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The Trinity Against the Spirit of Unitarianism
The Trinity Against the Spirit of Unitarianism
(from The Trinity: An Essential for Faith in Our Time, Evangel Publishing House, 2002)
Faced with cultural and religious pluralism the post-modern church in the west appears extraordinarily anxious or extraordinarily accommodating, depending on one’s point of view. The church regards its pluralistic setting as novel and is either tempted to panic and endeavour to preserve itself through a multi-faceted isolationism, or is tempted in its bold engagement with the world to squander the “deposit” (2 Timothy 1:12) which it has been charged to guard. Those prone to worry are more likely to insist on retaining a doctrine of the Trinity, if only to preserve continuity with their forebears in faith, not realizing that “if only” reduces the doctrine to an artifact in the museum of intellectual history. On the other hand, those eager to meet challenges are more likely to jettison any doctrine of the Trinity as an encumbrance which inhibits the church in its witness to the gospel and its exemplification of it in the common life of the world.
One issue facing the church, then, is this: is the doctrine of the Trinity baggage which is not only unnecessary but is actually a threat to the seaworthiness of the ship (church) as it appears to founder in the storms of modernity? or is it ballast in the ship’s keel apart from which the ship will capsize in even moderate winds?
I submit that apart from the doctrine of the Trinity “gospel” is rendered indistinguishable from religious aspiration or projection, while “Spirit” is reduced to a magnification of anything that the Fall-darkened heart and mind of humankind may conceive, and “church” becomes nothing more than one more social group (albeit in religious guise) which seeks to promote the agenda of its constituents. In short, without the doctrine of the Trinity the arch counter-miracle will occur: wine will be turned into water as the gospel is denatured.
In maintaining the doctrine of the Trinity to belong to the being of the faith rather than merely to its wellbeing I am not holding up as etched in stone the expression of any one thinker’s understanding; neither Augustine’s nor Aquinas’s nor Calvin’s nor Barth’s. Nonetheless, I am convinced that just as these thinkers were impelled to speak on behalf of the Triune God in order to forestall the acculturation of the gospel in their day, we must do as much in ours, all the while endeavouring to obey the fifth commandment; namely, to honour our parents (including our theological foreparents) in order that the days of the church may be long in the land which God gives us.
II: — I agree with those who maintain that a fully-articulated doctrine of the Trinity is not found in scripture. Nonetheless, the building blocks of the doctrine incontrovertibly are. Consider the following:
Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. (Matthew 28:19)
This Jesus God raised up…. Being therefore exalted at the right hand of God, and having received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, he has poured out this which you see and hear. (Acts 2:32f)
The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God, and the fellowship of the Holy Spirit be with you all. (2 Corinthians 13:14)
For through [Jesus Christ] we both have access in one Spirit to the Father. (Ephesians 2:18)
There is one body and one Spirit, just as you were called in one hope that belongs to your call, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of us all…. But grace was given to each of us according to the measure of Christ’s gift. (Ephesians 4:4-6)
…God chose you from the beginning to be saved, through sanctification by the Spirit and belief in the truth. To this he called you through our gospel, so that you may obtain the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ. (2 Thessalonians 2:13)
Chosen and destined by God the Father and sanctified by the Spirit for obedience to Jesus Christ and for sprinkling with his blood. (1 Peter 1:2)
As scripture attests the incursion of the Word scripture impels us to an understanding that God is eternally Triune. A doctrine of the Trinity makes explicit what is everywhere implicit in the “the faith once delivered to the saints” and for which faith, the apostle tells us, we must ever “contend”. (Jude 3)
III: — Christian faith is rooted in the oneness of being between Jesus Christ and God the Father. In the gospel God has revealed himself to us as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. (Without the divine activity of the Holy Spirit we should not know of the deity of Father and Son.) In this self-unveiling God has revealed himself in such a way as to disclose that what God is in himself God is toward us, and what God is toward us God is in himself, throughout his saving acts in history. In other words, what God is eternally in himself, that is, in his internal relations as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, God is in his activity toward us through the Son and in the Spirit.
If the oneness in being between Jesus Christ and God the Father is cut, then the substance and heart of the gospel is lost. For if what Christ does is not what God does, then before God humankind’s predicament is unrelieved. Again, if God himself has not come among us in the Incarnation, then God’s love for us (despite God’s good intentions!) stops short of God’s full identification with us sinners; in truth it is not finally love (or at least is woefully deficient and defective love) and the redemptive activity of God is finally ineffectual.
Faith in this God is generated by God’s self-witness and self-interpretation (Holy Spirit) in God’s Word (Jesus Christ). In short, knowledge of God is the work of God himself. Since there is no intrinsic ontological similarity between the eternal being of God and the contingent being of us creatures, the fact of faith (that is, the presence of women and men who believe) attests the utter priority of God over all thought concerning him. We can think correctly about God at all only because God includes us in his self-knowing.
In conjoining “Spirit” and “Holy” scripture insists that God is the only fit witness to himself; only God can disclose God. And since God has given himself to us in the person of the Son or Word, then Spirit and Son (Word) are inextricably linked. Or in the idiom of the written gospels, Jesus Christ is the unique bearer and bestower of the Holy Spirit. This is but to say that one cannot pronounce “Spirit” except in reference to Jesus Christ. (In this way the apostles insist that while Christless spirits do indeed abound, they can only be less than holy!) This point is reinforced by scripture’s depiction of the Spirit as being sent from the Father in the name of the Son, never in the Spirit’s own name; the Spirit speaks only of the Father and of the Son, never of himself. Put simply, the Spirit is like floodlighting. Floodlights are positioned in such a way that one does not see the floodlight itself, only that which it lights up and to which it therefore directs attention. (Recall our Lord’s words, “He (i.e., the Spirit) shall glorify me”. John 16:14) The Spirit imports no new substance into faith’s knowing, but rather facilitates faith’s knowledge of the Son, who is the “substance” of the Father.
