and lends the force of entreaty to the command. God manifests his awareness of the outrageous nature of his request.

As jarring as the outrageous request is, the terrible tension it engenders is heightened yet again as Abraham is told to take “your son, your only son, Isaac, whom you love.” By now the narrative has slowed to a crawl as the reader is forced to linger over the perseverated detail, Isaac who is loved unspeakably, and therein forced to reflect on a command whose ever-narrowing specificity fosters ever-increasing anguish. “Whom you love”, exquisitely drawn out, precludes any “escape-suggestion” that Abraham’s love for his son was deficient in any case.

The content of the test pertains, as already noted, to the promise and its (apparent) nullification. The context of the test is Abraham’s unsurpassable love for Isaac. Both are needed. Nowhere is it implied that Abraham’s love for Isaac is inordinate. God approves its intensity. Apart from a love as intense as it is proper, the dilemma concerning the promise would be but a cold abstraction devoid of human significance. Apart from the dilemma concerning the promise the story would not be trivialized (the loss of a child can never be trivial), but it would none the less lack the creation-wide significance it is meant to have.

Abraham is to give up Isaac as a “burnt offering.” Later Levitical ritual will designate this particular offering as the only one to be completely consumed. While the reader’s awareness of the conclusion of the story — the provision of the ram, God’s staying Abraham’s knife-wielding hand, the promises of God promulgated as a result of Abraham’s obedience — mitigates the story’s horror and incomprehensibility, for Abraham himself the instant of the command’s enunciation finds nothing mitigated. The test remains consummate test only if horror and incomprehensibility perdure.

The earlier command, “Go from your country, your kindred, and your father’s house to the land that I will show you” (12:1) was undoubtedly heart-wrenching for Abraham. As difficult as this command was, that of 22:1 is qualitatively different. The earlier command included the promise of a rich future, new land, numerous descendants, blessing for all nations. The most recent command includes no such promise. In fact, obedience to it precludes future, land, descendants, blessing — for all of these presuppose Isaac’s survival.

Was Abraham in torment? He cut the wood for the holocaust after saddling the asses. Surely it would make more sense to cut the wood first. Is he trying to conceal the nature of the test from those looking on? Is he postponing the most painful part to the last? Plainly he is distraught. One would expect servants to prepare animals and split wood. Yet Abraham wants to elicit no questions since he has no answers. His sole involvement in the ordeal means that it cannot be shared in any way; no relief can attenuate his pain.

No word is spoken throughout the journey to Moriah. Father and son arrive on the third day, “on the third day” being a Hebrew idiom indicating the elevated significance of an unusually dramatic moment. Abraham lifts up his eyes and sees the place “afar off.” To lift up one’s eyes before seeing similarly suggests throughout Genesis that what is to be seen is of momentous import. Abraham can recognize it, of course, in that it is the place “of which God had told him.” The reader is not made privy to what God has told him. Still, Abraham has plainly been told as much as he needs to know in order to identify the place. The fact that the reader is not told focuses attention all the more pointedly on Abraham’s determination to obey God at all costs; i.e., the details Abraham needed to know for the test to occur are extraneous to the test itself. If included, such details would only sidetrack the reader.

The drama takes a remarkable turn when Abraham, intending nothing but that resolute obedience which undeniably includes the death of Isaac, departs for the site with Isaac alone and, upon leaving the servants behind, adds, “[we]…will come again to you.” (22:5) On the one hand Abraham releases the servants in that he cannot endure seeing anyone else behold the ghastly event. On the other hand he indicates that he expects to return with Isaac, however illogical or inchoate his expectation here. Even now, then, Abraham is trusting God to fulfil the promise in a manner wholly unforeseeable yet not to be doubted. Paradoxically, the narrator speaks in such a way as to leave the reader understanding that Abraham intends nothing but the slaughter of Isaac and is therefore beside himself, even as he is relying on the promise fulfilled, an event that presupposes Isaac’s being spared.

Isaac, meanwhile, is aware that he and his father are on their way to worship, and aware, of course, that worship entails sacrifice. Unsuspecting, he calls out, “My father.” Abraham replies, “Here am I, my son.” Abraham’s heart remains knit to Isaac’s as strongly as it was the day he received the baby from Sarah. The iron-fast bond of affection only magnifies the tension as Isaac, not suspicious but certainly bewildered, notes that all is on hand for the sacrifice except the victim. “Where is the lamb for a burnt offering?” Isaac’s trust in his father is one with his father’s trust in God.

While much religious art depicts Isaac as a child, if not still an infant, the story makes plain that Isaac is strong enough to carry wood sufficient for that conflagration required to consume his remains. He is also sophisticated enough to apprehend the accoutrements of sacrifice. Not surprisingly, then, Jewish tradition deems Isaac to be 37 years old. Then Isaac can only be willing to be sacrificed. A vigorous young adult could readily overpower a very aged father. The test for Abraham is therefore a test for Isaac as well. Isaac, after all, could not be bound unless he complied.

When an animal was on the point of being sacrificed it was not bound; rather its throat was cut, it was dismembered, and then burnt. Since Isaac submits to being bound he is not mere piacular victim. He is as much an agent in the event now as his father. To the extent that Abraham is ready to obey God at all cost, Isaac is ready to obey his father — and therefore obey God through his father — at all cost. Lest the subtlety of all such considerations distract the reader from the shock-aspect of the deed, the narrator comments, “Abraham …bound Isaac his son.” (22:9) In addition, the “knife” that Abraham poises above the prostrate Isaac is the “knife” used elsewhere to dismember a ravished concubine into twelve pieces. (Judges 19:29) The event at Moriah remains grisly. Nothing can reduce the bizarreness, horror and enormity of what is about to happen.

Precisely at the moment of the knife’s descent God (I am reading “angel of the Lord” as a circumlocution for “God”) calls, “Abraham, Abraham.” The name repeated is a Hebrew way of denoting urgency, typically a way of stopping an action that someone is on the point perpetrating. God’s forbidding the dreaded act is now as pressing as his command was heretofore persistent. God has “seen enough.” Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice is sufficient proof of his undeflectable obedience to God and unalloyed trust in him. God’s unaffected awareness and artless acknowledgement, “Now I know that you fear God” (22:12), dovetails exactly with Abraham’s utter surprise at the provision of the ram. Earlier (22:8) Abraham had attempted to remedy Isaac’s bewilderment with “God will provide a lamb”, and then had moved ahead in obedience to God on the assumption that there were no this-worldly grounds for such intervention (the proof of Abraham’s mind and heart being his raising the knife over Isaac), when the ram was brought forth. Abraham’s surprise is no more feigned than his intent to obey God at any cost. Both dimensions must be underscored: it is true simultaneously that Abraham never doubts that “God will provide” (or else he has abandoned faith’s trust in the promise-fulfilling God) and that he is genuinely astounded at the appearance of the ram (or else he has abandoned faith’s obedience to the uncompromising claim of God.) Abraham is genuinely surprised, profoundly surprised, that the promise has been fulfilled in this manner.

Abraham names the place “The Lord will provide.” In naming the place he does not mention himself. He does not seek to exalt himself, never mind memorialize himself. He wants only to magnify the act of God wherein God’s mercy and wisdom are enlarged. Nothing in the story suggests that Abraham understands himself to be anything more than an “unprofitable servant.”

The second address of the “angel of the Lord” to Abraham (22:15-18) is by no means an “add-on”, let alone embellishment, but is rather an integral aspect of the story itself. Indeed the angel’s words “are the last and most emphatic statement of the promises given to Abraham.” For nowhere else does a divine oath, “By myself I have sworn” (22:15), occur in the patriarchal stories. Again, the singularity of the divine oath (emphasized by “by myself”) is matched by the divine acknowledgement of Abraham’s singular obedience: “Because you have done this”; “[because you] have not withheld your son, your only son”; “because you have obeyed my voice.” On account of Abraham’s obedience blessing will abound. “I will indeed bless you, really bless you” (22:17), the infinite absolute of “bless” being used here alone in Genesis to underline the truth that this promise surpasses all others.

As enormous as the ordeal has been, the blessing is “super-immense.” Abraham himself will be blessed, as will his descendants, as will (by his descendants) all the nations of the earth. The content of the blessing is specified in the case of his descendants. They will be uncountable (“as the stars of heaven and as the sand which is on the seashore”), victorious (“shall possess the gates of their enemies”), and used of God in his prospering others (“shall all the nations of the earth bless themselves.”) Abraham’s faithfulness is the occasion, under God, of a divinely ordained beneficence whose scope and profundity are inestimable.

In all of this one must be careful not to undervalue the unsubstitutably human. Abraham’s faithfulness and obedience and unwavering trust are a human event/act/affirmation upon which the blessing of the whole world hangs. The thrice-uttered “because you…” can only mean that the human “dialogical partner” of God conditions God’s response. What God will do (can do?) for all the nations turns on the integrity of a human agent. Heretofore the promise of God has been grounded in the will of God; now it is grounded in both the will of God and the will of Abraham. Not only has the test found Abraham unbroken; the test has been the occasion of the crown and climax of his walk with God. And the test has permitted God to bless the whole Gentile world.

It is little wonder, then, that the oath God has sworn to Abraham will be recalled repeatedly throughout scripture (e.g., Luke 1:55), for this oath gathers up and guarantees all God’s promises to the patriarch.

II: Luther

Luther knows what is at stake in the akedah: Isaac “had the promise of God concerning the future blessing of the entire world.” Yet the command of God, in light of the promise of God, has issued in a “contradiction with which God contradicts himself.” It is humanly impossible to understand this, for we should “inevitably conclude that God is lying — and this is blasphemy — or that God hates me — and this leads to despair.” Whereas God formerly seemed to be Abraham’s friend, God now appears to have become “an enemy and a tyrant.” Confronted by the God who is enemy and tyrant, Abraham is unable to believe that he is merely being tested, since he would know that in the face of Anfechtung he must recall, cling to and declare the promise of God — and this Abraham appears unable to do, no longer having “remained sure of the promise.” As profoundly discomfited as Abraham is by the ordeal, the episode is recorded for our comfort “in order that we may learn to rely on the promises we have.”

The dialectic Luther suggests here seems bizarre. Since the promise is now the occasion of logical contradiction, Abraham cannot be sure of the promise. Yet the purpose of the story of Abraham is to teach us that we must ever rely on the promise. Notwithstanding the oddity, Luther knows that Anfechtung does not arise ultimately in the face of “woman, gold, silver, life or death”; it arises, rather, when God “shows himself differently from the way the promise speaks.” Anfechtung overtakes us when God’s self-disclosure contradicts God’s self-utterance. When faced with contradiction (apparent or real) between God’s self-disclosure and the promise, what are we to do? Luther’s answer is unambiguous: we are to cling to the promise. And yet Luther appears to contradict himself immediately as he declares that “Abraham’s faith shines forth with special clarity in this passage, inasmuch as he obeys God with such a ready heart when He gives him the command.” Here Luther identifies faith as obedience to command rather than as trust in promise. At once, however, Luther adds, “And although Isaac has to be sacrificed, he nevertheless has no doubt whatever that the promise will be fulfilled even if he does not know the manner of its fulfillment.” “No doubt” can only mean “faith.” Here, then, faith is confidence in the promise fulfilled.

Nowhere in his commentary on Genesis concerning the matter under discussion does Luther speak of the command of God in terms of the law of God, and then contrast it sharply (as is his custom) with the gospel (promise.) Were he to do this, of course, he would have to relegate the significance of the command to fostering in the hearer that despair which drives one to the gospel (promise.) Were command to be understood as law, however, the tension in the incident would disappear and the “trial” would evaporate. Throughout his exposition of Genesis 22 Luther presupposes promise and command as the one gospel of God seen from two different angles. While the law/gospel distinction is crucial in Luther’s thought as a whole and therefore characteristic of him, it is plain that so far as Abraham is concerned the command is not to be understood in terms of law but in terms of gospel. When Luther probes the three-day journey to Moriah he notes that Abraham’s reliance on the command “strengthened and preserved him.” Everywhere in Luther the law, so far from strengthening and preserving, breaks people down for the sake of that which does: the gospel. Plainly Luther relates obedience to command even as he implies promise (rather than law.) The obedience he has in mind, of course, is that obedience which pertains to (promise-quickened) faith. Obedience “does not exist where this is no divine promise.” Clearly there is a subtle mutuality between promise and command. While from a human perspective promise and command may appear to contradict each other, ultimately the promise is the meaning of the command.

Obedience to the command is no small matter. For when Abraham heard the command of God “he hastened without hesitation to carry it out. This is an extraordinary example of a description of perfect obedience.” Unlike Adam, Luther notes, Abraham does not ask why. Adam’s Anfechtung, whatever else it may have involved, did not involve contradiction. Then how did Abraham manage to meet it? He met it only “through the power of the command of God.” Although, from a human perspective, Abraham “did not have a heart of iron but was of a very tender nature…emotions undoubtedly were accompanied by inexpressible groans, sighs, sobs, and fatherly tears”, his obedience “extended to his innermost being”, there being no room in him for doubt, let alone defiance. The resilience of his obedience, insists Luther, was attributable to the fact that the command “rules and lives in him.”

Immediately the reader recalls the New Testament insistence that Jesus Christ (i.e., the gospel) alone rules and lives in believers. Once more, then, Luther is relating obedience (to the command) to gospel- (promise-) quickened faith. In this context it should be noted that Luther maintains faith to arise as we open our ears and shut our eyes. Ears (metaphorically) receive the Word of God; eyes behold what is everywhere a contradiction of the Word of God. Abraham “hears” the (promise-grounded) command, and “sees”, as it were, Isaac slain — and then proceeds to slay Isaac, trusting God to fulfil the promise.

Reason, Luther rightly sees here, is helpless before the conundrum: “If Isaac must be killed, the promise is void; but if the promise is sure, it is impossible that this is a command of God.” Reason aside, Abraham cannot doubt that God has announced both promise and command.

At this point Luther brings forward a theme that will recur throughout his discussion of the episode; viz., the sacrifice of Isaac, and Isaac’s subsequent restoration (necessary if Isaac is to have descendants) is an anticipation of the resurrection of the dead. Within a few lines, however, Luther recognizes that to rely on Isaac’s being resurrected after he has been slain is to denature the event as incomparable trial. If Isaac is to be resurrected and thereby rendered the progenitor of a people, then strictly speaking there is no trial. There remains psychological tumult for Abraham (he must still slay his son), but no theological/spiritual conundrum, no trial with respect to faith in the promise of God and the future blessing of the world. Admittedly, God can continue to “try” Abraham’s trust in and love for One who visits assorted afflictions on Abraham, but appealing to the resurrection of the dead undercuts the nature of that trial which tries faith in the promise of the God whose promise has become an impossibility; i.e., tries faith in the God who has himself become an “impossibility.” Luther maintains that the Word of God is “equal to God”, as is God’s “spoken word” (i.e., God’s self-utterance.) The contradiction between the spoken utterance (command) and the Word (promise) renders God self-contradictory. God is an impossibility.

In reflecting on the akedah Luther reminds us that the Word of God and faith in that Word are correlative, and wherever “these two are, there follows the third, namely, the cross and mortification. These three make up the Christian life.” And what is the extent of mortification? Mortification entails self-denial, to be sure, yet a self-denial so far-reaching as to involve the cancellation of everything and everyone whose significance is connected to the “self” undergoing trial. Mortification, self-denial, is nothing less than utmost deprivation. In this regard Luther comments, “Abraham has now [i.e., upon hearing the command] nothing more, so far as the promise is concerned, than he had before Isaac was born; and yet, because of God, he is ready to give up not only his son, Sarah, an inheritance, his house and his church, but even his own life. Isaac’s death included all of this inasmuch as the promise was attached to Isaac.” Isaac’s death entails an obliteration that is nothing less than total. And since, as was noted earlier, a self-contradiction in God renders God an impossibility, obedience to the command of God will not only cancel the promise of God but thereby effect the ultimate nihil. Abraham, faced with an obedience to God that effects the ultimate nihil, finds a sympathizer in Luther who suggests why Abraham told no one of his trial: no one would have understood it (the same conclusion Kierkegaard was to arrive at independently centuries later.)

As Isaac’s initial bewilderment (“Where is the lamb for the burnt offering?”) gives way to his awareness that he is to be the offering, Luther highlights the obedience of father and son. On the one hand Luther maintains that so profound, so moving, is this development that nothing is said about it in that “the subject matter is greater than can be expressed by any eloquence.” On the other hand, he does manage to say something: “With the exception of Christ, we have no similar example of obedience.” With his subtle grasp of so very many ramifications Luther points out that Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac is not only Isaac’s self-sacrifice but also Abraham’s as well. For “death has a soul and a body”, and to die “in the truest sense of the word” is not to undergo biological cessation but rather “to feel the violence of real death.” In this sense “both are killed, since they see and feel nothing but death.” And while Abraham is everywhere commended for his faith in the promise, Isaac’s faith is no less remarkable. For at the moment that the knife is held to Isaac’s throat, Isaac insists, “I am the son of promise. Therefore I must beget children even if heaven collapses.” God’s promise is so very sure, and so very sure is Isaac’s faith in the promise, that heaven will “collapse”, the cosmos will de-create, before the promise fails — even as obedience to the command precipitates the ultimate nihil.

Plainly Luther views the Abraham-Isaac story as having cosmic significance. It is no surprise, then, that he ruminates, concerning the appearance of the ram that dies in place of Isaac, on two possibilities: the animal could have been brought to the site or been brought into existence at the site. He prefers the latter. For Luther God’s provision is not a providential rearranging of what already exists; God’s provision is nothing less than creatio ex nihilo. The Abraham/Isaac promise/command matrix, together with the blessing soon to be pronounced, means that the world’s life can begin again.

The resolution of the trial finds God swearing by himself. Such singular swearing has the force, says Luther, of God’s saying, “I desire so greatly to be believed and long so intensely to have my words trusted that I am not only making a promise but am offering myself as a pledge….If I do not keep my promises, I shall no longer be who I am.” The promise made to Abraham must be fulfilled or God has annihilated himself. That God does not (cannot) annihilate himself is God’s pledge that this promise is not merely something that God has said and now makes good; i.e., as related to the faithfulness of God this promise is integrally related to the being of God. This promise, then, is like no other. For this reason Luther rhapsodizes that by the aforementioned pledge God “enlarges His promise to such an outstanding extent that it surpasses all thinking and faith.” In other words, this promise transcends thought so as to leave us unable to comprehend it, even as the enlarged promise dwarfs our faith. Yet since promise and faith are internally related, an enlarged promise must issue in enlarged faith. For precisely this reason Luther adds, “What could be said or thought that is surer and more powerful for increasing faith?”

With respect to the scope of the blessing spreading out from Abraham, Luther speaks first of David. David apprehends (Psalms 89:35; 132:11) that by God’s oath the promise “has come into my [i.e., David’s] tribe, into my line, person and body….I am he to whom the promise is attached, just as it was attached to the person of Abraham.” In short, David is now the embodiment of the original promise. But then David’s enemies must have been anticipated in Abraham’s enemies and those of Abraham’s immediate descendants. Not unexpectedly, then, Luther comments that regardless of however “powerful and violent” the enemies of Abraham’s descendants might be, victory “will be with the sand and the stars, but especially with the Son.” With the Son? Luther’s final word concerning the scope of the ever-expanding boon could not be stronger: “The blessing promised Abraham is eternal.”

III: Calvin

In his Institutes Calvin admits that Abraham’s trial concerning Isaac is quantitatively different from all tests and afflictions (the greatest of which was childlessness) visited upon Abraham earlier, since “for a son to be slaughtered by his father’s hand surpasses every form of calamity.” All such tests, however, have merely facilitated Abraham’s mortification. Now, however, Abraham is pierced by a wound that is qualitatively different, “a wound far more grievous than death itself.” Here Abraham is tormented not merely at the prospect of bereavement, but rather at a faith-obedience wherein “the whole salvation of the world seemed to be extinguished and to perish.” The exercise of faith issues in “the destruction of faith.” It is little wonder that Abraham finds his “piety” a consuming “distraction.”

Calvin’s reference to “piety” is significant. For him pietas is a noble word and carries none of modernity’s pejorative freight; viz., a saccharine, cloying, ethereal, self-indulgent and meritorious religiosity. Pietas, rather, is “that reverence joined with love of God which the knowledge of his benefits induces.” In his earlier catechism, written more expansively than the compressed Institutes, Calvin had said, “True piety consists rather in a sincere feeling which loves God as Father as much as it fears and reverences Him as Lord, embraces His righteousness, and dreads offending Him worse than death.” Paradoxically it is Abraham’s piety that is now ultimate spiritual threat. To adore God is now one with abhorring him. Previous tests presupposed the veridicality of the promise; this test ensures its cancellation, and with it even the possibility of humankind’s salvation. The cancellation here, moreover, entails an inconsistency in God that renders God thoroughly opaque and therefore utterly untrustworthy. If trusting a treachery “proves” faith, what is the nature of the faith proved thereby? If to exercise faith is to be left with none, and not to exercise faith is to be left with none, then what is meant by “faith?” Lest the reader think that Abraham might be “hearing things” in all of this, Calvin, reading the text with exquisite attentiveness, insists Abraham cannot doubt that God has spoken.

In view of the fact that Calvin is notorious for insisting that word and faith cannot be sundered, he displays his own “distress” when, in the context of proving faith, he speaks uncharacteristically of the “disappearance of the word.” While Calvin everywhere else maintains that the word can no more disappear than God vanish, here he magnifies the uniqueness of Abraham’s test by insisting that God tries Abraham’s faith by drawing Abraham into a contest with God’s own word. Amplifying this, Calvin avers (again uncharacteristically) that “God would shake the faith that Abraham had placed in His word, by a counter-assault of the word itself.” In short, God would test Abraham by juxtaposing word as promise (previously vouchsafed to Abraham) and word as living voice of the One whom Abraham knew with undeniable immediacy, “since all occasion of doubt is removed.”

It is impossible to exaggerate the manner in which Calvin has heightened, in expounding this narrative, the tensions in his own theology. Calvin rigorously maintains that the word alone is the author and object of faith. “Word” and “faith” always imply each other. Any deviation here bespeaks the “fanaticism” of the 16th Century radicals. Since the word is now self-contradicted, no human reasoning can reconcile the immolation of Isaac (word) and the promise concerning his descendants and the salvation of the world. This singular simultaneity of self-contradiction has the force of making “full trial” of Abraham’s faith. Such a trial is “full” not in the sense of “not partial” but rather in the sense of a novum, unprecedented, categorically different from the trials that have tested Abraham and all believers. Whereas temptation to disobey God is normally “shaken off” by recalling and clinging to the promise, such recourse now appears impossible, since “God, in a certain sense, assumes a double character.” While word-quickened faith is kept constant as we “apply all our senses to the word of God”, such application is now useless since the word itself (God himself) has become the problem, God now being two-faced. God’s “forked tongue” can only bespeak a Jekyll-and-Hyde monstrosity. Calvin reminds the reader that when believers are assaulted they are always to arm themselves with the word, “the sword of the Spirit.” Now, however, he asks rhetorically what the predicament of believers must be if God at this moment attacks believers with that weapon wherewith he had previously protected them. While the predicament cannot be untangled at the level of thought, the predicament can still be lived. Abraham, forswearing the futility of immobilizing himself before it or speculating beyond the concrete occurrence of the unmistakable summons, wrestles with the test by faith. In it all he remains the paradigm of the person whose faith keeps him fixed on the immediacy of the command of God. Faith, in moments of dreadful testing, fixes itself to the immediacy of the command, obeying the command while trusting the promise. Calvin exalts the obedience of Abraham by pointing out that while believers of less rigorous faith are prone to be carried off “in whatever direction the breath of a doubtful vision may blow”, Abraham resolutely obeys God when, from a human perspective, he is faced not by a doubtful vision but by undeniable nightmare; and when from a believer’s perspective, he is faced with a command incomprehensible in itself, ruinous for his family, and catastrophic for the wellbeing of the world. As if the “double character” of God were not enough, horrible on account of the confusion it engenders, God appears to gloat in his torturing Abraham by mocking him: God’s requiring Abraham to exercise faith by obeying the command to wield the knife becomes itself the knife that dismembers the promise. As a result Abraham is commanded, as an act of faith, to “cut in pieces the charter of his salvation” — and that of the whole world’s.

Then is Abraham’s faith anything more than irrationality or impulsiveness? Is he merely a self-negating inverted romantic? Little if anything could be said to spare Abraham (and therefore Calvin) this accusation were Genesis 22 the whole history of Abraham’s engagement with God. While the test with Isaac is certainly unparalleled, it is not the only test or the first. In light of Abraham’s decades-long, rich acquaintance with God and his understanding of God arising from this intimacy, Abraham, Calvin insists, concludes, notwithstanding the present crisis, that God “could not be his adversary.” Abraham’s having concluded this much, however, still does not permit him to see “how the contradiction might be removed.” All of this is to say that Abraham, not yet permitted to walk by sight, must continue to walk by faith; he can reconcile promise and command only “by hope.” Again, however, such hope is never wishful thinking; Abraham’s history of “walking” with God saves hope from the charge of irrationality, impulsiveness or romanticism even as it allows Abraham to affirm the fact of such reconciliation, content to leave the manner of it with God.

At this point in his amplification of the narrative Calvin appears to have said as much as he wants or needs to say. Apparently mesmerized by the story, however, and unable to let it go, he circles back relentlessly upon the contradiction between command and promise and all its consequences for a world unaware. Having already told his readers that God has contradicted himself by reason of his word (something Calvin will admit here in light of the intractable text of Genesis 22 yet something he will deny as absurd everywhere else in his theology), Calvin now directs our attention to a similar problem: Isaac is the only pledge of grace. This sole pledge is now to be taken away, leaving — leaving a graceless God? (Again, such an implication occurs nowhere in Calvin outside the Abraham/Isaac story.) Admittedly, in view of the age-facilitated infertility of Abraham and Sarah, the occasion of the conception of Isaac was one of human impossibility. The destruction of the only pledge of God’s grace, however, is the occasion of a divine impossibility, for the pledge and he of whom it is pledge cannot be separated: destruction of the pledge is the self-willed destruction of God. Whereas the promised conception of Isaac had required Abraham to trust God in a way that redounded to Abraham’s praise as well as God’s, now Abraham is to trust God in a situation that renders God, promise, faith and blessing a farrago of inconsistency and incomprehensibility. Still, says Calvin, in all of this there remains the fact of a promise whose meaning is affirmed in the face of what appears to void the promise of meaning. Abraham’s test, Calvin adds laconically, is the prototype of test for every believer: God “reduces all their senses to nothing, that he may lead them to a complete renunciation of themselves.” With self renounced and understanding immobilized, Abraham suspends trying to “measure, by his own understanding, the method of fulfilling the promise.” Instead Abraham relies on the “incomprehensible power of God.” He will cling to the promise of God not only in the face of human impossibility but even divine.

At this point it is important for the reader to understand, in view of what Calvin has said already, that God’s power is “incomprehensible” not in the sense that God is to be counted on for a mighty act whose mightiness is beyond human comprehension; rather, God’s power is “incomprehensible” in that God is to be counted on to resolve his “double character.” He whose nature is mercy now wills the disappearance of his only pledge of mercy (grace.) Since “pledge” and “promise” imply each other, God’s power is “incomprehensible” at present in that the promise is to be vindicated (and Abraham’s faith with it) precisely where promise (and therefore pledge) wills its self-obliteration.

Still mesmerized, Calvin circles back yet again, examining the story from yet another angle of vision. Isaac is the “mirror of eternal life and the pledge of all good things.” “Mirror”, one of Calvin’s commonest metaphors, is never mirror only. When Jesus Christ, for instance, is said to mirror God, Calvin never means that those beholding the Nazarene are given a substance-less reflection. Similarly, when the sacraments are said to mirror Christ, Calvin never suggests that believers receive elements that somehow deceptively depict Christ but are devoid of him. The purpose of a mirror, for Calvin, is to render substance accessible. Then the death of Isaac as “mirror” can only mean the disappearance of eternal life. And since “eternal life” is uniquely the life of God, the death of Isaac entails the death of God. It is this human opacity and divine impossibility, “incomprehensible”, according to Calvin, that God’s power can remedy.

Unable to let the matter go, Calvin returns to it once more, stating that the death of Isaac does not merely wound Abraham’s “paternal heart”; it tramples upon [God’s] own benevolence.” Everywhere in Calvin God’s “benevolence” is his inmost nature turned outward salvifically upon the world. If God’s benevolence has been “trampled” (i.e., pulverized), then God himself has been de-natured.

Still haunted, Calvin comes back to the conundrum, this time stating that Isaac “was not a son of the common order but one in whom the person of the mediator was promised.” Calvin insists in Institutes and Commentaries alike that there is no knowledge of God (i.e., no participation in God’s life) apart from the mediator. Then the death of the person of Isaac plainly implies the non-existence of the mediator. Abraham’s obedience incontrovertibly deprives humankind of its sole saviour and thereby dooms it.

Calvin is so very reluctant to move past the perplexity he needs to point out only once in that he is evidently aware of its inherent shock: the person who embraces all of the foregoing embraces it as an act of faith. Calvin appreciates the correlation between an affirmation of the “incomprehensible” and a risible instance of the ludicrous, for he maintains that Abraham left the servants behind, on his way to Moriah, lest they find him “a delirious and insane old man.” While Calvin is speculating here, the speculation is none the less profound. Abraham is “insane” in that he is about to do what only psychotics do; “delirious” in that Calvin assumes Abraham to be hysterical. Abraham is understandably hysterical, for Isaac’s cry, “My father”, is a “new instrument of torture.”

Like Luther before him, Calvin maintains that Isaac is no infant but rather is middle-aged. Isaac “voluntarily” surrenders himself, and does so, says Calvin, only because he is “acquainted with the divine oracle.” In view of Isaac’s willing collaboration, therein rendering his death self-sacrifice, Isaac is bound not lest he change his mind and bolt at the moment of immolation but rather lest anything extraneous impede his act. Again like Luther before him Calvin states that the sight of Isaac slain would be enough to kill Abraham. In other words, Isaac’s willing submission renders Abraham’s obedience a joint perpetration on the part of father and son, even as it renders father and son joint victims. Abraham’s unalloyed obedience in faith destroys faith, son and Abraham himself. There is no other conclusion. And in view of Calvin’s understanding of the person of God inherent in all the acts of God, the destruction of the promise (act) is also the destruction of the promiser.

As a result of Abraham’s unvarying obedience God has come to know that Abraham fears him. Did God not know as much already in light of earlier tests? Yet as Calvin has averred repeatedly, this test is categorically distinct; this text exposed a “double character” in God and summoned Abraham to obey and trust the God self-exposed as such. Isaac’s release completes and terminates Abraham’s “true trial.” Verus, (“true”) has the force of real, actual, genuine. The concrete actuality of the akedah has become the reality of Abraham’s life, even the reality (albeit hidden) of the world, since the akedah lends the world its unacknowledged but no less real truth and substance: a divine blessing whose ramifications are inestimable.

Yet something can be “estimated”, even counted on: (i) even though Israel’s enemies will overrun her occasionally, Israel’s enemies can never defeat her definitively; (ii) the victory promised to Israel is fulfilled in Jesus Christ and his people “so far as they adhere under one head.” Calvin, it should be noted, adduces both without indicating any inconsistency or even tension in the two-fold outcome. Israel will never be exterminated; neither will the church (Christ and his people.) While Calvin does not develop at this point in his Genesis commentary anything approaching Paul’s treatment of Israel and the church in Romans 9-11, or even his own understanding that Jesus Christ, the one and only mediator, was salvifically present to Israel under the economy of the torah, his unelaborated conclusion to the story that preoccupies Israel to this day (no ram appeared at Auschwitz) is as sobering as it is pregnant.

In his examination of Genesis 22 Calvin says nothing about the relation of Isaac and the church. Yet the reader may legitimately ask after and probe this relationship, for in his exposition of Genesis 21:1 Calvin writes, “in his [Isaac’s] very birth God has set before us a lively picture of the church.” What does Isaac’s birth portend for the church, even as the arm of the sacrificer is stayed, but only at the moment of the church’s unconditional willingness to give itself up to death in demonstration of its trust in the promise? And how firm is the church’s confidence that “God never feeds men with empty promises”?

IV: Kierkegaard

Throughout Fear and Trembling‘s sustained reflection on Abraham Kierkegaard appears always to have two adversaries in mind: philosophical speculation (especially Hegel’s metaphysics) and ethics.

Hegel maintained that Christianity was merely a pictorial representation in concrete, colourful images of a truth that the philosopher could apprehend by means of rising to the standpoint of the Absolute through pure thought. To say this, Kierkegaard knew, is to say that the philosopher can apprehend a supposed higher unity in which God and humankind have been brought together, “God” now being no more than the essence of humankind.

Hegel’s understanding of religion, of course, includes his understanding of faith. And since philosophy “goes further” than religion, philosophy necessarily goes further than faith — only, says Kierkegaard, to turn wine into water. Similarly, a society popularly imbued with Hegel’s dilution is unable to comprehend the significance of Genesis 22 even as it disdains the biblical narrative as no more than “bourgeois philistinism.”

Philosophy, meanwhile, is not aware that it denatures faith, for philosophy insists that it comprehends faith even as it supersedes faith. In all of this theology is seemingly unaware that its mandate is theos, God. Instead theology “sits all rouged and powdered in the window and courts its favours, offers its charms to philosophy.” Theology has prostituted itself to philosophy while preening itself on an intellectual sophistication superior to the crudeness of Abraham and Isaac. After all, “it is supposed to be difficult to understand Hegel, but to understand Abraham is a small matter.” With mordant irony Kierkegaard turns the vocabulary of “further” back upon his opponent: overwhelmed at Abraham, Kierkegaard glories in the fact that in 130 years the patriarch “got no further than faith.” While “got no further” waggishly suggests that Abraham was stalled, Kierkegaard knows that Abraham, not the philosophical speculators, had alone moved on to existence. Existence cannot be gained or entered upon by means of the “thought experiments” of the metaphysicians, but only as the detachment of “worldly understanding” is left behind in favour of radical commitment.

The radical commitment is to God; not the “God” of philosophical constructs but the One who summons every would-be believer to Abrahamic trial. Such trial has nothing to do with the glib summaries of those who “recite the whole story in cliches: ‘The great thing was that he [Abraham] was willing to offer him the best.'” Neither is such trial the facile escape into religious ethereality of those who speak offhandedly of a post mortem resolution to Abraham’s conundrum. The trial, rather, is enduring the contradiction between promise and command. This contradiction is nothing less than “absurd.” As faith paradoxically embraces the absurd (in all of this the “this-worldliness” of Isaac and promised blessing must be kept in mind), faith is vindicated and confirmed not in an ethereal eternal but in the temporal: Isaac, having been given up, is given back in this world. Isaac lives, and the promised blessing is operative in the temporal. For this reason Kierkegaard underscores, for the benefit of philosophers and romantics alike, “Abraham had faith for this life…specifically for this life.” By way of reminder of the link between the absurd and the temporal Kierkegaard adds, “Only he who draws the knife gets Isaac.”

The second major adversary for Kierkegaard is the realm of ethics. Everywhere in this part of Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard relentlessly contrasts the “single individual” (or the “knight of faith”) with the universality of the ethical.

To act ethically is to embody a universal principle. Put more sharply, to act ethically is for the agent to “annul his singularity in order to become the universal.” From an ethical standpoint a father ought always (i.e., universally) to love his son more than he loves himself. For this reason a legitimate ethical protest would be Isaac’s crying out, “Do not do this: you are destroying everything.”

In light of the legitimacy of the ethical protest, why does Abraham set off with fire and knife, one thing only in mind? He does so for God’s sake and for his own sake; i.e., he does it because God has commanded it, and he does it inasmuch as faith exists only as faith is exercised, it being impossible for faith to be “thought” philosophically.

As different as faith and the ethical evidently are, they remain frequently confused. Such confusion is manifest whenever it is argued that since the ethical is universal, the ethical is also divine. The argument here traces duty back to God, since ethical duty (e.g., with respect to neighbour) is “essentially duty to God.” Perceptively Kierkegaard draws our attention to the crucial consideration here: “in the duty itself I do not stand in relation to God.”

Commensurate with the aforementioned contrast Kierkegaard distinguishes the ethical hero from the knight of faith. In giving up himself for the universal the ethical hero enjoys the security of knowing that others understand him and admire him; and if his heroism is tragic too, others will weep over him as well. No one, on the other hand, understands or admires the knight of faith. It would be preposterous to suggest that anyone would weep over Abraham. Instead Abraham can be approached only with a horror religiosus, akin to that with which Israel approached Sinai. At the same time there is a singular privilege vouchsafed to the knight of faith: she alone says “you” to God, whereas the ethical hero, related ultimately to a principle (the ethical universal), merely speaks of God in the third person. This lattermost point is pivotal: in the realm of ethics we do not meet, engage, or contend with the living God himself; we can do no more than speak about him at the level of hearsay.

None of this must be taken to suggest that the ethical is unimportant. Kierkegaard’s point, however, is that since faith alone is “an absolute relation to the absolute”, the single individual determines his relation to the universal by his relation to the absolute, never vice versa. The single individual may be summoned to what ethics forbids (e.g., the slaying of Isaac), but the single individual is never summoned to stop loving. Abraham loved Isaac — or else Isaac’s death was no sacrifice but simply murder — for Abraham was no Cain. Needless to say, however, the loneliness of Abraham (and therefore of any believer) is his inability to make any of this understandable to even one other human being. Since no one can foster the understanding requisite for faith, no believer can help someone else into faith: “either the single individual himself becomes the knight of faith by accepting the paradox or he never becomes one.”

All that Kierkegaard has said to this point about the ethical, the universal, faith, and absolute relation to the absolute yields his notorious assertion concerning the “teleological suspension of the ethical.” With the regularity of a tolling bell Kierkegaard avers throughout the latter half of Fear and Trembling that either there genuinely is such a suspension, either Abraham does exist in an absolute relation (higher than the category of the ethical) to the absolute (God), “or else Abraham is lost.” In light of philosophy’s incomprehension of all that Kierkegaard has said about the suspension, together with the human horror that surrounds the particular absurdity pertaining to Isaac, he does not hesitate to say that not only is Abraham’s life the most paradoxical that can be thought; it is so paradoxical that it cannot be thought. Still, the foregoing must never be regarded as unique to Abraham. He is prototype, to be sure, but as such is always to be imitated by those who have never settled for the cheap edition of him that the church is forever trying to sell. He remains the “guiding star that saves the anguished.”