IV: — While the foregoing is formally espoused throughout the church catholic it is materially contradicted frequently in various “unitarianisms”, such as those outlined below.
(i) A UNITARIANISM OF THE FATHER This popular “unitarianism” certainly preserves the truth that God is exalted, “high and lifted up”; that God’s thoughts are not our thoughts nor our ways God’s ways. (Isaiah 6:1; 55:8) God is the sole, sovereign, eternal one. God is not an aspect of his creation-at-large (the cosmos) nor an aspect of his creation-at-small (humankind). God is irreducibly GOD, never one with whom we may trifle.
However, the God who is only “high and lifted up”, without differentiation, tends to be so exalted as never to humble himself, so far beyond us as not to render himself accessible, sovereign with more than a suggestion of severe, unknowable in the sense of arbitrary, a creator who is also (or may be) capricious.
Eighteenth century deism portrayed God as the creator who fashioned the universe and then effectively absented himself from it. Seventeenth century Protestant scholasticism portrayed God as capricious in its notion of double predestination. God, it said, has foreordained elect and reprobate as such even before they are born, and therefore before they have even had opportunity to sin. When confronted with the irrationality of this its proponents stated that there is a reason underlying the only-apparent irrationality of the decrees, but this “reason” is hidden inscrutably in the innermost recesses of God. Therefore it is not our place to enquire, only our place to adore. The more the hidden justice of this scheme was advanced, however, the more apparent the manifest injustice was to many. In view of the unqualified remoteness of God, or the arbitariness of God, or the injustice of God which a unitarianism of the Father seems to imply, this particular unitarianism, paradoxically, ends in the denial that God is parent in any sense.
(ii) A UNITARIANISM OF THE SON Undifferentiated transcendence is overcome as Jesus Christ is God-with-us. So far from disdaining the complexity of the human situation God has identified with it in its totality. Jesus Christ is bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, is tempted at all points as we are (Hebrews 4:15), even becoming one with sinners, as his baptism attests, by “being made sin” for us.(2 Corinthians 5:21)
At the same time, to collapse God into God the Son distorts even the truth of the Incarnation. For then God-with-us is demeaned as pal. The saccharine Jesus finds no paradigm in scripture. No one who met Jesus Christ in the flesh ever spoke of him in this manner. The written gospels, rather, customarily depict him as one whom people do not understand and cannot domesticate. Even disciples, newly made aware in his presence of their systemic sinnership, can only plead with him to leave them alone. The apostles never confuse proximity with presumption. So far from being aider and abettor of human schemes, Jesus is the one who does not supply answers to questions, for he will not confirm the standpoint or the perception or the purpose of the questioner. Instead he poses his own question, therein showing the speaker to dwell in spiritual unreality; i.e., suffer from spiritual psychosis.
(iii) A UNITARIANISM OF THE SPIRIT It is the Spirit who imparts vitality and vibrancy in believer and congregation alike. It is the Spirit who supplies zeal, warmth, boldness, effectiveness. It is the Spirit whose gifts equip the congregation for ministry and whose fruits adorn the gospel, in all of this exhibiting the truth of God as the power of God and not mere ideation.
One New Testament word for the Spirit, ARRABON — “down payment” or “pledge”, (in modern Greek it means a woman’s engagement ring) — plainly means that there is more to come. While the Spirit satisfies the restless human heart the satisfaction it yields never satiates; believers, contented as never before and nowhere else, are nonetheless “hungrier” than ever even as they know that one day they will be fed so as to leave them hungering no more. The entire experiential aspect of primitive Christianity (e.g., “Did you receive the Spirit by works of the law or by hearing with faith?” (Galatians 3:2) plainly directs the attention of readers of the epistle to identifiable experience) is much undervalued in most expressions of the church today.
Notwithstanding, when the Spirit is magnified disproportionately and experience put forward unnormed, then “Spirit” ceases to be the power in which Jesus Christ acts himself and which he pours forth on his people. “Spirit” instead lends itself to frenzy, the suspension of the intellect, and the identification of God with powers which may be nothing more than the intrapsychic proclivities and pressures of the devotees themselves.
It appears that whenever the Trinity is denied through the aforementioned unitarianisms redemption is denied as well. In the first instance God’s transcendence is upheld in such a manner as to render God remote, distant, inaccessible, with the result that the creation is left unaffected. In the second instance God is so identified with the creation as not to transcend it so as to be free for it. In the third instance God is so identified with human intra-psychic processes as to leave them deified. It is the Triune God who alone saves, for it is the Triune God who alone can.
V: — In many areas of the church catholic today the doctrine of the Trinity is denied not merely materially but formally as well. Such a denial occurs whenever, for instance, the deity of the Son is impugned. “Son of”, in scripture, has the force of “of the same nature as”; to modify “same nature” is to deny what the church has always confessed in terms of the Incarnation.