Kierkegaard repeats several times over that what passes for faith in Christendom in fact is not; viz., “infinite resignation.” Infinite resignation is a movement prior to faith; in fact it is the last stage before faith, but never faith itself. Infinite resignation, it must always be understood, is a movement in thought not in existence. It is born of a concentration of the person in a goal or purpose which integrates that person. Infinite resignation gains the person an eternal consciousness; specifically an eternal consciousness “in blessed harmony with my love for the eternal being.” Kierkegaard’s point (contra Hegel) is that even an eternal consciousness is still only consciousness; it is not yet existence. Faith alone embraces existence, and does so only by means of a “leap.” This leap is always a qualitative transition that nothing can precipitate or effect incrementally. Again, infinite resignation yields peace and rest, the irreducible pain of life being yet the occasion of a peculiar kind of comfort. The pain of existence (i.e., of faith), on the other hand, can never be lessened.

While infinite resignation is the last stage before faith, it is not for that reason to be slighted. Indeed, in infinite resignation we become aware of our eternal validity, without which we could not “grasp the whole temporal realm”, albeit only by virtue of the absurd. Aware of our eternal validity, at the point of infinite resignation we resign the infinite (here I am convinced that Kierkegaard is distancing himself from Hegelian metaphysics with its preoccupation with the infinite as well as from a popular religious romanticism that likes to speak languorously of the infinite); we resign the infinite precisely in order, as knights of faith, to inherit the finite. Finite Isaac, it must be said again, once given up is given back, with untold blessing for a finite world. At the point of infinite resignation we are convinced that the impossible is just that: impossible — and hence the resignation. Faith, on the other hand, moves “beyond” infinite resignation (here Kierkegaard turns Hegel’s vocabulary back on Hegel himself) and “passionately acknowledges” (i.e., endorses or owns) the impossible. The single individual knows that we can be saved only as faith, itself a paradox, grasps the absurd. Such faith is forever the antithesis of the detachment of philosophy and forever the antithesis of the immediacy of the heart’s spontaneous inclination. Such faith is always the paradox of existence.

 

In light of all that has been said concerning the absurd, paradox, leap and existence, and the fact that the single individual can be neither understood nor admired, Kierkegaard is correct when he contends that the believer is finally a witness, not a teacher. A witness to what? A witness to grace, certainly, and also a witness to faith. For it is the single individual who alone can affirm, in the face of the absurd, Jehovah-Jireh, “God will provide.” And Abraham’s total existence, says Kierkegaard, is gathered up in that one Hebrew word. Existence, contra Hegel, is indeed “beyond” all philosophical thought-experiments.

Kierkegaard’s exclamation remains challenging, profound, and dismaying all at once: “No one is as great as Abraham. Who is able to understand him?”

V: Comment
A

Martin Buber, likely the Jewish thinker of greatest influence on the church in the 20th century, watched with sadness and horror as the best of his philosophy students at Berlin University in the mid-1930s appeared in class wearing swastika armbands. Soon these students were telling Buber that the horizon-filling goal of serving Naziism’s restoration of Germany’s glory was the telos that asked of them the suspension of all ethical considerations. Shortly they were highly-placed officers in the dreaded SS.

While the concept of “the teleological suspension of the ethical” may have much or little credibility in the context of Kierkegaard’s exposition of Abraham’s existence and therein that paradigmatic faith whose nature cannot be subsumed by either metaphysical thought or popular romanticism, in the context of Nazi ideology such a “suspension” has none. Grave danger attends any claim to such a suspension in any context. If a telos can suspend ethics, then the question has to be asked if any telos can suspend any ethical consideration. If not, then there have to be specified both those tele that do effect such a suspension and the reason for the suspension.

Imagine someone announcing in church that she has received a divine summons to slay her offspring. It is inconceivable that fellow-congregants would nod knowingly, all the while telling her they understood why she must proceed and assuring her of their support throughout it. Instead they would insist she undergo psychiatric assessment, thinking her to be psychotic. Now imagine that she submits to such assessment and is shown to be non-psychotic. It is still inconceivable that anyone would agree that, horrific as the deed appears, she must proceed as an act of faith. Most likely assertions would tumble out of many that God does not ask such hideous things of his people. If the woman in question were to reply, “Why not?”, then likely it would be said that God would not or cannot, on the grounds of the character of the God we apprehend through his self-disclosure. Willful slaying of one’s offspring is not the sort of thing that the God known in the church asks of his people, not the sort of thing that can be regarded as bringing honour to him in any way. This being the case, the question must be asked concerning Abraham: why would anyone concur that Abraham was divinely summoned to slay Isaac? If God’s character forbids such today, why would it not have forbidden it then? Conversely, if God’s “voice” rendered sacrifice non-murder then, why would it not do as much today?

A clue to coming to terms with the aforementioned question is suggested by Luther and Calvin in their insightful discussion of the akedah: in view of Isaac’s consensual complicity, the son is as much sacrificer as the father; and in view of the fact that Isaac’s death is tantamount to a fatal knife-thrust in the heart of Abraham, the father is as much the sacrificed as the son. Father and son are one in offering up and in being offered up; father and son are one in their obedience, their suffering and their trust.

I am convinced that a fruitful way ahead, in light of the critical comments adduced already in this section, is to consider the simultaneity of Father and Son with respect to the Atonement, presupposing as it does the homoousion as reflected in the apostolic confession of Jesus Christ and articulated in Athansius’s assertion at the Council of Nicaea. In the context of the Arian heresy, Athanasius insisted, following the apostles, that the Son was of the same nature as the Father, not merely of a similar nature. If Father and Son were merely of a similar nature, then the Father’s appointing the Son to the cross on behalf of humankind would be no more than the Father’s appointing an innocent yet hapless third party to misery in the interests of appeasing a wrath the Son did not share. Yet precisely because Father and Son are of the same nature, same substance, same identity and being, the Son’s free, self-willed identification with sinners is the Father’s; the Son’s sinbearing love is the Father’s; the Son’s cry of dereliction is the Father’s heart-cry of self-alienation for the sake of sinners that demonstrates Father and Son to be one in their judgement of humankind, one in their determination to redeem it, one in their self-identification with it, and one in their pain suffered for its restoration.

The Son’s God-forsakenness (not merely his feeling he was) for the sake of humankind, together with the Father’s self-same “God-forsakenness” means that no human being is — or can be — God-forsaken. Looked at from a different angle, the cross means that that to which God appointed himself at Calvary no human being will be appointed to now: namely, the sacrifice of one’s offspring.

Abraham and Isaac are together a prolepsis of God the Father and Son. The prolepsis, however, having been fulfilled in actuality in the event of Good Friday, is thereafter rendered impossible as prolepsis; i.e., any slaying of one’s offspring could thereafter be regarded as murder only, never as sacrifice. Abraham and Isaac are not an instance, or even the instance, of the “teleological suspension of the ethical.” They are, rather, an instance of the unity of Father and Son in the event of the cross, no subsequent “anticipation” ever being possible in the light of this anticipation’s definitive fulfillment. What Father and Son did in the cross is nothing less than that “one oblation…once offered, a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation and satisfaction, for the sins of the whole world.” Such an act needs no supplementation or duplication; neither does it permit one.

B

The force of Genesis 22:1-19 is that hope alone reconciles promise and command of God. Such hope, however, must always be distinguished from wishful thinking. Wishful thinking is but “dead” hope; “living” hope, on the other hand, is rooted in the event of the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. (1 Peter 1:3) From a biblical perspective, hope is always a future certainty grounded in a present reality. Any lessening of hope as certainty merely denatures “hope” and moves it in the direction of wishful thinking. The resurrection of Jesus Christ is that reality which is ultimately the fulfillment of the promise of Exodus 3:14: “I shall be who I shall be.” In the resurrection of his Son, God definitively resolves any suggestion or imputation of a “double character” (Calvin) in his kingdom-establishing event. The resurrection is that act of God whereby promise and command are reconciled; hope is the human counterpart that finds promise and command reconciled in the believer. Accordingly, the resurrection of Jesus Christ is ultimately the truth and reality that gave Isaac back; hope, that which gave him back to Abraham, the resurrection beings the guarantee of all the promises of God to all believers. Because Jesus Christ has been raised from the dead; because his resurrection and all it implies is the truth of the world (albeit hidden and therefore unacknowledged), as well as the truth of the church (an “open secret” and therefore acknowledged in faith), hope can never finally disappoint God’ s people. The future certainty of what is hoped for pertains to all the promises of God, whether now only partially fulfilled or not yet fulfilled at all. They will be fulfilled, and will be seen to be such.

Instances without end can be recited with respect to promises that appear to remain unfulfilled, as well as of commands that seem to perpetuate the non-fulfillment. One such promise/command appears to be the promise that the powers of death will not prevail against the church (Matt. 10:18), even as the church, defined by the gospel and charged to live by the gospel, must announce Jesus Christ with no little urgency in season and out of season. (2 Tim. 4:2) Related to the command to announce the gospel is the promise that God’s word does not return to him fruitlessly (Isaiah 55:11), as well as (among others) the promise that whoever hears the herald of the Lord hears that selfsame Lord himself. (Luke 10:16)

Yet the command appears to vitiate the promise, as the church dwindles numerically (at least in the west) week by week. The gospel has been promised to be fruitful beyond our imagining, while the command to declare it appears to ensure the church’s fruitlessness. After all, the gospel appears too narrow in an age of inclusiveness, too sharply-defined amidst the blurred vaguenesses of pluralism, too confident of its effectiveness in a time of polite opinions, too real for an era that prefers romanticism, too specific for those who like generalities, too precisely parameterized to suit the taste of those who want no boundaries. It appears that insofar as the church attempts to live by the gospel it will die by the gospel. Then what is the church to do?

Like Abraham of old it can trust God to fulfil promises in ways that the church cannot see at present. It can obey the command of God even though its obedience must render all such fulfillment hope. Or it can second-guess God and attempt to ensure the fulfillment of the promise by “improving” on the command as it resorts to gimmicks, entertainment, sure-fire techniques, agendas that “work” with other institutions and whose “success” the sociologist can explain.

For those who have agonized with Abraham there is only thing to be done: live in hope, confident that hope will see, in God’s own way and in God’s own time, the reconciliation of promise and command.

Victor Shepherd      January 2000

The Cross of Christ

(delivered at Knox Presbyterian Church, Toronto, August 2000)

The Cross of Christ

“For I decided to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ and
him crucified.”
1 Corinthians 2:2

 

“I decided to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ and him crucified”, the apostle Paul wrote to the Christians in Corinth. “I’ve got only one sermon in my briefcase. It’s about the cross. If you don’t like it, too bad, because you won’t hear anything else from me.” Why did he tell them they’d hear about Christ crucified only as long as he had breath? Paul knew how prone the Corinthian Christians were to disdain the cross of Jesus, and having disdained their Lord’s cross to disregard their own cross and instead embrace the “glitzy”, the sensational, the showy, the self-indulgent. He knew that unless they were reacquainted with the cross their faith would erode (since faith is always faith in and faith quickened by the crucified himself). Unless they were reacquainted with the cross their understanding would unravel until it became no more than a caricature of Christian truth. Unless they were reacquainted with the cross their discipleship would cease to be cruciform as cross-bearing was forgotten and self-indulgent ease took over. The Christians in Corinth were undoubtedly Christians; Paul never denied that they were. He was also convinced, however, that their spiritual life had declined and was in danger of sinking even lower. Their faith was at risk; their understanding was at risk; their discipleship was at risk. Only the word of the cross could correct them. Then the word of the cross was the only word they were going to hear from him.

 

I: — If we are going to understand the cross as it is attested in scripture, then we must begin where scripture begins. Scripture begins with God’s holiness.

God’s holiness is God’s own Godness, that which constitutes him uniquely God. In the first place God is holy in that he is utterly distinct from his creation. God is not to be identified with any part of his creation or any aspect of it.

In the second place God’s holiness means that he can’t be measured or assessed by anything other than himself. God is the absolute standard of himself.

In the third place God’s holiness means that God’s character is without defect or deficiency. God’s character is free from taint of any sort. God’s love is free from sentimentality; God’s anger is free from ill temper; God’s judgement is free from arbitrariness; God’s patience is free from indifference; God’s sovereignty is free from tyranny.

In the fourth place God’s holiness means that all the aspects of God’s character just mentioned are gathered up into a unity. Just as every shade of the spectrum from infrared to ultra-violet is gathered up into what we call “light”, so every dimension of God’s character and God’s transcendence is gathered up into God’s holiness.

God’s holiness is what scripture is actually about from cover to cover. To be sure, scripture is also about the holiness of God’s people, but always about this derivatively, secondarily. Primarily scripture has to do with God’s resolute assertion of his uncompromised holiness.

 

This lattermost point is important, for in our era the cross isn’t seen to be about God’s holiness. In our era the cross is viewed simply as one more instance of human virtue. The world has never been without its martyrs, for instance, and the cross of Jesus bespeaks his martyrdom. The world has never been without those possessed of the courage of their convictions, and Jesus plainly possessed the courage of his convictions. The world has never been without those victimised by political and religious power brokers, and Jesus is one more victim.

But the apostles never speak like this of the cross of Jesus. John the Baptist was victim; John possessed the courage of his convictions; John was a martyr; yet the apostles never speak of the death of John as they do of the death of Jesus. The cross of Jesus has a force, a significance that the beheading of John doesn’t approach.

What’s more, the cross of Jesus is that one, singular event that looms over everything in scripture. While the public ministry of Jesus lasted up to three years, over 50% of the written gospels concerns one week only (the death-week) of Jesus. The apostles see that the older testament anticipates the cross on page after page, from the story of Abraham and Isaac to the pronouncements of the prophets. They insist, together with Paul, they will preach only “the word of the cross.” They understand the resurrection of Jesus to seal the sacrifice of the cross; they understand the Holy Spirit to vivify the preaching of the cross. Then what it is about the cross that renders it the event in human history, the event in the drama of salvation, the event in the life of God himself apart from which, say the apostles, there is no possibility of life eternal for us?

Here we return to the centrality of God’s holiness. In view of the centrality of God’s holiness, everything about him and us must be understood in terms of his holiness. Sin is our defiance of God’s holiness. God’s anger (his reaction to our sin) is the reaction of his holiness. God’s patience with us is the persistence of his holiness. And his love? God’s love is his holiness refusing to compromise itself even as it refuses to abandon us. If God’s holiness refuses to compromise itself even as it refuses to abandon us, where does it all come to expression? What is the outcome? It all comes to expression in the cross. And the cross, the outcome of it all, is the triumph of God’s holiness.

Let us be sure we understand something crucial. Because God is holy, he is jarred by our sin. Jarred? Sin does more than assault him; sin offends him. He is repulsed by it. He finds it loathsome, so very loathsome, in fact, that he can’t tolerate it. Since there’s no sin apart from sinners, God finds sinners loathsome and can’t tolerate them. Then he has only two choices: either he annihilates sinners, or he remedies their sinfulness. It’s plain that God has chosen not to annihilate sinners (for the time being, at least.)

To be sure, he has every right to annihilate us. For we are ungrateful, defiant, insolent people who owe him our existence and our every blessing, even as we persist in ignoring him, never thinking that our ignoring him is an insult to him as life-giver and a slander upon his goodness.

Our society assumes that to ignore the God whose holiness is his very Godness; our society assumes that to ignore him is merely an option, a preference, a taste. A few people seem to relish “religion”; most do not. But in any case there’s no disputing taste. Fools! To ignore the one to whom we owe our existence and our every blessing is colossal ingratitude, inexcusable ingratitude, as offensive as it is unreasonable. Such ingratitude, however, is never mere ingratitude; it is also contempt. Yet our contempt of God is also folly for us. To perpetuate such folly when God sustains us moment-by-moment, and sustains us despite our folly; this is more than folly; this is folly-induced blindness. In view of our ingratitude, insolence and self-willed blindness it shouldn’t surprise us that God finds us loathsome. Anything else would mean that his holiness had disappeared; which is to say, that he himself had ceased to be God.

Revulsion, we should note in this context, is an affective reaction to human sin: it’s how God feels about us. Anger, on the other hand, is a volitional response to sin: it’s what God does about us. What does he do? He debars us; he denies us access to him. He can’t pretend that we are glad, grateful, obedient sons and daughters when we aren’t. He can’t pretend that we are fit to enjoy his presence when we are no more fit for him than the tone-deaf person is fit to enjoy a concert or the person whose voice resembles a dial-tone is fit to be an opera singer. God’s holiness has brought us to this point: either in his holiness he has to banish us or he has to remedy us.

Because God’s love is holy love he is going to provide what the apostle John calls “the remedy for the defilement of our sin.” To say that God’s love is holy is to say that his love is neither sentimental nor petulant. Because his love isn’t sentimental his love won’t let us off; yet also because his love isn’t petulant his love won’t let us go. In other words, not only is God’s love righteous, it is also resolute. His holy love will provide the remedy for the defilement of our sin.

The reason that the cross dominates all of scripture is that in the cross God’s holy love absorbs his holy anger and his holy revulsion. In the cross the judgement of the holy God is enacted and displayed. In the cross of Jesus the judgement of the holy God is borne by the Son of God — which is to say, borne by the Father himself, for Father and Son are one in nature, one in judgement, one in the execution of that judgement, and one in its absorption. The cross is the triumph of God’s holiness in that God’s relentless opposition to sinners and his unending love for them; his revulsion before sinners and his patience with them; his authority over sinners and his self-willed humiliation beneath them; all of this is concentrated in the cross and finds pin-point expression there.

I have said that in the cross the judgement of God is seen to be operative: his face is set against sin, and sin must issue in alienation from him. Were there no judgement upon sin, God would cease to be holy. Were God to remain unaffected by our sin; were God to be aware of our sin but indifferent concerning it; were God to know of our sin yet not react to it, all the while remaining stolidly impassive, he would be possessed of the grossest character defect. Our sin provokes God’s wrath. His wrath in turn mobilises his judgement. Then in the face of our sin there has to be anger-fuelled judgement.

Yet if there were judgement only, the wrath of God would be fulfilled but the purpose of God would be frustrated, for now God would have given up that for which he made us in the first place, people dear to him who live for the praise of his glory. In the cross, however, God honours all that his holiness entails even as he fulfils his purpose in fashioning holy people who love him, obey him, serve him and lend glory to his name.

I am a clergyman in The United Church of Canada. Which is to say, I serve in a denomination whose moderator, Rev. William Phipps, has denied the fact and significance of the incarnation not once but many times, not inadvertently but knowingly, not in isolation but supported in his denial by officials and dignitaries throughout the denomination. What Phipps and his supporters appear not to understand is this: the incarnation is essential to the cross, to the atonement. We can be made “at one” with God only as God the judge does two things: one, as God the judge exercises his judgement on sin and the penalty (alienation from him) is enforced; two, as God the judge absorbs that judgement in himself. Without the first, God’s character would degenerate and he would cease to be holy; without the second, God would remain holy but our predicament would remain hopeless. God can condemn sin and absorb that condemnation himself only if the human bearer of that judgement is also the divine bearer. Apart from the incarnation the cross is nothing less than monumental injustice: Jesus is punished undeservingly by a God who is simply unfair. Apart from the incarnation the cross has nothing more to do with our destiny and our future than has the death of John the Baptist. In the light of the incarnation, however, the just judge whose holiness will not permit him to wink at sin is also the loving father whose absorbing his judgement in himself creates a future and a hope we should otherwise never have. This is the point Phipps never gets.

In the cross God’s judgement is unmitigated, as our Lord’s cry of dereliction makes plain. In the cross too God’s love is undiminished, for how much more could he love us than to submit himself to humiliation, torment, and self-alienation in the Son?

To deny the incarnation isn’t to get rid of excess baggage, an intellectual encumbrance in the 20th century. To deny the incarnation, rather, is to cut the nerve of faith, for the only God there is to believe in is the one whose holiness can’t be compromised; and the only future we sinners can have depends on the God who in the Son incarnate bore his own judgement on us and bore it away. No incarnation, no atonement; no atonement, nothing but condemnation for humankind without hope of reprieve.

The atonement, the cross, is the triumph of God’s holiness in the face of human sin as God’s character is unimpugned and his truth is unaltered and yet his purpose is fulfilled and his people are recovered to be and remain the apple of his eye.

In biblical Hebrew there is no word for “doubt.” There is no word for “doubt” just because God’s inescapable holy presence, charged with his power and purpose, renders doubt groundless. In Hebrew thought God is the omnipresent, inescapable, immeasurably weighty reality. Doubt here, however understandable in terms of human psychology, is in reality as unsubstantial, groundless, as doubt of the presence of air, doubt of the fact and significance of breathing, when all the while the “doubter”, so called, is breathing air. While there is no word in biblical Hebrew for “doubt” there are, however, many words in biblical Hebrew for “wonder.” There are many words for “wonder” just because God’s inescapable holy presence, charged with his power and purpose, calls forth no end of wonder.

We hear such adoring wonder in the hymn, “How Great Thou Art”:

And when I think
That God, his Son not sparing,
Sent him to die,
I scarce can take it in.

And in a hymn older still Isaac Watts exclaims, “When I survey the wondrous cross” only to conclude,

Love so amazing, so divine,
Demands my soul, my life, my all.

God’s holy love is brought to effectual focus in the cross. The cross in turn is the triumph of God’s holy love over sin and ingratitude and unbelief. Then the one thing we must do is suspend our unbelief. We should suspend our unbelief, especially since unbelief is as groundless, as unsubstantial, as the psychotic person’s raving about an imaginary world that doesn’t exist. More to the point, we should suspend our unbelief since God hasn’t suspended his mercy but rather prolongs the day of grace.

Faith is our grateful surrender to God’s holiness, therein to be rendered holy ourselves and made fit to glorify him and enjoy him forever.

 

II: — Yet it isn’t enough to be possessed of that faith which glorifies him and enjoys him. Faith always seeks understanding, and therefore we who are the beneficiaries of the cross must have our understanding refined in the crucible of the cross, for then our understanding will be purified as dross is melted out and discarded.

Think, for instance, of how we understand power. In my 1st year SystematicTheology class I always ask the students about the Christian meaning of such words as “power” or “almighty” or “sovereignty.” I always ask the students, “In Calvin’s Institutes, the 2000-page magnum opus that is Calvin’s single largest work, how many times does the expression ‘the sovereignty of God’ occur?” The answer is “none.” Nowhere in the Institutes does Calvin speak of God “the sovereignty of God.” Since the post-Calvin Calvinist tradition has virtually identified Calvin with this expression, the fact that he doesn’t use the expression ought to make those of us who love him pause and think.

Now I am not denying that Calvin believed in the sovereignty of God. Of course he did, as all Christians do. The crucial point here, rather, is what is meant by God’s sovereignty? How is that sovereignty exercised? Next I tell my students that since the cross dominates scripture, we must understand sovereignty in the light of the cross.

Now to be sure the cross means ever so much. (Part of the meaning of the cross we have already examined tonight.) Yet it can never be denied that the cross means too that there is no limit to God’s vulnerability. God’s wrestling with Israel throughout Israel’s history highlighted God’s vulnerability again and again. God is Israel’s creator and sustainer yet is treated as if he were an intruder. God is Israel’s judge yet is mirthfully dismissed. God is Israel’s lover yet his love is thrown back in his face, wrapped in insult and ingratitude. God stands by Israel when Israel is assaulted, yet Israel doesn’t stand by God when God is affronted. The history of God’s engagement with Israel is God’s self-exposure to contempt and ridicule and abandonment. Yet in all of this God’s vulnerability hasn’t reached its zenith. His vulnerability will expose him ultimately to a cross. The cross means there is no limit to God’s vulnerability.

And the resurrection? The resurrection means there is no limit to the effectiveness of God’s vulnerability. (And here is where I pick up again those 1st year students who had given up on me, thinking, no doubt, that their beloved professor of theology didn’t believe in God’s sovereignty.) God’s sovereignty is the triumph of his vulnerability. God’s sovereignty is his vulnerability rendered everywhere victorious.

We must never think that because God has given himself into the hands of evil men and women he has given himself over to them. We must never think that because God is willing to suffer for those he loves, and suffer immeasurably, God is therefore useless. On the contrary, just because his suffering is effective his suffering can save us.

Most Christians, I have found, look upon the cross as an episode in Christ’s life, an episode he put behind him in much the same way that he put his infancy behind him and then his childhood and then his adolescence. His public ministry, another episode, was unfolding (not without difficulty) when one day (a Friday, it so happened) he had a bad day, a really bad day, the worst day he’d ever had. But never mind, he got over it as Easter Sunday followed; things have been looking up ever since.

But the cross of Christ isn’t an episode in his life. It isn’t a bad day that he put behind him as things took a turn for the better. Let us never forget that the crucified one is raised wounded. Our Lord is not raised healed; he is raised wounded. Let us never forget that the ascended Christ suffers yet. Scripture is perfectly clear on this matter. The hymn writer knew whereof he spoke when he wrote, “Rich wounds, yet visible above.”

Since the ascended, glorified, omnipotent Lord suffers yet, it’s plain that his rulership of the cosmos is a rule he exercises from the throne of his cross.

No one grasped all of this better than Martin Luther. Over and over in his writings Luther speaks of the “theology of the cross”, theologia crucis.

When the world beholds the crucified it sees only shame. The apostle John, however, rightly discerned the cross to be the “hour” of Christ’s glory.

The world sees the cross as weakness so weak it couldn’t be weaker. The apostle Paul, however, knew the cross to be God’s strength, a strength so effective it couldn’t be stronger.

The world sees the cross as nothing more than folly. (Imagine the folly of someone who identifies himself so thoroughly with condemned men and women that their condemnation spills over onto him.) Yet the church knows the cross to be that wisdom of God which only the Spirit-illumined can recognize as wisdom.

The world sees the cross as that hideous moment when death gloats. Disciples know that the cross yields life, life eternal.

Luther knew that the cross is the crucible of all Christian understanding. For this reason Luther knew that in the crucible of the cross the world’s understanding is transmogrified as the resurrection renders the cross victorious and therein renders Christian understanding truth.

Luther knew that while the world regards the cross as proof of God’s uselessness, the cross in fact is the venue not only of God’s mightiest work but also of his characteristic work.

 

III: — Did I say “characteristic work?” I did. But if the cross is where God acts most effectively because most characteristically, then our discipleship is characteristically Christian and therefore effective only if it is cruciform. Then vulnerability for the sake of Christ’s kingdom has to characterise our discipleship. And such vulnerability will always be invigorated with the selfsame resurrection that rendered our Lord’s vulnerability victorious.

I want you to form in your mind’s eye the following picture of an old man.

He is age 81.
He has been trudging from door to door for four consecutive days, begging money.
It is wintertime, and as he tells us himself, his feet have been immersed from morning
to night in ice-cold slush.
He stops begging at the end of the fourth day inasmuch as he has been overtaken by
what he calls a “violent flux.” (Today we should say “uncontrollable diarrhoea.”)
By this time he has garnered 200 pounds wherewith to purchase food, clothing and
coal for poor people who are very dear to him.
He is not a stupid man. In fact he has written 35 tomes, including a textbook on logic.
Let me say it again: he is not a stupid man. In addition to his native English he knows
thoroughly eight other languages: Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, German, Dutch,
Italian, and Spanish. In fact he knows these eight languages so very thoroughly that
he has written a grammar in seven of them. He reads comfortably in more languages
than Luther, Calvin, Jonathan Edwards, Joseph Butler or Immanuel Kant.  Still, in his
transparent humility he will undergo any humiliation and endure any suffering for
the sake of a cruciform ministry modelled after the cruciform ministry of his Lord.
His name is John Wesley.

Discipleship is always cruciform. Take the simple matter of forgiveness. It is a simple matter. Simple, I said; I didn’t say easy. Forgiveness is never easy. Is a cross ever easy? Remember, what we forgive is precisely what can never be excused. Most people confuse these two matters. Most people, I have found, assume that to forgive is to find an excuse for something or accept an excuse for something. In any case, they think that to forgive is to excuse. But in fact forgiving and excusing are mutually exclusive. We excuse the excusable. We forgive, on the other hand, what is inexcusable, utterly inexcusable. We forgive precisely what can never be excused. It can only be forgiven. But will it be forgiven? Only those people forgive who have been seared and stamped with the cross. Forgiveness entails vulnerability before an offender when this offender has wounded us more than she will ever know.

All discipleship is cruciform. All Christian service is cruciform. I was a pastor for 30 years. I know how difficult, understandably difficult, it is to have people commit themselves to arduous tasks of major inconvenience over a long time. Long before I became a pastor I learned that my late father, during the 11 years our family lived in Edmonton (where I was born); my late father visited Fort Saskatchewan Penitentiary every Sunday afternoon for 11 years. As soon as we moved to Winnipeg my father began spending Sunday afternoons (he was in his own church Sunday morning and evening) at the Stony Mountain Penitentiary. He visited penitentiaries weekly to befriend and conduct worship for convicts who were as dear to him as the poor were to Wesley.

Let’s come back to Luther. Luther said that the Christian never lives in himself. The Christian lives in another. He lives in Christ by faith, and he lives in the neighbour by love. Living in the neighbour by love: what does this entail? How much love is love? What does it cost?

In the first place, said Luther, we live in our neighbour by sharing her need. This is not especially difficult. Out of our abundance we share our goods with our neighbour in her scarcity.

In the second place we live in our neighbour by sharing her suffering. This is considerably more difficult, since proximity to another person’s pain is itself painful for us. (Here love has been “notched up”, as we like to say today.) At the same time, we feel rather good about sharing our neighbour’s suffering because we feel somewhat heroic, virtuous; we feel even better if we are recognized and commended for this.

The cost of love can be “notched up” still more, we should note soberly. In the third place, said Luther, we live in our neighbour by sharing her disgrace. Now no one commends us for it. In fact people despise us for it. They whisper that we’ve compromised our standards. They wag their heads all-knowingly and repeat the supposed, self-evident truth that those who lie down with dogs get up with fleas. They remind us that you can always tell a person by the company she keeps.

Have they lost sight of the one who was numbered among the transgressors? Yes, they have. Was he a transgressor himself? No, he was not. He who knew no sin was made to be sin in order that inexcusable sinners like you and me yet might be forgiven and therein be rendered the righteousness of God.

But those people of shrivelled heart and acidulated spirit; they don’t grasp the logic of a love that finds us living not in ourselves but in the neighbour for the sake of the neighbour. Not grasping the nature of such a love, they also fail to grasp the cost of a love that becomes ever costlier as we move from sharing the neighbour’s need to sharing her suffering to sharing her disgrace.

All discipleship is cruciform.

 

IV: — The apostle Paul told the Corinthian Christians that the one sermon they were going to hear from him concerned Jesus Christ crucified. Just because the cross — sin-absorbing mercy — preoccupies prophet and apostle alike, the cross must preoccupy us as well.

For the cross is that event in which the holiness of God is recognized even as the wrath of God is averted and the love of God is visited upon disobedient men and women.

The cross is the crucible in which our understanding is transmogrified so as to reflect the truth and reality of him who acts most effectively and most characteristically precisely where he is most derided as useless.

The cross is the pattern of our discipleship, for no servant is ever going to be greater than his master, just as no one who now bears her own cross in the light of the master’s will ever fail to be crowned.

The cross is, and ever will be, that act of God whereby his holiness remains uncompromised and his love unimpeded, as holy love fashions

a people that is the apple of his eye,
a people that lives for the praise of his glory,
a people that reflects his goodness.

This people, as stark as it is strong, is a city set on a hill. It may be harangued; it may be harried; it may be harassed; but in any case it can never be hid.

 

Victor Shepherd    August 2000

The Origins of the Operative Theology of The United Church of Canada

published in Theological Digest & Outlook (Burlington, March 2000)

How Did We Get Here?

or

The Origins of the Operative Theology of The United Church of Canada

I

In 1990 Bishop Donald Bastian of the Free Methodist Church in Canada gave me a copy of Rev. Wayne Kleinsteuber’s book, published in 1984, More than a Memory: The Renewal of Methodism in Canada. In the course of reading the book with relish and profit I was startled to find myself quoted in the text. I had no recollection of saying what was imputed to me. When I checked the endnotes, however, and saw the reference to the CMHS meeting of 1978, I recognized immediately the context and content of my assertion.

In the “question and answer” period following my CMHS address in 1978 I had been asked, “Which has had the greater influence in the theological formation of The United Church of Canada: the Calvinist tradition or the Wesleyan?” And I had responded, without reflection or hesitation, “Neither. Schleiermacher, the German romantic liberal, has been the determining influence…..”

I was reading in 1990 a book published in 1984 that quoted my comment from 1978. In 1978 several developments that continue to haunt the United Church had not occurred: the publication of In God’s Image (1980), the distribution of Sexual Orientations, Lifestyles and Ministry (1988), the decisions of the General Council later in 1988, the adoption of Membership, Ministry and Human Sexuality (1990). These pronouncements and promulgations reflected the United Church’s theological understanding underlying its statements concerning sexual conduct deemed to conform to a profession of faith. The theology of John Wesley was evident in none of this. Apart from Wesley’s doctrinal standards (the Sermons, Articles of Religion, and Notes on the New Testament), one would need to read only the single largest tract Wesley penned, that concerning original sin, to see that a chasm loomed between his theological tenor and that of United Church documents and developments.

Once the denomination’s highest court had rendered the “sexual revolution” denominational policy, other theological pronouncements followed, all of which were similarly remote from anything Wesley would have owned. I speak now of Membership, Ministry and Human Sexuality (1988), The Authority and Interpretation of Scripture (1992) (where the most that could be said of Jesus is that he is “mentor and friend”), Mending the World (1997), Voices United: The Hymn and Worship Book of The United Church of Canada (1996), Renewed Understanding of Ecumenism (1995), and not least the response of the executive of General Council to Moderator Phipps’ interview with the Ottawa Citizen (1997). When Phipps publicly announced, defended, and was supported officially in a Christology that was manifestly non-apostolic, and when Phipps’ declaration and defense were located in a succession spanning the last two decades, it could only be concluded that liberal theology of the late 18th century and the entire 19th century had become the operative theology of the denomination.

I am not pretending that liberal theology is monochrome. Undeniably there are significant differences in the work of Ritschl, Harnack, and Troeltsch. None the less, in many respects they all stand on the shoulders of Schleiermacher. The lattermost thinker is the progenitor of the theological movement.

Can my thesis (that Schleiermacher is the inspiration of the operative theology of the United Church) be supported? The thesis can be tested only as Schleiermacher himself is examined.

 

II

Early in his adult life Schleiermacher (1768–1834) became aware of the contempt that cultured (but not necessarily snobbish) people poured on the contemporary articulations of the Christian faith. He insisted that these people were held off faith not because of the offense of the gospel but rather because of the offensiveness of its current, less-than-sophisticated expression. Knowing that these people were part of that world which “God so loves”, he maintained that the church, and especially its theological spokespersons, were to love them no less. To love them meant at least to take seriously the reason they found faith repugnant (S. said it was merely the crude way faith was voiced that these people found unacceptable), and to address their objections sincerely.

Moreover, S. knew that the Christian mission is never served by the church’s deliberately refusing to relate the gospel to human reflection at its profoundest and human achievement at its loftiest. Here he could only recall God’s word to Jeremiah millennia earlier, “Seek the welfare of the city [i.e., Babylon, the place of exile where Israel was thoroughly despised], for in its welfare you will find your welfare.” (Jeremiah 29:7) The church is never to huddle inwardly in attempted self-survival; it must always face outwardly, forever wrestling with the connection between the substance of the gospel and the thought-forms of the culture. To fear for the gospel in its engagement with society is only to declare one’s lack of confidence in the gospel’s inherent integrity and vitality and militancy. In a word, not to adapt “the faith once for all delivered to the saints” (Jude 3) to modernity is to render the church and its proclamation museum pieces that nostalgically recall a bygone era but lack all relevance to the world around us.

Schleiermacher was born in Breslau, Germany, where he was schooled at the hands of Moravian Pietists. S.’s philosophical brilliance, however, soon transgressed the intellectual boundaries of the Pietists, and he found himself studying modern philosophy and classical Greek at the University of Halle. Here he supported himself by tutoring aristocratic families who in turn exposed him to the higher reaches of German culture, his exposure issuing in his epoch-making Addresses on Religion to it Cultured Despisers. At the University of Berlin he taught several hours per week in every subject of the theology curriculum (apart from the Older Testament), published volume after volume, and never skimped on the preparation for his weekly sermon. He remained a much-loved pastor at the same time that his intellectual gifts found him appointed to the highest echelons of the Academy of Berlin. His misshapen body, ill health and near-chronic pain never found him bitter or resentful.

From 1880 to 1930 S. was studied more than any other theologian in Europe (Luther excepted.) His thinking dominated the church in the 19th century and continues to dominate most of it in the 20th.

Schleiermacher begins his theology by identifying the nature of religion. Religion isn’t morality. (People can be moral without being religious. Furthermore, the truly free person doesn’t submit to an external moral law.) Neither is religion the rational apprehension of doctrine. (People can finesse doctrine yet remain unacquainted with God.) Neither is religion philosophical insight. The seat of religion is neither the will (as with moralists) nor reason (as with philosophers) but feeling. The religious consciousness is the “feeling of absolute dependence.” Did S. mean “the feeling of absolute dependence upon the Absolute“? Alas, he never resolves the ambiguity that surrounds him here, often speaking of “God” and “nature” interchangeably. Pantheism (the notion that God is the essence of everything) or panentheism (the notion that the essence of everything includes God) haunts S.’s theology throughout. Since religion consists in the feeling of absolute dependence, doctrine is virtually insignificant. S. assigns no weight to any statement we formulate concerning God. We can merely represent God to ourselves pictorially, imagistically, as shepherd, king, father, etc., without every saying something true of God himself.

Not surprisingly, S. everywhere reinterprets Christian vocabulary, with the result that biblical distinctiveness is forfeited and the substance of the faith evaporates. While S. retains the word “redemption”, for instance, his doing so appears pointless (even misleading) when his understanding of “sin” bears virtually no resemblance to what prophets and apostles and the church have always understood.

In the same way all the major building blocks of the Christian faith are recast. Convinced that the particularity of Jesus’ Jewish background is simply something that the “universal” Jesus must repudiate (and no doubt aware too of virulent anti-Semitism in Berlin), S. denies that Jesus is the Messiah of Israel. His denial of Jesus’ messiahship is matched by his silence concerning the Incarnation. Instead of the Incarnate “God-with-us”, Jesus happens to one who possesses intensified God-consciousness. To be sure, all humans possess it in some degree; Jesus, however, more than anyone else. Jesus’ mission is to stimulate our God-consciousness until it becomes the determining influence in our life. Whereas the apostles everywhere confess Jesus of Nazareth to be the Son of God, and are careful to distinguish the Son as begotten from sons and daughters who are made such by faith, S. is content to speak of Jesus as quantitatively superior in terms of God-consciousness.

Insisting on the feeling of absolute dependence (God-consciousness) as the focus and origin of all theological expression, S. draws attention to the fact that no reflection upon religious awareness yields anything remotely resembling the church’s historic statements concerning the Trinity. The Trinity too is an instance of antiquated theological “baggage” that now understandably occasions the contempt of the cultured. Then the Trinity must be jettisoned. (Needless to say, as soon as S. forfeits the doctrine he forfeits what the doctrine always preserves; namely, the bedrock truth that what God is in himself eternally he is toward us, and what God is toward us he is in himself eternally.)