Formal denial need not be blatant; in fact it is no less a formal denial for being subtle. Whenever the question, “Is Jesus the Son of God?”, is answered, whether waggishly or sincerely, “Of course he is; all of us are sons and daughters of God”, Incarnation is denied and therefore Trinity as well. And since the being of God is intrinsically related to the knowledge of God, any departure from acknowledging the Tri-unity of God imperils the knowledge of God. The current preoccupation with “Creation Spirituality” is such a subtle yet formal denial.
The question, “Who is God?”, is a question which scripture answers only indirectly. It answers this question by first asking and answering two others: “What does God do (outside of us, yet for our sake)?”, and “What does God effect (in us)?” We can know who God is only as we first learn what God has done on our behalf, for our sake, in the Son, and only as we become beneficiaries of this work on our behalf through the power of the Spirit. In sum, we know God as we are included in God’s work for us and as we are illumined concerning this work. To become acquainted with the living God is to learn that the creation is not God. It is too frequently overlooked that the non-divine status of the creation has to be revealed — or else why should the creation not be assumed to be divine, as in fact it often is? As it is only by grace (i.e., by the action of God himself) that we learn that the Triune one is God, so it is only by grace that we learn that the creation is not God but rather is creaturely. “Creation Spirituality”, on the other hand, is predicated on the postulate that the creation either is God or mediates God, both of which prophet and apostle reject. Since God is God and we are but creatures of God, the order or logic of revelation generates the order or logic of our knowledge of God. And since the creation does not reveal the Triune God, the creation (itself fallen and in bondage to death) is not the vehicle of that life which the Spirit (who is God) alone effects.
Any diminution of the Son as one with the being of the Father is an explicit denial of the Trinity. Such diminution of the Son invariably fosters an idolization of the creation.
VI: — Any sundering of Spirit from Son is a similar denial with similar consequences. Sundering the Spirit from the Son means that the “Spirit” ceases to be holy, ceases to be intrinsically related to the Word (as the reformers, following the apostles, were careful to note), and becomes instead the religious legitimation of human fancy or fantasy. Since, as was seen above, it is only through the truth that truth is known and non-truth recognized, only by reality that illusion is discerned, then only through revelation can we gain proper perspective on and understand assorted claims to truth, reality, godliness and goodness.
(i) RELIGION Despite its apparently ascendant secularism our era is startlingly religious. It is assumed that religion is good and that Christianity is religious. Christianity may indeed be, but is faith “religious”? Prophet and apostle attest that the gospel exposes religion as non-gospel, non-faith; i.e., unbelief. Elijah on Mount Carmel does not suggest to the Baal spokespersons that they are religious, he is religious, and therefore they should all pool their religiosity, seeking out a common denominator, maximizing convergence and minimizing divergence. On the contrary Elijah maintains that shortly Yahweh will act in such a way as to expose Baalism for what it is. This is not to say that Israel’s faith remained free of religion; the prophets continually deplore the religious invasion of Israel and continually recall Israel to the God who displayed his outstretched arm in delivering them from slavery and formed them his people at Sinai, and now nurtured them like a mother with her child at her breast.
It seems that the church today thinks itself to be meeting religious pluralism for the first time, when in fact the faith of Israel and of Israel’s greater Son came to birth and had to survive in the context of competing religious claimants. To be sure, this pluralism always encroached upon the faith of God’s people and threatened to dissolve them. Significantly, while Paul begins his sermon on Mars Hill (Acts 17) by acknowledging the phenomenon of religions (the Greek word he uses — DEISDAIMON — also means “superstition”, it should be noted), he quickly moves to an unambiguous declaration of Jesus Christ, his resurrection, and the coming judgement. Nowhere do the apostles counsel seeking commonalities with contiguous religious manifestations.
Unless the church recovers its discernment of how revelation discloses itself as distinct from religion, how will the church recognize — and repudiate — the religious accretions to the gospel, and even the most subtle (yet no less deleterious) psycho-religiosities which attach themselves to our own believing? How will it distinguish between the truth that God, for the sake of his glory and our salvation, has freely justified us of his own free grace, and religion as the insidious attempt at justifying ourselves before a god whose mercy and pardon we plainly doubt?
(ii) CULTURE Again, as soon as Spirit is sundered from Word (Jesus Christ is the one Word of God we are to hear and heed in life and in death, according to the Barmen Declaration), the “Spirit” is co-opted as the legitimization and even the divinization of culture. Aesthetic enjoyment is then spoken of as “spiritual experience”. All experiences of the creaturely order in its own mysterious depths are denoted “spiritual” and are confused with the work of the Holy Spirit of God. The obvious conclusion from this confusion is that cultured people are spiritually superior and that culture saves.
The Germans, as usual, have a polysyllabic word for it: Kulturprotestantismus. The culture-religion which had permeated the German church left people unable to distinguish between God himself and the awesome depths of God’s creation, between having “God’s love poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us”(Romans 5:5) and being moved by natural beauty or artistic talent. When Kulturprotestantismus went beyond viewing aesthetics as the vestibule to the kingdom and affirmed culture and kingdom to be synonymous, the nazification of the land of Goethe, Schiller, Beethoven — not to mention the world’s leading medical research — demonstrated that culture can readily cloak the conflict between Holy One and evil one. It demonstrates too that Kulturprotestantismus supplies neither the ability nor the urge to remove the cloak.
(iii) SELF-INTEREST The spectacle of most television religious programming, replete with references to “God”, “Holy Spirit” and “faith” raises the issue of narcissism. Narcissism is preoccupation with oneself, preoccupation with one’s own comfort, advantage, recognition, advancement and reward. The televised “gospel” offers this more often than not. It is only as the Spirit is known to be always and only the Spirit of him who had nowhere to lay his head, of him who summons followers to leave all and shoulder a cross if they are to be his followers, that the spiritual counterfeit of narcissism can be identified.
(iv) PATHOLOGY In the same way once the Spirit is divorced from the one who is the guarantor of the kingdom (i.e., the creation healed), once pneumatology is separated from Christology, people are theologically/spiritually defenceless against psycho-religious pathology. Jonestown need not be recalled; suffice it to recollect those whose “faith” has rendered them ill, or rendered them more ill.
VII: — When Jesus Christ is confessed as the unique bearer and bestower of the Spirit; when the Spirit is known as the power in which Jesus Christ acts, to the glory of God the Father, then distortions which bedevil the church are avoided and Trinitarian doctrine preserves proper balances.
Reference has already been made to the question Paul put to the Christians in Galatia, “Did you receive the Spirit by works of the law or by hearing with faith?”. The question directs his readers to recall and reflect upon an aspect of their life in Christ which they cannot deny, an event (however protracted), moreover, which is so common as to provide an indisputable beginning-point for his subsequent reasoning with them.
As the church today recovers experience of God (for experience of God is the only experience the Spirit of Jesus Christ facilitates) the theological content of the gospel will never be arid intellectualism. It is the Spirit who prevents the gospel (so-called) from becoming the preserve of the intellectually gifted, from degenerating into a western philosophy which happens to employ a religious vocabulary. The gospel must not become one more abstraction to be assessed along with other “world-views”, when in truth the gospel, ultimately, is the presence and power of the living Lord Jesus Christ in his person.
When the Spirit is honoured as the power of God which renders Jesus Christ forever contemporaneous then living faith will always triumph over traditionalism. “I’m a Lutheran”, when uttered in the apparent absence of throbbing faith in the living Word, usually means that the Lutheran Church is the one someone stays away from! The same phenomenon is seen in those whose Protestantism consists in their anti-Catholicism.
When “Spirit” and “Word” are acknowledged to imply each other then institutionalism will not supplant adventurous discipleship. No longer subserving itself or an un-gospel agenda, the institution will subserve the community which lives for the praise of God’s glory. The institution will resist calling for that obedience which is owed God alone. In trusting the promise that the powers of death shall not prevail against Christ’s people who, like John the Baptist, point to him, it will soberly remember that institutional remains litter the landscape of history.
Where the Spirit is recalled as the Spirit of him who insists that harlots and tax-collectors enter the kingdom of God ahead of the “righteous” the placebo of moralism will be detected and dropped. The Christian life will not be impoverished until it becomes precisely what the world misunderstands it to be: conformity to a code, success at which enterprise breeds self-righteousness while failure precipitates despair. Evident instead will be glad obedience to the living person of Jesus Christ, out of gratitude for the deliverance he has effected.
Where the Spirit is trusted to lend effectiveness to proclamation in Christ’s name evangelism will not give way to assorted techniques for proselytizing or garnering adherents. To evangelize is to set forth the gospel of the Son in reliance upon the God whose Spirit is sufficient to empower the saints’ testimony. In other words, the outcome of our evangelism can be left in God’s hands.
A church which does not trust the Spirit to honour witness borne to the Son is a church which confuses evangelism with conversion; which is to say, a church which cannot distinguish between its work and God’s work. Moreover, a church which thinks that conversion (rather than witness) is its responsibility is a church which coerces; the harassment can be physical, social or psychological, but it remains coercion. Paradoxically, the church which thinks that it has to generate the fruit of its diligent “God-talk” announces to the world that it does not believe in God, since it cannot trust God to vivify God’s own Word! To trust that the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son or Word is to be freed from anxiety concerning the results of mission and therein spared the fear of failure and the concomitant temptation to coerce.
VIII: — A recovery of the doctrine of the Trinity would do eversomuch to assist The United Church of Canada concerning the catholicity of its mission. Despite our denomination’s protestations that it sides with the victimized, the marginalized, the oppressed, and those disadvantaged in any way, it remains virtually exclusively an occurrence of the ascendant middle class. That segment of the socio-economic spectrum from which the UCC draws its people is becoming smaller as it also becomes more affluent: we are attracting fewer and fewer people, virtually all of whom are more and more wealthy. We attract no poor people, even remarkably few who are not socially ascendant.
In times of economic turbulence the rich are cushioned against material misfortune and remain rich; the poor are not cushioned, but neither do they have anything to protect, with the result that they remain poor. The rising middle class, however, is unrelievedly vulnerable. In times of economic dislocation it is precipitated downwards. It collapses into that segment of the socio-economic spectrum with which our denomination has no credibility at all. In other words, simply as a result of uncontrollable economic convulsions the UCC would be deprived of its constituency. A recovery of Trinitarian faith, especially with respect to the appointment of God himself in the person of the Son, would commission us to re-examine our socio-economic exclusiveness. The Word of God is baptized in dirty water at the hands of someone who will be forever out of place among the socially slick. The pronouncement heard at this baptism — “Thou art my beloved Son; with Thee I am well pleased” — is a conflation of Psalm 2 and Isaiah 42. Psalm 2 is God’s appointment of the royal ruler, the one possessed of genuine authority. Isaiah 42 speaks of God’s approval of the “Servant of the Lord”, commonly known as “the suffering servant”, the one who “was despised and rejected by humankind…and we esteemed him not”. The mission of God himself in the Son will ever be effective (God is sovereign), but its effectiveness will materialize through a servanthood which entails hardship and sacrifice and social rejection. Then to be Christ’s follower is to be commissioned to a ministry of service, not domination; of self-forgetfulness, not personal advantage; even of social rejection rather than public congratulation. Would not a new appreciation of the Son’s mission, when the Son is one with the Father himself, be the recovery of our identification with the Son who cherished the very people to whom we cannot relate? In that Son who is of the same substance and nature as the Father God effectively loved the world — not merely one aspect of the world, i.e., social aspirants whose psycho-social needs church-affiliation appears to serve.