Since Incarnation is the presupposition of atonement, pivotal distortion in the former can be expected to garble the latter. S. omits any understanding of atonement as God’s making “at one” with himself those who are unable to “rightwise” their relationship with God. Reconciliation with God isn’t primarily wrought by God and owned by believers in faith. Rather, it’s something we effect as our God-consciousness frees us from self-rejection. Where scripture speaks of propitiation and expiation, the averting of God’s wrath and the sacrifice which effects this, S. says nothing. His silence here is one with his silence on other matters that loom so very large in the bible: the forgiveness of sins or justification. S. never acknowledges that sinful men and women are exposed to the judgement and condemnation of God.

In view of the fact that S. has set aside as non-essential all the historically-affirmed building blocks of the Christian faith (the election of Israel, the Incarnation of Israel’s greater Son, and the Incarnation’s raison d’etre, Christ’s atoning death — the cross being the one “word” that the apostles insist gathers up all that God as ever said or will ever say) we can only ask where S. appears to have set out on the wrong path. Most elementally he went wrong when he set aside the Older Testament. (Recall he taught every subject except the Older Testament.) This omission was his Achilles’ heel. When he denied that Jesus is the fulfillment of God’s promises to Israel; when he denied that Jesus’ relationship to Israel’s scriptures differs in any way from Jesus’ relationship to pagan religion; when he insisted that Jesus even contradicts the Hebrew bible (since the Hebrew bible is essentially legalistic(!) while Jesus is not), modern theology was undone.

The Hebrew bible provides the unsubstitutable grammar and logic of faith in Jesus Christ. Whenever it is rejected the Newer Testament is invariably skewed to the point of being falsified. Whenever the Newer is read without the Older, the Newer becomes merely a collection of moralistic teachings (the teacher himself rendered superfluous as soon as his teachings are appropriated), or merely the depiction of a model to be imitated (imitation of the person now superseding the claim of his teachings), or merely a popularized, pictorialized illustration of existential philosophy.

S. enormously undervalues the significance of the sole physical description we have of Jesus: he was circumcized. For the apostles, plainly, it’s crucial for Christian faith that Jesus is a son of Israel. For S., however, the Jewish provenance of Jesus is an impediment to the faith of us Gentiles — and therefore must be erased. The resulting de-judaized Jesus isn’t the fulfillment of God’s centuries-long struggle with Israel. This “universal” figure is now “ideal manhood (sic) achieving itself under the conditions of history.” Religious reality isn’t the result of God’s incursion in Israel; instead it’s the product of human achievement, world history ultimately generating Jesus’ God-consciousness.

Everything in S.’s theology, every aberration in 20th century liberal theology, unravels from this point. According to scripture faith in God begins (and continues) with the fear of God — fear of the One who transcends his creation and is never to be identified with it, whether in whole or in part, or be viewed as an extension of it. S., however, illogically makes his understanding of the creation (specifically, of the contents of humankind’s consciousness) the “whence” and “whither” of his understanding of God. (Here he anticipates the “creation spirituality of the 1980s.) S.’s anthropology everywhere controls his understanding of God (so-called.) He could have avoided the disaster that overtook his theology (even as he never perceived it) if he had begun with theoanthropology, the Incarnation. If he’d begun with a full-orbed Christology he would have found himself emerging amidst the riches of the 16th Century Protestant Reformers, for whom theology ultimately is Christology — as it is in scripture. When he began, however, with anthropology alone (albeit anthropology of religion), he couldn’t avoid the abyss into which he fell, taking all of 19th and most of 20th Century Protestant theology with him. Man, even man at his noblest, is simply not the measure of God.

Victimized by his failure to grasp the Holy One of Israel’s uncompromised “Otherness”, S. appeared to confuse God with nature or at least with some aspect of nature. Not surprisingly, S. characteristically confused an experience of the admittedly awe-full, mysterious depths of the creation with an experience of the mystery of God. “God” was simply the exclamation of someone moved by the creation’s inherent beauty and depth. The confusion, while easy to make and easy to understand, wasn’t thereby rendered any less idolatrous.

S.’s misunderstanding with respect to the creature leads to his misunderstanding with respect to sin. For him sin appears to be the arrears or residue of biological primitivism. He maintains (correctly) that God ordains the conditions of human existence; he goes on to say (incorrectly) that sin arises from these conditions. Plainly he’s confused sin with creatureliness, depravity with finitude. To be sure, creatureliness is the human condition (we aren’t divine), but the human condition as created, not as fallen. Moreover, it’s human creatureliness that God fashions uniquely for dialogical partnership with him. (In scripture God clearly loves all his creatures but he speaks only to men and women. His speaking to us renders us “response-able” and therefore “response-ible.”) Sin doesn’t arise from this! S. fails to grasp the essence of sin. It’s not a carryover from biological primitivism; rather it’s disdainful, disobedient rebellion against and perverse defiance of the One to whom we owe everything. With sad but appropriate consistency S. never deploys the appropriate (biblical) categories for discussing the remedy for sin: reconciliation rooted in atonement and issuing in regeneration.

Displaying his era’s the immense confidence in the outcome of historical processes, S. regarded process as progress. And just as obviously the Hebrew mind doesn’t. S. denied that Jesus is the Son of God Incarnate according to the purpose and act of God, and affirmed instead that Jesus is someone whom history inexplicably spawned as extraordinarily God-conscious. His affirmation concerning historical processes contradicts the logic of scripture. Biblical thought, illuming this point through the Virgin Birth, insists that history cannot generate the redeemer of history. History’s redeemer must be given to it. History’s prideful insistence that it can redeem itself is reduced to absurdity by history’s oft-repeated horrors, as the genocides of our era alone attest.

Perhaps the nature of S.’s theology is most evident in his discussion of doctrine. He maintains that doctrine says nothing about God; doctrine merely reflects an aspect of human consciousness. For this reason he can say virtually nothing about truth. In scripture “truth” is used as a synonym for “reality”, and also as a predicate of statements that express this reality. Doctrine, then, is the articulation of the truth of God on the part of those who have been included, by God’s grace, in God’s self-knowing. Doctrine is the human expression of the truth of God vouchsafed to believers through God’s self-disclosure. Since it’s a human expression, any doctrinal expression is provisional; there’s no formulation concerning the being or activity of God that is beyond re-articulation. To say this, however, isn’t to say that all such formulation is dispensable with respect to the church’s life and mission. Neither is it to say that all such formulation is presumptuous. S. appears to have thought that either doctrinal statements are purely speculative (guesswork) or such statements presumptuously and prematurely (even preposterously) claim to comprehend God, humans taking it upon themselves to speak “the last word” about God. He appears not to have understood that doctrinal statements are the grace-wrought apprehension of God. Believers are admitted, by God’s grace, to a genuine knowledge of God without claiming an exhaustive knowledge of the One whose depths can never finally be plumbed. While it’s plain that knowledge of God born of an encounter with him can never be reduced to any statement about God, it’s also plain that the truth of God and faith in him can never be commended as true (i.e., real) apart from such statements. S.’s failure here meant he could never commend Jesus Christ as truth; S. could only attempt to foster the emergence of a God-consciousness that he assumed somehow to be contagious.

Yet even the crux of S.’s approach overlooked a simple point. Since nothing can be articulated of God himself, said S., and since what is commonly affirmed to be the Holy One of Israel is no more than religious primitivism that cultured people rightly despise, exactly who is the “God” of whom we are supposed to be conscious? of whom Jesus was conscious? It can’t be the God of whom the prophets spoke and whose Son the apostles recognize Jesus to be. Then “God-consciousness” is a vacuous term.

S.’s approach to doctrine (at best, undervaluation; at worst, out-and-out dismissal) continues to characterize much liberal theology, while the vacuity of his major item appears undetected.

S.’s attempt at “adapting” was commendable; his unwitting move from adapting to adopting, however, was fatal. For in adopting the assumptions of the world he de-natured the gospel, turning wine into water, when all the while water can be found everywhere and wine nowhere. Here the gospel was reduced to little more than a mirror reflecting the world’s self-understanding back to the world, even as the world’s aching spiritual need remains unaddressed because unnoticed. In moving from a commendable “adapt” to a fatal “adopt”, S. ultimately confused the offensiveness of a less-than-cultured expression of the Christian faith with the irremovable offense of the gospel itself. S. assumed the truth of the world’s postulates. Liberalism always does. These postulates are (a) the world has an accurate and adequate understanding of its own condition, (b) this condition, while perhaps needing adjustment or even correction here and there, isn’t grievous, let alone both grievous and blind, (c) if the gospel is to be heard, the church must fit its proclamation to the world’s self-understanding.

Surely the horrors of our century alone have exposed the liberal theology of the last two centuries to be intellectually shallow and substantively dilute. Then why does it continue? Why is some variant of it still the dominant theological ethos of mainline North American churches and seminaries? The reason is, liberal theology doesn’t challenge the assumption that the world has access to the ultimate truth about itself. It doesn’t question the facile confidence that the eyes through which the world sees itself have no need of corrective lenses. It doesn’t show that the presuppositions of the world contradict those of the kingdom of God. It doesn’t highlight the truth that morality and religiosity (and much “spirituality” today) are neither the same as the kingdom and therefore the solution to the world’s ills, nor even the vestibule to the kingdom. Rather they are monuments to humankind’s defiance of God and barricades behind which it attempts to hide from God. It leaves unchallenged the biblical conviction that the worst consequence of sinnership is blindness to one’s sinnership, and in the wake of such ignorance of one’s sinnership, further immersion in it.

The most chilling aspect of S.’s theology, and that of the theology of his offspring, is this: S.’s God doesn’t so transcend the world as to be able to visit it with mercy. Chilling or not, this aspect of his theology only magnifies the tenacity of those for whose theology mercy would be but an alien category. Liberal theology dominates the ecclesiastical landscape in that the majority of humankind, including the church, remains unaware that in light of the undeflectable judgement of God mercy is the one thing needful and humankind’s only hope.

Victor Shepherd

The Educational Ministry of the Church

published in Theological Digest & Outlook (Burlington, March 2000)

The Educational Ministry of the Church

 

 

The problem with the person suffering from amnesia isn’t that he can’t remember where he’s left his umbrella and will have to spend another $15 to replace it. The problem isn’t even that he’s going to get wet and will be inconvenienced before he arrives home. The problem with the amnesiac, rather, is that he doesn’t know where home is and therefore will never find his way there. More tragically, the person with no memory doesn’t know who he is. No less tragically, the person with no memory can’t be trusted. This isn’t to say that the amnesiac is unusually nasty. It is to say, however, that the person with no awareness of his identity behaves erratically, and behaves erratically just because he has no sense of anything that might be “out of character.”

The church’s educational ministry seeks to prevent a similar development from overtaking the church. A congregation or denomination that suffers from collective loss of Christian memory lacks a Christian identity. Lacking Christian identity, it can only behave erratically, all the while thinking itself to be the soul of consistency. Once again, this isn’t to say there’s treachery here born of mean-spiritedness, but it is to say that without a Christian memory people meander without knowing themselves to be meandering, forever losing their way without knowing the way.

Concerning the church’s educational responsibility, the Protestant Reformers liked to speak of the church as “the school of faith.” While “school” may call up “schoolish”, replete with associations that many find dull if not distasteful, our Reformation predecessors were at least aware that the church’s educational ministry has to do with truth, with substance, with elementary beginnings that develop cumulatively with the result that “everyone may be presented mature in Christ.” (Colossians 1:28) Our foreparents knew, as did the Hebrew prophets before them, that the living God is anything but ephemeral, vague, “will-o’-the-wispish”, abstract. The Holy One, rather, is concrete, denser than the utmost density we can imagine, opaque, solid, substantive. And not only dense but so very immense too – filling all space – that God is the one prophet and apostle know to be inescapable. God can always be fled, to be sure, but not escaped. Then who this God is whom we can’t escape and who – thanks to the Son’s absorbing in himself the God-forsakenness of Gethsemane and Golgotha – will never forsake us; who this God is is the “Other-with-us” in which the church endeavours to school its people from the youngest to the oldest.

Mind and heart must be steeped in the truth of God as relentlessly as a youngster learns the alphabet, then assembles words and phrases, then grasps something of the grammar that orders human discourse and without which what is known can never be communicated profoundly. That’s it! It’s only as grammar is learned too can we commend to others what we’ve come to comprehend for ourselves. And of course we soon discover that to commend what we comprehend is to find our own comprehension gaining depth and breadth. “Force-feeding”, however, is like “cramming” for exams: the momentary glut disappears as quickly as it was acquired. Better by far is the gradualist approach that Isaiah cherished when he spoke of “teaching knowledge” and “explaining the message”: “For it will be precept upon precept…line upon line…here a little, there a little.” (Isaiah 28:10) Surrounded as he was by Canaanite nations, Isaiah knew that that as surely as the unique substance of Israel’s faith thinned out through dilution, distraction and detraction, “faith” would become indistinguishable from the idolatry that faced his people wherever he looked.

It is God who is to be loved with the mind. Apart from the church’s ceaseless effort at educating its people, the Holy One won’t be loved with the mind; which is to say, won’t be loved at all.

With respect to children, I still think Northrop Frye’s advice to be sound: there’s no substitute for scripture’s delight in story telling. The stories are to be told and re-told at every age and stage of the younger person’s development. Needless to say, this doesn’t mean that the stories are to be regurgitated year after year in mind-numbing monotony, devoid of subtlety, sophistication and application. Neither does it mean that these stories only are to be told. But it is to say that regardless of pedagogical technique, and regardless of the much-needed variety in the content and manner of presentation, somehow the ongoing educational task of the church always manages to recycle the “old” stories. For to recycle the stories is to find them newly pertinent to the newly-recognised problems and perplexities besetting humankind. Northrop Frye argued that only as these stories sank down to the bottom of the English student’s mind and remained embedded there – but not buried “out of sight, out mind” – would that student have any chance of understanding the tradition of English literature and of western culture in general. How much more is it the case that only as these stories remain embedded in the developing Christian’s mind can they be revisited at any period of that person’s life and be found to speak with ever-fresh relevance. More to the point, because they speak with conclusive relevance they are acknowledged to speak authoritatively.

Admittedly, at first the youngest child won’t be able to make much of many of the stories, despite the best efforts of parent or Sunday School teacher. Still, as long as the stories remain part of the hearer’s mental (and cardiac!) furniture, the stories can be probed in ever-greater depth as the hearer is granted ever-more intimate access to the One of whom they speak.

Think of the story of Abraham and Isaac on Mount Moriah. For the many the story’s grotesqueness will be bizarre at best; for others, repulsive at worst. Still, for good or ill, the story is a vivid aspect of the church’s memory. Abraham, the prototype of the person of faith, has been promised spiritual descendants as numerous as the sands on the seashore. If the promise is to be fulfilled, then two conditions must be met: Abraham must persevere in faith (or else he can’t be the foreparent of descendants-in-faith), and Abraham’s son, Isaac, must survive (or else there won’t be descendants-in-faith.) Abraham, then, is wracked with this dilemma: if he obeys God and offers up his son Isaac, then God’s promise is null and void, since Isaac hasn’t survived; if, on the other, hand, he second-guesses God and preserves Isaac, then God’s promise is null and void, since his disobedience exemplifies his unfaith. Abraham’s obedience nullifies the promise as surely as his disobedience nullifies it. With an anguish that the old story heightens by means of such literary devices as “Take your son, your only son…” (Genesis 22:2), Abraham decides to stake everything on trusting God to fulfil God’s promises in ways that Abraham can’t even imagine at this point. He will obey God even though such obedience, from a human perspective, ensures the non-fulfilment of the promise.

Years later, the child-become-adult, now part of a church growing ever smaller in a secular society, understands with fresh comprehension the force of Christ’s promise concerning the inviolability of the church before the powers of death. (Matthew 16:18) The child-become-adult is equipped, able to assess assorted responses to the church’s retraction. Some responses, of course, are gospel-generated; other “solutions” are little more than techniques, tools, gimmicks of one kind or another. Of all the proffered programmes for assisting the church today, which are to be endorsed and which declined? The person possessed of Abraham’s faith will continue to uphold the gospel, even though it is fidelity to the gospel that appears to be shrinking the church in an era and a society that insists the gospel to be obsolete. The dilemma, again, is Abraham’s: do we obey God, counting on God’s fulfilment of the promise concerning the church, or do we second-guess God, assuming we “know better”, preferring to do what we think will ensure the church’s future, even though this latter approach entails forfeiting the gospel? Abrahamic faith means that we trust God to fulfil God’s own promises in ways that we can’t imagine now.

While it’s one thing to speak of the need to preserve biblical substance in the church’s educational ministry, finding the vehicle for this is another. Twenty-five years ago, in one of my postgraduate courses, James D. Smart, well-known bible scholar, theologian, translator and Christian educator, commented that any minister would be fortunate to find 10% of the worshipping congregation in an adult study group. The 10% of 25 years ago has shrunk, I fear, to 5% in 1999. Still, there remains a place for the small group. Streetsville congregation had a C.S. Lewis reading group that met monthly for four years, reading its way through all of Lewis’s popular writings. Alpha and Bethel courses in our congregation continue to help many. Again, our congregation has had a bible study that meets one Sunday evening per month, or meets Sunday morning before worship for six consecutive Sundays only. (People will commit themselves to a study programme with a predetermined conclusion when they often won’t to one that remains ongoing.) I have found that the latter arrangement (Sunday morning) attracts far more people, since they were coming to worship on Sunday morning in any case. (Modernity’s busyness finds even Sunday evening too much for many to manage.)

While not unappreciative of the vehicles I’ve just mentioned, I have yet found, over a 21-year ministry in the same congregation, that the Sunday morning sermon remains a most effective “delivery system.” Each autumn for over a dozen years now I have placed a small insert in the bulletin, “I should like a sermon on….” Worshippers fill in the insert and place it on the offering plate. These requests are gathered up and become the roster for my preaching throughout the following spring. In addition to providing “fodder” for sermons, the requests tell me where people are living, what they are thinking, how they are suffering, and why they are perplexed or angry or anxious. The requests vary from the expected (the struggle for faith in a world riddled with evil) to those that I didn’t foresee (the neurophysiology of endogenous depression.) By means of this vehicle I’ve found myself schooling the congregation in such matters as euthanasia, the sin against the Holy Spirit, whether the bible should be censored, the nature of psychopathy, angels, life-as-relationships, gossip, the meaning and timing of confirmation, the ethics of organ transplants, and even “revival and Jonathon Edwards.”

The opportunities here for deepening a congregation as contemporary issues are related to the “old, old stories” and such stories are seen to be normative; such opportunities are limitless. The congregation also prints each sermon for pick-up the following week. With the chance to read the sermon at their leisure, people find they absorb far more than they do when they hear it from me once only at 130 words per minute. Frequently the vehicle of the sermon fosters another vehicle; namely, formal and informal conversations on the same topic.

Evidently the educational ministry addresses two kinds of needs: the perennial human need rooted in the human condition, as well as contemporary needs arising from the modern-day situation. The human condition – we are fallen creatures, alienated from God on account of our defiance and disobedience – is the deeper of the two. In other words, the human condition always underlies the human situation, while the situation, changing from era to era, finds symptomatic expressions that vary kaleidoscopically. Still, in addressing the situation the educational ministry has every opportunity to address the human condition.

Yet in all of this we must take care to understand that the educational ministry of the church isn’t one-sidedly cerebral. (I say “one-sidedly” rather than “over”: since God is to be loved with the mind and is never honoured by slovenly thinking, we can’t be over-cerebral, whereas we can always be one-sidedly so.) Jesus both taught and healed. His teaching rendered his healing intelligible, while his healing embodied his teaching. If he had merely taught, his kingdom would have remained unembodied, a “head-trip” for amateur, armchair philosophers who like to muse on religious themes. If he had merely acted, his action would have remained ununderstood with respect to the kingdom. The kingdom of God (which is to say, the whole creation healed), is found in the singular fusion of his head, heart and hand. Throughout Christ’s public ministry the person healed (or in need of healing) was related to the community and restored to the community, as was the case with the Gadarene demoniac, now found not only seated and right-minded but clothed; i.e., he belonged to that community to which he had been readmitted. (Mark 5:15) Community ever remains essential to the educational ministry of the church. Without community and the suffering found in it, the educational ministry of the church will inevitably slide from a much-needed reasonableness into a dry-as-dust rationalism. If this happens a Christian anthropology is denied, for then reason, rather than spirit, has come to be regarded as the essence of humankind; and reason, rather than spirit (Spirit too), has come to be viewed as both ultimate reality and the access to it. The community ever remains the venue of the church’s educational ministry; which is to say, human suffering is always the context that lends the educational ministry of the church as much credibility as it will ever need.

The collective memory of the church is like the ballast in a sailing ship’s keel. The ballast consists of lead, isn’t particularly pretty, and is found below the waterline in any case. Without ballast, however, the ship, top-heavy with sail, capsizes in the first squall. Everyone knows that the more sail a ship carries above the waterline, the more ballast it needs below it. A ship with no sails never leaves the docks. Herein it resembles Admiral Nelson’s Victory: the brass is polished every day, the ceremonial cannon is fired for reasons of nostalgia, people even pay significant sums of money to climb on board – but the ship never goes anywhere. A ship with no ballast, on the other hand, naively thinks it can best the sea, only to find that the first storm leaves it foundering. The lesson here for the church is plain.

The church today is eager to hoist sails to catch the wind of the Spirit (not always recognising, however, that some spirits are less than holy) while disdainful of adding weight to the ballast. The educational ministry of the church, however, always pertains to both sails and ballast. And in our era, impatient with history and tradition and anything substantive, renewed attention must be given to ballast. For the neglect here has been long and persistent. We aren’t the first generation of Christians. Appreciating the wisdom of those who ventured before us will ensure that our immediate parents in faith weren’t the last.

Victor Shepherd

May 1999

A Comment on Postmodernism

A Comment on Postmodernism

Victor Shepherd

 

I: — What is postmodernism or postmodernity? Plainly we have to know what is meant by “modernity” before we can grasp “postmodernity.”   Some people maintain that modernity begins with the French Revolution with its explicitly secularist, anti-religious outlook.  Others date modernity from the Enlightenment with its development of science. Others still (here I include myself) date modernity from the Renaissance with, among other things, the rise of market-capitalism, the development of transnational banking, the nation-state.   Modernity, then, runs from mid 15th century to mid 20th century, or from 1450 to 1945.

Let’s think first of modernity.   There are several features of modernity that we all recognise as soon as they are mentioned: technoscience, for instance.   Think of how the telegraph was followed by the telephone, followed in turn by the wireless, followed yet again by satellite communication, and so on.

Mass production is another feature of modernity. At one time goods were produced in what were known as “cottage industries.”   Someone with a few sheep spun wool in her living room and then wove it, eventually having a garment of some kind she could sell.  When mass production arrived a newly-invented mechanical loom hummed night and day in a factory, producing wool far more quickly, and thus permitting a vastly more efficient means of manufacturing and distributing huge quantities of woollen goods.  Horse-drawn carriages used to be made by one or two men who spent weeks building one carriage completely before beginning another.  With the advent of the horseless carriage, the automobile, Henry Ford developed the assembly line. The number of units manufactured per week skyrocketed.  Not only did the factory-housed loom and the automobile assembly line speed up the manufacturing process, they also lowered the price per unit so that the manufactured goods were affordable to large segments of the population.

Developments in industrial efficiency, we should note, created what economists call “real wealth” and distributed it in such a way that a middle class arose and mushroomed.  Prior to modernity there were two classes: the noble or aristocratic class (very few in number) and the rural peasant class (very large.) In other words, there were a few rich land-owners and hordes of poor land-workers. The few possessed immense wealth and power; the many possessed neither wealth nor power. Industrialisation, a major feature of modernity, gave rise to a middle class that was larger than either the rich or the poor.  And of course together with the expansion of the middle class there occurred the representative democracy we all cherish.

The nation-state was a feature of modernity. The purpose of the state is to subdue lawlessness, punish evildoers, promote the public good. At the close of the Middle Ages it was noted that a people that had much in common could band together and thereby promote the public good much more efficiently. At the close of the Middle Ages there were 300 fiefdoms or principalities in Germany , with a prince presiding over each.  It was obvious that if many German-speaking peoples forged themselves into a single German-speaking people, a nation-state would arise possessed of a domestic and international power that 300 fiefdoms could never hope to have.

By far the most readily recognised feature of modernity, I think, is what I mentioned first: technoscience.         “Labour-saving devices” are only a small part of it.  The devices that we now take for granted weren’t merely labour-saving (a tractor that ploughs in an hour what a horse ploughed in a day.)    The technoscience we admire had to do with vaccinations, inoculations, surgeries (chest surgery was virtually impossible prior to the invention of the heart-lung machine).   As well as the technoscience that provided safety: radar, electronic navigation, weather-predicting.   As well as the technoscience that “greened” large parts of the world with wheat that was impervious to rust, corn impervious to blight, fertilisers that multiplied crop yields a hundred fold, and methods of transportation that were quicker, safer, cheaper, more comfortable than anything our foreparents could have imagined.

Modernity was characterised by a belief in progress, a manifest mastery over nature, and the magnification of efficiency everywhere.

 

II: — Then what about postmodernity?   What are its features? Let’s begin here where we left off: technoscience.         There is now widespread loss of confidence in technoscience as a blessing. While nuclear science generated electricity more efficiently than steam turbines, nuclear science has spawned nightmare after nightmare.   (Not to mention propaganda to cloak the nightmare: there are on average 500 major nuclear accidents per year, most of which are never reported to the public.) As for nuclear weaponry, we entered the cold war, seemed to pass out of it in 1989, and now appear to be on the edge of it again.  At the height of the cold war (1945-1989) the USA and the USSR were aiming at each other nuclear weaponry that guaranteed what the military-industrial complex called “Mutually Assured Destruction”: MAD. Conventional weaponry had been used to win wars; nuclear weaponry would guarantee loss on all sides.  Yet nuclear weaponry proliferated.

Developments in electronics were hailed as glorious. Electronic surveillance has eroded privacy already and brought depersonalisation and dehumanisation in its wake. And we haven’t seen anything in this regard compared to what we are going to see.

In the postmodern era pharmacology has become suspect. Drugs to relieve pain are one thing; what about drugs that don’t merely relieve pain, don’t merely elevate moods (from depression to contentment), don’t merely subdue agitation or compulsiveness, but alter personality? If drugs can alter personality, then what do we mean by “personality?”   Since personality is intimately connected to personal identity, has personal identity evaporated? Then what has happened to the person herself?    What do we mean by “self?”   Is there a self? Furthermore, if self and personality are related to character, what has become of character?

While we are speaking of character we should be aware that the United States Armed Forces have developed drugs that eliminate fear. Courage, of course, is courage only in the context of fear.  Drugs that eliminate fear therefore also eliminate bravery.  No American combatant need ever be awarded a military honour!   More to the point, drug-induced fearlessness renders someone a robot; robots are never afraid, robots are never brave, robots are never human. That’s the point: the drugged soldier is no longer human.

What modernity called progress postmodernity deems anything but progress.  Where is the progress in ecological damage so far-reaching that air isn’t fit to breathe or water to drink, while ozone-depletion renders our skin irrecoverably cancerous?   Where is the progress in schooling that finds university-bound students unable to write or comprehend a five-sentence paragraph?

To no one’s surprise, postmodernity has suffered widespread loss of confidence in reason.  We may call postmodernites cynics or we may call them realists; in any case postmodernites see human reasoning as a huge factor in the postmodern mess. They see reason (so-called) as simply a means to an end that isn’t reasonable itself.

One feature of the collapse of confidence in reason is the disappearance of truth. Truth is now reduced to taste. Postmodernity denies that there is such a thing as truth, or denies that we can access truth. Instead of knowing truth we express opinions, or we indicate preferences, or we “go with our gut.” Truth?   What is truth, anyway?  And if it existed, what makes us think we could know it?   And even if we could know it, how would we know when we had found it? Truth?  You have your opinion and I have mine.  Who or what is the arbiter between you and me?

Needless to say the disappearance of ethics is related to the disappearance of truth. Postmodernites don’t speak of ethics; they speak of values.  Everyone knows that different people hold different values.  But this isn’t to say one value is superior to another.  What any one person values is up to him or her.  No one is to be told his values are defective or inferior.  Lest we feel sorry for ourselves, thinking that the newness of this feature of postmodernism is brandnewness, we should read again the concluding sentence of the book of Judges: “In those days there was no king in Israel ; every man did what was right in his own eyes.” (Judges 21:25 ) We aren’t the first to reduce what is right to matters of taste.   Three thousand years ago there were those who regarded themselves and their fancies as the measure of the universe.  As Israelites, they had even made themselves and their fancies the measure of God. It all came down to taste; and, as everyone knows, there’s no disputing taste. Taste, preference, opinion, whatever – it all adds up to the sufficiency of the subjective.

If someone, nervous about all of this, speaks up, “But shouldn’t opinions or preferences be grounded in something, grounded in reality?”, such a person will be reminded, “Asking whether they should be grounded in reality is pointless when no one knows what reality is or how it might be recognised.” “But can’t the smorgasbord of opinions be considered and weighed rationally?” Raising this matter is pointless when reason is already suspect.  Besides, to challenge someone else’s values or opinions is to excite emotion, and everyone knows that when emotion and reason meet, reason always takes second place.

Another feature of postmodernity is the weakening of the nation-state in the face of tribalism. All over the world tribalism is reasserting itself.  It is especially strong in Africa . Quebec ’s growing self-advancement, however, is a form of tribalism too, as is the United Church ’s all-aboriginal presbytery. The most vicious form of tribalism (“vicious”, of course, is a value-laden term, my value) is ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansing is on the increase. Internally the nation-state is fragmenting; externally the nation-state is increasingly the pawn of international finances and multinational corporations.

Another feature of postmodernity is the mushrooming of consumerism, consumer-driven everything.  In the modern era economics were producer-driven; in the postmodern era, consumer-driven. Consumerism determines what church-congregations offer, what pulpits declare, what school boards program. Reginald Bibby, sociologist at the University of Lethbridge , maintains that there’s a huge demand throughout the society for religious consumer-products. “If the church wants to survive”, says Bibby, “it should meet consumer demands.” In other words, the church should forget what it believes to be the truth and substance of the gospel. The church should merely prepare the religious buffet that allows consumers to pick and choose according to taste, whim, preference.  It must never be forgotten, of course, that it’s consumers who fund the church. Consumerism?   My daughter Mary has just finished her B.Sc.N. program at McMaster University . When she began the course she was told that patients are no longer patients; what used to be known as patients are now clients. Patients are sick; clients are consumers who are purchasing a service.

My wife, Maureen, came upon three Grade one students writing obscene graffiti. She deemed this to be an “actionable” offence, and action was taken.  Next day the parent of one of these three children came to see Maureen. The parent remarked, “How unfortunate it was that my daughter signed her name to the graffiti she wrote.” “It wasn’t unfortunate that your daughter signed her name, thereby giving herself away”, Maureen replied; “It wasn’t even unfortunate that she wrote the obscene graffiti in the first place.  It was simply wrong; wrong.” The category “wrong” has no meaning for that parent.  The parent has already disavowed everything that might be logically related to the word “wrong.”   Her attitude encapsulates postmodernity.  Besides, as a taxpayer she’s a consumer who is purchasing a service for her child. And since consumers are paying the piper, they are now calling the tune.

 

III: — Is postmodernity all bad? Has the sky fallen on Chicken Little? Is our situation hopeless? No.  Think of something familiar to all of us: the writing of history.  We all studied history in school.  We all studied it thinking it to be the soul of objectivity.  History dealt with facts, unarguable facts.  Postmodernites tell us (and tell us correctly) something different. A few years ago I addressed a group of curriculum planners at the central office of the Toronto Board of Education. I was speaking about prejudice in general, racism in particular.   I told the group that while racial segregation had always occurred spontaneously in Ontario , it had been mandated by law in one institution only: the school system. Yes, schools were segregated along black/white lines beginning in the 1850s.   (Most of the curriculum planners were completely unaware of this.) Then I asked them, “In what year was the last racially segregated school in Ontario closed?” Two planners shouted, “In 1965.” They were correct. They were also black. The black educators knew about racially segregated schools in Ontario ; the white planners had never heard of it and were aghast to learn of it. When I was studying Ontario ’s history, I was never informed of this matter.  Were you? The postmodernites are going to keep asking us, “Who writes history?   Whose viewpoint is reflected?   Whose interests are advanced?   And what despised group is silenced?”   Here postmodernism is doing us a favour.

Is postmodernity all bad?  No. Before we deplore the hastening demise of the Church of Scotland (to name only one denomination sick unto death); before we lament the morbidity of the Kirk we should remember that many people are already ambivalent about it. My earliest Old Testament professor, Scottish himself but belonging to a denomination other than the Church of Scotland, told me that when he was a young man in Scotland you couldn’t get work in the post office, a bank, or schoolteaching unless you were a member of the Kirk.  You didn’t have to attend; you didn’t have to worship; you didn’t have to believe anything. But your name had to be on the roll. No one today laments the disappearance of such an arrangement.

Is postmodernity all bad?  No. Admittedly confidence has collapsed in technoscience as something that can promote the human good. (Technoscience, of course, can always promote the technically efficient.   But the technically efficient is a long way from the human good.)  While technoscience has done much to ease physical toil and bodily discomfort, done much to promote longer life and reduce the likelihood of sudden death, Christians are aware that technoscience was never going to promote the human good.  Then the public loss of confidence in technoscience is loss of confidence where Christians had none in any case.

Is postmodernity all bad?  No. So what if postmodernites insist that reason (reasoning) is suspect, reasoning being little more than rationalisation serving any number of subtle or not-so-subtle ends. Christians have always known that sin blinds so thoroughly as to blind humankind to the speciousness of its reasoning. Christians have always known that only grace, God’s grace, frees reason and restores reason to reason’s integrity.  Then postmodernity reminds us all of a human predicament that Christians know the gospel alone to be able to cure.

Is postmodernity all bad?  No. While tribalism is to be deplored, the radical relativising of the nation-state isn’t to be deplored. Surely the development of hydrogen warheads rendered the nation-state obsolete.  Surely the nation-state has been a reservoir of old wounds and resentments and recriminations and national aggressions that we’re all better off without. Surely we don’t need a cess-pool whose toxic wastes seep into neighbouring aquifers.

 

IV: — Then what are Christians to do about postmodernism?   Specifically, what are the concrete challenges that postmodernism brings to the church?

 

First of all we are challenged to remember at all times and in all circumstances that “The earth is the Lord’s and the fullness thereof.” (Psalm 24:1)  “The Lord of hosts is the king of glory.”   He is; he alone is. Christians aren’t dualists. We don’t believe that the cosmos is stuck fast in an interminable struggle between two equal but hostile powers, God and the evil one, neither able to defeat the other. We don’t believe that the Fall (Genesis 3) has obliterated the goodness of God’s creation. Yes, Jesus says that the creation lies in the grip of the “prince of this world”. But the prince is only that: prince, never king.  The earth is the Lord’s, and no one else’s.

The gospel of John, the anonymous epistle to the Hebrews, and Paul’s letter to the church in Colosse; all these documents declare that the whole world was made through Christ for Christ. He is the agent in creation, and the creation was fashioned for his sake.   He is its origin and end. He is its ground and goal. And no development in world-occurrence can overturn this truth.

We are told in Colossians 1:17, “In Jesus Christ all things hold together.”   However fast, however violently, the world spins (metaphorically speaking), it can never fly apart. “In him all things hold together.” Why doesn’t the creation fly apart (metaphorically speaking)?  Why doesn’t human existence become impossible?   Why don’t the countless competing special-interest groups, each with its “selfist” savagery, fragment the world hopelessly?  Just because in him, in our Lord, all things hold together.  What he creates he maintains; what he upholds he causes to cohere. “Hold together” is a term taken from the Stoic philosophy of the ancient Greeks.  But whereas the ancient Greek philosophers said that a philosophical principle upheld the cosmos, Christians knew it to be a person, the living person of the Lord Jesus Christ.  He grips the creation with a hand large enough to comprehend the totality of the world. In other words, the real significance of postmodernism can’t be grasped by postmodernites; the real significance of postmodernism can be grasped only by him whose world it is and in whom it is held together.  The real significance of postmodernism, its bane but also its blessing, can be understood only by those who are attuned to the mind of Christ. The sky hasn’t fallen down.

 

Another challenge, the second challenge, that postmodernism brings to the church: we are to meet everyday challenges and opportunities each and every day.  Many Christians think that the first thing to be done is a philosophical rebuttal of postmodernism’s tenets.  I’m a philosopher myself (or like to think I am), and I agree that a philosophical critique, a philosophical rebuttal, is entirely in order. At the same time, there are relatively few people with the training and the equipment for this sort of thing. All Christians, however, can meet everyday challenges and opportunities each and every day.

You must have noticed that Jesus doesn’t merely illustrate his ministry with everyday matters (a homemaker sweeping the house clean in order to find her grocery money); he directs us to everyday matters as the occasion of our faith and obedience, trust and love. I mentioned earlier the concluding verse of the book of Judges: “In those days there was no king in Israel ; every man did what was right in his own eyes.” (Judges 21:25 ) In a postmodern world that is therefore postchristendom as well, Christians must exemplify the truth that there is a king in Israel ; there is a Lord whose claim upon the obedience of us his subjects we neither dispute nor deny nor disregard. We who are Christians must embody our conviction that we don’t do what is right in our own eyes. We are preoccupied, rather, with what is righteous, and what is righteous reflects the heart of the Righteous One himself.  Everyday matters remain the occasion, the context, the venue of everyday obedience. Discipleship isn’t suspended until philosophers can dissect postmodernism; discipleship is always to be exercised now, in the context of the ready-to-hand. We trust our Lord and his truth right now (or we don’t); we grant hospitality right now and discover we’ve entertained angels unawares (or we don’t); we uphold our Lord’s claim on our obedience in the face of postmodernism’s ethical indifference (or we don’t).  We recognise the approach of temptation and resist it in the instant of its approach, or we stare at it like a rabbit staring at a snake until rabbit-like, we’re seized.  We forgive the offender from our heart and find ourselves newly aware of God’s forgiveness of us, or we merely pretend to forgive the offender and find our own heart shrivelling.  The apostle John insists that we do the truth. We have countless opportunities every day challenging us to forthright faith and obedience and trust regardless of whether or not we can philosophically rebut postmodernism’s philosophical presuppositions.

 

The third challenge postmodernism brings to the church is as profound as it is simple: Christians must recover the Christian truth that human existence is relational.  A few minutes ago I mentioned, for instance, that one feature of modernity’s modulation into postmodernity was the shift from production economics to consumer economics.         We should note, however, that neither form of economics impinges upon a Christian understanding of human profundity.  God intends us to be creatures whose ultimate profundity is rooted not in economic matters but in relations.

Think of the old story concerning the creation of humankind. “God created man in his own image.   In the image of God created he them.” (Gen. 1:27) Adam is properly Adam; Adam is properly himself, only in relation to Eve. To be sure, Adam isn’t a function of Eve or Eve a function of him.  Neither one can be reduced to the other; neither one is an aspect of the other. None the less, each is who he or she is only in relation to the other.

I am not reducible to any one of my relationships or to all of them together.   I am not an extension of my wife or an aspect of my parents or a function of my daughters. I am me, uniquely, irreplaceably, unsubstituably me.  Still, I am not who I am apart from my relationships.

Every last human being is a dialogical partner with God. This isn’t to say that everyone is aware of this or welcomes this or agrees with this. It isn’t to say that everyone is a believer or a crypto-believer or even a “wannabe” believer. It isn’t to say that everyone is going to become a believer or be considered one.  But it is to say that the God who has made us all can’t be escaped; can’t be escaped by anyone.  God can be denied, he can be disdained, he can be ignored, he can be unknown, he can be fled, but he can’t be escaped.  Not to be aware of this truth is not thereby to be spared it.   To ridicule this truth is not thereby to be rid of it.  The living God is always and everywhere the dialogical “Other”, the relational “Other” of everyone’s life, even as there are many creaturely “others” in everyone’s life.

Decades ago the Jewish biblical thinker Martin Buber wrote, “All real living is meeting.”   He was right: what isn’t profoundly a “meeting” isn’t living; it’s death. What isn’t a “meeting” isn’t real; it’s illusory.  Reality, said Buber, is the “between”; the “between” between person and person, the “between” between person and the Person. Jean Paul Sartre, the French existentialist philosopher, complained that the mere existence of another human being diminished the individual’s freedom.  The existence of God, Sartre continued, suffocated the individual, so suffocating was God in his immensity compared to the human individual gasping to exist. Therefore, said Sartre, God had to be denied if humankind was to thrive humanly.  Buber (who always maintained that Sartre was a novelist who thought himself a philosopher) correctly saw that Sartre had inverted the picture: the relation of “I-it”, how we approach things, isn’t bedrock reality, the “I-thou” relation being no more than an ethereal fantasy. It’s the other way around: “I-thou” is bedrock reality; “I-thou” is the primordium of the cosmos, “I-it” being a mere abstraction.         Postmodernity is suspicious and cynical and bitter all at once, and often for good reason. It denies the category of the real. Right here there is challenge and opportunity a-plenty for Christians: the real is the relational.

 

The fourth challenge postmodernism brings to the church: we have to work out much more thoroughly what we understand to be the human, the quintessentially human.  Our society is beset on all sides with depersonalisation and dehumanisation. We are now facing the technological novelty known as “virtual reality” or “synthetic reality.” Soon we’ll be sitting in front of our TV screens with a contraption on our head that allows us to experience the sensations of touch, smell, taste, sight. When so much of the human can be counterfeited electronically, what does it mean to be human? Surely Christians have something to say and do here.

 

The fifth challenge postmodernism brings to the church: we must reappropriate the category of the holy.   Here postmodernity forces us to come to terms with something the church has considered too slightly if at all: the polar opposite of evil isn’t good, not even the good.  The polar opposite of wrong isn’t right, not even the right. The polar opposite of evil, rather, is the holy.  The polar opposite of wrong is the holy.  Plainly the holy and the good are not exactly the same.   The holy and the right are not exactly the same.  Wherein lies the difference?

In order to answer this question we must spend a few minutes refreshing our understanding of God’s holiness.

God’s holiness is God’s own Godness, that which constitutes God uniquely God.   In the first place God is holy in that God is utterly distinct from his creation. God is not to be identified with any part of his creation or any aspect of it.

In the second place God’s holiness means that God can’t be measured or assessed by anything other than himself.         God is the absolute standard of himself.

In the third place God’s holiness means that God’s character is without defect or deficiency.  God’s character is free from taint of any sort.  God’s love is free from sentimentality; God’s anger is free from ill-temper; God’s judgement is free from arbitrariness; God’s patience is free from indifference; God’s sovereignty is free from tyranny.

In the fourth place God’s holiness means that all the aspects of God’s character just mentioned are gathered up into a unity. Just as every shade of the spectrum from infrared to ultra-violet is gathered up into what we call “light”, so every dimension of God’s character and God’s transcendence is gathered up into God’s holiness.

When we are faced with evil in any of its manifestations we must find ourselves driven ultimately not to a consideration of good, even the good, for even the good is but a philosophical category, not the living person of the Holy One himself. When we are faced with wrong we must find ourselves driven ultimately not to a consideration of right, even the right, for even the right is but a moral category, not the living person of the Holy One himself. Instead we must find ourselves driven to contemplate afresh and own anew the One whose uniqueness and awesomeness and splendour left our Hebrew foreparents in faith prostrate and adoring. For God alone is that to which (to whom) the deficits of postmodernism point us: God.

And if postmodernism is used in God’s inscrutable providence (Calvin’s description) to turn the hearts and minds of many to him, then even postmodernism is a harbinger of hope: hope for the church, to be sure, but hope as well for that world which God so loved as to pour himself upon it without measure and bind himself to it without end.

1999 Congregational Address

The Lord is a stronghold for the oppressed,
a stronghold in times of trouble.
And those who know thy name put their trust in thee,
for thou, O Lord, hast not forsaken those who seek thee.

Psalm 9:9-10

Israel of old always insisted that the first responsibility of its king was not to preen himself or increase the lustre of his court or even triumph splendidly in feats of military prowess or political wizardry. The first responsibility of its king was invariably to safeguard the poor.

And who were the poor? They could be the financially deprived, of course. Yet they were also those whose finances were adequate but who had been rendered unusually vulnerable for any number of reasons: reversals, illness, defamation, conspiracy, enemies manifest and hidden. Who spoke up on behalf of the oppressed? Who succoured them? Who endeavoured to provide “armour” where they were most exposed? It was Israel’s conviction that God did. Yet regardless of God’s capacity to act as he had promised, regardless of his eagerness to, the oppressed would entrust themselves to him only as they knew his “name”; that is only as they were acquainted with God’s nature, character, person, presence. (Plainly “name” is a very rich notion in Hebrew.) Just as it was the vocation of the king to safeguard the vulnerable in the service of the King, so it was the vocation of the prophet to acquaint the people with the heart of the King himself. Then, and only then, could needy people be expected to abandon themselves to the One whom they now knew would never abandon them.

Will God abandon us? Why wouldn’t he, in view of the fact that he abandoned even his Son precisely when his Son needed him most? Paradoxically, it is just because the Son was forsaken for us that no human being anywhere, at any time, in any predicament, is ever God-forsaken now or can be. Because the Son was left so thoroughly derelict, and because the pang of that dereliction pierced the heart of the Father, God has taken upon himself that dereliction which we sinners deserve, which we should otherwise have, and which we should rightly fear yet could never fend off. In other words, the anguish endured by the Son and absorbed by the Father now spares us that anguish which we are sure we feel even as our feeling is in fact without foundation or substance. “I will never fail you nor forsake you” (Joshua 1:5; Hebrews 13:5) is now the cry of God’s heart to us.

Then entrust ourselves to him we must. For from the perspective of cross and resurrection we understand that what Father and Son together did for us, they did so that it never need be done to us. God is a stronghold for the oppressed. We know his “name” and will therefore put our trust in him.

The truth of the psalmist’s word I have proven time and again. And as surely as I have proven it for myself I know that I am called to be an icon of it for you. Because God doesn’t abandon, neither do I. And neither must you. For just as the king’s vocation was to reflect the characteristic behaviour of the King himself, so our vocation is to exemplify the Stronghold himself. He who provides refuge for the oppressed commissions us to do as much for each other in any and all circumstances. We, then, shall not fail or forsake one another.

 

Victor Shepherd

 

Has The Church A Future?

This paper appeared as an article entitled “Has The Church A Future?”
in Horizons (Toronto, The Salvation Army, November, 1997).

 WILL THE 21ST CENTURY BE AN AGE OF CHRISTIAN REVIVAL?

 

I think so. Mainline liberal Christianity is declining rapidly. Having joined itself naively to the spirit of one era, it found itself bereft in the next. Theological liberalism assumed the world’s self-understanding to be true, and therefore adopted it as the starting point and controlling principle of Christian reflection. Eventually theological liberalism came to be seen for what it was: the world talking to itself about itself, albeit while deploying a Christian vocabulary. As a result the liberal churches have spent untold resources and energies mirroring what the world already knew — and often what it had tried, found wanting, and left behind as it moved on to other aspects of its ideational orbit.

The Christian revival will stand out starkly against the aforementioned in several respects.

* There will be a recovery of classical Christian foundations. The Incarnation, for instance, will be cherished anew as the underpinning of Christian faith and life. (The Word becoming flesh is qualitatively distinct from the Word becoming words.) In the same way the doctrine of the Trinity — who God is is known by what God does on our behalf and what God effects within us — will be honoured again as the matrix within which Christian existence and activity unfold, in accordance with the eternal being and creative activity of God.

* There will be a recovery of the meaning, burden and privilege of discipleship, as discipleship reflects afresh biblical convictions concerning service and sacrifice. Christian discipleship will be much more intentional, self-renouncing and self-forgetful. As Christians become an even smaller minority there will be added to them only those who are serious about imitatio Christi in a recalcitrant world. The church will consist of those who both identify and identify with the victimized, the marginalized, the voiceless, the defenceless — and more widely, with the creation’s frustration and self-contradiction. Sustained by the triumph of Jesus Christ over the powers of death, such discipleship will eschew any notion or display of triumphalism, knowing that the resurrected Lord still suffers (according to apostolic testimony), and being reminded every day that the society of the 21st century permits it no opportunity for triumphalism in any case.

* In light of the hunger for the transcendent, the mood and style of Christian worship will be increasingly charismatic. While it is impossible to be over-cerebral, it is certainly possible to be one-sidedly cerebral. This latter imbalance, rendering the church lop-sided for too long, will be redressed as community-life and personal devotion are re-equilibrated: head and heart, understanding and effusiveness, doctrine and dancing, ardour and affection. The worship, self-understanding, and service of the Christian community will be formed and informed, moved and driven by the “ballast” of the Catholic and Anglican tradition, the “sails” of Pentecostal exuberance, and the careful “charting” of Reformation conviction.

* As denominations disappear (they were often centuries-old imports from European political squabbles in any case), church-bureaucracies will collapse. A nineteenth century church leader (William Booth) was not without insight when he spoke of bureaucracy as “mediocrity in purple.” The autonomous church-community will see readily that mediocrity is an impediment, while purple is mediocrity’s face-saving disguise. Autonomous churches will be in touch with their constituency and their service-opportunities in ways that bureaucracies neither apprehended nor assisted.

Throughout history there have been fresh incursions of the Spirit of God and, called forth by such incursions, new manifestations of the people of God. While the 21st century will not see a replication of 19th and 20th churchmanship, it may indeed see a manifestation of the people of God in their unity, uniqueness (holiness), and catholicity — thanks to a fresh appropriation of the prophetic/apostolic testimony to the One whose victory means that his continuing vulnerability remains effective within a world that he refuses to abandon.

 

Victor Shepherd
September 1997

Repentance and Life

This paper first appeared in The Free Methodist Herald
(Mississauga, Free Methodist Church in Canada, December, 1997)

Repentance and Life

 

Breast-beating, tears, dredging up spiritual sludge — isn’t this what “Repent!” brings to mind? It’s little wonder that our society shuns the word and disdains what it things the word represents. People understandably shy away from rubbing their nose in their personal garbage pail, especially when guilt and depression and self-belittlement are expected to effervesce.

Nonetheless, our Lord Jesus Christ, who comes only to impart healing, help and wholesomeness — life — summoned people to repent every day of his public ministry. His summons was always urgent. “Don’t put it off for a minute. Can’t you see it’s the only sensible thing to do? The kingdom of God, his end-time restoration of a world in bondage to sin and evil ever since the Fall, is upon you. Abandon yourself to God’s deliverance!” The urgent summons to repent is one of the major building-blocks of our Lord’s ministry. Pull it out, and his ministry would be unrecognizable.

In view of the good news of the kingdom, an about-turn is needed. Repentance is this about-turn. To make an about-turn is plainly to return. And in fact everywhere in the older testament to repent is to return. To turn into the kingdom of God is to return to the God made us, who grieves over our defiant departure from him, and who longs for our return to him.

When our Lord cries, “Repent, return”, he has in mind three startling pictures painted by the Hebrew prophets before him.

(i) The first image is that of an adulterous spouse returning to wife or husband. Adultery is horrific at any time. For adultery is the betrayal of the most intense intimacy; adultery is the violation of a promise; adultery is personally degrading; and adultery is a public humiliation of the faithful partner.

To repent, then, is to return to God and recover that intimacy with God which we were created to know and enjoy as covenant-partners with him. To return is to uphold the promise we have made to him on countless occasions throughout our lives. To return is to leave off our self-degradation (for make no mistake: however much our society ridicules a doctrine of sin as “Victorian” or Puritan” or even “mediaeval”, sin remains invariably degrading.) To return is to turn from publicly humiliating God to publicly praising him for his incomprehensible patience.

(ii) When the prophets, in the name of God, urge their people to repent, they speak of pagan idol-worshippers returning to the worship of the true and living God. The Hebrew word for “idols” is literally “the nothings.” At the same time, only a fool would pretend that “nothing” is inconsequential. A vacuum is nothing, yet a vacuum has immense power: it sucks down everything around it. A lie is nothing, for a lie is a statement without substance. Yet lies destroy people every day. Delusions are nothing, for a delusion is without foundation. Yet deluded people are at best utterly misled and at worst out-and-out insane. Most tellingly, perhaps, is the fact that we are inevitably conformed to what we worship. To worship any of the “nothings” is to become nothing ourselves.

Since stubborn refusal of the kingdom of God is self-annihilation, why don’t we repent, return, and become someone, that child of God created in his image and impelled to cry, “Abba, Father”, eternally? When our Lord pleads with is to repent he is pleading with us to renounce our pursuit of nothing (the lie, the delusion, the spiritual vacuum) only to find ourselves plunged into truth and reality, the kingdom of God.

(iii) The third prophetic picture of repentance is that of rebel subjects returning to their rightful ruler. The rebel subjects have thought they could rule themselves, only to find that their inept attempts at self-rule have left them chaotic and fragmented. Their rebellion was born of ignorance of themselves, and their ignorance was born of ingratitude to their sovereign. Grateful now to that rightful ruler who alone can subdue disorder, and possessed now of the self-knowledge that without him they will be forever self-destructive, they return. Then the only sensible thing to do is suspend foolish rebellion and fall at the feet of the king himself.

As the meaning of “Repent!” permeates informed hearts, the command is understood as invitation: “Come unto me….” And repentance itself is now known to be nothing less than resurrection and life.

 

Victor Shepherd
October 1997

Predicament and Provision

Published in The Free Methodist Herald,
(Mississauga, Free Methodist Church in Canada, Feb. 1998)

 PREDICAMENT AND PROVISION


“God gave them up!” These have to be the most chilling words that describe the human predicament. Three times in five verses (Romans 1:24-28) Paul reiterates, “God gave them up.” He means that God has handed us over. Handed us over to what? Handed us over to what we keep telling God we want. We don’t want him? We don’t have to have him. He’ll give us exactly what we want. (Satan, we should note, is never this generous; Satan invariably gives us what he wants.) We don’t want God’s truth? We don’t have to have it — which is to say, of course, we’re going to be left with falsehood and illusion. We don’t want God’s claim on our obedience? Then we shan’t have to obey him. But then we’re going to have a pretender claiming us, and this claimant won’t be the slightest bit benevolent. At bottom humankind keeps telling God it doesn’t want him. Then Godlessness is what we want. Godlessness is what we have. God gives us up to it, hands us over to it, abandons us to it.

Needless to say, there are consequences to what we have or want, anywhere in life. Not to want God is to be stuck with the consequences of not wanting, not having him. Paul lists the features (or at least some of them) of the human self-expression that displays itself as God hands us over to the Godlessness we crave: slander, murder, ruthlessness, covetousness, boasting, gossip, deceit, parent abuse, sexual perversion, and so on. (Rom.1:28-32) This is the sorry state to which God “gives us up, gives us up, gives us up….” It reverberates like a bell tolling the death knell of the entire human race.

But it isn’t the death knell! By God’s mercy it’s the wake-up call. It’s the huge electric shock administered to jar the heart-patient back to life. Because God is love, because love exhausts God’s nature (1 John 4:8), God can never be indifferent. (Indifference is the opposite of love, not hatred, contrary to what most people think.) While God abandons us to what we want — together with its consequences — he doesn’t abandon us. In fact he “gives us up” just because he has never given up on us. God gives us up to the miserable consequences of our disobedience and defiance just because he’s never ceased loving us and wants to bring us to our senses. At no point in the downward spiral has God given up on us. To be sure, our predicament is evidence that God’s anger has been aroused. But since his anger is only his love burning hot, his anger is simply his love shaking us awake. (We must always remember that since God is love, his every attitude and act are actually expressions of his love for us.)

If God were indifferent, the human predicament would now be hopeless, since indifference would simply not bother with us henceforth but simply leave us alone in our self-willed mess. An angry God, however, plainly cares; his caring means that he bothers; he bothers in that he not only shakes us awake to our predicament, he also awakens us to the provision his love has made for us. He has given us his Son, given us himself in his Son. In the words of the Anglican Prayerbook, our Lord was given us to make “by his one oblation of himself once offered a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world.” God’s provision blesses all humankind in that atonement which Jesus Christ has wrought as he makes “at one” a wayward human race and the God who can’t bring himself to give up on us, and can’t bring himself to give up on us inasmuch as he can’t will himself out of his nature, love.

As eager as God is to bless us, however, he won’t bulldoze us, won’t tyrannize or coerce. Everywhere in his provision for us his self-giving sounds the note of the tender, the wooing, the winsome. Centuries before the event of Incarnation and Atonement the prophet Hosea overheard God, whose wrath had just flayed the people Israel, sobbing in God’s own innermost heart, “How can I give you up?” Centuries later provision would be made for us just because he who has already given us up to all that our depraved hearts crave has never given up on us — and can’t. In Hosea’s era God had said to Israel, his wayward people, “I will allure her…and speak tenderly to her.”(Hos. 2:14) It is love’s plea. “I will betroth you to me in faithfulness, and you shall know the Lord.”(Hos. 2:20)

The human predicament is remedied in love’s provision, the crucified Son. The spiritually quickened see him now and are destined to glory in him eternally.

Victor Shepherd
December 1997

What Are We?

Published in The Free Methodist Herald
(Mississauga, Free Methodist Church in Canada, June, 1998)

 

WHAT ARE WE?

All of us glow every time we read the question and answer. Q: “What is man that thou art mindful of him?” A: “Thou hast made him little less than God, and dost crown him with glory and honour.” (Psalm 8:4-5) We should glow every time we read it. All men and women are the pinnacle of God’s creation, only slightly less than God himself. Because we are crowned, all of us, without exception, are meant for the royal family; before God there are no commoners. We are crowned with an honour that no one else can snatch from us, an honour we can’t even forfeit ourselves.

Yet this isn’t all we are. When the psalmist asks the same question again, “What is man? woman?”, the answer is different this time: “Man is like a breath; his days are like a passing shadow.” (Psalm 144: 3-4) Our “glow” has given way to sobriety as we are reminded that we are short-lived creatures for whom life passes speedily. In addition we are vulnerable creatures for whom life unfolds perilously.

When Job provides yet another answer to the same question our sobriety gives way to disagreement or disgust or even simple bewilderment. What is man? “A maggot! A worm!” (Job 25:4-6) Before we settle into bewilderment or seethe with disgust, however, we should examine the context of the question. “How can a man be innocent (NEB) or clean (RSV)?” Can a man be righteous in God’s sight? pure?” (NIV) “Maggot! Worm!” It’s the writer’s way of reminding us that we sinners are defiled in God’s sight.

Now I’m the last person to belittle what the psychologists tell us about the importance of positive self-image and self-confidence and ego-strength. The person whose self-confidence has eroded utterly or who has never had any is a truly pathetic creature. Then what are we to make of “Maggot, Worm!”, especially when we all know that maggots frequent rottenness and worms frequent excrement? Is scripture simply fostering a negative self-image, destroying what little self-confidence we have, and ruining the ego-strength we’ve struggled for years to build up?

Not at all. When scripture pronounces us “Maggot, Worm!”, it’s reminding us that sin defiles; we are defiled before a holy God. Defilement is always loathsome. Our sin repulses him. Specifically sin’s defilement deprives us of our access to God; sin’s defilement disqualifies our acceptance with God.

Yet the marvel of God’s grace is that as loathsome as our sin renders us to him, he has made provision for us in the cross of that Son who identifies himself with the loathsome. The paradox of grace is that the more loathsome we are to God the more he longs for us. The glory of the gospel is that while we can (and do) sin our way into God’s mercy, there’s always more mercy in God than there is sin in us!

“Maggot, worm!” So far from being a putdown, an ego-crusher, it’s the most positive thing that can be said of humankind. It’s positive in the first place because it’s the truth about us, and no falsehood, however sweet-sounding, is ultimately helpful or positive. It’s positive in the second place in that such a pronouncement is riddled with hope: sinners can be salvaged and restored.

Years ago I came to see that the most positive thing to be said about human beings is that we are sinners. The alternatives are unrelievably negative. If instead we say that humankind’s root problem is that we are uninformed, we make ourselves the ready victims of propagandists. If instead we say that we are socially maladjusted, we welcome the cruelty of social engineering. If instead we think our root problem to be our material deprivation, we embrace a statist economy; and statist economies, we have seen repeatedly in our century, are human horrific. It’s supremely positive to say that we are sinners: there’s hope for us!

To be sure, it’s the creature crowned with glory and honour that is also the sinner whom the Hebrew writer pronounces “Maggot, worm!” Yet it’s we maggots who, despite our best efforts at doing our worst, cannot forfeit the glory and honour in which we are created. What’s more, the provision God has made for us in his Son declares God’s unqualified longing to have us rid of our defilement and to have our inalienable glory and honour displayed in full splendour.

This is God’s intention for all of us. Some people have recognized it, now affirm it, and are stepping ahead in it. Others continue to scorn it and thrust it away. Yet the invitation and summons remain. And therefore we are to look upon every man and woman as urgently summoned and warmly invited to the fellowship of that Son in whom humankind’s destiny is realized. For God aches to see everyone the beneficiary of it.

As is so often the case, Charles Wesley gathers it all up most compellingly: “O let me commend my Saviour to you.”

 

Theology of Life

Published in Theological Digest & Outlook,
(Burlington, September, 1998)

THEOLOGY OF LIFE

“Sunstroke” and “moonstroke” are alike dreadful, albeit each in its own way. Yet the psalmist (Ps.121) insists that the Lord, helper and keeper of his people, has guaranteed that the “sun shall not smite you by day nor the moon by night.” When our foreparents in faith spoke metaphorically of sunstroke they had in mind the frontal assaults that crumble people: war, rape, torture, intra-family savagery. “Moonstroke”, however, was something else. To be “moonstroked” was to be submarined insidiously by what we do not see, cannot anticipate, and against which therefore we aren’t forearmed. To be moonstroked was to be victimized unknowingly, victimized helplessly, victimized utterly. It was also the conviction of our foreparents that the same Lord who safeguarded his people against “sunstroke” and “moonstroke” alike would also “keep them from all evil”, “keep their life.”

Our foreparents’ conviction notwithstanding, we can’t help asking, “Are people “kept” in the face of evil? What does it mean to say they are kept when they manifestly aren’t kept alive? How are the 1.2 million unborn children aborted each year in the U.S.A. kept? And the brain-damaged daughter of Robert Latimer, the Saskatchewan farmer, on the day her father killed her?

We can move toward answering such questions only as we patiently probe the witness of scripture to the truth. God can “keep our life” only because God is the author of life; and he is the author of life inasmuch as he is the “living God” himself. God’s very nature is life. For this reason alone he is able to impart life to his creatures, and it is his sole prerogative to do so. God “breathes” the breath of life into his creatures, who thereby are rendered living themselves.

We are not to think that the God who lives “makes alive” by sharing his deity with his creatures. (This would be but an anticipation of New Age pantheism); neither is it the case that creatures possess life as an immanent creative principle. God alone has life in himself; all others have life on a loan. The God who lives himself and makes creatures distinct from himself alive too ever remains sovereign sustainer. While God’s sustaining of life is not episodic or spasmodic and can therefore be trusted, any presumptuousness on the part of beneficiaries is inappropriate. The king of Israel knew as much when he replied to Naaman’s messengers when they sought help, “Am I God, to kill and make alive?” (2 Kings 5:7)

Since life belongs to God, individuals do not have the right to destroy their own life or wantonly take the life of others. In short, since God is uniquely “living” and sovereignly imparts life to the work of his hands, the older testament everywhere esteems life as the supreme earthly good, particularly since life is meant to be fulfilled in intimate communion with God. This latter point needs to be underlined, for it is precisely what distinguishes humankind from the animals. The animals, after all, possess life too. Created on the same “day” as humankind, and possessed of “soul” as well (according to Genesis), they are yet not the crown of creation and are not made in the image and likeness of God. While God loves the animals and protects them (as environmentalists rightly remind us), God speaks to men and women alone. God’s addressing us, however, is never idle chit-chat. His Word is freighted with his gift of salvation and his claim upon our obedience. The Hebrew word for “word” (dabar) means both “word” and “event.” By his Word God summons the creation into being; by his Word he renders us alive; by his Word our obedience is voice-activated. The event that all this is is meant to issue in the event of communion with God. Since such communion with God is the goal or purpose of human life, only the life of grateful, loving obedience is ultimately satisfying. While life is “life” by definition (i.e., by God’s decree, lest we etherealize life and undervalue bodily existence), biblical thought consistently insists without fear of contradiction that only the life that is shaped by obedience to the Word is properly called “life.”

What does it mean to say we are created “in the image and likeness of God”? God’s free resolve, “Let us make man in our image”, indicates once again that no power inheres the creaturely in such a way that the creation itself can give rise to human existence. (Any power inhering the creation that could originate humankind independently of God could also annihilate us similarly; and this the sovereign One does not permit — for our blessing.) Instead, nothing can ever deprive a human being of humanness just because we have our existence by God from God. Succinctly put, man is “of” the creation (because forever creaturely, never divine) but not “from” it (because God-fashioned for a particular relationship with him and therefore especial.) At the same time bible-readers have long noticed that scripture nowhere specifies in what the “image of God” consists. Is the image a stamp or impression engraved upon us, or is it that pulsating relationship with God, unique in the creaturely realm, to which all are called? If the latter only, then we can only conclude that all who repudiate this relationship, frustrate it, even forfeit it are accordingly devoid of the image. If the former only, then with equal rigour we must conclude that the image, without reference to a relationship and to this extent “thingified”, doesn’t have to do with the profoundly personal. In both cases the uniquely human has been lost. The witness of scripture is plain: having being created response-able (to God), we are thereby rendered response-ible. We may honour God’s intention for us or disdain it, fulfil God’s purposes or frustrate them, love God or remain indifferent. What we can’t do, however, is escape it all! While we may attempt to flee our vocation as covenant-partners of God (and the Fall means, among other things, that everyone without exception attempts such a flight), the attempt is forever futile. And precisely here is our blessing, our hope, and the only ground of our dignity and ultimate inviolability! The “substantial” aspect of the image is that God unfailingly knows us and loves us, thereby giving us our identity and our worth, together with our capacity and desire for knowing and loving him. The “relational” aspect of the image is that fully human now on account of the Creator, we can (paradoxically) become “fulfilledly” human only as we abandon ourselves to our Redeemer. While we can and do stumble with respect to our vocation, we cannot rid ourselves of its glory.

It all means that we fallen creatures are “bent in on ourselves” (as the Protestant Reformers speak of us), and because “bent” in this manner find ourselves going ’round in circles instead of stepping ahead on that way which is also truth and life. Still, God has set a limit to the disaster we bring upon ourselves: we can’t fall so as to plunge ourselves beneath our human status and render ourselves animal or even demonic. However depraved we might be, we can’t cease to be the crown of God’s creation, singularly identified for an especial bond with him and destined for a glorious future in him. It all means too that no human being, however temperamentally vicious, psychologically twisted, physically malformed or intellectually disadvantaged; none of these is to be viewed as sub-human. It also means that no one can deprive others of their God-ordained identity, preservation and protection. Regardless of how terribly people are abused, they remain what they are (human) and who they are (their identity) before God. In view of the unspeakable horrors of the twentieth century, it must be emphasized that the worst violation of a human being cannot overturn that person’s ultimate inviolability. Because of the image of God, our reality as human beings and our identity are guaranteed.

This is not to say that sinful men and women cannot and do not deny this truth in themselves and others. We need only call to mind the commandants and their S.S. assistants in the death camps of the Nazi era. Lest the victims slated for execution appear to have been murdered, they were first degraded and made to appear as less-than-human. (Only human beings are properly described as having been “murdered.”) Camp-bosses cleverly sought to preface the destruction of detainees with the latter’s self-destruction. Such self-destruction need not have entailed suicide; self-destruction as humans was fostered by the “Catch-22” of insisting that prisoners maintain personal and communal cleanliness by defecating only in specified areas and at the same time forbidding prisoners to absent themselves from work or roll-call. This “excremental assault” (the title of Chapter three of Terence des Pres’s, The Survivor) aimed at a humiliation and degradation so thoroughgoing as to relieve guards of the last twinge of conscience. For who would ever be conscience-stricken at disposing of sub-human vermin? Even the victims’ death was to be deprived of any significance for the victims themselves and their peers: the extermination of vermin bespeaks only sanity and sanitation! And of course the treatment meted out precluded even the consolation of martyrdom. Martyrs, we know, choose to die for their faith, and these people had no choice. Moreover Jewish camp-victims were slain not because of their faith but merely because of their ancestry: they happened to have had at least one Jewish great-grandparent Now at least one-eighth Jewish, they “qualified” for inhuman treatment as sub-humans.

Just as others may deny any person’s humanness (but never deprive him of it), so any one person may contradict her own humanness. We admit as much in everyday speech when we say to someone whose conduct is deplorable, “Be a man!” We never say to an alligator, “Be an alligator!” Because an alligator can be only an alligator, anything it does perfectly reflects its nature. “Be a man!”, on the other hand, means that someone is falling short of what he is created to be. He is contradicting himself; his conduct fails abysmally to reflect his nature. The glorious, humanity-saving paradox is that the imperative,”Be a man!”, lefthandedly suggests that someone can fail to be human even as the fact of the address means that he can’t! The subtle ambiguity here is grounded in the twofold significance of the image of God.

 

G.K. Chesterton was surely correct when he said that the Christian doctrine of the Fall is the only doctrine that is verifiable! In view of the world’s ongoing violation of defenceless humans, Christians aren’t inclined to lose sight of the truth of the doctrine. Christians often are inclined, however, to lose sight of the complementary truth that God wills to preserve a fallen world, and wills to preserve it with a view to its redemption and its eschatological renewal in Christ. In other words, God’s judgement on a fallen world includes his determination not to let it sink so far into evil that it becomes uninhabitable, his determination not to turn his back on it in disgust or abandon it as hopeless. In the wake of the Fall the creaturely, unqualifiedly good as it came from God’s hand, is now known as the “natural”; i.e., the “natural” is the creaturely warped by the Fall. On the day of “the new heavens and a new earth in which righteousness dwells” (2 Peter 3:13) the natural will be rid of its Fall-imported frustration and futility, distortion and disfigurement. In the meantime the natural remains the means whereby God providentially protects the creaturely good whose goodness he hasn’t allowed to disappear completely. To say the same thing differently, God’s providential care for a fallen world is exemplified as we see how the natural safeguards life against the unnatural. To be sure, the unnatural can prevail for a time; in the long run, however, the natural reasserts itself and prevails by its providentially-lent strength. Adolf Hitler spoke of his “Thousand-Year Reich” that was to usher in a wholly new humanity, the race of “supermen.” The result? The Reich lasted only a decade, and fifty years later the unnatural horrors of the Nazi era continue to fill even the most convinced atheist with loathing. The depredations of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, the cruelties of Mao Tse Tung and the Cultural Revolution, the throat-cutting of children and the raping of women in Bosnia, the genocide in Rawunda; the unnatural is as unmistakable as it is undeniable. At the same time the Nuernburg war-crimes trials, public outrage and economic sanctions and military interventions and international correctives: these are the reassertion of the natural in the face of the unnatural, the ever-watchful providence of God preserving the life of a fallen world for its ultimate liberation in Christ.

All that has been said concerning the natural as the means whereby God preserves life in a fallen world has specific application to the right to bodily life. It is incontrovertible that God wills human life to be bodily life. While the human person cannot be reduced to the body, the body must none the less be preserved for the sake of the person. Human beings (persons) are neither disembodied spirits nor bodies only. Yet since the body is essential to the person (no one has ever seen, met or known a person apart from encountering that person’s body), the preservation of the right to bodily life grounds all other rights. The importance of this is incalculable, particularly when the Hemlock Society speaks of the “right” to kill oneself and totalitarian societies speak characteristically of the “right” to sacrifice individuals for the sake of the collectivist good.

Then is the life of the body an end-in-itself or only a means to an end? To say only that the body is an end-in-itself is to reduce persons to bodies and to invoke the pagan cult of the body. Yet to say, on the other hand, that the body is only a means to an end (e.g., only a means to one’s personhood), is to suggest that the means can be ignored as soon as the end is obtained. If, again, the body is only a means to an end, then we have no right to bodily joys (a misapprehension that scripture corrects on page after page.) And of course if the body is only a means to an end, then any injury done to my body isn’t an injury done to me. This needs only to be stated in order to be set aside.

As the gospel-story of the rich man and the socially-useless Lazarus makes clear, life is good regardless of its utility. (Luke 16:19-31) To arrogate to ourselves the capacity to distinguish between life that is worth living and life that is not is to “Nazify” our society and welcome the unnatural. As often as I hear it suggested that we should do this I think of the severely physically disabled people, known to me, who relish life; and of the severely mentally ill people whose faith I have found radiant. And in view of the sanctuary afforded the defenceless through the many “L’Arche” communities, no more than a moment’s reflection is required to imagine Jean Vanier’s comment on the arrogance of those who take it upon themselves to “select” those whose life is deemed worth living and those whose is not.

Running throughout scripture’s nuanced discussion of life is the eschatological goal of life. Jesus Christ claims all of life as he reclaims it from the disfigurements of sin, evil and death. God protects and preserves natural life in that he has always intended its redemption and fulfilment. Scripture accordingly uses “life” of both bodily existence and this existence fulfilled in that relationship with God which Jesus Christ effects. The writer of Proverbs records the unembroidered assertion, “He who finds me finds life.” (Prov. 18:35) While God is said to have animated humans by breathing into them the breath of life, the business of humans thus rendered able to breathe themselves is to praise God. (Ps. 150:6) Over and over scripture speaks of life as an unqualified good just because there hovers above all such discussion the conviction that life is really life only as God’s purpose for it is realized: a bond with him that nothing will break. Typical is the older testament’s insistence both that life-as-such is of inestimable value and that God summons us, “Seek me and live.” (Amos 5:4) In the same vein, while God puts life and death before people who are bodily alive now and bids them choose, he doesn’t proffer life and death as if each were weighted equally. Instead God urges us, pleads with us, warns us, woos us, “Turn [i.e., repent] and live.” (Ez. 18:32) God’s pronouncement over the valley of dead bones is that people who are alive at present will yet live only as God puts his Spirit within them. (Ez. 37:14) In numerous places throughout scripture “life” means “relationship with God.” In the newer testament “life” has this meaning virtually exclusively. In the same vein “image” in the older testament speaks of our inalienable humanness; in the newer testament “image” speaks of our transformation in Christ, who is himself “the image of the invisible God.” (2. Cor. 3:18;4:4)

Jesus insists that he is life. (John 11:25) The essence of life is not to be expressed simply as biological or intellectual activity, but expressed rather as indissolubly linked to his person. Jesus never says that he has life, only that he is life. The question, “What is life?” therefore gives way to the question, “Who is life?” We must be careful, in our psychology-conscious age, lest we subtly psychologize our Lord’s insistence, as happens when people remark, “Were it not for Jesus Christ, my life would lack meaning” or “Were in not for my Lord, life wouldn’t be worth living.” While these psychological assessments are unobjectionable in themselves (because no doubt true), they are not what the apostles have in mind when they bear witness that Jesus Christ is life (John 14:6) and that he is our life. (Phil.1:21 and Col. 3:4) Despite the fact that the spiritually unquickened do not know this, affirm it or celebrate it but rather direct themselves against it, it remains the hidden truth of their existence. In the proclamation of the gospel they are summoned and equipped to “see” it, own it, confess it and praise God for it. As the definitive reversal of life’s enemy, death, the resurrection of Jesus Christ grounds the God-ordained goal of all human existence. Believers, united to their Lord who is life, know and enjoy “eternal life” now. For them, future life can only be greater intimacy with God’s “steadfast love.” Here the psalmist’s profound acquaintance with “life” — intense intimacy with his Lord — is so very rich that in contemplating its becoming richer still he finds language inadequate; he can only say, blissfully oblivious to verbal inconsistency, that God’s steadfast love (i.e., life) is even “better than life.” (Ps. 63:3)

If the nature of God’s safeguarding is to preserve us against “sunstroke” and “moonstroke”, what is the scope of God’s keeping? The psalmist says that God can be trusted to keep our “going out and coming in.” This is a rich Hebrew expression with three distinct meanings.

“Going out and coming in” is a Hebrew way of expressing entirety or totality; it comprehends every eventuality. Nothing that befalls us will ever undo God’s keeping; nothing will ever handcuff God so as to leave him unable to keep us. He who wasn’t handcuffed by the death of his Son won’t be handcuffed by anything now.

“Going out and coming in” refers to the important ventures, efforts and undertakings of life. To have these kept is to have our diligent efforts rendered fruitful. Psalm 126 promises, “He who goes out weeping, bearing the seed for sowing, shall come in with shouts of joy, bearing his sheaves with him.” We may have seen little fruit to date for the energy we have poured out, the sacrifice we have made and the prayers we have pleaded. Still, it all isn’t finally going to dribble away!. It’s going to be crowned.

“Going out and coming in” refers also to the early and sunset years of life, infancy and old age, when we are helpless, frequently voiceless, and always vulnerable. At he beginning of life and at the end we are kept. The child who dies in infancy, the still-born child, the aborted child, the brain-damaged child — all are kept inviolate before God, by God. The most senile person in the nursing home whose befuddlement has left her virtually unrecognizable, the most “scattered” schizophrenic whose inner torment wasn’t relieved for decades; the humanity and identity of these are kept inviolate before God as well.