The recovery of the doctrine of the Trinity will foster the recovery of Trinitarian faith; this in turn will mean a return to the catholicity of the gospel. And such a return will spell recovery of mission and service on behalf of the all the “far off” who have been “brought near in the blood of Christ”.(Ephesians 2:13) For “through him we both [i.e., Jew and Gentile, which is to say all human beings equally despite apparently insurmountable barriers] have access in one Spirit to the Father.” (Ephesians 3:18)
The tetragrammaton, , contains no vowels. Lacking vowels, it is unpronounceable. Because it is unpronounceable it is untranslatable; for this reason there can be no substitute for it. There can be no substitute for the name of the God who has named himself Father, Son and Holy Spirit. To know God, honour and obey and adore God, is to find that the doctrine of the Trinity is neither the museum-like security-blanket of the nervous nor the jettisonable baggage of the naive. The doctrine of the Trinity, rather, will ever orient us to the living God whose love for a dying world commissions us to love it no less.
Victor Shepherd
My Spiritual Debt to Martin Luther
My Spiritual Debt to Martin Luther
in THE CANADIAN LUTHERAN October 2002
As a child, adolescent and university undergraduate student I had no exposure to Luther at all. Then in the course of preparing for ordained ministry within The United Church of Canada I immersed myself in the theology of John Calvin, where I heard Calvin described frequently as a “second generation Lutheran.” My work in Calvin found me reaching back to Luther to see where the Genevan was indebted to him and where he differed from him (e.g., on the manner of Christ’s presence in the Lord’s Supper.) Soon I found myself drawn to Luther not as background to Calvin but as a spiritual and theological giant himself. Always impressed by Luther’s grasp of the gospel, I was overwhelmed at the gospel’s grasp of Luther, at his heart, at the manifest “heart seizure” he had undergone at the hands of Jesus Christ.
Three words taken together describe Luther’s heart for me: truth, passion, compassion. Nothing ever eclipses the living Lord Jesus as truth and reality for Luther. To embrace Christ in faith is to love him, flooded by the love with which he first loved us, and in loving him find ourselves delighted and contented in him. And of course to embrace Christ in faith is to embrace as well all whom he embraces; which is to say, all of humankind in its sin, suffering, and self-contradiction. Luther’s heart broke as surely as his Lord’s at the sight of people whose wounds were undisguisable and undeniable.
Several years later I was appointed Professor of Historical Theology at Tyndale Seminary, Toronto. Here I teach a course in the theology of Luther every eighteen months. While I teach many courses in several different disciplines (e.g., philosophy), students tell me I’m at my best in Luther. I understand this, since Luther is the easiest Protestant thinker to love, and my love for him has admitted me to the deeper recesses of his heart. His influence upon me is inestimable, and my debt to him is unpayable.
Gospel definition
Luther’s definition of the gospel — “the promise of God fulfilled in our midst” — moves me as often as I reflect upon it. His way of putting the matter gathers particular associations around it and thereby creates a mood and an ethos that Lutheranism has always known and cherished. God has made promise after promise to his wayward creation; God gathers up his many promises in one grand, overarching promise to act for us and save us; God fulfills this grand promise amidst our earthliness and earthiness in such a way as to satisfy yet never satiate all who cling to the Son in faith. In other words to meet and know that Son whom God hasn’t withheld from us but has given up for us and now persists in giving to us; to meet and know this one is to want to look nowhere else. “At rest” in him, we are left plumbing riches we can never exhaust.
In the history of the Church few besides Luther have loved the living person of the Lord Jesus in such a child-like way. And for this reason few have unselfconsciously reflected the child’s wonder and excitement at Christmas. Like a child, Luther was awed that the Creator kept his promise of the gift, and is therefore a Father whom we can henceforth trust in dark days and difficult times. Before the Christmas gift (who, as the Incarnate One, is ultimately the giver himself) Luther stood speechless at the humility of the God who condescends to us as baby. Learning all of this through scripture alone, and knowing therefore that scripture is indispensable in the economy of salvation, Luther was yet aware that scripture and Incarnate One are categorically different. “Scripture is the manger,” he liked to say, “in which the child is laid.” Bible and baby ought never to be confused; yet they ought never to be separated, since it is only through the witness of prophets and apostles that we can apprehend the long-promised gift of God; better, only as we habitually revisit the manger do we find the Saviour apprehending us. Luther’s insight here — pithy, profound and memorable — would do much to spare the Church the family-quarrels over scripture that settle nothing yet scar everyone.