It is “our great God and Saviour” (Titus 2:13) who will ever keep our life.

Modern Saints and Prophets?

Published in The Free Methodist Herald,
(Mississauga, Free Methodist Church in Canada, March/April, 1998)

 

Modern Saints and Prophets?

Recently I was asked if there are modern prophets and saints. To answer the question we need to ask more questions. “Is God alive?” “Does God speak?” “Does God still call, equip, commission and appoint?”

Let’s think first about the prophets of the biblical era. The Hebrew prophet is summoned before God, addressed by God, and appointed by God to a specific task. When the prophet is singled out (Amos said he was singled when he was a mature adult, a shepherd in Tekoa; Jeremiah, in his mother’s womb), the prophet is brought before the “heavenly council”, as it is called. Once admitted to God’s deliberations with himself, the prophet is allowed to overhear God talking to himself out loud, or even addressed by God directly. Now the prophet has been given (burdened with!) a specific word reflecting the mind and heart, the will and way and purpose of God.

But haven’t all God’s people been made aware of the mind and heart of God? Yes. All God’s people know that God has disclosed his will and way and purpose at Red Sea and Sinai, at Calvary and empty tomb. Then who needs a prophet? To be sure, Red Sea and Sinai, Calvary and empty tomb form the people of God and inform them after God’s heart. Yet in the pilgrimage of God’s people from deliverance to promised land they need specific directions for specific crises or opportunities in the midst of specific developments. Sometimes the prophet’s word is directed to the people as a whole, as was the case when the Israelites were exiled in Babylon and floundered in the midst of foreigners who taunted them and tempted them. At other times the prophet’s word is addressed to an individual, as was the case when the prophet Nathan told David, after David’s violation of Bathsheba and murder of Uriah, that the king of Israel was nonetheless a “creep.”

In all of this the prophet is different from the teacher. The teacher expounds and interprets the whole body of the truth of God. The teacher mines the rich deposits in the goldmine of the gospel. A modern teacher will expound the Sermon on the Mount or the Ten Commandments or the message of the Psalms or the parables of Jesus.

While the prophet must never contradict the whole body of the truth of God (if he does, he’s manifestly a false prophet), he has yet been called and equipped to speak God’s special word to a special development.

Since life is punctured only occasionally by special crises, since life unfolds ordinarily most of the time, it’s obvious that teachers have to be many while prophets are few. Teaching is common while prophecy is unusual. Yet both are essential. The teacher acquaints God’s people with their identity and self-understanding as God’s people; the prophet imparts specific direction in the midst of unique developments. Both are essential.

Are there modern prophets? Of course there are.

In the same way there are modern saints. “Saint” translates hagios, holy. In the New Testament saints or holy people aren’t super-spiritual Christians; all Christians — even weak or immature or sin-riddled Christians — are called “saints” without exception.

The root meaning of “holy” is “set apart.” To be sure, Christians are set apart to do much: to do the kingdom-work that obedient subjects do gladly, to labour and struggle while it is still day. Yet before they do, Christians are set apart to be. We are to be light, salt — just be.

Whenever I think of what it means to be set apart, a saint, I think of Paul’s graphic images in his Corinthian correspondence. We are to be an aroma, the fragrance of God. (2 Cor. 2:15) Now I’m exceedingly fond of perfume. I’ll even stop on the sidewalk and continue sniffing after a woman fragrant with perfume has walked on down the street. As fond as I am of perfume, I loathe stenches — and would loathe even more being a stench. We shan’t be, however, for we’ve been set apart to be an aroma, the fragrance of God, rendering God attractive.

Paul says too that Christians are God’s letter. (2 Cor. 3:23) We are the letter that God sends to others. The purpose of a letter is to convey information — and of a love-letter, to disclose the letter-writer’s heart as well. We are God’s letter, “written not with pen and ink but with the Spirit of the living God on the tablets of the human heart.”

The apostle insists too that the saints are set apart to be God’s garden, God’s plantation. (1 Cor. 3:9) A garden is meant to feed people; God’s garden is feed them ultimately with him who is the bread of life.

Saints today? All who have embraced our Lord in faith have been set apart to be — saints! And among them will also be found those prophets the church needs to hear in every era.

Victor Shepherd
February 1998

A Wedding Homily

A WEDDING HOMILY

I: — “Marriage”, says the Anglican Book of Common Prayer, “is not to be entered into lightly”. Indeed it is not, for marriage is the most significant human relationship any man or woman will ever enter upon. So momentous is marriage, so telling, so pervasive is it that it penetrates to our innermost core as no other human bond can. God deems marriage the most pertinent metaphor for his most intimate relationship with his people. Throughout scripture marriage is the commonest analogy for faith. The apostle Paul draws an explicit comparison between marriage and the life Jesus Christ lives with and in his people. So momentous is marriage, so telling is it, that adultery, everywhere in scripture, is the commonest metaphor for idolatry — where idolatry is that violation of the first commandment which entails the violation of all others. So momentous is marriage, again, that both it itself and that faith of which it speaks metaphorically are described as “mystery”. Mystery, according to our Hebrew foreparents, is never something vague or abstract or spooky; rather it is everyday concrete reality, even as this concreteness remains profound — so profound that while it can be pointed to, experienced, commended, and described it can never be explained, much less explained away. No words can finally do justice to mystery.

 

II: — Jesus insists that marriage involves both leaving and cleaving. “Leaving” implies this: while we are not to neglect, despise, abandon or forget our families once we marry, nonetheless we must understand, as they must understand, that they are no longer the chief source of our human comfort and consolation: our spouse is and ever must be. In the same way we must understand, as they must understand, that they no longer have first claim upon us: our spouse has and ever must have.

And “cleaving”? Jesus insists that as we leave others and cleave to spouse we become “one”, “one flesh”. “One flesh” means one, unitary organism of body, mind and spirit. It does not mean that we become clones of each other or mere functions of each other. It does not mean that personality and individuation have been surrendered. Yet neither does it mean that our new union can be likened to two blocks of wood now glued together. For regardless of how tightly glued they might be they never interpenetrate each other. A “one flesh” union, rather, must be likened to a tree-graft. The graft occurs when two living organisms are opened up to each other, are allowed to pervade and suffuse each other, immerse themselves in each other — and thereafter are fused forever. As this occurs they bring forth fruit in a splendour and munificence they otherwise could not.

When two trees are grafted together each is first slashed sharply. The slash exposes what has been heretofore hidden; it lays bare the innermost substance of each. In this development what each possesses uniquely is made available inimitably to the other. At the same time the slash undeniably renders each tree vulnerable. Plainly, risk of and exposure to vulnerability is the condition of any union worthy of the description, “one flesh”. If two people are to be married in that union of which our Lord speaks then there must be defenceless openness and self-forgetful self-exposure, together with the sober recognition that the fearsomeness of this rent is the condition of the fusion’s fruitfulness.

 

III: — Yet while all Christians aspire after such a union the ubiquity of the Fall finds anyone’s marriage molested by sin. We ourselves are fallen creatures in whom the image of God is now partially obscured and defaced (even as its lineaments remain recognizable). Individually and collectively our humanity is distorted by depravities within and dangers without. Then marriage will remain resilient, in the face of such depravities and dangers, only by grace, God’s grace. Which is to say, marriage thrives as it aspires to reflect God’s resolve to be faithful to his promises declared to us in Christ Jesus. And since when God’s faithfulness meets our sin it assumes the form of forgiveness, marriage thrives as we extend that pardon which has been quickened by the greater pardon we have received. We must recall the foundation of God’s covenant-faithfulness whenever our proximity to each other fosters friction and magnifies irritability.

Marriage endures by faithfulness. The current myth that has left so many people tasting dust and ashes is that it endures by sentiment. Marriage must continue to thrive even on those occasions — whether short-lived or protracted — when two people are feeling less than enraptured.

A corollary to faithfulness is patience. When grass turns brown in the summer sensible people do not tear up the lawn; they know that in another month the heat will pass and the lawn become green again. Impatience here is not only inappropriate but utterly destructive; it betokens not so much silliness as folly.

 

IV: — Finally we must remember that while marriage promises a most intimate, rich, and satisfying communion it cannot provide what it was never meant to provide; namely, that profoundest contentment found only in God. To expect husband or wife to provide what no human partner is able to provide; to expect husband or wife to give what only God can is to burden marriage unrealistically. Then we shall always need to hear and heed and cling to him whose burden is light, whose yoke is easy, and whose name is the only name given to us whereby we may be saved.

What God joins together let none of us put asunder — ever.

Amen

Victor A. Shepherd
November 1993

The Holiness of God & the Holiness of God’s People

 

 

I: — “I have been crucified to the world, and the world has been crucified to me,” the apostle Paul declares in his Galatian letter. (Gal. 6:14) Is he boasting? Is he putting himself forward as a spiritual super-achiever whom we are to recognize and congratulate?

On the contrary, he insists it’s by the cross of Christ he’s been crucified to the world and the world to him. He claims no credit at all for whatever has happened to him. The crucified One has turned him from Saul to Paul, from persecutor to apostle, from someone who bragged “blameless” in terms of the law to someone who shamefully acknowledges he’s the “chief of sinners” in light of the gospel. Boasting about himself is the farthest thing from his mind. If he’s going to boast at all he’s going to boast in – that is, extol – the cross of Christ and this only.

Crucifixion always has to do with rejection. At the cross our Lord was rejected by religious authorities and civil authorities alike. He was even rejected by uncomprehending disciples. Not least, he was rejected by his Father – “Why have you forsaken me? – even as Father and Son alike owned the Just Judge’s judgment on sin and alike absorbed the Just Judge’s condemnation of sinners, thereby pardoning all who cling to the Son in faith and find themselves at home with the Father. Crucifixion always entails rejection of some sort.

When Paul exclaims that the world has been crucified to him he means he’s rejected the world’s tinsel and trifles and toys. None of it appeals to him. The world’s superficiality, its tawdriness, its hollow promises; he craves none of it.

What doesn’t appeal to Paul can’t ‘hook’ him. Since there’s nothing in the world Paul craves there’s nothing in the world that can seduce him or seize him. He can’t be ‘hooked.’

At the same time Paul insists he has been crucified to the world. The world has rejected him. The abuse he’s received over and over amply attests the world’s rejection of him. To say he’s been rejected by the world is to say there’s nothing in him the world wants. Therefore there’s nothing in him he can sell. There’s nothing in him the world can co-opt.

Think about it. There’s nothing in the world the apostle craves and by which he can be ‘hooked.’ There’s nothing in him the world wants and by which he can be co-opted. If he can’t be ‘hooked’ and he can’t be co-opted then he’s free. It’s only as we are crucified to the world and the world crucified to us that we are free. As long as there’s something in the world we crave we risk being enslaved by it. As long as there’s something in us the world can co-opt we risk being swept up into schemes that aren’t God-honouring. But insofar as we are beyond such risks we are free.

“Am I not free?” Paul cries to his detractors in the church in Corinth. “Have I not seen Jesus our Lord?” It’s his sight of the crucified One and his transformation by the crucified One and his public identification with the crucified One: this has made him free. He is free by the cross of Christ.

II: — What is freedom? Most people think of freedom as the capacity to choose among alternatives; i.e., we are free if we can choose to watch TV or study Hebrew grammar or attend an event at Tyndale. Choosing among alternatives, however, is mere non-determinism. Non-determinism has nothing to do with freedom.

According to Scripture to be free is to be freed from every impediment that hinders us from acting in accord with our true nature. When Paul declares in Gal. 5 “For freedom Christ has set us free” he doesn’t mean that Christ has made us able to choose between obeying him or disobeying him, honouring or not honouring him. Paul means only that Christ has removed every impediment to our obeying him; therefore freedom is obeying Christ. Christ has removed every impediment to our honouring him; therefore freedom is honouring Christ.

Think of it this way. If a de-railing switch has been placed on railway tracks, a train running over the switch will come off the tracks and stop. However, if someone removes the derailing switch, the train will be free to run along the rails. Now if someone says “But is the train free to fly like a bird?” we must hasten to answer that it isn’t a train’s nature to fly like a bird; it’s a train’s nature to run on rails.

You and I were created as sons and daughters of God. Our nature is to obey God and love him and love all whom he has made to live with us. On account of our depravity, however, we don’t obey and we don’t love. We are self-absorbed. Our self-absorption is a giant impediment to our acting in accord with our true nature. The impediment has to be removed. Only Jesus Christ can remove it. For this reason the apostle John exclaims, “If the Son makes you free you will be free indeed.” (John 8:36)

Because Paul is the beneficiary of Christ’s cross he and the world are crucified to each other. He is free. He has been freed from every impediment to acting in accordance with his true nature: he is a child of God called to be an apostle.

Who called him into the company of Jesus Christ? Who called him to be an apostle? God did. Not deity-in-general; not one deity among others. The God who called him is the God who is unique, comparable to no one; the God who admits no rivals and whom no one else approximates; in a word, the God who called Paul is the God who is holy.

III: — To say that God is holy is to say that God is incomparably himself. He belongs to no class. He is predicated of nothing. He isn’t one among several deities; he isn’t even one among several deities albeit the best or the greatest or the most important. He, Yahweh, alone is God.

Everyone is aware of how crucial Deut. 6:4 is to Israel’s faith: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one.” If this text (“…the Lord our God…”) is read by itself, however, it might suggest that Yahweh happens to be Israel’s God but Shiva could be no less the deity of Hinduism and Devas of Buddhism. In order to avoid this misunderstanding we must always read Deut. 6:4 alongside Zech. 14:9: “And on that day Yahweh will be king over all the earth. On that day Yahweh will be one and his name one.” Yahweh isn’t a deity among the deities or even the highest of the deities. Yahweh alone is God. Foundationally God’s holiness is God’s uniqueness. The Holy One of Israel alone is God.

[i] Because God’s holiness is God’s unique Godness; because God’s Godness is derived from nothing else and is shared with nothing else, God is not to be identified with his creation as a whole or with any part or dimension or aspect of his creation. While pantheism maintains that God is the essence of all that is, prophet and apostle insist that God is not the essence of anything God has made. The being of God is divine. The being of the creation is creaturely. There is a qualitative discontinuity here, an ontological discontinuity that can’t be compromised. The being of God is infinite and necessary. The being of the creation is finite and contingent. Any suggestion that a creaturely item is divine is an affront to the holiness of God.

A minute ago I spoke of pantheism, the notion that God is the essence of all that is. Panentheism, a near relative, insists that God is in the essence or of the essence of all that is. If God is the essence or of the essence of all that is, then there’s nothing that isn’t divine. And if there’s nothing that isn’t divine, then by definition sin and evil can’t exist. (Now we understand why our secularite ‘yuppie’ friends flirt with or are even devotees of the New Age Movement. The New Age Movement, pantheistic or at least panentheistic, legitimates, even divinizes, all human behaviour while denying any human behaviour to be sinful or wicked.)

[ii] In the second place God’s holiness means that God can’t be measured by or assessed by anything other than himself. God is the absolute standard of himself.

[iii] In the third place God’s holiness means that God’s character is without defect or deficiency. God’s character is free from taint of any kind.
Whereas human love is often mixed with sentimentality, God’s love is devoid of soppiness of any sort.
Whereas human anger – even genuinely righteous anger, the sort of anger that God mandates – nonetheless remains mixed with irascibility or petulance, God’s anger is devoid of ill-temper of any sort.
Whereas human judgement, however just, is never without bias, God’s judgement is devoid of arbitrariness at all times.
Whereas human patience can masquerade indifference or detachment, God’s patience is never disguised detachment or disguised indifference.
Whereas human sovereignty is usually little more than coercion, God’s sovereignty is utterly devoid of tyranny. (What, after all, is less tyrannical, less coercive than God the Son dying between two criminals at the city garbage dump, abandoned by friends and Father?)

[iv] In the fourth place, God’s holiness means that all aspects of God’s character are gathered up into a unity. Just as every shade of the spectrum from infrared to ultraviolet is gathered up into what we call ‘light,’ so every aspect of God’s character and God’s loftiness and God’s lordship is gathered up into God’s holiness.

IV: — The God who is holy insists that his people be holy too. Needless to say, we can’t be holy with God’s Godness, since God’s Godness he shares with no one. Nonetheless we are appointed to reflect God’s holiness, to reflect God’s character, in a way that is appropriate to us whom he has made in his likeness and image. To say we are made in God’s image is to say we are to mirror God in such a way that when people look at us they see God imaged in us.

It should surprise no one, then, that from cover to cover Scripture is preoccupied with holiness. Scripture is preoccupied, we have to admit, where the church hasn’t been. For instance, Christians have contended vociferously over predestination. We should note, however, that the predestination word-group occurs approximately fifteen times in Scripture, while the holy/holiness word-group occurs 835 times. Scripture is obsessed with holiness, both God’s and ours.

I am convinced that the overarching, all-inclusive theme of Scripture is two intertwined matters: God’s re-assertion of his holiness in the face of our denying his, and God’s re-establishing our holiness in the wake of our contradicting ours. We deny God’s holiness and we contradict our own. According to Scripture God is ceaselessly at work to re-assert his holiness and re-establish ours. The holiness of God and the holiness of God’s people are Scripture’s preoccupation.

Both these concerns are gathered up in what I call the ‘root’ commandment of Scripture. The ‘root commandment’ is found in Lev. 19:2 and repeated elsewhere: “You shall be holy as I the Lord your God am holy.” This commandment is heard over and over throughout the bible. It’s the bass note; it’s the downbeat; it’s the refrain; it’s the pulse: “You shall be holy as I, the Lord your God, am holy.”

The ‘root’ commandment, I have called it? But look at the grammatical form: “You shall be….” “You shall be” can be read as command or as promise. Read as command it means “You ought to be holy, you had better be holy.” Read as promise it means “One day you will be rendered holy; I guarantee it: you will be found holy.”

It is our friends, the seventeenth-century Puritans, who insist that all God’s commands are “covered promises.” The Puritans always knew that what God requires of his people God gives to his people. What God commands his people to exemplify God promises his people will display. Put another way, “You shall be holy as I, the Lord your God, am holy” is the command of God underlying all Scripture and no less the promise of God crowning and adorning all Scripture.

V: — Holiness is both God’s gift and humankind’s task. What God gives us, we are to exemplify. Holiness is both by grace and by grit. How gritty is the grit? Very gritty, according to the single most protracted discussion of holiness in all of Scripture. The single most protracted discussion of holiness is found in Leviticus, chapters 18-27. Leviticus 18 begins, “And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying, ‘Speak to the people of Israel, and say to them I am the Lord your God. You shall not do as they do in the land of Egypt, where you lived, and you shall not do as they do in the land of Canaan, to which I am bringing you.” Plainly holiness has everything to do with our doing. It doesn’t matter how we feel or what we intend or what ecstatic religious experiences we have undergone if we fail to do.

Do what? Holiness, so far from being so heavenly as to be of no earthly good, is startlingly mundane, according to Lev. 18-27. Consider the following. We are never to disrespect the elderly but rather to stand up when we meet them in order to honour them. We are to treat the stranger (the stranger is always vulnerable, lonely and anxious) as one of us. If we are merchants we are to use just balances and weights and measures. If we have to go to court we mustn’t attempt to bribe the judge. And if we happen to be the judge then we must judge justly, favouring neither the rich nor the poor.

We mustn’t offer up our children to pagan deities. Surely the discussion of holiness in Leviticus is irrelevant right here, for who would sacrifice their own children today? As a matter of fact millions offer up their children to pagan deities every day. How many parents are there in Thailand who have consigned their children, more or less twelve years old, to a horrific sex-trade catering to wealthy Europeans and North Americans while the Thai government looks the other way, so incomparably lucrative is the tourist sex-trade for the Thai economy?

Do you think children today aren’t offered up to pagan deities? Surely a child is sacrificed to a pagan deity when the little boy is told from infancy that he must become an NHL player, and everything in the family is given over to this all-consuming preoccupation.

Do you think children today aren’t offered up to pagan deities? Then why is it a handicapped child has the right to special education and the right to social assistance and the right to special access in public buildings and, not least, the right to her own toilet – but she doesn’t have the right to be born? The government of Canada (the people of Canada) will ensure that she has her own washroom but won’t ensure that she gets to use it.

Leviticus says more. God’s people aren’t to reap a field of grain right to the border or gather the gleanings after the harvest. Why not? Food has to be left for poor people and sojourners (resident aliens) lest they go hungry. Employers must pay the worker his wages at the end of the day (not next morning or next week) since the worker needs money the same evening in order to feed his family. The deaf aren’t to be cursed or a stumbling block put in the way of the blind. Vengeance is not be exacted upon the offender and no one is to bear a grudge. In short, “You shall not hate your brother in your heart, but…you shall love your neighbour as yourself.”

Lest we think that such down-to-earth holiness is a peculiarity of the book the church manages to avoid (when is the last time your pastor preached on Leviticus?) we should look at holiness in the book of Exodus: “You shall not boil a kid (young goat) in its mother’s milk.” (Exod. 23:19) Why not? A she-goat would never be aware that her offspring was being boiled in her milk.

There are two considerations here. One, even though the goat isn’t aware that it’s her offspring being cooked in her milk, anyone who has watched a mammal nurse her offspring tenderly and defend it fiercely would be utterly insensitive if he did what the command of God forbids. In the second place, in the ancient world to boil a young goat in its mother’s milk was to invoke a foreign deity. If God forbids us now to boil a kid in its mother’s milk then God is forbidding his people now to call upon foreign deities.

Tell me: what deities, so-called, are invoked right now? What deities are invoked when a baseball player who fails to get a hit seven times out of ten is guaranteed ten million dollars per year for the next five years while homemakers are selling daffodils on street corners because cancer patients needing treatment have been told there’s a six-month waiting list for the equipment?

And while we are talking about earthly holiness we might as well talk about earthy matters, like sex. Everywhere in Scripture it is deemed ludicrous to speak of holiness in any respect if sexual integrity is lacking. If you read the Newer Testament carefully you will find that sexual integrity is found in all the apostolic discussions of the holiness of God’s people. Think, for instance, of the apostle’s statement in Colossians 3: because Jesus Christ is the life of any follower of Christ, any follower is by definition a new creation in Christ. The old man or woman has been slain at the cross as surely as Christ was slain. Yet the old man, Martin Luther reminds us, doesn’t die quietly: the corpse still twitches. For this reason, says Paul, we have to keep on putting him or her to death. On the one hand, it makes no sense to speak of slaying what’s already been slain. But Luther, like his Lord before him, relishes paradox. And for this reason Luther glories in Paul’s insistence that we who have already put on Christ must continue to put him on (every morning, in fact), while we whose old man has already been slain must continue to slay him.

When Paul renders more specific what’s involved in slaying the old man/woman he begins with “fornication, impurity….” In case we think his insistence in Colossians 3 no more than Paul’s intrapsychic oddity he says the same in Ephesians 5: “Walk in love, as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us….but fornication and impurity….Take no part in the unfruitful works of darkness, but instead expose them.”

Here Paul is accurately reflecting the Master who electrified him on the Damascus road and scorched him forever. For when Jesus says that nothing going into us makes us unclean; what makes us unclean is what comes out of us, out of the heart – when Jesus speaks of this matter he cries, “What comes out of a man is what defiles a man. For from within, out of the heart of man, come evil thoughts, fornication….” (Mark 7:1-23) To aspire to holiness without aspiring to sexual integrity is oxymoronic.

Yet we mustn’t become one-sided, lopsided, in our understanding. In one and the same sentence Paul speaks in Ephesians 5 of both fornication and covetousness, even pronouncing covetousness to be idolatrous (something he doesn’t predicate of fornication.) And when Jesus speaks of what defilements come out of the human heart, he follows “fornication” immediately by “theft.” It’s obvious that our integrity concerning money says as much about holiness as our integrity concerning sex.

In a discussion of the holiness of God’s people we need to remember that Jesus says more about money, in the written gospels, than he says about any other single topic. Jesus says more about money than about anything else (sex included) for one reason: money is a graver spiritual threat than anything else. In the synoptic gospels money is mentioned in one verse out of ten; in Luke’s gospel, one verse out of eight. (And in the epistle of James, one verse out of five.) Money, we should note, receives an attention in Scripture that it appears not to receive in the contemporary church’s conversation.

Let’s ponder money and its spiritual force. According to 1st John 3:8 the purpose of Christ’s coming is to “destroy the works of the devil.” According to Hebrews 2:14-15 the purpose of Christ’s coming is to “destroy him who has the power of death…and to deliver all those who through fear of death were subject to lifelong bondage.” And then in Luke 16:13 Jesus says briefly and bluntly, “You cannot serve God and mammon.” In other words, according to Jesus the power of God and the power of mammon (mammon isn’t merely a commodity; it’s a spiritual power) are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. God and mammon are rival powers who will agree to no truce in their seeking to win the loyalty of everyone they touch.

John opposes God and the evil one. Hebrews opposes God and the power of death. Jesus opposes God and mammon. Plainly the devil, the power of death, and mammon are related; they are three different angles of vision pertaining to the one actuality, the looming actuality that strives to loom larger than God in his immensity. These three powers – devil, death and mammon – how do you think these three powers are related?

To speak of the devil is to highlight the Christian life as spiritual conflict. To speak of death and bondage to death is to highlight Jesus Christ as resurrection and life. To speak of mammon is to highlight Christ’s exposure of mammon as the chief vehicle that the death-dealing, evil one deploys. In other words, the devil deals out death; and the devil deals out death chiefly through mammon.

If you think me overstated let me refer you to someone wiser than I, John Wesley. So very profoundly had Wesley observed the connection among the three powers that he pronounced mammon to be the talent that gathers up all other talents (intellectual gifts and athletic gifts, for instance, are different kinds of talent. Don’t most people sell their talent to the highest bidder?) Mammon is the temptation that underlies all other temptations; mammon is the snare, “a steel trap that crushes the bones,” Wesley wrote graphically, having in mind an eighteenth-century bear trap. Mammon is the poison that kills the most ardent discipleship. In Scripture money is related to holiness as money isn’t related to holiness in today’s church.

VI: —  Yet in our discussion of the holiness of God’s people we must beware at all times of why so very many people are nervous as soon as they hear the word ‘holiness.’ They are nervous because they have seen first-hand, and seen first-hand too often, an uninformed zeal for holiness pursue the holy (so-called) at the price of the human. It’s as though a zeal for holiness were inherently dehumanizing. We must renounce all such nonsense. The truth is, the purpose of God’s sanctifying grace is to render us authentically human. Some people have foolishly spoken of God’s sanctifying grace in terms of their becoming superhuman. But to aspire to be superhuman is to aspire after sin. To want to be superhuman is to disdain God’s gift of humanness. And not to put too fine an edge on it; to aspire to be superhuman is to behave like a subhuman. It is the purpose of God’s grace to render us authentically human.

What does this mean? A few minutes ago I spoke of the ‘root’ commandment of Scripture: “You shall be holy as I the Lord your God am holy.” Now recall the great commandment, “You shall love the Lord your God without qualification or reservation or hesitation, and you shall love your neighbour with total self-forgetfulness.” How is the root commandment related to the great commandment? The connection is plain: holiness is freedom to love. To be holy is to be human (authentically human); to be authentically human is to be free to love.

We must be sure to grasp that the great commandment mandates we love God and neighbour, not that we understand God or neighbour. To be sure, we must understand something of God or else it’s nonsensical to say we love him. It’s ludicrous to say “I love x, and I don’t have a clue as to who or what x might be.” At the same time, we can understand relatively little of God yet love him profoundly. And, regrettably, we can understand a great deal about God yet not love him at all, thanks to our sin-shrivelled heart.

Don’t misunderstand me: I never belittle understanding. God isn’t honoured by human ignorance, and above all never honoured by ignorance of the truth concerning him. In case anyone needs to be reminded, I have spent my entire working life teaching Christian doctrine; that is, I have always endeavoured to help people understand the truth of God. After all, the more we understand of God the greater our capacity to love him. Yet we must never think that the ‘A’ student in systematic theology loves God exceedingly well by virtue of the grade she received in the theology course.

In the same vein I’ll never be found decrying the place of the will in Christian discipleship. I’m saddened to see people who have a wishbone where they ought to have a backbone. Yet I’m aware that love governs willing as surely as love governs understanding. Just as we understand most thoroughly what we love most profoundly, so we do most consistently what we love most profoundly.

In the short run we can always will what we don’t love. If we don’t love studying Greek but we do love basketball, in the short run, tonight, we can always study Greek anyway instead of watching the Raptors’ basketball game because there’s a Greek test tomorrow and if we don’t study we won’t pass. But what happens in the short run never happens in the long run. In the long run we always end up willing, doing, what we love; and in the long run we always come to understand most profoundly what we love. In other words, what we love integrates our understanding and our willing; which is to say, what we love integrates us. For this reason the great commandment isn’t that we understand God; the great commandment isn’t even that we obey him. The great commandment is that we love him, for if we genuinely love him we shan’t fail to understand him and obey him.

What about holiness and love of the neighbour? Once again, we are called to love the neighbour, not understand her. Regardless of what we might understand of her there remain oceanic immensities in her that we don’t understand and never will. When people tell me they can’t understand me, I remind them they should try loving me. In our depravity we prefer to understand the neighbour, and prefer this for two reasons: one, if we understand her we think we’ll have legitimate reason not to love her; two, if we understand her we’ll be able to manipulate her. But the great commandment forbids us to excuse our lovelessness and forbids us to manipulate. We are mandated to love.

Thomas Chalmers, a nineteenth-century Church of Scotland minister, spoke often of “the expulsive power of a new affection.” He meant that only a qualitatively new affection – Holy Spirit-quickened love of God and neighbour – could expel the old affections and passions that haunt us and hurt others. What’s involved in a new affection I have learned most profoundly from my friends who are addicts. The men and women of Alcoholics Anonymous distinguish between someone who is chemically sober and someone who is contentedly sober. The chemically sober person is the addict who is alcohol-free at this moment, in the short run, thanks to his short-run force of will. But everyone knows he’s going to relapse in the long run, still in bondage to his addiction. The contentedly sober person, on the other hand, can continue to will his sobriety just because he’s intimately acquainted with “the expulsive power of a new affection.”

Holiness is finding through God’s grace the integration of the affections together with the integration of affect and understanding and will.

VII: — We began tonight with Gal. 6:14. We noted that to be crucified to the world and to have the world crucified to us means there’s nothing in the world we crave and by which we can be hooked, at the same time that there’s nothing in us that the world can use and by which we can be co-opted. We said too that to find ourselves in this situation is know ourselves free because freed by Jesus Christ.

As we are freed by Jesus Christ we are free from the world and its blandishments precisely in order to be free for the world in its need. Over and over the psalmist insists that God is for us. God is for the world. God so loved the world – and continues to love it – that he embraced the world so as never to disdain it or spurn it or abandon it.

Next we probed the nature of God’s holiness, God’s unique Godness wherein his being is free from the being of the creation in every respect. Now, however, we must be sure to grasp that God as God is free from the world in order to be free for the world. The God whose holiness means he must never be confused with the world is the God who so loves the world as never to fail it or forsake it.

By God’s grace you and I have been freed from our bondage to unbelief. Freed from our unbelief and its attendant self-absorption, we are freed for our immersion in God and our immersion in God’s world. It is God’s holiness that renders him singularly helpful to the world. It is no less our holiness that renders us salt and light in the midst of the world.

In a word, as we are crucified to the world and the world is crucified to us we are profoundly holy and pervasively a blessing to that world which we now love with a love that mirror’s God’s.

VIII: — The Newer Testament characteristically speaks of Christ’s people as hagioi, ‘holy ones,’ ‘saints.’ Saints aren’t spiritual super-achievers of any sort. Saints are simply exemplary human beings. Saints are human beings, restored by God’s grace to human authenticity, who exemplify him who went about doing good inasmuch as he knew that One alone is good, and this One alone is good just because this One is Yahweh, and Yahweh alone is God.


Victor Shepherd 7 June 2012

 

Why Does God Allow Bad Things Happen To Good People?

Isaiah 25:6-9   Mark 5:1-13; 21-24; 35-43.

 

I (i) —  “Why does God allow bad things to happen to good people” – this is the question I have been asked to address tonight.  I’m somewhat bothered by the question.  After all, since all of us are sinners – “No one is good but God alone”, says Christ Jesus our Lord – surely the question should be “Why does God allow bad things to happen to anyone?”  Since the ‘bad things’ by which we are assaulted are ‘bad’ insofar as they inflict suffering upon us, we could as readily ask, “Why does God allow people to suffer dreadfully?” or even “Why does God allow people to suffer at all?”

When we ask the question, “Why suffering?”, we may be assuming that God, good and powerful in equal measure, should be able to program a universe and design human beings in such a way that suffering would never occur.  In asking the question we are assuming that we human beings who are asking the question could remain who and what we are  — persons whose intellectual nature is what we know it to be — even if we were redesigned so as to be unable to suffer.

But is this the case?  To ask the question, “Why suffering?  Why does God permit suffering?”; such a question requires a high level of abstract thought.  The capacity for high level, abstract thought presupposes a very sophisticated brain and neural structure.  Neurobiologists remind us that as a creature’s neural complexity increases so does that creature’s level of consciousness.  A monkey has a spinal cord and brain vastly more complex than that of a toad. As neurological complexity increases, the level of consciousness increases and intelligence increases.  Neuroscientists are aware too, however, that increasing complexities in neural structure are quantitative: the shift from consciousness to self-consciousness, from percept-awareness to concept-awareness; this shift is qualitative.  Therefore while the human creature is the only instance in the animal world of self-consciousness, the only instance of abstract thought, our capacity for such can’t be reduced to unparalleled neural complexity.  But while our capacity here can’t be reduced to unparalleled neural complexity – that is, neural complexity isn’t sufficient to yield the capacity for abstract thought – neural complexity is necessary for abstract thought.  After all, a toad doesn’t ask questions like the question in tonight’s address.  Neither does a robin.  A robin isn’t distressed over the matter of slaying a worm, even though the writhing of the worm indicates that the worm resists being stretched and slain and eaten.  The robin merely kills and eats instinctually, as instinctually as the worm itself does whatever worms do to stay alive.

We human beings, however, are different. We don’t act instinctually; we ask questions.  To ask the question, “Why suffering in a world governed by God?”; simply to understand that there’s an issue here, simply to be able to formulate the question: all of this requires an exceedingly complex neural structure.  The complex neural structure that allows us to understand the problem and formulate the question is the same complex neural structure that gives us our extraordinary capacity for pain; not merely our capacity for physical pain, but also our capacity for emotional pain.
In asking the question we are assuming that we can have the extraordinary privilege, as it were, of being able to reflect as we do without our extraordinary vulnerability to suffering.  But – let me say it again – the neural complexity that supports advanced thinking is the same neural complexity that supports increased suffering.  Whenever we ask the question, “Why does God allow us to suffer?”, we are asking, in effect, “Why doesn’t God create us so that we can think profoundly enough to ask the question about suffering even as he creates us so that we have no capacity for suffering itself?”  In asking for this has it ever occurred to us that we might be asking for something that is logically self-contradictory?  If we were to ask, “Why doesn’t God make a square circle?”, we’d recognise immediately the silliness of what we’ve proposed; we’d never fault God for not making a square circle, since a square circle is a logical impossibility, an instance of nonsense, non-sense.  No one faults God for not creating non-sense.  When we ask the question that has motivated today’s sermon we should pause; we might be asking for non-sense; we might be asking for a logical impossibility.

(ii) In the second place, since we are creatures with enormous sensitivity to suffering, we must admit that some sensitivity to pain is essential to our self-preservation.  Sensitivity to physical pain is essential if we are going to survive in a physical world.  The elderly person who has lost sensitivity in her hand places her hand on a stove element to steady herself.  She burns her hand.  Then the burn infects. Now she has blood poisoning in her arm.  Because she has diminished sensitivity to pain she can’t protect herself; unable to protect herself, she can’t preserve herself.

In the same way it’s our capacity for mental anguish that facilitates our self-preservation.  The person who is working too hard, too long, under too much stress finds himself exhibiting telltale signs that he is close to collapse.  The telltale signs he exhibits are in fact different instances of suffering that are nothing less than a ‘wake-up’ call.  He’s been warned.  The warning signs (his suffering) tell him that he has to make changes for the sake of self-preservation.

(iii) In the third place, our capacity for suffering is also our capacity for pleasure.  To be without any vulnerability to pain would mean that we should never know delight.  Once more, to fault God for not making us able to experience pleasure without exposure to pain might be faulting him for not creating a logical impossibility, non-sense.

(iv) In the fourth place, when we think beyond our private vulnerability to suffering to our capacity to cause others to suffer, to harm them, the question then becomes, “Why is the universe so arranged that people can be made to suffer terribly on account of someone else’s cruelty?”  When we ask this question we forget that that arrangement of the universe which makes it possible for others to harm us also makes it possible for others to help us. (Such help we shall always need in a fallen world.  In heaven, however, we shall delight in our Lord and in each other without the capacity for pain, and because we shall lack nothing we shall neither need to be helped nor have the capacity to be harmed.)

(v) In the fifth place, we must never forget what C.S. Lewis holds up before us: “God whispers to us in our pleasures, shouts at us in our pain.”  Elsewhere the thoughtful Englishman has said, “Pain is God’s megaphone to rouse a deaf world.”  Most often we don’t even recognise sin’s consequences to be consequences of sin until pain has pierced us.  Our suffering here is God’s attempt at getting our attention.  (I say God’s attempt at getting our attention, since it’s obvious his previous attempts have failed).  As fallen creatures self-absorbed in folly we tend to get serious about our sin only as its consequences pain us.
“Why does God allow people to suffer so dreadfully?  Why does God allow people to suffer at all?”  I trust that what I have said so far provides reason for some suffering at least.

II: — At the same time I admit that when we have reflected upon the five considerations mentioned in the last few minutes we don’t have reason enough for the great weight of suffering afflicting humankind.  There is suffering so intense, so relentless, that it’s of no use at all.  It doesn’t further our self-preservation in any way.  It is vastly greater suffering than appears to be needed for anything.

The Great War (World War I) set a record, an infamous record: never before had nation slaughtered nation on such a hideous scale.  Twenty million people perished in World War I, that is, twenty million over the course of four years.  Virtually all of them, we should note, were military combatants waging war.
World War I was immediately followed by an outbreak of influenza.  The Great ’Flu Epidemic began in October 1918 and lasted until May 1919; the Great ’Flu Epidemic lasted only seven months.  In those seven months between 50 million and 100 million people perished.  Were those whom the ’Flu Epidemic consumed chiefly the very youngest and the very oldest, those with the least resistance to sickness?  On the contrary, those who perished in the epidemic were chiefly young men and women aged 20 to 45.  In other words, the ’Flu Epidemic slew young parents whose orphaned children would never recover psychologically or materially.

III: — In all our discussions concerning evil we had better be sure always to insist that evil is evil, unalterably evil, invariably evil.  We had better never be found mouthing the ridiculous platitudes that evil (what some ‘merely’ call ‘evil’) is actually a good in disguise.  A good in disguise is still good, however unrecognized.  Evil, however, can never be good.  We must never say that evil is a latent good, for a latent good is unarguably good.  Neither is evil good-on-the-way, or the potential for good.  Of itself evil is never the potential for anything except more evil.

My aunt’s grandson (my cousin’s son) died at age seven.  The little boy was born a normal child and developed normally until age two when he was diagnosed with a neurological disease.  His condition deteriorated thereafter.  His facial appearance changed — became grotesque, in fact; his mobility decreased; and his intellectual capacity decreased.  When I spoke with my aunt at the funeral parlour I said to her, “There’s no explanation for this.”  (I didn’t mean there was no neurological explanation; of course there was a neurological explanation.)  I meant, rather, “Given what you and I know of God, there’s no explanation for this.”  My aunt told me later it was the most comforting thing anyone had said to her at the funeral parlour, for virtually everyone who spoke with her put forth an “explanation”; such as, “Maybe God wanted to teach the parents something.” What were the parents supposed to be taught by watching their son suffer and stiffen and stupefy for five years?  “Maybe God was sparing the little boy something worse later in his life.”  It would be difficult to imagine anything worse.  These aren’t explanations; these are insults.  As long as God is love, unimpeded love, there isn’t going to be an explanation for this.

We must always be careful and think 25 times before we conclude we’ve found the meaning (or even a meaning) to such a development.  Think of the one and one-half million children who perished during the holocaust.  Their parents (four and one-half million of them) were first gassed to death, whereupon their remains were burnt.  The children, on the other hand, were never gassed; they were thrown live into the incinerators.  If anyone claims to be aware of the meaning of this event I shall say, among other things, “Meaning for whom? for the barbequed children? for their parents? for their survivors? for their executioners? for the shallow pseudo-philosophers who think their question is worth the breath they spend to utter it?”  What meaning could there ever be to such an event?

We can ask the same question in the midst of Toronto’s newest: a hospice for children afflicted with incurable, neurodegenerative diseases.

IV: — In light of what I’ve just said I have to tell you how unhappy I’ve been with Harold Kushner’s bestselling book (now twenty years old but still referenced), When Bad Things Happen To Good People.  I’m disappointed in the book for several reasons.  In the first place there’s virtually no discussion of God’s love in Kushner’s discussion of God.  In view of the fact that God is love, that God’s nature is to love, the book is woefully deficient right here.  In the second place, because God’s love isn’t discussed, the rest of the book is skewed.  Kushner writes, “Let me suggest that the bad things that happen to us in our lives do not have a meaning when they happen to us.  [I’ve no problem with this.]  They do not happen for any good reason which would cause us to accept them willingly.  [No problem here either.]  We can redeem these tragedies from senselessness by imposing meaning on them.”  I object to this statement.  We redeem them by imposing meaning on them?  Any meaning that is imposed can only be arbitrary.  An arbitrary meaning, something imposed, is just another form of “make-believe”, and no less “make-believe” for being adult “make-believe.”  My cousin and his wife whose seven-year old son died of neurological disease; what meaning were they supposed to impose on the event?  And why impose that meaning rather than another?  And how would the imposition of such arbitrary meaning redeem the tragedy?

Harold Kushner’s book is yet another attempt at theodicy.  Theodicy is the justification of God’s ways with humankind, the justification of God’s ways in the face of human suffering.  All attempts at theodicy left-handedly put God on trial, so to speak, and then develop arguments that acquit God, allowing us to believe in him after all, allowing us to believe that he really is kind and good despite so much that appears to contradict this.  All theodicies assume that we know what should happen in the world; as long as there continues to happen what shouldn’t, God (we think) is on trial; we have to develop arguments and marshal evidence that will acquit him if we are to go on believing in him.

Let me say right here that theodicy, or something approaching theodicy, is a theme of the book of Job.  Job, or perhaps more pointedly Job’s friends, ask the question ‘How can bad things happen to good people?’  We must be sure to notice two things about this question.
(i) The book of Job doesn’t answer the question in the sense of giving an explanation.  Instead of explaining anything God thunders at Job, “Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth?  Tell me, if you have understanding.” (Job. 38:4)  In other words, Job’s question, a question he regards as perfectly sensible, appears not to be sensible at all.

(ii) The second thing we must notice is this: Job’s question is a marginal question in scripture.  It isn’t scripture’s typical question; it isn’t the profoundest question; it’s a marginal question.  It’s marginal just because the logic of Job’s question doesn’t reflect the logic of scripture as a whole.

V: — Having brought this matter to our attention I want to move on to my next point; namely, our assumption that the questions we think to be obvious and obviously correct are the right questions.  The question, for instance, “If God is all-good, he must want to rectify the dreadful state of affairs so often found in people’s lives; if God is all-powerful, he must be able to rectify such a state of affairs.  Since such a state seems not to be rectified, then either God isn’t all-good or he isn’t all-powerful – right?”  Next we set about trying to remove the suspicion that surrounds either God’s goodness or his might.  We think our question to be the right question, even the only question.  But in fact the question we’ve just posed didn’t loom large until the 18th century, specifically the 18th century Enlightenment.  The question we’ve just posed was raised by Enlightenment thinkers who weren’t even Christians.  Eighteenth century Enlightenment atheists raised the question, and Christians took it over in that they thought it to be a profound question.  But this question didn’t loom large in the Middle Ages where physical suffering, at least, was worse than it is today.  This question wasn’t pre-eminent in the ancient world; neither was it front-and-centre in the biblical era.  The pre-eminent question in the biblical era wasn’t “Why?” or “How?” or “How come?”, because those people already knew why: the entire creation is molested by the evil one.  The pre-eminent question in the biblical era was “How long?  How long before God terminates this state of affairs?  What’s taking him so long?”

Think for a minute of the biblical era; think of John the Baptist.  John and Jesus were cousins.  Not only were they related by blood, they were related by vocation.  John began his public ministry ahead of Jesus.  John’s ministry ended abruptly when a wicked woman, angry at his denunciation of her sexual irregularities, had him slain.  What did Jesus do when he learned of John’s death and the circumstances of John’s death?  Did Jesus say, “We need a theodicy.  We need a justification of the ways of God.  We need an explanation of how John’s terrible death could occur in a world ruled by a God whose love is mighty.  And if no explanation is forthcoming, then perhaps we can’t believe in God.” — did Jesus say this?  Jesus said no such thing.  When John’s head was severed Jesus didn’t cry to heaven, “You expect me to trust you as my Father; but how can I believe you’re my Father, for what Father allows his child to be beheaded?  In view of what happened to cousin John, I can’t be expected to think that I’m dear to you.”  Jesus said no such thing.  When he was informed of the grisly death of John, Jesus said, “It’s time I got to work.”  Whereupon he began his public ministry, and began it knowing that what had befallen John would befall him too, and did it all with his trust in his Father unimpaired.

My point is this: that question which we suppose to be a perennial question, “How can we continue to believe in a mighty, loving God when terrible things keep happening in our world?” — wasn’t the most pressing question in the biblical era or the ancient church or the mediaeval church.  It was shouted chiefly in the 18th century Enlightenment, and was shouted by atheists.  Having heard the atheists’ question, the church took it over thinking it to be the soul of profundity.

Susannah Wesley, mother of John and Charles, had 19 children.  Ten of them survived.  As the other nine died (eight of them in infancy), Susannah’s heart broke.  Never think that she didn’t care; never think that her heart wasn’t as torn as anyone’s heart would be torn today.  Read her diary the day after a domestic helper accidentally smothered Susannah’s three-week old baby.  Infant death was as grievous to parents then as it is now.  What was different, however, is this: even as Susannah pleaded with God for her babes while they died in her arms she never concluded that God wasn’t to be trusted or loved or obeyed or simply clung to; she never concluded that as a result of her heartbreak God could only be denounced and abandoned.
Until the 18th century Enlightenment there was no expectation of living in a world other than a world riddled with accident, misfortune, sickness, disease, unrelievable suffering, untimely death.  There was no expectation of anything else.  It was recognized that the world, in its fallen state, is shot through with unfairness, injustice, inevitable inequities, unforeseeable tragedies.  When John the Baptist was executed Jesus didn’t say, “If honouring God’s will entails that then I need a different Father.”  Instead Jesus said, “I’ve got work to do and I’d better get started.”  Susannah Wesley didn’t say, “If I bear children only to have half of them succumb to pneumonia and diphtheria, I should stop having them.”  Instead she had twice as many.  If today our expectation is so very different on account of the Enlightenment, then what did the Enlightenment cause us to expect?

VI: — The Enlightenment brought us to expect that humankind can control, control entirely, the world and everything about it.  The Enlightenment brought us to expect that we are or can be in control of every last aspect of our existence.  Specifically, the Enlightenment brought us to expect that the practice of medicine would smooth out our lives.  And with the new expectation of physicians there arose as well a new agenda for physicians.  Whereas physicians had always been expected to care for patients, now physicians were expected to cure patients.  Until the Enlightenment physicians were expected to care: they were to alleviate pain wherever they could, they were expected to ease the patient in every way possible, and above all they were expected to ease the patient through death, which death everyone knew to be unavoidable in any case.  But cure?  No one expected physicians to cure, at least to cure very much.  Nowadays physicians are expected to cure everything.  I’m convinced that people unconsciously expect physicians to cure them of their mortality. When physicians can’t cure people of their vulnerability to death, blame for such failure is unconsciously transferred from medicine to God.

A minute ago I said that we creatures of modernity assume (arrogantly) that the questions we ask are the questions that people have asked in every era; our questions are perennial questions, and our answers are the only answers.  It’s not so.  If people today are asked how they’d prefer to die, they nearly always say, “Quickly.  I want to die quickly.  I’d like to slip away quietly in my sleep.”  During the Middle Ages, however, no one wanted to die quickly; people dreaded sudden death.  Why?  Sudden death gave them insufficient time to make adequate spiritual preparation for death.  What we regard as human expectations as old as humankind are actually very recent.  What’s more, these recent expectations weren’t fostered as we reflected on the nature and purpose and way of God; they were fostered by atheists who, at the time of the Enlightenment, came to think that there was nothing humankind couldn’t control.

VII: — Let’s come back to the situation of the young person afflicted with a lingering illness and about to die all too young.  Why are we especially upset at this?  I think we’re upset in that we feel the young person to have been cheated.  The 85-year old who dies has had a life, a complete life (or at least what we regard as complete.)  The eight-year old, we feel, hasn’t; she’s been cheated.  The elderly person’s life can be told by means of a story; the young person, on the other hand, has virtually no story to be told.  I am 69 years old, and if I die tonight others will gather up my life in a story and tell the story.  Hearers will identify me, the real “me”, with my story.  But let’s be honest: they will regard “me” and my story as identical in that my story is fit to be told (I’ve never been publicly disgraced); my story is positive (I’m a ‘winner,’ a highly successful professional); my story is rich (supposedly).  No one would hesitate to tell my story.  But if my story were one that couldn’t be told; if my story were bleak or disgraceful or shocking or simply incomprehensible, others would like to think that the real “me” was somehow better, somehow grander, than my shabby story or my incomprehensible story.

It isn’t only the eight-year old child with leukaemia or neurodegenerative disease whose story seems to be sad and sorry and miserable.  There are many, many adults whose stories are longer, to be sure, but no better.  One Sunday, several years ago, a man wearing a clerical collar sat in the gallery of my church in Mississauga, accompanied by a lawyer-friend of mine.  The man with the collar was an Anglican clergyman.  He was also a plastic surgeon with a practice in one of the wealthiest areas of Toronto.  He was at worship, that Sunday, as he awaited trial.  He and his estranged wife had had an altercation, in the course of which his wife was struck, the result of which was that her skull was fractured.  Several weeks after the service he attended in Mississauga the fellow was convicted and sent to jail.  Upon his release from jail the College of Physicians and Surgeons restored his licence, thus permitting him to do plastic surgery again.  The Anglican Church, however, didn’t reinstate him as a clergyman.  A year later the man committed suicide.  What’s his story?  Is it a grand story?     Is it a story anyone would envy?  Or is it a story better left untold?

Maureen and I were asleep on a Friday evening when the phone rang at midnight.  The caller was a man I’ve looked out for for 35 years.  He’s paranoid schizophrenic.  I’ve followed him around to restaurants, hospitals, jails, and numerous shabby “digs.”  Last autumn he was in Vancouver and got into a “discussion” (as he tells his story) with a motel clerk.  The clerk phoned the police, and Eric spent the next three months in a provincial psychiatric hospital.    A week or two before Christmas I took him to Swiss Chalet for lunch.  We had been seated for only a few seconds when he leapt out of his seat and shouted, “It’s bugged.  It’s bugged.  There’s a tape-recorder under my seat.”  I took the shaken waitress aside, told her my friend was deranged, promised her I’d see that no harm befell her, and asked her to find us seats in an area that was free of hidden tape-recorders.  A few months after this incident Eric phoned me again.  In the afternoon he’d gone to a barber shop, only to have the barber “butcher” his hair.  And why had the barber “butchered” his hair? Because the barber too is part of the conspiracy that is putting foreign substances in Eric’s drinking water and causing his urine to stink.  Eric had come home; while making supper his sister had burnt the toast; Eric had decompensated and smashed the toaster.  His sister had fled the house; the police had been called; Eric had refused to open the door to them – and was now in a great deal more trouble.  Eric was phoning me at midnight.  He wasn’t angry and he wasn’t violent: he was frightened, terribly frightened.  He feared he was going to be sent back to a provincial hospital.  Eric is 75 years old.  He was diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic when he was a 20-year old university student.  Eric has suffered atrociously since then.  He hasn’t had one torment-free day in 55 years.  What’s Eric’s story?  Do you want to hear all the details?  Would anyone want his story (all of it) told at his funeral?  Tell me: are Eric and Eric’s story identical?

The truth is, none of us is identical with our story.  Our story isn’t big enough, comprehensive enough, grand enough.  None of us has a story (whether tellable or untellable) that does justice to who we are truly in ourselves because of who we are truly before God.  Our story is small and feeble and miserable and frustrated.  Often our story, so far from reflecting who we truly are, contradicts who we truly are.  Our story has to be taken up into a much bigger story.
Then what’s the bigger story, grander story, for Eric?  It’s the story of a man who once lived in a cemetery. (Mark 5:1-20)  He was violent, anti-social, and an inveterate “streaker.”  One day Jesus came upon him and asked, “What’s your name?”  “My name?”, the fellow replied, “I’ve got lots of names.  I’m your local nut-case; so why not call me ‘Peanut, Pistachio and Pecan’, ‘P-cubed’ for short.”  Some time later the townspeople saw the same man seated, clothed and in his right mind.  By God’s grace that gospel-story has been appointed to be Eric’s story, Eric’s true story.  That story is the final story into which Eric’s story is taken up and in which Eric’s story is transfigured.

And the eight-year old who has just died of leukaemia?  Her story too is bigger, grander than most people know.  A distraught man cried to Jesus, “My daughter is sick unto death.  Won’t you come with me?”  Our Lord is delayed by a needy woman who is distressed herself.  While he’s delayed, the daughter dies.  Now all the relatives are beside themselves.  Jesus declares, “The little girl isn’t dead; she’s asleep.”  The relatives scorn him.  Plainly she’s dead; anyone can see she’s dead.  But you see, in the presence of Jesus Christ (only in the presence of him who is himself resurrection and life, only in his presence but assuredly in his presence) death is but sleep.  The girl is awakened shortly — as the eight-year old has been appointed to be awakened.  This is the story into which the leukaemia patient’s story is taken up and in which it is transfigured.

VIII: — If you ask me why such things as leukaemia and neurodegenerative disorders mental illness happen I shall not attempt an answer.  When tragedy befell John the Baptist Jesus didn’t say, “I can’t figure out why these things happen; therefore I can’t trust my Father.”  Jesus knew that in a fallen world such things happen and will continue to happen until God’s patience, finally exhausted, ends the era of the fall and with it forecloses the day of grace.  Jesus didn’t explain John’s wretched death; Jesus responded to the news of his cousin’s death by launching his public ministry.

Let me conclude by recalling Aaron, my cousin’s little boy who was diagnosed with a neurological disease at age two and who declined hideously for the next five years.  Our Lord offers no explanation.  (What help would an explanation provide?)  Our Lord, rather, whose risen life is grander even than his life from Bethlehem to Golgotha; his risen life is that larger, grander story in which Aaron’s story is transfigured.  Furthermore, our Lord is the occasion of a response: the response of Aaron’s friends and relatives and neighbours and congregation.  The response we make to all such developments is an expression of our caring.  (Not an expression of our curing; ultimately I can’t cure you, you can’t cure me, and medical practice can’t cure any of us, ultimately.)  Such a response will be caring enough until that day when we see our Lord face-to-face, the sight of whose face will transfigure our face, for the sight of his face will be enough to wipe away every tear from every eye.

Victor Shepherd                                                                     Westminster Chapel 2013

David Lauber. Barth on the Descent into Hell: God, Atonement and the Christian Life.

David Lauber. Barth on the Descent into Hell: God, Atonement and the Christian Life.
Burlington , VT : Ashgate, 2004. Pp vi + 186.         cloth, us$89.95. ISBN 0-7546-43341-1

 

The purpose of David Lauber’s book is an investigation of Karl Barth’s understanding of Christ’s suffering of the wrath of God on our behalf and in our place.

The foil for this book is Wayne Grudem’s article, “He Did Not Descend into Hell: A Plea for Following Scripture Instead of the Apostles’ Creed” [Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 34 (1991) pp. 103-13.] Contradicting Grudem at al points, Lauber asserts relentlessly that the descent into hell is intrinsic to a complete understanding of the substitutionary suffering of Jesus.

The immediate conversation partner throughout is Hans Urs von Balthasar in his perspective on the descent.

Lauber explores Barth’s grasp of the divine condemnation that Jesus Christ bore on behalf of humankind.  While Barth has affinities with Anselm, his understanding of the atonement moves beyond the static, mechanical – even non-biblical transactional – aspects of the Latin view of the cross.  Insofar as Barth relocates the descent in the doctrine of God he avoids the liabilities that have haunted the Latin view of the atonement and its espousal of penal substitution; namely, how the sacrifice of an innocent human changed God’s nature from wrath to love and allowed grace to succeed judgement. Love, rather, provides the sacrifice even as grace precipitates saving judgement.

With Calvin, Barth insists that the curse, punishment and ordeal that Jesus endured in the cross as God’s reaction to sin – specifically, the humanly incomprehensible horror of the dereliction – is the descent; for here Jesus, the ever-obedient Son, was cast into an abyss that no one else can mine or measure.  Unacceptable, then, is any notion that the descent is the exalted Christ’s “journey” wherein he “harrows hell” as he engages the devil and releases captive believers. Neither Friday’s finished work nor Easter’s disclosure of it lends the Church anything to say concerning Holy Saturday.

Lauber contrasts the lattermost point with Balthasar’s exposition of Holy Saturday wherein Balthasar affirms the descent to be distinct from the cross (albeit never separated from it), viewing the descent as marking the defeat of sin and death and acting as a transition from death to resurrection.

Balthasar distances himself from the language of “descent”, arguing that Jesus qua dead can do nothing. Jesus, rather, is taken to the dead. Jesus’ “descent” is first to Sheol of the Older Testament.  In Sheol Jesus, the God-forsaken one, fulfils the judgement that was adumbrated in God’s judgement on covenant-breakers, the judgement that had been pointed to in God’s abandonment, e.g., of Moses, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Job and the Suffering Servant.  Beyond Sheol, however, Christ’s “descent” is an experience of the ‘second’ death. Here Balthasar departs from Barth, as Balthasar insists that God-forsakenness prior to Jesus’ death (“Why have you forsaken me?”) is not the same as God-forsakenness after death.  While diverging here from the Reformed tradition, Balthasar maintains nonetheless that there is nothing insufficient or incomplete in Friday. Still, on Friday Jesus, actively obedient, endures God’s wrath; on Saturday, utterly passive, Jesus is one with the poena damni. In complete solidarity with the dead, he, alone the Son of God Incarnate, is uniquely subject to the arch-torment of rejection at the Father’s hand – which rejection forges hell; i.e., hell is a product of the world’s redemption.

What are the implications of the descent for the Trinitarian life of God? Having exposed Karl Rahner’s discussion of the descent briefly yet convincingly as disguised naturalism, Lauber criticizes Juergen Moltmann at length. Moltmann maintains that the dereliction introduces a rift into the divine life.   At the cross God “becomes” or “turns into” (p. 122) what God formerly was not. God isn’t love eternally. God becomes love only as there is a creation to be loved; i.e., God creates the world as an act of divine self-completion.  More to the point, God has to suffer at the hands of the world in order to be God. Lost here is the particularity of the dereliction as the enacting of sin-bearing atonement. Instead God is now qualified to be an empathic fellow-victim of creaturely brutality even as God is fully constituted God.

Upholding the distinction between immanent and economic Trinities, Barth and Balthasar assess the dereliction regarding Trinitarian implications while avoiding Moltmann’s divagations. Balthasar insists that the eternal intimacy of Father and Son assumes another modality in the economy of the Incarnation as the dereliction occasions a new expression of the eternal love of the Triune God.  Unlike Moltmann, Balthasar maintains that the mission of Jesus is grounded in the eternal procession of Father and Son, even as mission is never collapsed into procession. In this way the effectual specificity of the dereliction is recognized as an event in the life of the Triune God (the dereliction enacts; it doesn’t merely illustrate) while the eternal Tri-unity of God is preserved.

The book concludes with an application of the descent for Christian discipleship.  Disciples can’t bear Christ’s cross, and he won’t bear theirs.  While his is atoning and theirs isn’t, his mandating theirs invites a conversation with Balthasar’s sounding of Colossians 1:24, wherein disciples’ sufferings “complete” what is “lacking” in Christ’s afflictions, even as Christ’s are deficient in nothing.

One mark of a good book is the protracted discussion it catalyzes with its principals and its topic. In this regard Lauber’s book is exemplary.

 

Victor A. Shepherd

Tyndale Seminary

Toronto

 

Greschat, Martin; Martin Bucer: A Reformer and His Times.

Greschat, Martin; Martin Bucer: A Reformer and His Times.  Louisville : Westminster John Knox Press, 2004. Pp. xii + 340. paper, can$34.50. ISBN 0-664-22690-6. Translated by Stephen E. Buckwalter.

 

The ligature of Greschat’s fine book is Bucer’s career-long preoccupation: the transmutation – individual, social, institutional, even economic – that Jesus Christ effects in God’s people.   Bucer’s formal theology, occasional writing, and day-to-day activity alike orbited around this epicentre.  Church discipline was a means to the transmutation of ethic and ethos, and for this reason Bucer insisted that church discipline was a nota or “mark” of the church in addition to Word and sacraments (i.e., discipline pertains to the being of the church, not merely to its wellbeing.) He remained aware, however, that any discipline that was merely imposed could only coerce and antagonize simultaneously; the law of God had to be written on the heart. This could be fostered only through smaller fellowships within a congregation, issuing in greater spiritual intimacy and accountability.  Bucer never surrendered his conviction here.

Becoming acquainted with Bucer’s spirit and genius, however, is less straightforward than with other Reformers in that Bucer wrote less.  In fact he appeared to his disadvantage when he had to write; he was at his best when face-to-face with those whose hostility his transparency could defuse and for whom his gift of public speaking (vastly more telling than his written articulation) could birth nuances that evaporated standoffs and advanced understanding, even as his non-acerbic wit melted defensiveness.   In other words, while he was no less talented than other Reformers, Bucer’s gifts were notably different.  He was a conciliator, working indefatigably for Protestant accord amidst intra-Protestant disputes no less jagged than those with Rome . He was the acknowledged father-figure among a constellation of dazzling theological stars in Strasbourg : Matthew Zell, preacher; Wolfgang Capito, theologian; Caspar Hedio, translator from Latin to German. When Calvin sought refuge in Strasbourg (1538-1541) Bucer schooled Calvin in the liturgical order, the singing of psalms, the function of ecclesiastical offices, and the weekly meeting of pastors – all of which Calvin would implement upon his return to Geneva.  From 1534 to 1539 he travelled 12,000 kilometres on difficult and dangerous roads on behalf of Protestant unity.  Between 1538 and 1541 he addressed colloquies at Leipzig , Hagenau, Worms and Regensburg .

Bucer’s major work, De Regno Christi, together with his commentaries on Psalms and Ephesians, remain landmarks in Reformation theology. Still, they seem lonely alongside the prodigious written output of Luther, Calvin and Bullinger (the lattermost having written more than the former two combined.) Plainly Bucer’s formal theological contribution was eclipsed by his possession of gifts and graces beyond theology that the leader of any era needs if the Kingdom of Christ is to gain visibility.

Bucer insisted on identifying the non-negotiable core of the substance of the faith. One aspect of it, he maintained consistently, was justification by grace through faith.  No less crucial was godliness, both individual and social, shaped not by the letter of the Old testament but rather by the justice, equity and mood that the Old Testament aspires to inculcate – with all of this infused by an incursion of the Holy Spirit (in everything he wrote Bucer elevated the Old Testament and magnified the Holy Spirit, grounding both in the Christological concern characteristic of Reformation theology) that alone spared the church deadly, gospel-less legalism. Having identified the core, Bucer then moved outward, in concentric circles as it were, to what was arguable, concluding with the optional, the adiaphora, all the while forging a credibility with Anabaptists, Lutherans and Roman Catholics that would adorn ecumenism today.  While Bucer never denied major problems in the Catholic Church of his day (not least of which for him was the sacrifice of the mass), he insisted unrelentingly that the Church of Rome was church, the Body of Christ. For this reason he could write “I do hope, however, that there are many dear children on both sides, improperly named after men, and thus kept divided.   We should …use all ways and means in order that all God-fearing persons in all camps become united in Christ, our Lord.” (p.104)  Unlike most giants of the Reformation whose written legacy the church will never be without, Bucer’s achievement as conciliator and mentor consisted almost entirely of his influence.

No “Buceran” church or denomination has been named after the man who towered over Strasbourg as surely as Luther did over Wittenberg and Calvin over Geneva . The reason is plain: following Charles V’s defeat of the Schmalkaldic League in 1547, the future of the church lay with territories whose prince-protector could guarantee institutional survival. As a free Imperial city, Strasbourg had no such protector, with the result that the Reformation couldn’t remain fixed there. City authorities made their peace (Bucer would say they compromised) with those bent on overturning the Reformation.  Bucer had to move to England .

Feted at Cambridge University , Bucer was awarded its first honorary doctorate in theology.  Yet the adjustment to England was difficult. In a letter to William Farel he indicated what grated on him: weather, language, food, customs, housing, wine, inefficient fireplaces, “and just about everything else.” (p.245). Centuries later the scope of his theological contribution to the English church was celebrated; better scholarship, however, has soberly concluded that his noteworthy work in his new home appeared in the theological shift from the Catholicism of the 1549 Book of Common Prayer to the Protestantism of the 1552 revision – even though Bucer died one year before it appeared.         When “Bloody” Mary ascended and set about undoing the Reformation in England , she had his remains exhumed and burnt.  Her successor, Elizabeth I, rehabilitated him.

And yet there recrudesces in the characteristically conciliatory, irenic Bucer the horrific anti-Semitism that disfigures Humanists, Magisterial and Anabaptist Reformers alike.   In this regard Bucer, master-Hebraist notwithstanding, exhibited the Church’s age-long inability to understand God’s covenant as indefeasible (despite the Reformers’ preoccupation with covenant.)   Bucer, lamentably, recommended to political authorities that Jews not be allowed to build synagogues; Jews were to be barred from the trades; Jews were to refrain from “blaspheming Christ.” They were to be engaged “in the humblest, most arduous and most trying tasks” (p.157) – namely, sweeping chimneys, cleaning sewers, and disposing of deadstock. Such means, Bucer wrote, would prove to be a “deterrent and a corrective.” (p.157)  Subsequently Jews were permitted to engage in commerce even as they were consigned to the accursed role of moneylender, albeit only under the strictest supervision. The Talmud was banned; Jewish attendance at Christian services designed to convert them was mandated; if Jew and Christian were found living together both were executed. While none of this is extraordinary in light of the anti-Jewish miasma of the era, something better could have been expected from Bucer in light of his massive emphasis on the Old Testament in his programmatic Christianizing of Strasbourg’s social order, and in view of his recognition of Torah as God’s loving, salvation-bringing Word and Way – an understanding that Luther never attained.

Greschat’s book is essential reading for all who investigate the Reformation and who know that the wheels of history are turned as much by who people are unselfconsciously as by what they contrive to write.

 

 

Victor Shepherd
Tyndale University College & Seminary
Toronto

MacLeod, A. Donald. W. Stanford Reid: An Evangelical Calvinist in the Academy.

MacLeod, A. Donald. W. Stanford Reid: An Evangelical Calvinist in the Academy. Montreal & Kingston : McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004.         Pp. xxii + 401. Cloth $80.00 or Paper $29.95     

ISBN: 0-7735-2770-2 (cloth) or 0-7735-2818-0 (paper)

 

This book is the thirty-first in Series Two of McGill-Queen’s Studies in the History of Religion. Like the fifty-six others in Series One and Two it endeavours to acquaint readers with determinative aspects of Canadian history, culture and religious life. In exploring the life and work of W. Stanford Reid (1913 – 1996) it fills two major lacunae, the first being the need for a thorough study of a figure whose mark in both university and church (such a two-fold mark wasn’t rare in an earlier era but has become exceedingly rare more recently) renders him formative.  The second lacuna is the need for situating Reid himself in a theological tradition and a Canadian denomination from which he couldn’t be deracinated and on whose behalf he struggled tirelessly, albeit less effectively (it would seem) than he would have preferred.

This book delivers all that it promises.  In its seventeen chapters of approximately equal length it judiciously reflects the able historian’s avoidance of “over-determination;” i.e., it recognizes the interplay of religious, social, historical, economic and national factors.  It begins with the significance of Reid’s foreparents in Nineteenth Century Anglophone Quebec ; it concludes with an exhaustive bibliography of Reid’s writings.  It never drifts, however, from its orientation as advertised in the title: Reid as Calvinist by conviction and history teacher by profession. In substance, style and lucidity it is exemplary.

In the course of mining the profundities, not to say murky depths, of church and university and human psyche, MacLeod traces at least three lodes that are readily discernible.  In the first place the book acquaints readers with a man whose theological carriage was as stark, unalterable and unmistakable as was his larger-than-average physical presence.  Amidst a milieu of doctrinally diluted, ecumenical accommodation Reid is exposed as an unapologetic “confessionalist” (a term MacLeod uses repeatedly as characteristic descriptor.)  In short, while Reid was neither a fundamentalist nor a literalist (his “confessional” conservatism often found him accused of such), he remained possessed of irrefrangible conviction concerning the tenets of the Magisterial Reformers, especially those of John Calvin. Reid’s was not a cultural Presbyterianism, the misty-eyed yen to use the church as a vehicle for preserving bagpipe and haggis.  Neither was his a state-Presbyterianism, coveting the place of the Kirk in Scotland while lamenting the denial of a similar place to the Kirk’s Canadian descendant in the New World . While Reid was known outside the Presbyterian communion chiefly as a Professor of History, first at McGill and then at the University of Guelph (where he headed the history department) MacLeod persists in holding up Reid’s vocation to the ordained ministry, his zeal for preaching and teaching in the church even when he ceased to have a pastoral appointment, and his poimenical concern for fellow-congregants and needy students.

While a mind, like the Word of God it apprehends, is commended for being “sharper than a two-edged sword,” a sharp-edged personality is not. MacLeod, however, always does justice to both, pointing out Reid’s inimitable contribution to Scottish Studies (see the list of graduate students whose work in this field he supervised at the University of Guelph), and keening quietly over Reid’s occasional proclivity to excoriate if not lacerate, which proclivity deprived Reid of institutional support when he needed it most.

With respect to this last point it is sufficient to recall Reid’s refusal to extend congratulations to Dr. David Hay upon the latter’s retirement. Hay had served Knox College as Professor of Systematic Theology for thirty-three years.         In his penultimate year Hay had publicly described evangelicals in the Presbyterian Church as “Rechabites,” “freeloaders and institutional parasites” (p.232.)  Reid, converted at age fourteen by means of a Montreal street-corner evangelist, upheld the evangelical ethos ever after.  A graduate of Westminster Seminary ( Philadelphia ) and its trustee for decades, Reid also exalted the Reformed tradition.  Hay disavowed Reformed evangelicalism.  His remark widened a fissure between him and Reid that would never be bridged. Like his beloved John Knox (Reid had written a major biography of the Scottish Reformer) Reid “neither flattered nor feared any flesh.”

The second lode is MacLeod’s candid tour of the subterranean trade-offs, political favours and power echelons that bedevil any institution. Forthrightly and fairly he identifies, describes and amplifies the machinations riddling the denomination generally and Reid’s situation particularly.  In this regard MacLeod helps readers understand what lurked and why when Reid appeared to be ill-treated on several fronts, and how it was that Reid, if not marginalized, was certainly kept away from key positions and professorships in his denomination and its seminaries.

The third lode is MacLeod’s self-exposure. No doubt unintentionally and certainly unobtrusively yet no less unmistakeably, MacLeod’s “heart” is revealed.  Trained in history at Harvard, currently pastor to a small-city congregation, like Reid he loves the denomination he will not leave.  There is no bitterness here, no self-exempting accusation, no angry denunciation; there is however, the sober acknowledgement that sin blinds and corrupts, with the result that doors providentially opened do close, and opportunities for appointing prophets pass.  While MacLeod has spent much more of his working life as a congregational pastor than Reid did, as Adjunct Professor of Missions at Tyndale University College & Seminary he too is “an evangelical Calvinist in the academy.” Yet he remains himself.

Calvin, loved by Reid and MacLeod alike, said that those who try to mimic a giant in the faith without being moved by the Spirit “are not imitators; they are apes.” (Commentary Matthew 9:20) MacLeod is anything but an ape.

 

Victor Shepherd

Tyndale University College & Seminary

Keith Haartman, Watching and Praying: Personality Transformation in Eighteenth Century British Methodism

(STUDIES IN RELIGION/SCIENCES RELIGIEUSES, Fall 2005 )

Watching and Praying: Personality Transformation in Eighteenth Century British Methodism

Keith Haartman

Amsterdam , NY : Rodopi, 2004. xii, 241

 

This book is the fourth volume in the series, “Contemporary Psychoanalytic Studies”. Not surprisingly, then, the book aims passim at a psychoanalytic exploration, amplification and assessment of the personality transformations of those who were the immediate beneficiaries of the eighteenth century Methodist movement spawned and sustained by John Wesley.   Unlike most psychoanalytic attempts at explanation (the book insists on explaining religious development, not merely describing it), Haartman’s doesn’t regard religious experience as inherently pathological.

Haartman’s debt to two notable psychologists, Melanie Klein and Abraham Maslow, is evident and acknowledged.         Klein’s psychoanalytic work with children figures significantly throughout Watching, while Maslow’s concept of self-actualization is melded with such traditional aspects of psychoanalysis as the relation of superego to ego-ideal and the nature of ego reaction.

Drawing on Wesley’s Sermons on Several Occasions (150 sermons in four volumes) and his movement’s journal, Arminian Magazine (published first in 1778, and as Methodist Magazine after 1798), Haartman consistently relates the normative function of the former to the anecdotal function of the latter.         Perceptively he grasps Wesley’s insistence on “salvation” as a present reality (rather than a post-mortem occurrence), and relates it to the psychoanalytic agenda of unconscious-conflict resolution and intrapsychic integration. In all of this Haartman indicates how psychoanalysis provides a tool for understanding the process of the doctrinal tenets that early-day Methodists embodied.

Foundational to Haartman’s entire exposition, and according to him the first stage of religious development, is the unconscious conflict pertaining to childhood stresses: parental punishment, unresolved grief and separation anxiety. (In the 1700s parents were urged not to “spare the rod”; the infant/childhood death rate was higher than 50% in many areas of Britain ; and children were frequently traumatized on account of the untimely loss of parents through sickness and accident.)

The second stage, “justification”, is a form of displacement of ordinary consciousness. Here the accumulation of grief, guilt and anxiety issues in a crisis religiously labelled “repentance”, which crisis ought then to be resolved as the penitent is flooded with an awareness of God’s pervasive pardon, free acceptance, and ubiquitous mercy.         In psychoanalytic terms, the crisis is defused as it proceeds to a punitive ecstasy where new-born believers, rejoicing in their deliverance, apprehend themselves and the entire creation as unfolding within the sphere of God’s omnipresent love.         Concomitantly with this unitive ecstasy, believers recognize and surrender to God’s claim upon them for “inward and outward holiness” (a favourite expression of Wesley’s whereby he means transformation of disposition and conduct alike) – or, once again, unconscious moral insights or ego-ideals can be said to be brought to consciousness.

The third and final stage consists of “watching and praying”.         Ever “watching” believers introspect so as to become increasingly aware of threats to their integration that might precipitate “backsliding”, a regression to the pre-justification stage of development. Ever “praying”, they “practise the presence” (of God), therein conforming to the ego-ideal that the Christian tradition has named “sanctification”.

While Haartman insists that religious ecstasies and unitive experiences pertain to the core of Methodist spirituality, they are not (or at least not necessarily) manic denials of the reality principle.         Notwithstanding the psychological assessment, there remains an ontological assessment that the book appears to overlook; namely, what do psychoanalysis and Wesley (the Methodist movement) affirm to be ultimately real? The ontology of the former is natural; the latter’s is supernatural, the presence and significance of Spirit, that reality which cannot be reduced to the natural world nor to any aspect or dimension of it.         While the book renounces naturalistic reduction, many passages in it suggest the opposite. For instance, in speaking of justification (the Christian affirmation that those “in the wrong” before God are rendered “rightly related” to God), Haartman writes, “In the optimal outcome of the desolation crisis, the lifting of repression allows the ego to regain access to intrapsychic representations of the good parent.”(p.114)         Elsewhere he writes, “…psychic integration, what Wesley deemed ‘growth in grace’”. (p173)         For Wesley these two developments were ontically dissimilar: one could be growing in grace while lacking psychic integration.

Irrespective of the foregoing, Watching displays a thorough grasp of the classical and contemporary psychoanalytic literature. It is replete with helpful insights concerning the Methodist tradition.         It is cogently argued. It is a worthy contribution to the psycho-religious discussion and will foster much fruitful discussion.

Keith Haartman currently teaches at the Institute of Communication and Culture, University of Toronto at Mississauga .