The babe in the manger thrived; he grew both in stature and in wisdom. As an adult the Son of God endured a humiliation in the cross that dwarfed the humility of the stable. Mesmerized by the cross, Luther gloried in the “exchange” (2nd Corinthians 5: 16-21) as the crucified took on our sin, guilt, degradation and death only to clothe us in his righteousness, acceptance, honour and life.
Christ defined
The “exchange” motif lies at the heart of Luther’s Christology. The “Christ” who is chiefly teacher (as if the root human problem were ignorance) or chiefly exemplar (as if it were the absence of a model we can mimic) or chiefly law-giver (as if edicts could eliminate our fatal self-contradiction) is useless in the wake of the Fall. In light of the Fall Luther always knew the difference between deprivation and depravity; he knew that our predicament arises not from deficits and deficiencies but rather from incomprehensible yet lethal perverseness. Only the heaven-sent Saviour can address our depravity. He does so not as he tries to “fix up” humankind but as he exchanges our heart of stone for his heart of flesh (Ezekiel 36:26), our inconstancy for his faithfulness, the condemnation we deserve for the approval we can only receive. Every time he gazed upon the crucified Luther knew that a life-crushing burden had been exchanged for life-giving blessing. To be the beneficiary of this exchange was to be freed.
Freed from what? In his unforgettable tract, The Freedom of the Christian (1521), Luther insisted we are freed from the law, from sin, and from death; that is, we are freed from having to justify ourselves (or thinking that we can), from disobedience as the determinative truth of our life before God, and from expulsion from God’s presence. We are freed for love to Jesus Christ and service to the neighbour. Freed (paradoxically) by our bondage to Christ, we no longer live in ourselves, out of ourselves, for ourselves; instead we live “away” from ourselves by living in the “other.” Specifically we live in two others: we live in Christ through faith, and we live in the neighbour through love. Taken out of ourselves, we are liberated from that anxiety which always marks the self-preoccupied. Aware that our frantic efforts at reducing anxiety merely feed it, Luther knew that the profoundest cure for anxiety is self-forgetful self-abandonment to those in whom we now live.
Living in the neighbour
Since the arms of the crucified embrace the neighbour, genuinely to live in Christ is always to live in the neighbour as well. Never shallow, Luther insisted we live in the neighbour by sharing her need. This isn’t especially difficult, since we are meeting her scarcity with our abundance. In the second place we live in our neighbour by sharing her suffering. This is considerably more difficult, since proximity to another person’s pain is itself painful for us. At the same time, we may feel rather good about sharing our neighbour’s suffering in that we may feel somewhat heroic, virtuous; we shall likely feel even better if we are recognized and commended for this. In the third place we live in our neighbour by sharing her disgrace. So far from being commended now we find ourselves despised. We are told that we have compromised our standards. We are reminded that that you can always tell a person by the company she keeps. Our only comfort here, says Luther, is to continue clinging to him who was himself numbered among the transgressors. He, after all, knew no sin yet was made to be sin in order that we whose sin can never be excused may yet know it forgiven and know ourselves rendered the righteousness of God.
Theology of the cross vs theology of glory
Everything noted so far is generated by Luther’s Theologia Crucis or “theology of the cross.” By “theology of the cross” Luther understood first that the God who remains hidden to human gaze (both physical and philosophical) reveals himself where the world never thinks of looking for him. Faith alone knows this God. For this reason Luther liked to say, “The gospel is aural”; it can only be “heard.” (In other words, the Spirit-sensitized heart recognizes the gospel as it is proclaimed.) The gospel can never be “seen.” Luther knew that what we can all see every day everywhere in the world — crime, war, starvation, betrayal, natural disaster — never persuades anyone of the Father’s love. We apprehend God’s love for us and thereupon entrust him with our lives only as we “shut our eyes and open our ears.” For only the faith-quickening Word that we hear can get beyond the resistance to God aroused by the doubt-quickening sights that we see.
Luther contrasted the “theology of the cross” with a “theology of glory.” The latter has four principal features. First, it confuses the living God of self-willed suffering with the “God” that philosophy infers: power, aloofness, impassivity; in short, everything but the God who empties himself of every divine prerogative yet doesn’t empty himself of sin-absorbing love.
Secondly, a theology of glory relishes the triumphalism of the church’s institutional life. It glories in social privilege, economic power, the capacity to coerce, all the while disdaining self-renouncing service.
Thirdly, a theology of glory ignores the consistent testimony of scripture, “This is my beloved Son; hear him“, and prefers to read God off the face of nature. Overlooked, of course, is the fact that nature is at best impersonal and at worst “red in tooth and claw.”
Fourthly, the same theology attempts to read God off the face of history. Luther knew that one nation’s military subjugation of another acquaints us with nothing concerning God. Luther’s “theology of the cross” was his relentless conviction that God does his most characteristic work (love) and his mightiest work (the redemption of the world) precisely when he appears, from a human point of view, to be utterly helpless and useless.
In the light of his “theology of the cross” Luther maintained that life’s “trials” (Anfechtungen), unavoidable in any case, can be understood as the occasion of God’s refining the faith of his people, purifying it, strengthening it, ever rendering it more attractive and more useful. Since the world hates the gospel and those identified with it, Christians can escape the world’s hostility only by renouncing faith — and this they will not do. For indeed, said Luther, faith’s worst trial is to have no trial, since trial keeps faith alive and vibrant.
Luther himself never lacked trials. For twenty-five years, from the Diet of Worms in 1521 until his death in 1546, he lived with a price on his head. Heartbroken at the death of Magdalena, his fourteen-year-old daughter, the death of Elisabeth at eighteen months devastated him. Nevertheless, when he was dying in Eisleben and he learned that his beloved Katarina was fretting in Wittenberg, he sent to her a word that will ever be my comfort: “I have a caretaker who lies in the cradle and rests on a virgin’s bosom, and yet, nevertheless, sits at the right hand of God, the Father almighty. Therefore be at peace. Amen.”
Victor Shepherd
Tyndale Seminary, Toronto
Reflection on “9/11” — Jewish-Christian-Muslim Trialogue
Jewish-Christian-Muslim Trialogue Sponsored by Jewish-Christian Dialogue of Toronto
Reflection on “9/11”
Rev. Dr. Victor Shepherd
February 19,2002
In the course of discussing informally Sept. 11 with many people I have always insisted on the need to hear afresh and honour anew the 9th Commandment of the Decalogue: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour.” When Muhammad Ali was taunted with, “How do you feel in view of the fact that the Sept. 11 perpetrators belonged to your religion?” he replied smartly, “How do you feel in view of the fact that Hitler belonged to yours?” I think it better that we move away from all such efforts at religious or ideational one-upmanship, for all such efforts sooner or later involve bearing false witness.
In the immediate aftermath of Sept. 11 I found myself not to be bent out of shape at all, while most people around me were. I hadn’t planned on preaching on the event the following Sunday, only to discover that I had to as parishioners wanted me to address their dismay. I wondered why I wasn’t distressed. It was not because I regarded the event as inconsequential; not because I was insensitive to the suffering it brought with it, especially the suffering of those who didn’t die immediately; not because I was unaware of what it portended in terms of public anxiety and financial downturn and rising unemployment and increased suspicion and even victimization for our Islamic fellow-citizens. Gradually I came to realize why other people were bent out of shape by the event and I wasn’t: their understanding of God had suffered a devastating blow that verged on a fatal blow, while my understanding of God had not.
The reason for this, I realized, is that unlike them I wasn’t surprised at the event, and wasn’t surprised just because such an event is congruent with the evil that I find surging over and coursing through the world at all times. I have long noted that I have a sense of evil that is far more vivid than most people’s. To be sure, I have always insisted that the goodness of the creation perdures despite the ravages of the Fall or the “yetzer ha-ra” or however we choose to speak of the fact that the goodness of the creation is contradicted. Nonetheless, the evil that now disfigures the creation is, in my opinion, hideously evil.
But not everyone agrees with me. My philosophy students, for instance, do not. Whenever my philosophy class comes to the work of Immanuel Kant I always find myself at odds with my students. I point out to my students that while the earlier Kant certainly admitted evil, albeit in terms of his rationalist ethic, and the later Kant admitted radical evil, his radical evil is never radical enough for me. While Kant may have been able to admit evil perpetrated out of woeful ignorance or misguided zeal or even the naïve assumption that evil may be a step toward a greater good, Kant seems unable to admit evil perpetrated for the sake of evil, evil perpetrated for the perverse pleasure of evil. My students aren’t Kantians, yet they too can’t admit radical evil, evil for the sake of evil. For years I have been puzzled at this and only recently have come to see the reason for their reluctance. They believe that God is great and God is good; therefore the world can’t be as evil as Shepherd makes it out to be. If it were, they would have to abandon their belief in the greatness and goodness of God. Myself, I too believe that God is great and God is good; for me, however, the evil of the world renders God not less believable but more. My students think that if radical evil existed it would leave God compromised; I think it leaves God magnified. My students continue to look for meaning in outbreaks of evil, seemingly unaware that part of evil’s evilness is its sheer irrationality. To the extent that evil could be understood it would thereby be less evil. Radical evil, then, will always be incomprehensible because necessarily incomprehensible. (Parenthetically, I think it should be asked, “If radical evil, unrelentingly horrific, were possessed of meaning, could any of us endure it?”)
The question in the hearts of so many people is “why?” It’s assumed that “why” is the profoundest question to be asked. But this question wasn’t deemed the profoundest in the biblical era, or in the patristic or mediaeval or early modern eras. Biblical thinkers didn’t first ask the question “why” just because they already knew the answer: the world lies in the grip of the evil one. The profounder question for biblical thinkers was “How long? You, God, have promised to resolve the contradiction we live with, and the contradiction is tormenting us, so how long will it be before you act definitively and relieve us?”
Then who raised the question “why”, and raised it, supposedly, as the soul of profundity? The French agnostics and atheists who came to the fore in the Enlightenment: they framed the question, and then the church, at least, took it over as the profoundest question, whereas Christians of an earlier era had asked an entirely different question. My reaction to Sept. 11 simply confirms that my Christian conviction maintains the pre-Enlightenment question to be profounder.
In view of what I have said concerning the presence and potency of radical evil, and in view of its magnification of the holiness of God, for me Sept. 11 magnifies God’s anger at sin (at the sin of all of us, I should add, not merely the sin of those who crumbled the World Trade Tower); it magnifies God’s mercy, for mercy is the form God’s love takes when his love meets our sin; it magnifies God’s heartbreak over a people that seems perversely bent on never being his “peculiar treasure”; it magnifies God’s patience (his patience, unlike ours, is immense; not infinite, as the fact of judgement attests, but immense nonetheless); it magnifies God’s persistence, without which his patience would be synonymous with indifference; above all it magnifies God’s faithfulness to the covenant he made with Abraham. The covenant with Abraham is foundational for everyone here tonight, regardless of religious persuasion. While we continue to advertise ourselves as covenant-breakers, he keeps faith with us who do not keep faith with him. It’s plain, then, that God’s covenant-keeping has found him not abandoning the world because it’s disgusting or renouncing it because it’s hopeless or dismissing it because it’s intractable.