 

 

Victor Shepherd

Professor of Systematic and Historical Theology

Tyndale University College & Seminary

Toronto

Molnar, Paul D. Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity

(STUDIES IN RELIGION/SCIENCES RELIGIEUSES, Fall 2005 )


Watching and Praying: Personality Transformation in Eighteenth Century British Methodism

Keith Haartman

Amsterdam , NY : Rodopi, 2004. xii, 241

 

This book is the fourth volume in the series, “Contemporary Psychoanalytic Studies”. Not surprisingly, then, the book aims passim at a psychoanalytic exploration, amplification and assessment of the personality transformations of those who were the immediate beneficiaries of the eighteenth century Methodist movement spawned and sustained by John Wesley.   Unlike most psychoanalytic attempts at explanation (the book insists on explaining religious development, not merely describing it), Haartman’s doesn’t regard religious experience as inherently pathological.

Haartman’s debt to two notable psychologists, Melanie Klein and Abraham Maslow, is evident and acknowledged.         Klein’s psychoanalytic work with children figures significantly throughout Watching, while Maslow’s concept of self-actualization is melded with such traditional aspects of psychoanalysis as the relation of superego to ego-ideal and the nature of ego reaction.

Drawing on Wesley’s Sermons on Several Occasions (150 sermons in four volumes) and his movement’s journal, Arminian Magazine (published first in 1778, and as Methodist Magazine after 1798), Haartman consistently relates the normative function of the former to the anecdotal function of the latter.         Perceptively he grasps Wesley’s insistence on “salvation” as a present reality (rather than a post-mortem occurrence), and relates it to the psychoanalytic agenda of unconscious-conflict resolution and intrapsychic integration. In all of this Haartman indicates how psychoanalysis provides a tool for understanding the process of the doctrinal tenets that early-day Methodists embodied.

Foundational to Haartman’s entire exposition, and according to him the first stage of religious development, is the unconscious conflict pertaining to childhood stresses: parental punishment, unresolved grief and separation anxiety. (In the 1700s parents were urged not to “spare the rod”; the infant/childhood death rate was higher than 50% in many areas of Britain ; and children were frequently traumatized on account of the untimely loss of parents through sickness and accident.)

The second stage, “justification”, is a form of displacement of ordinary consciousness. Here the accumulation of grief, guilt and anxiety issues in a crisis religiously labelled “repentance”, which crisis ought then to be resolved as the penitent is flooded with an awareness of God’s pervasive pardon, free acceptance, and ubiquitous mercy.         In psychoanalytic terms, the crisis is defused as it proceeds to a punitive ecstasy where new-born believers, rejoicing in their deliverance, apprehend themselves and the entire creation as unfolding within the sphere of God’s omnipresent love.         Concomitantly with this unitive ecstasy, believers recognize and surrender to God’s claim upon them for “inward and outward holiness” (a favourite expression of Wesley’s whereby he means transformation of disposition and conduct alike) – or, once again, unconscious moral insights or ego-ideals can be said to be brought to consciousness.

The third and final stage consists of “watching and praying”.         Ever “watching” believers introspect so as to become increasingly aware of threats to their integration that might precipitate “backsliding”, a regression to the pre-justification stage of development. Ever “praying”, they “practise the presence” (of God), therein conforming to the ego-ideal that the Christian tradition has named “sanctification”.

While Haartman insists that religious ecstasies and unitive experiences pertain to the core of Methodist spirituality, they are not (or at least not necessarily) manic denials of the reality principle.         Notwithstanding the psychological assessment, there remains an ontological assessment that the book appears to overlook; namely, what do psychoanalysis and Wesley (the Methodist movement) affirm to be ultimately real? The ontology of the former is natural; the latter’s is supernatural, the presence and significance of Spirit, that reality which cannot be reduced to the natural world nor to any aspect or dimension of it.         While the book renounces naturalistic reduction, many passages in it suggest the opposite. For instance, in speaking of justification (the Christian affirmation that those “in the wrong” before God are rendered “rightly related” to God), Haartman writes, “In the optimal outcome of the desolation crisis, the lifting of repression allows the ego to regain access to intrapsychic representations of the good parent.”(p.114)         Elsewhere he writes, “…psychic integration, what Wesley deemed ‘growth in grace’”. (p173)         For Wesley these two developments were ontically dissimilar: one could be growing in grace while lacking psychic integration.

Irrespective of the foregoing, Watching displays a thorough grasp of the classical and contemporary psychoanalytic literature. It is replete with helpful insights concerning the Methodist tradition.         It is cogently argued. It is a worthy contribution to the psycho-religious discussion and will foster much fruitful discussion.

Keith Haartman currently teaches at the Institute of Communication and Culture, University of Toronto at Mississauga .

 

 

Victor Shepherd

Professor of Systematic and Historical Theology

Tyndale University College & Seminary

Toronto

John Webster, Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch.

 (The Toronto Journal of Theology, Fall 2004)

John Webster, Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch. Cambridge , Eng. Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp vii + 144. paper, $19.00 ISBN 0-521-53846-7.

 

The ligature of this book is as unmistakeable as Webster aspires to render it irrefragable; namely, while it is never to be denied that biblical texts have a “natural history,” what characterizes such texts isn’t this history but rather their role in the saving economy of God’s self-communication. In short, this function “is ontologically definitive of the text.”(p. 19) Admitting the assistance that cognate social and literary criticism renders the exegete, Webster relentlessly prosecutes his thesis: the essence of Scripture (he capitalizes the word everywhere) isn’t one with the ontologies presupposed by cognate disciplines; the ontology of Scripture is unique just because there is no substitute for the service it renders the self-bestowing God who ever remains ontically sui generis and whose self-communication is therefore logically singular. In short, Webster’s book sustains his conviction that Scripture is rightly understood only as it is apprehended in accord with its dogmatic purpose, fellowship with the Holy God.

While the book is principally about Scripture, it can be about this only as it is simultaneously no less about gospel, church and theology. Accordingly Webster declares concurrently, “[I]n following God’s address of the church in Holy Scripture, theology cannot be anything other than a commendation of the gospel.”(p. 132) Situated in an era where many find theology freighted with almost every concern except the gospel, Webster’s pronouncement will reverberate as both manifesto and gauntlet.

The book consists of four chapters, each of which describes a feature essential to “an orderly dogmatic account of what Holy Scripture is.”(p. 1) In the first chapter, “Revelation, Sanctification and Inspiration,” Webster insists that Scripture is a human artefact and the church’s use of it a human event. Yet since Scripture is acknowledged Holy, it is related to God in a way that the creation-at-large is not. Specifically, Scripture is an aspect of that revelation whose author and content is the self-bestowing God who genuinely gives himself to us salvifically without giving himself over to us. God ever remains Lord of that revelation whose substance God alone is, and Scripture ever remains the unsubstitutable occasion of its reoccurring. In this context sanctification is that act whereby God authentically uses human creatureliness without thereby suggesting that God’s action here renders revelation naturally apprehensible or Scripture’s substance philosophically determinable. Wisely avoiding “naming names” (e.g., post-Reformational Protestant Scholasticism) Webster cogently argues for the subordination of inspiration to revelation. (To invert this is to misconstrue both.) He insists that inspiration is neither objectification (this would elevate the inspired “product” above the activity the reality it attests) nor spiritualization (this would render the church the locus of inspiration rather than the text.)

In the second chapter, “Scripture, Church and Canon,” Webster is unambiguous: “The definitive act of the church is faithful hearing of the gospel of salvation announced by the risen Christ in the Spirit’s power.”(p. 44) Yet he disclaims anything approaching bibliolatry: to speak of Scripture is to speak for the sake of the action of God; i.e., while Scripture is not the object of faith it can never be separated from the faith that God alone quickens.

In a masterly discussion of canon and canonization Webster voices the most direct disagreement of the book when he faults Robert Jenson for the latter’s insufficiently qualified assertion (Systematic Theology, Vol. 1. Oxford : OUP: 1997, p. 27) that the canon is the church’s decision rather than acknowledgement. Jenson’s deficiency here Webster deems to leave Scripture in the church’s control, whereas faithful submission to Scripture defines the church. The same deficiency denatures Scripture as the instrument of God’s judgement on the church. Canonization, Webster argues, is not the church’s achievement but rather the event of the risen Christ’s bringing his people to account for his sovereign efficacy through the witnesses he has commissioned.

In the third chapter, “Reading in the Economy of Grace,” Webster advances his preference for “reading” to “interpreting” Scripture, since the latter term is freighted with literary, psychological and philosophical considerations amounting to qualifications that humans “bring” to the text, when Scripture as viva vox Dei requires self-renunciation as spiritual qualification. Here Webster distances himself from Schopenhauer’s typically modern “anthropology of reading” wherein reading results (supposedly) in an unthinking absorption that obviates the “immediacy of judgement” (p. 69), a free, creative, spontaneous act. The revelation that Scripture attests and in which it is included contradicts Schopenhauer at every point as grace frees cognition from self-deception and spontaneity from arbitrariness. Reading , then, so far from mindless absorption, is a human activity that paradoxically confesses, “Nothing in my hand I bring.” Perspicuity, similarly, is an implicate of soteriology as faith discerns the inherent splendour of the gospel.

“Scripture, Theology and the Theological School ,” the final chapter, explores the place of Scripture in the curriculum of theological institutions. Cherishing the theo-logic of the Magisterial Reformers, Webster ransacks Ursinus’ A Hortatory Oration to the Study of Divinity. He contrasts Ursinus’ preoccupation with the substance of Scripture to the methodological self-consciousness that haunts contemporary theological discussion and obscures the gospel. Like Calvin before him, Webster gladly admits pietas alone to direct theological learning to holiness, without which theological endeavour becomes vicious. At the same time his emphasis on pietas by no means denigrates the place of office. So far from Spirit-less bureaucratization, “office” confesses that theology has been appointed to warn the church where and how it is capitulating to an idolatrous proclivity to domesticate the Word. Theology will honour its authoritative office only as is claims no authority for itself but forever points away from itself to that Word whose authority can never delegated, relegated or shared.

While the book’s thesis tolls the author’s disagreement with approaches to Scripture that claim to be theological yet disdain dogmatics, the tone of the book can only be described as judicious understatement. Aware that his point is unpopular in much of Anglo-American divinity, Webster takes pains to ensure that if there has to be a stone of stumbling it won’t be his style. His most tendentious points never so much as hint at rabies theologorum. At the same time subtlety never fosters opacity. Certainly compressed, the book is nowhere turgid or confused. Modestly it claims to be no more than a sketch when in fact it is a lode whose riches can be mined . Unflinchingly it has planted the flag of dogmatic priority concerning Scripture in that citadel whose putative guardians claim every scholarly reason for recognition except the reason: the God who is known only as he reconciles recalcitrant sinners, thereby relieving their blindness. For they are made partakers of that reality which Scripture attests and whose coherence dogmatics exposes.                                                              1102 words

 

Victor Shepherd

Tyndale University College & Seminary

Toronto

Oberman, Heiko Augustinus; The Two Reformations: The Journey from the Last Days to the New World . New Haven : Yale University Press, 2003.

(Toronto Journal of Theology, Spring, 2004)

Oberman, Heiko Augustinus; The Two Reformations: The Journey from the Last Days to the New World .  New Haven : Yale University Press, 2003. Pp xx + 235. Cloth $65.99 Can. ISBN: 0-300-09865-5

 

Published posthumously, this book concludes the prolific, always profound writing of a Reformation historian who had previously produced dozens of books in four languages: Dutch (his native tongue), German, French and English. While perhaps appearing anti-climactic in the wake of his prize-winning The Harvest of Mediaeval Theology and Luther: Man between God and the Devil (this earned him the Historischer Sachbuchpreis for what Germany deemed to be the most significant history book, 1975-1985), the work crowns a contribution to church and university that few can equal.

The book consists of ten chapters that illustrate Oberman’s broad expertise concerning the diverse ingredients yielding any event in historical occurrence. Chapter I, “The Gathering Storm”, for instance, probes the manifold aspects of the Fifteenth Century, examining such determinants as the devastating impact of the Black Death, the suppression of Church conciliarism and the simultaneous appearance of political conciliarism, and the role of the Modern Devotion in shifting the common understanding of “religious” life from monasticism to Christian faith. Having begun his career as an intellectual historian at Oxford and Harvard, Oberman moves on, in Chapter II (“Luther and the Via Moderna: The Philosophical Backdrop of the Reformation Breakthrough”) to trace the lodes that are admittedly only one factor in the Reformation but by no means dismissible.

Subsequent chapters discuss, inter alia, the differences between Luther’s anti-Judaism and Erasmus’ anti-Semitism. Soberly Oberman concludes that while Luther admitted the baptized Jew to be Christian while Erasmus did not, Luther’s failure lies not so much in what he did but in what he failed to do: uniquely positioned at the end of the mediaeval period to “detoxify the central poison in Christian doctrine” (p. 83) – namely, supersessionism – Luther instead failed to announce the undeflectability of the covenant-keeping God with respect to the Jewish people.

Thoroughly conversant with the vernacular and classical languages of the Middle Ages and the Reformation, as well as with the most subtle nuances of mediaeval thought and life, Oberman characteristically brought to his métier an appreciation of diverse “locations” and their interconnexion. Here he was ahead of his time for most of his life, maintaining for decades what historians, pressured more recently by social scientists, have come to admit as essential: namely, the matrix of the political, economic, literary, social, intellectual, military, and religious factors that together determine historical developments. Oberman had long known that the isolation or elevation of any one of them rendered the historian’s work one-sided, inaccurate and misleading.

In a moving investigation of the doctrine of predestination, for instance, and its function with respect to the Reformed understanding of faith, Oberman sensitively discusses the location of Calvin and his followers as refugees. Hounded out of France and later out of Switzerland (1538-1541) Calvin remained a refugee virtually all his life, becoming a citizen of Geneva only in 1559, five years before he died. His theology, written for a pursued people permitted no rest on account of Counter Reformation persecution, aimed at sustaining those whose faith could not survive, let alone thrive, unless they knew that Christ’s grip on them was greater than theirs on him; in a word, they had to know that their life in Christ was rooted in an eternal appointment that no earthly treachery could undo. While acknowledging that most people in the Reformed tradition today are embarrassed by Calvin’s doctrine of predestination, Oberman more sympathetically probes the psycho-social situation of the refugee, quoting several times Calvin’s haunting comment, “We have no other place of refuge but his (i.e., God’s) providence.” (p.150) For homeless, stateless, hapless refugees, God’s hand – never to relax and drop them into that “abyss” that Calvin did not doubt – remained the sole, saving solace.

In the same vein Oberman brings to light the role of social location in the well-known fact that the Jewish people have fared much better in Reformed lands than elsewhere. Before Calvin, Luther and Zwingli had adopted the Augustinian notion, pregnant with horrors for Jewish people throughout the Middle Ages, that Jews wandered refuge-less inasmuch as God had consigned them to misery on account of their non-recognition of Jesus. It was only when Calvin and those he sustained found themselves forever wandering just because of their recognition of Jesus that they began to re-read scripture and to find in it the promise that no human violation of the covenant induces God to abandon us. As a result the Jewish people gained the support of Calvinist Christians even as the latter gave up a theology whose barbarity, rooted in ages-old supersessionism, had tormented neighbours wanting only to honour the covenant forged with Abraham. Pursuing the same point, Oberman unobtrusively corrects those who maintain that only in post-revolutionary France , avowedly secular, was the Jew allowed to become a citizen: in fact Jewish people were granted citizenship in Calvinist Holland by the end of the Sixteenth Century.

The book concludes with its longest chapter, “Calvin’s Legacy: Its Greatness and Limitations.” While these fifty-three pages may appear scant satisfaction to Oberman readers hungry for the tome on Calvin he had been working at for fifteen years, they are replete with riches available nowhere else in the literature. Only in Oberman, for instance, do we read that while Calvin is reputed for his mountain peak commentaries on Romans and Hebrews, 2nd Timothy remained his favourite in all of scripture.

Rich in substance, the book is redolent with the humble faith of an intellectual giant who cherished Calvin’s strengths, admitted his weaknesses, and was unashamed to say with Luther, “We are beggars” – and then to add himself, “These beggars are kings.”

Heiko Augustinus Oberman         1930—2001     Requiescat in pace.

 

Victor Shepherd

Professor of Systematic and Historical Theology

Tyndale Seminary

Toronto .

Jenson, Robert W.; On Thinking the Human: Resolutions of Difficult Notions ( Grand Rapids : Eerdmans, 2003)

Canadian Evangelical Review, Fall 2003

Jenson, Robert W.; On Thinking the Human: Resolutions of Difficult Notions ( Grand Rapids : Eerdmans, 2003) Pp. xii + 86. $23.99 Can.

 

This brief book’s compression is unparalleled among recent, shorter offerings in theology. Readers of Jenson will not be surprised at this feature, since they have seen as much in his always-rigorous, representative work over several decades: God After God: The God of the Past and the Future as Seen in the Work of Karl Barth — 1969; then more recently America ‘s Theologian: A Recommendation of Jonathan Edwards — 1988; and more recently still, his two-volume, magisterial Systematic Theology — 1997, 1999.

At the same time, his characteristic compression does not issue in opacity; on the contrary it is lucid throughout, even as the most diligent readers will find themselves having to sit straighter in their study chair. For this book is no little challenge for the theological neophyte. It presupposes more-than-modest familiarity with the history of Christian thought, and, equally, considerable philosophical sophistication together with an appreciation of postmodernism.

Then who will profit from the book? Maturer thinkers who need to think in new patterns and with a new vocabulary most certainly will gain from it, along with any and all who by vocation or avocation are concerned with understanding the profundities of what is uniquely human: social scientists, philosophers, cultural historians, literary critics, and politicians (whose work, ultimately, is the trusteeship of what is publicly owned as the human good.) While not written for the theological beginner, the book could well drive such a person, after the pattern of Jenson’s beloved Luther, to a despair that to be relieved only through delving into the cited works, mountain peaks in thought, among which Jenson moves with accomplished ease. Regardless of where a chapter begins or what paths it pursues, it “comes home” invariably where all humankind can alone be “at home”: participation by grace in the innermost life of the Triune God. Plainly the doctrine of God (i.e., the doctrine of the Trinity) is the ad quo and the ad quem of all Jenson’s thought. This fact alone is noteworthy, for in today’s “therapy culture” even theological texts concerned with “thinking the human” are expected to be, and lamentably too often are, religionized glosses of the social sciences. Jenson, however, insists that what it is to be a human being can be known only with reference to the Triune God; and for this reason, any reflection on “difficult notions” pertaining to the human must be reflection ultimately on who God is in himself eternally — which is to say, who and what we are in relation to him, since God has not willed to be God without us.

The book begins with “Thinking Death” and concludes with “Thinking Love. In between are four more chapters, “Thinking…Consciousness, Freedom, Reality, Wickedness.” Each chapter takes one (or several) theologian and philosopher as interlocutor. Thereafter it investigates the topic at hand by viewing it from several angles, always in conversation with philosopher, theologian, assorted assessors of culture, and Jenson’s own evaluation of contemporary social trends. (He is not afraid, for instance, to liken “our eugenics by mass execution” to those of the Nazis. He has in mind, of course, the cavalier deployment of abortion.)

Perhaps the best way that a reviewer can introduce the book is to acquaint the reader with the substance and style of any one chapter. “Thinking Wickedness” was begun the Monday following the terrorist attack on New York City. Denying all facile notions of “moral equivalence” (suffering engendered elsewhere through American foreign policy legitimates the sort of slaughter of “9/11”), Jenson nonetheless acknowledges that human wickedness, however cursorily discussed or denied in shallow pulpits of modernity, has been and deserves to be a matter worthy of theological diligence. He reaches back to the work of Michael Illyricus Flacius, the Gnesio-Lutheran excoriated by the Philipists (intellectual descendants of Melanchthon;) Flacius insisted that fallen human nature is substantially wicked. The Philipists pointed out, of course, that if this were the case then “people” would not be so much fallen as obliterated; redemption would be impossible; and the Incarnation could never have occurred. At the same time, Jenson is unhappy with the Philipists’ wording in the Formula of Concord (Lutheranism’s classical doctrinal statement) that in the wake of the Fall humans are sinners only “accidentally” rather than “substantially” (Concord herein using these terms with utmost Aristotelian precision, since “accidental” leaves our sinnership too remote from who we are, all humankind now “Teflon-coated.”) Next he probes the matter of individual identity, its adherents presupposing that identity has to do with what is “in us” rather than with our relationship to what is outside us. From here he makes a big step (but not a leap) to a discussion of ontological contingency, humans, of course, always possessed of contingent being only. Then he points out that substance, strictly speaking, is substance only if it perdures through time and beyond time, since temporality renders finite substance inherently impossible. (His footnote “reminds” readers that the only serious theological error he finds in Thomas Aquinas is perhaps the latter’s failure to probe eternity/time sufficiently critically.) Next he expands his previous assertion on how we are identical with ourselves not in virtue of what is within us but rather in virtue of what (Who) we are within; for in truth we are within the “within-ness” of the inherently triune life of Father, Son and Spirit. Finally he argues with exquisitely nuanced progression how it is that only when the triune community and all created community are finally one will there be resolved that human wickedness which is more than accidental (despite “therapeutic” protestation) yet cannot be “substantial,” as Flacius’s opponents knew.

In an era when so very much theology appears to have forgotten that theology is to be about God, this book is sustained witness to Jenson’s preoccupation with the doctrine of God — which preoccupation, the reader will conclude, arises just because nothing less than God fills the horizon of Jenson’s thought and life.

 

Victor Shepherd       Tyndale University College & Seminary

Webster, John. Holiness (Grand Rapids : Eerdmans, 2003)

Webster, John. Holiness. Grand Rapids : Eerdmans, 2003. Pp. ix + 116. Paper, $26.99 Can.

ISBN: 0-8028-2215-0

 

Those familiar with Webster’s magisterial works concerning the practical import of Karl Barth’s theology (e.g., Barth’s Ethics of Reconciliation and Barth’s Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth’s Thought) will not be surprised to find this book exemplifying the same learning, wisdom, and turn of phrase that sears insight after insight upon mind and heart. Neither will they be surprised to find here sufficient evidence that it is precisely the most recondite theology which most consistently and most profoundly assists the Church in its daily life, worship and mission. Webster’s opening sentence, “This book is a Christian theological essay on holiness” (p.1), declares his agenda. The four chapters of the book deliver the promised substance.

Webster is unapologetic concerning his orientation and logic: theology is holy speech; holy just because it is generated by, bound to and disciplined through the Holy One whom it aspires to serve. And since “The self-giving presence of Christ in the Church is the law of the holy” (p.2), theology can be articulated only in the Church. In turn the Church’s stammering attempt at speaking for God can be protected only by a proper fear of the Church’s Lord.

Throughout chapter one, “The Holiness of Theology”, Webster sustains his contention that theological thinking about holiness is itself an exercise in holiness. In this vein he develops the leitmotif of “holy reason.” Here Webster avoids twin pitfalls: capitulation to modernity’s brazen confidence that reason is unimpaired, and capitulation to postmodernity’s lament or sneer that reason’s integrity can never be recovered (or perchance never existed.) Cogently he argues, from several different angles, that it is grace alone, known in faith, which restores reason’s integrity inasmuch as reason is an aspect of humankind in its entirety, and it is this entirety which is included in the history of sin and reconciliation.

In “The Holiness of God” Webster’s Trinitarian focus comes to the fore. Rejecting any non-ostensive understanding of God, he insists that God’s simplicity, for instance, isn’t an undifferentiated unity in God that logically precedes God’s tri-unity (as in much Protestant Orthodoxy) but rather God’s “irreducible ‘this-ness’, executed in the drama of his works.”(p.38) Distancing himself from Rudolf Otto, Paul Tillich and Friederich Schleiermacher, for whom “the holy” was chiefly a religiously generic, humanly experienced phenomenon rather than God’s presence and action, he avers that “the holy” is the undiminished majesty of God in its most intimate saving relationship with us. Here Webster’s ringing affirmation is the ligature for several related considerations: e.g., the positive, sanctifying aspect of God’s holiness is characteristically prior to the wickedness-destroying aspect, the latter being merely the merciful militancy of the former; God’s jealousy is holy love’s refusal to allow the creature to forfeit itself by setting the terms on which it will live before God.

In “The Holiness of the Church” Webster maintains that the Church is holy not because of any ontological participation in God but solely on account of its vocation. For this reason he remains critical of “social trinitarianism”, the notion that the Church becomes not the witness to God’s saving incursion because first an heir of it, but becomes rather part of the being of God on account of the Church’s participation (in Hegel’s sense) in the Triune life of God. Here Webster identifies two implicates: the undervaluation of the free majesty of God and the concomitant drift toward divine immanence, as well as the compromising of the perfection and sufficiency of God’s work in Christ. At the same time he judiciously cautions against a similar two-fold reaction: a false spiritualization in which the humanness of the Church is denied, together with a dualism where God and the human are necessarily deemed mutually exclusive. Denying that the holiness of the Church is visible as if holiness inhered the Church, Webster nonetheless glories in the earthliness of the Church by insisting that the Church’s holiness is visible as the Church visibly hears ever again the promise and command of the gospel, confesses its sin in penitence and faith, bears witness to the world, and pleads with God for God to hallow his own name.

In the final chapter, “The Holiness of the Christian”, Webster highlights the difference between the Christian’s holiness and contemporaneity’s concern with “spirituality”, the latter too often hedonistic self-fulfilment. Instead he maintains that holiness is rooted in and finds its stable basis in forgiveness and reconciliation. He continues this “otherward” direction by complementing a reinvestigation of Calvin’s “mortification” with a refreshing exploration of holiness as divine appointment to obligatory service of the neighbour. Put most pithily, the believer’s holiness in Christ means “by the Spirit’s power I am separated from my self-caused self-destruction, and given a new self, enclosed by, and wholly referred to, the new Adam in whom I am and in whom I act.”(p.84)

Everywhere the book exudes an irenic spirit as Webster gently exposes inadequacies (e.g., Schleiermacher) while identifying strengths (Juengel, Staniloae, Augustine.) It rescues a crucial topic from the hands of religious romantics. It depicts an able theologian at work, zealous for God’s honour and the edification of the Church.

 

Victor Shepherd

Tyndale Seminary, Toronto

Thomas Clark Oden. The Rebirth of Orthodoxy: Signs of New Life in Christianity. San Francisco : Harper, 2003.

Thomas Clark Oden. The Rebirth of Orthodoxy: Signs of New Life in Christianity. San Francisco : Harper, 2003. Pp. xi + 212. Cloth. $39.99 Can. ISBN: 006009785X

 

Readers of this book might be advised to begin with Oden’s autobiographical statement, “A Personal Odyssey”( pp. 82-96), wherein he speaks candidly of his captivity to modernity, which captivity he unhesitatingly describes as “chauvinistic” in its arrogant, groundless assumption that the newer is invariably better than the older, the novel better than the tested, the speculative that titillates self-important knowledge elites better than the profound that has gained the consensus of the people of God. He then testifies to a conversion at the hands of God not in a spirit of self-advertisement but in confidence that the grace which brought him up out of the theological “miry pit” will use his testimony to do as much for those who still languish in it.

An American Methodist clergyman, Oden immersed himself in Bultmann’s anti-Incarnation and anti-Resurrection reading of the New Testament, then in Marxist economics, psychoanalysis, the human potential movement, feminism, abortion advocacy. All of this was gathered up in an unabashed politicization of the church’s mission; it issued in the shallowest spiritual faddism.

Oden’s turnaround began when Will Herberg, a Jewish colleague at Drew University whose recent acquaintance with classic Judaism found him returning repentant from the “far country” of communism, insisted that Oden would remain a dilettante until he studied his own tradition, particularly the “paleo” colossuses of the East and West alike: Athanasius, Basil, Chrysostom, Gregory of Nazianzus, as well as Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome, Gregory the Great. Oden’s recovery put him on a theological trajectory that he is still pursuing thirty years later.

Oden’s commitment to orthodoxy (the lower case letter is important, since the churches of the West as well as the East are included) is a repristination of “integrated biblical teaching as interpreted in its most consensual period”. (p.29) By “consensual” he means “the teaching that has been duly confirmed by a process of general consent of the faithful over two millennia.” (p.29) Plainly he honours tradition. Tradition ought never to be pitted against scripture since it is the conduit of scriptural teaching, even as scripture remains the unnormed norm of tradition while tradition aspires to be the faithful recollection of scripture. Without referencing G.K. Chesterton, Oden resonates with Chesterton’s understanding of tradition as the church’s memory. And just as amnesiac people whose lack of memory means they have no identity and cannot be trusted, Chesterton argued, “amnesiac” churches that disavow tradition can only be treacherous.

Oden pretends nothing else, having been himself both perpetrator and victim. Still, just as he is persuaded of orthodoxy’s soundness so is he convinced of the resilience and militancy of the regenerating power of the ancient faith. Orthodoxy has proved itself such, for it has withstood persistent assault at the hands of mainline denominations that have married modernity and mobilized their vast resources in the service of the ideologies and “isms” now characterizing denominational programs, publications, and seminaries. Oden argues that the World Council of Churches, whose outlook is incarnated in the U.S.A. in the multi-denominational collaboration housed at 475 Riverside Drive , New York City , was manifestly unravelling in the 1960s as it veered toward neo-paganism, shamanism and animistic primitivism. By its meeting in 1998 in Harare , Zimbabwe , the WCC had thoroughly betrayed the vision of its founders at the 1948 inauguration in Amsterdam . The only sounds emerging now from this “old” ecumenism are its death rattle.

The “new” ecumenism, on the other hand, is deliberately grounded in ancient consensus, upholds the distillations of the ecumenical councils, recognizes the arrears of sin even in believers, and remains critical of failed modern ideas (e.g., of Marx, Freud and Nietzsche) that have proved lethal amidst world-occurrence.

Oden cautions readers against confusing “new” ecumenism, orthodoxy, with “neo-orthodoxy.” For the latter (he makes some exceptions for Karl Barth) never was really concerned with the Fathers, life in Christ, liturgy, prayer, discipline, spiritual formation, sacramental live and pastoral care. Sound theology and Spirit-invigorated people, always essential to each other, emerge from a worshipping community whose doxological confession is matched by its willingness to suffer for the One it extols.

In light of the emphasis on ancient wisdom written, readers are not surprised at Oden’s reiterated reminder that much modern biblical study amounts to speculation concerning oral traditions that preceded the written text of scripture, together with a magnification of the supposed difference between the oral and the written. The “new” ecumenism, orthodoxy returning, recognizes that Holy writ is the primary source, ground and norm of all Christian (and Jewish) teaching. Unlike their modern counterparts, ancient exegetes looked to the whole of written scripture to illumine each part.

Yet it must not be thought that Oden is naively nostalgic, denying all substance to current concerns. He endorses the legitimacy of the “fairness revolution” (the attempt at redressing social inequities that are sheer iniquities) even if he deplores an approach whose consequences tragically include deepened inequality. He contends, however, that orthodoxy is the ally of the “fairness revolution” in that it corrects the latter’s blind spots, supplies it with a perspective it cannot acquire itself, and lends it staying power. In the same way orthodoxy supports the current concern for diversity, inclusion, tolerance and empathy. What, after all, is more diverse than an ecumenical consensus that included ethno-racially diverse spokespersons from lower Egypt, North Africa , Asia Minor and France ? (Not to mention the fifteen ethnic identities listed in Acts 2.)

While orthodoxy is inherently irenic in its service of the Prince of Peace, it unashamedly upholds the boundary-definitions inherent in Christian teaching. For this reason the critical aspect of orthodoxy, always bent on being constructive, honours in its polemics the faithful who have the courage to say “No”, apart from which their “Yes” would mean nothing. Sophia worship, for instance, is an excrescence whose appearing rightly elicits the faithful’s “No.”

The last chapter in the book, “Recovering the Classic Ecumenical Method,” also the longest, is a masterly presentation of the work and wisdom of Vincent of Lerins (c.450 C.E.) Known for his aphorism, Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est (“What has been believed everywhere, always, by all people”,) Lerins has furnished a key that has repeatedly unlocked the fetters of the church’s cultural captivity. Oden is his most persuasive in his articulation and deployment of Lerins’s “What has been believed….” Skilfully, patiently, cogently Oden acquaints the present-day Christian (who is now beginning to feel almost sectarian) with the nuances that had to be deployed in the fifth century and will have to be deployed in any era. Expansively but not verbosely Oden articulates the force of ubique: the faith that the church confesses the world over; of semper: the faith confessed by the apostles first and confessed thereafter; ab omnibus: the faith confirmed by an ecumenical council or a broad consensus of ancient Christian writers, affirmed by the laity and expressed in the church’s liturgy. Then Oden illustrates his exposition by juxtaposing “What if…?” to each of Lerins’s expressions: What if — a part of the communion rejects the whole? — a “new gospel” is preferred to the apostolic faith? — ancient witnesses themselves might be wrong? — no conciliar precedent is defined? He concludes the chapter by illustrating all of this by means of critical irruptions in the church’s history: the Donatists, the Arians, Mary as “Theotokos,” Appolinaris, Tertullian, Origen. Oden’s pellucid presentation in this chapter is worth the price of the book.

No less valuable, however, is his consistent inclusion of Judaism within the orthodoxy he espouses. Without trace of that supersessionism which has bedevilled the church and therein excoriated the Jewish people, Oden’s exquisite attention to scripture finds him admitting the place of Israel as Israel in God’s economy concerning church and world. Judaism, having awakened too from its modernistic miasma, is recovering its identity in scripture and the rabbinic tradition forged coincidentally in the Patristic era. Never discounting the uniqueness of Jesus Christ, Oden is glad to say that through the Nazarene, Gentiles have been brought into the faith of God’s covenant with Israel, there being only one covenant (albeit renewed in Christ) as surely as there is only one God. In all of this Oden remains convinced that Jews, no less than the church, have something decisive at stake in the recovery of classic Christianity, even as Christians have as much at stake in the recovery of classic Yiddishkeit.

  Oden’s challenge is as unmistakeable as it is undeniable: “Can classic Christians and confessors of apostolic faith in the mainline churches cooperatively form a plausible accord that effectively resists the apostatizing temptations endemic within the unregenerate mainline?” (p.141) Since the evangelical churches are now seemingly indistinguishable from the mainline in their neglect of long-term memory and in their cultural accommodation, Oden’s question ought to haunt all Christians alike.

 

Victor Shepherd
Tyndale University College and Seminary

Perkins, Robert L. (editor). International Kierkegaard Commentary (Volume 21): For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself! Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 2002.

(International Journal of Systematic Theology)

Perkins, Robert L. (editor). International Kierkegaard Commentary (Volume 21): For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself! Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 2002. Pp. xii+374. $45 US.

With the completion of Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the ‘Philosophical Fragments’ (1846) Kierkegaard intended to cease writing. Finding, however, that he could not deny himself, his “second series,” penned non-pseudonymously, began four years later with the appearance of For Self-Examination.

The “second series” highlights theological issues that Kierkegaard finds in Luther or Nineteenth Century Danish Lutheranism. In a country where the church is established a virulent, militant “Christendom” is inevitable. Galvanized by the extent to which the Peace of Westphalia (it rendered the religion of any political ruler the religion of the people) had diluted the gospel, perverted Lutheranism, profaned the church, and misled most concerning the gift, claim and suffering of genuine faith, Kierkegaard’s two works under discussion in the twelve essays of Vol. 21 of the IKC speak to Christians of any persuasion of the insidiousness of “Christendom.”

In the first article Lee Barrett explores the cruciality of “authorial voice” in Kierkegaard’s non-pseudonymous writings; e.g., poet, penitent, humorist, aspiring-yet-deficient Christian. He argues that an appreciation of the differences in authorial voices is not a post-Kierkegaard agenda of literary criticism read back into him; rather it is to see how Kierkegaard himself relates voice and meaning. Drawing on British philosopher J.L. Austin’s understanding of “performative force” in language, Barrett insists that the meaning of existentially significant textual communication does not inhere the text. In other words, the meaning of the text is controlled, at least in part, by the end which the author intends; i.e., by how the text performs or is meant to function. In illustrating his thesis Barrett contrasts FSE & JFY! with Works of Love. The latter aims at clarifying love, stimulating it, and magnifying its attractiveness. The former aims at awakening pained awareness of one’s failure in all of this, together with repentance and self-abandonment to the grace God proffers.   This contrast, however, is no contradiction. Liturgically, for instance, both are needed in the service of praise and penitence. Barrett’s point remains, however, that a text’s content is always related to its intent, and this in turn to the form of communication. He concludes, “…a neutral, omniscient authorial metaperspective is not available.”(p.35) Communication is always context-specific.

Craig Hinkson explores Lutheranism’s divagations as successive Luther images, amounting to a contradiction of Luther, appeared in Melanchthon’s humanism, Chemnitz’s orthodoxy, Arnold’s pietism, the Enlightenment’s Rationalism, and finally Goethe’s “Luther personality” giving rise to Germany’s culture and its spirit. First Luther’s thought was co-opted by the orthodox who re-introduced Aristotle as a buttress for theology. The pietists, rightly discerning the dimension of the “heart” in Luther and rightly resisting Melanchthon’s intellectualist veer in the doctrine of faith, pointed out that pure doctrine and pure faith were not the same. At the same time, pietism’s undervaluation of doctrine born of revelation inadvertently supported the rationalism lurking in Melanchthon. Orthodoxy found its zenith in an Enlightenment that claimed to be able to demonstrate doctrine philosophically. By now the operative image was Luther as the champion of autonomous reason (Luther himself had called this a “whore.”)   Hegel provided a philosophical legitimization of Kulturprotestantismus. Goethe insisted that Luther’s character was the only noteworthy feature of the Reformation.   Kierkegaard set his face against the conglomeration of Luther images, unambiguously announcing the purpose of his authorship: “I have wanted to prevent people in ‘Christendom’ from existentially taking in vain Luther and the significance of his life.”[1]   Derided as an eccentric, Kierkegaard found vindication only as Luther was discovered anew in the Twentieth Century.

Lee Barrett returns to argue compellingly that despite Kiergkegaard’s insistence in FSE and JFY! that Christians are characterized by what they do, Luther’s priority of grace-engendered faith is not denied. In fact it is the latter that grounds Kierkegaard’s understanding of the three uses of the law. With respect to the third use Kierkegaard magnifies gratitude for gratuitous salvation as the motive for wanting to follow “Christ the Prototype,” even though this following necessarily entails the world’s hostility and the believer’s consequent suffering. In view of a gratitude that fuels self-forgetfulness, believers are relieved of the “probabilities” inherent in those whose shrewd calculating creates a “self” they can never afford to forget. While gratitude is the Christian’s initial motive, the Christian’s more exalted motive is apprehension of love’s inherent loveliness (God’s). (Here this reviewer finds a parallel to Jonathan Edwards that could have been probed and would have proved fruitful.) At the end of the chapter Barrett teases the reader with the suggestion that the Christian as agent must cooperate with grace in some sense. The reader could wish that Barrett had explored in Kierkegaard the logic of non-synergistic cooperation, presupposed glaringly in “Ludvig-and-his-stroller,” and found lucidly in the Patristic notion of gratia operans/gratia cooperans.

In light of Bonhoeffer David Law examines FSE as a protest against “cheap grace.” “Justification by grace through faith” has been reduced to a formula that can be recited mantra-like as a means of avoiding the gospel. At fault, says Kierkegaard, are the following: meticulous biblical scholarship whose logic is at odds with the logic of scripture and that ends in obscuring the Word it purports to serve, an apologetic whose rationalism is the sphere in which doubt is addressed (supposedly) even as the self-same rationalism legitimates and magnifies doubt, a failure to understand that doubt concerning the truth disappears as truth is done, non-acknowledgement that “new death” (“dying to” self) is essential to “new birth,” and the confusing of “subjectivity” with selfism. Law faults Kierkegaard for failing to grasp the gospel’s redressing of social inequalities. The reader may ask whether all social inequities are ipso facto social iniquities, and ask again if Kierkegaard’s “oversight” is in fact his refusal to reduce the gospel to ideology.

Murray Rae challenges Barth’s assessment that in the dialectic of the gospel Kierkegaard ultimately weights condemnation more heavily than grace. Addressing Barth’s complaint that Kierkegaard’s imbalance issued in a legalism that deadens, saddens and sours, Rae corrects Barth’s misapprehension: Kierkegaard is not guilty of an imbalance wherein the announcement of forgiveness and reconciliation in Christ fails to uplift but leaves hearers despairing still of their unworthiness.   Rae brings together Kierkegaard’s illustration of the birds of the air and the lilies of the field (they are alike carefree), the fact that the Prototype with his unconditional demand is also the Redeemer, and the latter’s unconditioned gift of reconciliation that eclipses our condemnation. The aforementioned atonement (incomprehensible apart from our utter condemnation) exalts disciples and renders their discipleship acts of trust in it. Such publicly enacted trust serves as witness. Whereas the Enlightenment, not understanding that reason is culturally conditioned, prefers “reasons” that explain condemnation, reconciliation and obedience, Kierkegaard insists that witnesses alone declare Truth to be accessible by S(s)pirit; which witnesses, he notes, doubt never afflicts. In the same vein Rae exonerates Kierkegaard in the face of Barth’s accusation that believers are left ransacking their hearts for the love wherewith they are to love others. Drawing on Works of Love as well as FSE and JFY!, especially “Ludvig-and-his-stroller,” Rae indicates neighbour-love to be the outworking of God’s transformative love in atonement-embracing sinners; i.e., love is Spirit-facilitated. Rae concludes his correction of Barth by showing that the Prototype’s unconditional demand is also unconditional promise: “You shall love” means both “you must love” and “you will unfailingly love,” for in Christ the law has been fulfilled.

Sylvia Walsh investigates not so much an issue raised chiefly in FSE and JFY! but rather the theme of self-denial everywhere in Kierkegaard. In the course of her examination she introduces English-speaking readers to a protracted dispute between two Swedish scholars, Torsten Bohlin and Valter Lindstroem, on whether Climacus’s understanding of dying to immediacy in the Postscript conforms to Kierkegaard’s subsequent interpretation of it. Is Kierkegaard ultimately sin-denying or life-denying? Walsh, thoroughly acquainted with the subtleties in Kierkegaard and his commentators, adroitly steers the reader through the dispute, then moves on to yet another commentator, Marie Thulstrup, and assesses the latter’s insistence that any shift in Kierkegaard’s understanding of “dying to” arises from a shift in his view of nature. Having identified and probed the many nuances in this disputed topic, Walsh concludes that Kierkegaard’s “dying to” entails not the negation but the transformation of the immediate, natural, pagan and human dimensions. Lest readers regard the conversation as arcane, she hauntingly ends her article with the reminder that “dying to,” according to Kierkegaard, means that the Christian will die twice over: when repudiating selfishness, and when incurring and accepting the hostility of a world whose “self-denial” and “love” are the abysmal inverse of Christianity’s.

Paul Martens expounds the role of the Holy Spirit in FSE and JFY!, maintaining that Kierkgaard here says more about the Holy Spirit than anywhere else. Only the Spirit saves “dying to” from corrupted self-assertion, collapses earthly hope into hopelessness thereby giving rise to “hope against hope” (Romans 4:18), and keeps arduous discipleship from being inherently enervating. Only the Spirit, according to the parables of the Royal Coachman in FSE and JFY! respectively, drives the Christian ahead on the Way and at the same time stills all attempts at self-making for the sake of a self divinely wrought. Martens indicates that for Kierkegaard too the Spirit alone leads people into the Church, exalts the Redeemer and vivifies the Word. In short, the Spirit alone ensures that all that is urged in the two books concerns an encounter with God.

Louise Carroll Keeley confronts the putative misogyny in Kierkegaard with a moving, lyrical exploration of the riches embedded in FSE‘s apparently patriarchal “And You, O Woman.” Arguing that the substance of Kierkegaard’s “silent woman” may be exemplified by men, Keeley searches the depths of silence, domesticity and joy. Silence is not the artificiality of deliberate wordlessness; it is rather attentive listening to the eternal Word amidst the world’s noise. Predated by the Word, silence injects into the present its “beneficent power,” and because pregnant with the Word silence orients one to the future by directing one’s action. Silence alone can render one aware that one is constituted by Another. And since what one hears in silence one subsequently does, so far from isolating one from others silence connects one to them. In the same manner Keeley indicates how Word-besotted silence renders a house a spiritual home, and how Word-fostered joy sheds temptation as joy overcomes the divided mind that temptation always exploits.

In an approach reminiscent of A.J. Heschel who, when faced with younger Jewish people complaining that they did not understand Torah told them that if they only did it they would understand it, John Whittaker explores Kierkegaard’s insistence that only as we do the truth do we believe it. In probing Kierkegaard here Whittaker distinguishes between objective religious truth and the means by which it is known. Objective religious truth can be known only “subjectively,” only in “inwardness,” only as one inhabits truth that is essentially transformative. Herein Kierkegaard insists that the authority of God’s Word is never inferred and never generated by something outside that Word. Aware of the nature of scriptural authority, believers renounce all attempts at explaining why God’s Word is believable. Ultimately, then, the authority of the bible is the capacity of Jesus Christ (the “Prototype”) to transform readers and conform them to him as they read the book that attests him.

Julia Watkin probes the nature of Kierkegaard’s analogy of scripture as “The Letter from the Lover.” In this regard she examines chiefly the matter of biblical criticism and the extent to which it might erode what Kierkegaard calls “one’s acceptance of Christianity.” Rightly she points out that if the “Prototype” and the “God-man” are necessary for faith, and if criticism could establish that Jesus of Nazareth never existed, then no one is “equally free” to “accept Christianity.” (CUP) Concerning the Incarnation Watkins’s work will precipitate protracted discussion for here she points out that Kierkegaard never indicates why the appearance of the God-man is necessary to the occasion of faith, and insists herself that any number of situations may serve as such an occasion. Thereby she supports the agnostic/atheist offspring of Kierkegaard who affirm the possibility of “truth is subjectivity” while denying what Kierkegaard deemed to lie behind it. Since Watkin maintains that the universe’s lover is “capable of writing all kinds of love letters (p.313),” she appears to leave the reader with too little help and perhaps Kierkegaard himself misrepresented when she concludes with, “yet, as with every communication, people need to be alert as to whether it really is a love letter that they are looking at (p.313).”

David Cain probes dialectic in Kierkegaard through Kierkegaard’s rejection of “cheap victory” amidst pseudo-Christian triumphalism: the star (of victory) is in the cross, not the cross in the star. Then Cain returns to an examination of the Law-Gospel arrangement, only this time in a way that recalls the logic of the Heidelberg Catechism: Bad News, Good News, Gratitude born of Good News as the sole, sufficient motivation of Christian discipleship. Gratitude, Cain insists, is “Christian motivation for staying ‘in the striving (p.323).'” Cain crowns his essay on Kierkegaard’s dialectic from the Journals and Papers (1:993): “…infinite humiliation and grace and then a striving born of gratitude — this is Christianity.”

Martin Andic concludes the volume and the four essays on Kierkegaard and scripture through a comparison of the “mirror” of the divine in both Kierkegaard and Socrates. His principal point is that Kierkegaard, in affirming the reading of scripture to be a divine way to self-knowledge, “contrasts the Christian view with the Socratic one too sharply” inasmuch as “Socrates, the pagan…did seek to know himself precisely before God (p. 355).” Andic proceeds to prosecute his thesis that for Socrates “We become like God by selfless righteousness that will never do wrong no matter what worldly good we must forfeit and regardless of what worldly evil we have to endure. Kierkegaard says that we become spirit and… acquire the love of God by doing God’s Word and suffering whatever comes. Both call for dying to self and worldliness, and for both it is humility and justice that unite us to God, the self-effacing service of truth that makes us living mirrors.” (p. 357) Here Andic’s article will surely provoke much discussion as to whether Socrates did or could seek to know himself before “God;” i.e., is Socrates’ “divine” the Holy One of Abrahamic faith who renders himself Incarnate? Is the formal similarity in Socrates and Kierkegaard a material identity? Do Socrates and Kierkegaard remain congruent if Christ-wrought grace and faith are deleted from the latter?

Its angle of vision chiefly theological rather than philosophical, this volume exhibits Kierkegaard’s oneness with key dimensions of Luther; it distances Kierkegaard from theological and ecclesiastical distortions in Lutheranism; it develops themes that Kierkegaard scholarship has overlooked heretofore; and it challenges readers to reread the Dane where contributors’ readings appear tendentious.

 

Victor Shepherd , Tyndale University College and Seminary, Toronto.

[1] On My Work as an Author, Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.) p.17.

Oldstone-Moore, Christopher; Hugh Price Hughes: Founder of a New Methodism, Conscience of a New Nonconformity

 (CANADIAN EVANGELICAL REVIEW, Spring, 2003)

Oldstone-Moore, Christopher; Hugh Price Hughes: Founder of a New Methodism, Conscience of a New Nonconformity (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999) Pp. x + 393. $82.95 CAN.

ISBN: 0 7083 1468 6

 

This fine book, published in 1999, appears to have lurked in a Sheol-like underworld for several years, only recently to emerge among the living. It ably acquaints readers with the vision, theology, courage and suffering of a Methodist giant who applied himself relentlessly to the challenges his era brought before him.

The book aims at providing a critical analysis of the ideas and work of Hughes. Herein it sheds light on aspects of British history treated only slightly elsewhere. Along the way it schools readers profoundly in the origins of the ecumenical movement in Britain , Methodism’s contributions to the women’s movement, and the nature of the “Nonconformist Conscience.”

Hughes (1847-1902), the most prominent spokesperson for British Methodism during the latter half of the 19th century, maintained that two matters characterized modernity: the rise of learning among the masses (together with the newly politicized workers’ demand for social democracy), and the concomitant rise of cultured Christians. The latter’s apprehension of and zeal for the Kingdom could guide, support and elevate a movement that would heal class divisions (they were worse in Britain than anywhere on the Continent) and defuse the social evils that frustrated society in its appointment to reflect the glory of God. To his life’s end Hughes tolled the six evils that he had identified as especially iniquitous: slavery, drunkenness, the social evil [sexual impurity with its attendant degradation and disease], ignorance, pauperism and war. Yet in all of this he never proffered panaceas, always insisting that a deepening of the spiritual life in clergy and leaders remained Methodism’s most urgent need.

Knowing the allegiance that the Free Churches enjoyed in Britain , Hughes urged them to shed their inferiority and assert themselves as the vanguard of renewal. His first target was the liquor traffic. Knowing that Hogarth’s painting, ” Gin Lane ,” was no exaggeration, he insisted that liquor-abuse and misery were alike cause and consequence of each other. Both would have to be attacked.

Next he turned to the “Contagious Diseases Act”, meant to limit the spread of venereal disease. In fact it amounted to government sanction of prostitution. It also violated the human rights of women, subjecting them to invasive examinations. Since the Act pertained only to women, it enforced a double standard; since it was applied only to “common” prostitutes, it thickened class distinctions; since its real purpose was to provide VD-free fornication for armed forces personnel, it was reprehensible. Prostitutes, said Hughes, were dealt with “as sewers are treated” by sanitation engineers; they were dehumanized. (Congregationalists and Baptists shrank from his “indecent” public pronouncements.) The Establishment “packed” on him, some of its members glad to avail themselves of sexual opportunities rendered as risk-free as possible. Hughes remained unintimidated. His work here typified his lifelong, “holistic” conviction: the spiritual well-being of the individual, together with a just social life, and all of this supported where possible by parliamentary legislation urged by Christians.

Yet it must never be thought that Hughes was a thinly-disguised leftist who advocated social dismantling. He both supported and profited from the meetings of the Holiness Convention, reconsecrating himself to God in 1875, vowing his “all” to God without qualification or reservation. His rededication here coincided with his recognition that he had expected more from politics than it could deliver: only utmost spiritual renewal could effect national transmutation. Not surprisingly, then, his pastorates in an upscale London suburb and in Oxford found his ministry reverberating with evangelistic urgency. Yet always aware that “heat” and “light” belong together, he gained an advanced degree in philosophy from the University of London , and also introduced 1000-seat lecture halls into new Methodist church buildings, insisting that the farthest-ranging education of the laity was now non-negotiable in the Methodist ethos.

At the same time he knew that evil is most entrenched when most systemic. For this reason he came to embrace “socialism”, yet always a socialism informed by evangelism and, reciprocally, an evangelism infused with socialism. He was the first prominent Wesleyan preacher to declare himself a Christian socialist. “Have your right hand on political economy, your left on works of socialism, and before you the open Bible,” he urged every minister. (His “socialism” meant “social alleviation;” it never approached Marxism, advocating neither social levelling nor a state-planned economy.)

Hughes’ greatest achievement was the Forward Movement. The Methodist church was singularly positioned for this in that it was zealous for evangelism, assumed responsibility for the social well-being of people (Anglican claims to social reconstruction Hughes deemed insufficiently evangelical) and could form a new national consciousness. Convinced that Anglicanism was duplicitous on account of its relationship to the governing classes, Hughes felt that only Methodism could address social horrors in Britain . When it was reported that parents sold 13-year old daughters into prostitution for as little as five pounds, Hughes expostulated, “Can there be found a more shameful abuse of the power of wealth?” A colleague made such a purchase to prove it could be done, and then published an account of it in the Pall Mall Gazette. While some Methodists recoiled from tough confrontation, Hughes was adamant. The challenge he recognized here he deemed to be Methodism’s crossroads: either it demonstrated its capacity for effecting spiritual renewal with consequent social and national renewal (private charity, for instance, could never address systemic poverty) or it faded into the obscurity of a backwater sect.

Crucial to the Movement was the formation of the “Sisters of the People.”   These “Sisters” were more than the centuries-old deaconesses who had customarily administered material relief. Rather they promoted women’s equality, lobbied aggressively for social transmutation and political liberation, and preached at open-air services. Foregoing vows, they lived together and dressed distinctively. They were anything but mere soup-ladlers.

The Movement’s greatest crisis concerned overseas missions. It came to light that Methodist missionaries in India lived far above the people they were sent to serve, were paid far more than Methodist preachers at home, and accommodated their gospel to the Brahmins among whom they glided. (American Methodist missionaries in India , it was noted, were paid far less yet seemed vastly more effective.) The contradiction was resolved, but not before Methodist officialdom, embarrassed and angry, nearly censured Hughes.

The Movement’s greatest notoriety concerned Charles Stewart Parnell and the controversy around Irish Home Rule. Long a supporter of the latter, Hughes was aghast when the Irish continued to support Parnell despite his protracted adultery with Kitty O’Shea, wife to an Irish member of Parliament. “What is morally wrong can never be politically right,” Hughes repeated as often as he reiterated purity to be a political principle. In the wake of the conflagration Nonconformists gathered around him more tightly than ever.

In the second surge of the Movement he gave himself unstintingly to the recovery of the Church’s unity. Attacked by the high-church faction of Anglicanism, he pronounced it a threat to religious freedom, insisting that Free Church Christians were true “Scriptural Catholics.”   His leadership here was recognized in his election as first president of the National Council of Evangelical Free Churches.

Soon elected as well (1898) as president of the Methodist Conference, he reminded everyone that the local congregation remained the heart of the church: “I am very glad you have put a circuit minister in the chair.” From his chair he continued to press for old age pensions, better education for the socially underprivileged, and improved housing for the poor. Yet even more ardently he struggled for Methodism’s emphases: the necessity of conversion and Christian perfection, the latter being self-forgetful love for God and neighbour in self-abandonment to the Kingdom’s future in the world.

Hughes had brought English spiritual life out of 19th century doldrums; he had rendered Nonconformity a political force; he had seen Methodist laity become the people’s leaders through such developments as the Trades Unions. In it all the luminosity of Jesus Christ had remained the “whence” and “whither” of his life and work.

Upon learning of Hughes’ desire to enter the ministry, his father, a physician, had said, “I should rather my son be a Methodist preacher than the Lord Chancellor of England.” Thirteen years after Hughes’ death David Lloyd George, chancellor of the Exchequer and soon to be prime minister of Great Britain, unveiled a portrait of Hughes and told the huge crowd what he had been thinking when he had attended Hughes’ funeral: “There lies silent the greatest spiritual force my generation has produced for a generation.”

[Victor Shepherd: Professor of Historical Theology: Tyndale Seminary, Toronto ]

Jehle, Frank. Ever Against the Stream: The Politics of Karl Barth, 1906-1968.

 (Toronto Journal of Theology Fall 2003)

Jehle, Frank. Ever Against the Stream: The Politics of Karl Barth, 1906-1968.

Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. Pp. vi + 117. Paper, us$22.00. ISBN 0-80828-4944-X

   “A silent community, merely observing the events of the time, would not be a Christian community,” wrote Barth in 1944 as he reflected on his decade-long political struggle in Germany and Switzerland. Jehle relates how Barth exemplified his conviction that Christians, caught in political treachery, may and must act politically just because God’s grace alone lends the state its legitimacy and informs it of its task. So far from being thanked for his contribution here, Barth was never acclaimed in his native land. Four days after his death (December, 1968) a memorial service to honour him was held in the Basel cathedral, with no representative of the federal Swiss government attending. Three months earlier the funeral of Karl Jaspers, Basel’s famed philosopher, had seen many politicians on hand.

The book begins with Barth’s 1906 admission to Zofingia, Switzerland’s oldest student union. Already the twenty-year old was theologically astute and politically alert, thanks to the Swiss Reformation legacy of Zwingli, Oecolampadius and Calvin. Informed by them Barth’s political criticism quickly became diverse and discerning, comprehending a socio-economic arrangement whose “glass ceiling” kept able students out of university on account of their working-class background, as well as Germany’s “unbearable militarism” and Russia’s “Cossack terror.”

In 1907 Barth met Christoph Blumardt (the younger) and owned the latter’s awareness that the entire creation is “sighing for redemption”, and therefore can never itself be the kingdom of God. Soon his exposure to Harnack found him both profiting from the giant’s brilliance and disagreeing with his rapprochement between kingdom and culture. The historical criticism of Harnack’s liberal school was insufficiently critical, Barth concluded, mesmerized by the mystery of documents rather than by the mystery of their subject matter.

While World War I had sealed Barth’s departure from liberal theology, nascent fascism quickened his penetration of that anti-Semitism which he ever after maintained to be its “innermost centre” — never a mere feature of it. As early as 1922 he pronounced German anti-Semitism a “Christian impossibility”, even as church leaders were actualizing it and Barth was telling them they were re-paganizing church and nation alike. In 1925 he denounced Lutheran Theologian Paul Althaus’ sacralization of politics, finding no surprise in Althaus’ subsequent adulation of Hitler as a “pious and faithful sovereign.” In the face of even the theologically sophisticated who announced, “Christ has come to us through Adolf Hitler”, Barth persevered: the enemies of the Jewish people are the enemies of Christ. For this reason he fumed when the Pastors’ Emergency League sought to protect clergy of “non-Aryan descent” but failed to protect Jewish people in general, and then had to oppose benefactor Georg Merz (who had underwritten the publication of Barth’s 1922 Romans) when Merz supported the law forbidding Jews to assimilate, assimilation being an Enlightenment degeneracy. Barth faulted the Confessing Church when its Bishop Wurm commended the minister of justice for the latter’s fight against a Judaism that was inherently subversive morally, religiously and economically. By now he was isolated theologically and politically.

Deported to his native Switzerland, Barth continued to lecture on theology and the state until, in 1941, his telephone was tapped. His outspokenness was thought to threaten Swiss neutrality — even as Emil Brunner’s bathetic bromides were left untouched. At war’s end Barth campaigned for the humane treatment of Germany, never hesitating to endorse its guilt yet insisting that grace always entails a new beginning — only to be accused of harshness when he labelled Nazi depredations “inhuman.”

As World War II gave way to the Cold War, Barth didn’t carry the fight to communism as he had to Naziism. Jehle readily admits a measure of naiveness in Barth. Barth had said that communism was so far from Naziism’s brutalities that “they shouldn’t be mentioned in the same breath.” Stalin couldn’t be compared with Nazi “charlatans.” Barth defended himself: communism aimed at something good, however awry it went; Naziism had aimed at nothing good. Still, Jehle insists that Barth never romanticized communism and soon recognized its hideousness.

Unquestionably the exploration of Barth’s correspondence with East European theologians is a major strength of this book. As vigorously as he opposed those who wanted to make Naziism an article of Christian faith, Barth wrote Bereczky, a pro-Communist Hungarian theologian that no political arrangement can be made such an article. And when Hromadka (Czech) proffered a theological endorsement of communism, Barth wrote that his “theology” was really a “particular kind of philosophy of history” that had been seen in the German Christian theologians as early as 1933.

At least one topic in the book is theologically provocative and should prove fruitful: Jehle maintains that Luther’s “Two Kingdoms” doctrine, pilloried for abetting Germany’s political accommodations, is virtually indistinguishable from Barth’s theology of politics. Both thinkers wanted to desacralize politics, thus freeing Christian obedience in the political realm.

The book brings readers face-to-face with Barth’s discernment, wisdom, realism and energy; above all, however, with his courage — much needed since, according to Jehle, “He never said what others wanted to hear.” Barth strikes this reviewer as a megaphone for the cry of Zwingli, Barth’s Swiss predecessor: “Not to fear is the victory.”

 

Text of review (excluding publishing details at top): 855 words.

 

Victor Shepherd

Tyndale Seminary

Toronto

Theology, Music and Time Jeremy S. Begbie

Jeremy S. Begbie, Theology, Music and Time: Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Pp xiv+317 ISBN: 0 521 44464 0 or 0 521 78568 5 (pb)

 

Books abound on the theological significance of music. (One need think only, for instance, of the many discussions of Bach’s chorales.) There has been, however, a dearth of material on the “musicality” of theology. Specifically, there appears to have been no treatment, theologically learned and musically accomplished in equal measure, of those aspects of the created order for which time is more than merely the complement of space. Here Begbie has filled a lacuna in both the theological and musical disciplines. One of his mentors, Victor Zuckerkandl, points out, “There is hardly a phenomenon that can tell us more about time and temporality than can music”. Begbie illustrates the assertion by exposing the reader to the kind of temporality essential to music, and thence to the kind that he deems to inhere and order the world at large. In light of the role of time in music, Begbie explores features of music (rhythm, metre, resolution, repetition) that he finds helpful additionally in providing new perspective on traditional themes of the faith: creation, salvation, eschatology, election, ecclesiology. The book’s sublime achievement remains an imaginative exploration of gospel truth in which the significance of music’s temporality, together with the assorted temporalities that are constitutive of the cosmos, are theologically related to each other through being related primordially to the temporality of God’s incursion in the Incarnate Son.

Yet Begbie’s book attempts even more: it aims at showing that music can enable theology to do its job better. Despite the fact that music is at best half-articulate (everyone maintains it “communicates” but no one knows precisely what) Begbie insists that music can deepen our knowledge of God. In the course of showing how music may and must sophisticate theology he indicates how music’s deployment of time assists theology in providing resources for understanding the temporality of the created order from a new perspective, for rejoicing in the inescapable “time signatures” of human existence, and for acquainting us thereby with previously unnoticed angles of vision that deepen theology’s grasp of the depths of creation, of our “fit” in it, and of the wisdom of the Creator of it all. Not least, he illustrates how a knowledgeable grasp of life’s “metres” and “rhythms” also highlights several unconscious yet untoward distortions that have skewed theological thinking.

Yet nowhere does Begbie attempt a “natural” theology of music that holds up music as a source of revelation, the nature of music thereby acquainting us with the nature of God. The book, rather, holds up everywhere Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Son of God, as the event in which we are made the beneficiaries of God’s redemptive and creative gifts through the activity of the Holy Spirit.

Similarly the book nowhere submits to the older (i.e., late eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century) notion of Kulturprotestantismus. According to Kulturprotestantismus, supported by many thinkers in one era of Germany’s intellectual history, the kingdom of God is understood in terms of developments within history, the culmination of which is a cultural achievement whose genuine richness only the philistine would deny. Yet as world-occurrence was soon to make manifest, the richest cultural achievements are not the kingdom of God, are not revelatory, have no power to redeem (whatever else they might do as a creaturely good), but rather can be and have been co-opted by powers that few have hesitated to pronounce demonic.

The Introduction includes two groundwork chapters, “Practising music” and “Music’s time.” In the former Begbie acquaints readers lacking musical expertise with the nature of music. Music-making, for instance, is “the intentional bringing into being of temporally organised patterns of pitched sounds.” In accommodating the musically uninformed Begbie points out features of sound that are unarguable as soon as we ponder them yet which we should fail to note had he not drawn our attention to them; e.g., we can see only what our visual “space” contains at one moment. (We can’t see in a room, for instance, what is behind us.) On the other hand, in the same room we can hear simultaneously the several sounds (as in a three-note chord) that occupy the same aural space.

In “Music’s time” he explicates aspects of music that he will return to throughout his book. Tonal music of the west, for instance, “goes somewhere”; its teleology is reflected in the constantly repeated pattern of tension and resolution; the resolution “gathers up” what has preceded and finds rest, even if the rest is only fleeting and an ingredient in the next sequence of sounds (“hyperbar”) that is itself a meta-exemplification of tension and resolution.

Plainly rhythm and metre pertain to music’s directionality. In fact temporality in music is manifested primarily through rhythm interacting with metre, the latter being chiefly a patterned succession of beats (e.g., “waltz time”), while the former is articulated by tones. (We hear the tones that acquaint us with the rhythm, and sense the metre through the rhythm.) Rhythm and metre, together giving rise to waves of tension and release, prevent the “time” of music from being no more than the linear regularity of metronomic monotony.

In this chapter Begbie demonstrates a “realist” conviction that the temporality that is one of the structures of the world at large is just that; it is not projection. Temporal patterns are found, after all, throughout life’s “clocks” from the macro-scale to the micro, from the larger rhythms of sleep and digestion through the smaller rhythms of the central nervous system (e.g., heartbeat) to the micro rhythms of subliminal neural impulses. Time is simply basic to human order; time is a function of the way things are intrinsically related. More to the point, music’s time-intensiveness is connected not merely to the temporality of the human mind and body but to the temporalities of the physical world at large in which diverse human temporalities participate. Begbie maintains, in his consistent realism, that much of the creation’s intrinsic temporality (e.g., bodily kinetic impulses) are implicated in the music we hear; part of what we experience through music is this intrinsic temporality. Temporality, then, is not the environment in which music occurs; it is a crucial part of what music is — of what everything is. Music is meaningful, then, not because of its representational power (unlike some forms of painting it largely lacks this) but rather through the interplay between music’s temporal processes and the manifold temporal processes that shape our lives.

In this regard the reviewer is reminded of a remark he heard from violinist Isaac Stern (d. 2001) when last he spoke in Toronto. A promising young violinist played for Stern and admitted she couldn’t get the phrasing of the music correct despite re-phrasing it repeatedly. Stern told her to sing the part. “I have a poor voice and I don’t want to sing”, she told him. “Sing the violin music anyway”, he told her. She did, and the phrasing fell into place immediately. “You see”, continued the old master, “when you sing you have to breathe. Breathing is a natural, temporal event; the breathing that is part of singing will acquaint you with the natural phrasing — the timing — of the violin music.” The point that Stern made about the relation between the timing and rhythm of breathing, a human occurrence whose “realism” no one denies, and the realism of the phrasing of the music; this relation, an intertwining of music with the temporality of the world at large and also with the temporality of the Incarnate one through whom and for whom all things have been made, Begbie explores ingeniously and articulates compellingly everywhere in the book.

In the second major section of the book “In God’s Good Time”, Begbie exposes and distances himself from the Greek philosophical understanding of time that continues to haunt the church, principally through the influence of Augustine. Hellenistic philosophy undervalued the ontic significance of time, insisting that only timeless existence is true existence. In the light of God’s incursion in the Word Incarnate, however, a proper recognition and affirmation of time corrects Augustine’s neo-Platonic deficits, insisting instead on (i) the world as the venue of God’s salvific activity, with an emphasis on Jesus Christ’s engagement with the totality of the creation; (ii) the work of the Spirit who directs all creation to its fulfilment. Having noted the Hellenistic-Augustinian difficulty with time’s reality, Begbie addresses its comparable difficulty with time’s goodness. Here he probes Augstine’s De Musica, noting that Augustine restricts his reflections on music to rhythmics and metrics concerning the way (thanks to Plato, his successors, and the realm of Forms) the mathematical ratios they illustrate riddle the universe. For Augustine the significance of music lies not in music’s sounds but in its mathematics, musical theory helping us to grasp immaterial reality, and thereby moving the soul from the tainted world of sense (music’s sounds would only fix it there) to the realm of intelligibility. While Augustine can speak positively of music, then, he does so not because of a temporality that God has authored and blessed and pronounced “good” without qualification but rather because music’s mathematics enables the mind to grasp a timeless eternity of pure intelligibility.

Begbie’s emendation is swift and sure. (i) Music demonstrates the possibility of ordered change (i.e., change need not imply chaos); music shows us that subjection to time doesn’t imply a warped creation, a deficient good. (ii) Music shows us that “taking time” — in the several senses of this expression (we need think only of the time Jesus spent “doing nothing” in the wilderness, without which the time he spent elsewhere would have been fruitless) — is inherently good and humanly enriching. (iii) Since a crucial aspect of music is the resolution of tension, the protraction of such tension deepens our capacity for waiting. Begbie notes the place of “waiting” in scripture, and of course never confuses waiting with waiting around or loitering. Waiting, both musically and scripturally, heightens anticipation. Waiting reminds us that we are not the lords of time. (iv) Music reminds us of different time-structures: things happen at different times, in different times, at different rates. (v) Music reminds us of the temporal limits of our finitude. Here Begbie repudiates the Hellenistic identification of finitude with fallenness, temporality and goodness (on this understanding) being mutually exclusive.

Since life is finite or limited, transience is inescapable. The transitions inherent in music (music is always the succession of sounds, never the “piled up” coagulation of sound) are ordered, glorious and enriching, and direct us to the manner in which life’s transience can be fruitful. Furthermore, since Jesus Christ is God’s gracious engagement with time, our temporal limitation and inescapable transience remind us that we live by grace — and die by the selfsame grace. (As a pastor who has stood at deathbeds for over thirty years the reviewer has come to grasp what the writer of Ecclesiastes meant when he wrote, without any hint of bitterness or futility, that in God’s good ordering there is indeed a time to die.)

Exploring yet more deeply the theme of transition in terms of tension and resolution, Begbie notes the theological significance of delay and patience, together with the relation of patience to steadfastness amidst suffering and the refinement of character amidst hardships. Sensitively he unfolds the way in which delays, in music and in the spiritual life, are fraught with provisional gratifications. (Music eschews instant gratification; the spiritual life ought to eschew them.) Each provisional gratification magnifies expectation of final gratification. Each closure in music (e.g., the end of a phrase) is related intrinsically through time to every other closure (the end of a movement) and ultimately to final closure (the end of the piece.) The Christian life, set between Christ’s Resurrection and his Parousia, similarly advances by means of provisional fulfilments, all of which are gathered up in its eschatological crowning, the ultimate “hyperbar” in Christian understanding and living. Music’s temporality, Begbie notes judiciously, not only gives us resources for theological reflection on God-given temporality but even becomes itself an event in the salvific process through the worship and witness of Christians.

Music, everyone is aware, is highly repetitive; good music, never cloyingly so but always “sameness with a difference”. Begbie illustrates this truth from the first movement of Beethoven’s Sixth Symphony where the repetition is unusually protracted. Even as key and instrumentation change, the sound pattern is repeated tirelessly. In the hands of a skilful composer repetition — needed to preserve a musical piece’s identity whenever tonal modifications threaten to obscure that identity — both heightens tension and concurrently effects resolution, only to use the matrix of tension/resolution as the tension feature in the next hyperbar.

As with music, the repetition of the eucharist stabilizes, for through it God recalls the Christian community to the cross and the cross’s transformation. Yet since the eucharist rebinds Christians to the cross of the One who comes only to seek and save the lost, it destabilises by sending Christians back into a world of turbulence, turpitude and treachery, yet always with renewed hope for the world. And just as the proper deployment of variation essential to the profoundest repetition doesn’t deny the integrity of the initial appearance of the theme, so the eucharist’s repetition, modified by liturgical variation that forestalls dreariness, doesn’t deny either the singularity of “crucified under Pontius Pilate” or the sufficiency of Christ’s finished work.

Repetition in music never means that what has been repeated then falls back into vacuity. Musical repetition, then, parallels the biblical understanding of remembrance. Biblically to remember is to have a completed event in the past become the operative actuality in the present. Eucharistic repetition lies within the orbit both of musical repetition and biblical remembrance: what is past becomes the operative actuality of the present in the event of the repetition. Once again Begbie shows the reader how theology can be done through music.

The third section of the book, “Time to Improvise”, begins by discussing the relation of constraint and freedom, proceeds to articulate the place of constraint and freedom inherent in jazz improvisation, and gathers all of this up in a brilliantly argued reinvestigation of the gift-giving and gift-receiving, akin to that found in jazz, which Paul deems to characterize the mutual fruitfulness of Jews and Gentiles within the church.

Begbie introduces this final section by probing the work of two modern composers, Pierre Boulez (French) and John Cage (American). While they represent two contrasting approaches (Boulez is preoccupied with musical organisation, Cage with “just let it happen”), their music sounds similar just because both have shed the constraints of tradition, eagerly cancelling musical memory. Yet just as the amnesic person lacks an identity and is therein wholly determined by occurrences within and without, so Boulez and Cage have forfeited musical identity for the sake of a “freedom” that finds them courting determinations of which they seem to be unaware. To be relieved of constraints is to be in bondage to necessity of some sort, even that of chaos.

While improvisation might appear to the musically naïve to be no more than liberation from constraint, the improvisation characteristic of jazz presupposes uncommon constraint. In fact just because jazz maximizes improvisation it is the musical idiom most subject to the constraint of metre. (The pace of jazz metre is virtually unvarying.) Probing more profoundly the nature of jazz improvisation and its reliance on constraint, Begbie notes that constraint fosters contingency, and contingency is never without risk of mistake, even risk of failure. Yet the contingency that improvisation is by definition is also a contingency that allows musicians to take up “mistake” and weave it into the texture of the work. Plainly, then, jazz’s contingency-improvisation shows us how we are allowed to fail and yet not fail irretrievably. What matters is how “mistake” and “failure” area incorporated finally in the music as performed, heard and cherished. Space to fail ever remains essential to superlative jazz performance.

The foregoing, rich in itself, appears to be propaedeutic to the final chapter, “Giving and Giving Back”. Here Begbie luminously relates the exchange of “gifts” between actors (where one actor’s “gift” to another actor in the course of a performance may be either “blocked” or “returned”) as well as the gift exchange between jazz musicians; Begbie relates these to the mutual gift-giving and receiving of Jewish and Gentile Christians described in Romans 9-11.

In Romans 9-11 Paul agonises over the Jewish rejection of the Messiah. Begbie maintains that a legitimate way of reading these chapters is to understand them as Paul’s attempt at introducing the Roman Church to the improvising strategies of God. Jew gives to Gentile. (Gentiles, wild olive branches, have only lately been grafted into cultivated tree trunk that Israel is.) Yet it is Jewish rejection on a larger scale that has spelled Gentile acceptance. And it is Gentile acceptance that will issue ultimately in unparalleled blessing for Jews.

The ground of the improvised Jewish/Gentile exchange, of course, is the grand exchange enacted by God in Christ on behalf of us all. While this exchanged isn’t mentioned in Romans 9-11, it is presupposed throughout the passage because articulated in detail in Romans 1-8. God’s gift of the gospel presupposes God’s rejection of the refusal rooted in Adam’s sin and the ensuing hostility that issued in the death of God’s Son. Christ is the “return” of the wholly obedient covenant partner. Christians are those whom the Spirit brings to share in the exchange and continue to share in its dynamic.

Begbie then extends all that he has said concerning Romans 9-11 to the pastoral issue between Jew and Gentile in the Roman Church over the consumption of meat previously sacrificed to idols. Each has a gift to give and a gift to receive, the “improvisation” of it all necessary in that nothing could be pre-planned even as the welcome/acceptance/reception both have already received from Christ is the “metre” that alone makes any spiritual giving/receiving possible.

Begbie’s sharpest criticism concerns John Taverner. Transparently sincere in his recognition of Taverner’s genius, Begbie nonetheless takes issue with the theology that Taverner attempts to embed in his music. Taverner regards music as an Ikon (sic), “a real presence…lifting our minds and hearts above this earth (where we are exiled for a time) into Heaven, our true ‘Homeland'”. Begbie advances the following theological cautions. Has Taverner undervalued the Incarnation in which God confirms creaturely reality and its goodness? Has he understood that in Jesus Christ God has embraced all the features of our fallen humanity (deprivation, pain, loss) and made them the material of salvation? Has he grasped the manner in which God’s eternity has been opened up to us not through Ikonic beauty but through an ugly death? Does his understanding of the eschaton deny the restoration of the creation and suggest instead its cancellation?

The philosopher Martin Heidegger maintained that language is the “house of being”. To say the same thing differently, being is a function of language. To be sure, Heidegger would never deny the converse: language is a function of being, albeit in the relatively small sphere wherein words denote or describe objects. Vastly greater, however, is the sphere wherein being is a function of language. Here the force of language isn’t that we have more words in our vocabulary and can thereby bamboozle; expanded language, rather, creates a world and admits us to a world that is vastly richer than the world inhabited by someone with meagre language. Here language doesn’t describe an already-existing world but rather gives rise to a universe imperceptible to those for whom language remains only a function of being.

In the spirit of Heidegger, Begbie’s book acquaints us with yet another house, for metre and rhythm are similarly a “house of being”. For our awareness of the fact, nature and ubiquity of the “rhythm over metre” that is exemplified in music and riddles life everywhere facilitates an ever-expanding universe we should otherwise never know and enjoy.

Dr Victor Shepherd, Professor of Historical Theology

Tyndale Seminary, Toronto.