I am aware that in the wake of Sept. 11 many people felt they that the understanding of God they had long cherished was no longer tenable. Once again I found that they and I were not of one mind. As I spoke with them I realized that they had had in mind a definite notion of what God can or cannot do, should or should not do. Myself, I have long ceased to ponder what God can/cannot do, should/should not do. I ponder now only what God has done, therein defining himself and rendering all speculation about him pointless. As a Christian I affirm that he has so thoroughly identified himself with us, our folly and our misery, our predicament, that he has given himself up in utmost vulnerability for our sakes; God’s omnipotence or almightiness means there is no limit to his vulnerability and no limit to the effectiveness of his vulnerability.
In light of my conviction here I am persuaded that what is required of us, in the first instance, isn’t that we pursue a solution to the perplexities that Sept. 11 may have raised for us. What is required of us in the first instance, rather is that we make a response. Regardless of what we think we can understand of Sept. 11 or fear that we can’t understand, the response we have to make is our first responsibility. All efforts at solution aim at an intellectual abstraction. Solutions are always of the order of disengaged, armchair abstraction, when what is required of us is committed, concrete response; a response, be it noted, that may require of us a vulnerability similar to God’s.
Our response may take many forms. There is a response we make to the victims of Sept. 11 and to any and all victims of like occurrences. There is a response we make to our Islamic neighbours lest they be victimized in a way no less evil. There is a response we make whenever and wherever we can do something, anything, about the injustices that wound and then fester and finally develop into raging systemic infections. For we agree with the prophets that peace without justice is no peace at all. Admittedly, not all inequities are iniquities, but some are, and therefore discernment is as essential as determination.
I have mentioned several times tonight that we like to put questions to God. There’s a question, however, that God has already answered: “Why?” There’s a question he delays answering: “How long?” There’s a question, finally, that he answers as often as we ask it, yet always answers by turning our question to him back upon us: “How can you allow this sort of thing to happen?”
Rev. Dr. Victor Shepherd
Thomas Oden
Article on
THOMAS ODEN
for
Biographical Dictionary of Evangelicals
Oden, Thomas Clark (1931), Methodist minister and theologian, professor at Drew University, was born on 21st October 1931, in Altus, Oklahoma. His father was a lawyer and his mother a music teacher. In 1949 he enrolled in the University of Oklahoma and graduated with a B.Litt. in 1953. He began studying theology formally at Perkins School of Theology (Southern Methodist University), graduating with his B.D. in 1956. Ordained by the Oklahoma Conference of the United Methodist Church (deacon, 1954; elder, 1956), he served in varied parish ministries. Beginning in 1956 he studied at Yale University, and was awarded his M.A. in 1958 and his Ph.D. in 1960. Hans Frei and H.Richard Niebuhr supervised his work. His doctoral dissertation, revised for publication, was published as Radical Obedience: The Ethics of Rudolf Bultmann. One year of postdoctoral study followed at Heidelberg.
In 1958 he began his professional teaching career as an instructor at Perkins School of Theology. From 1960 to 1970 he was associate professor and then professor at Phillips University. In 1971 he became the Henry Anson Buttz Professor of theology at Drew University, where he taught until his retirement.
Oden has also been a guest lecturer or visiting professor at Moscow State University, Oxford, Edinburgh, Duke, Emory, Princeton and Claremont. In addition he has been consultant to the Ethics and Public Policy Center of Washington, D.C., the White House Dialogue on Urban Initiatives (1985), and Public Information Office Briefings (1984-1986.)
Oden has published approximately forty books and 80 articles.
Following his Agenda for Theology (1978) republished as After Modernity, What? (1990) with four additional chapters and an introduction by J.I. Packer, Oden described himself as an “out-off-the-closet evangelical.” He has continued to distance himself from the ethos of the institutions, images and “isms” that earlier he wore as a badge. His Requiem: A Lament in Three Movements (1995) is anguished autobiography concerning the lethal stranglehold that totalitarian “liberals” have on denominational bureaucracies, church conferences, and seminary education. A former left-wing radical, he now affirms the genuine radix of the scripture-normed authority of the post-apostolic writers. His “new” radicalism, inspired and measured by the gospel, nevertheless finds him still espousing out-of-step causes, such as the utter unreformability of the seminaries unless the practice of tenure is overhauled.
Recently Oden has become a contributing editor of Christianity Today. His position there magnifies his influence enormously, as this magazine is the most widely-read evangelical journal in North America.
Never backing away from rendering the judgements that he deems gospel-fidelity to enjoin, Oden has made the rare move of publicly faulting another denomination in another country. The United Church of Canada (Canada’s largest Protestant denomination, formed in 1925 of Methodists, Presbyterians and Congregationalists), Oden has pronounced devoid of ecumenical identity, “and is no longer thought properly to be called an ecumenical communion”; i.e., is no longer the church in that it has abandoned consensual teaching on creation, sin, covenant sexual fidelity and the blessings of marriage.
By his own admission every turn that Oden took on his way to the theological position with which he is now identified was a left turn. The “turn” that “righted” him, however, was not a right turn or series of compensatory right turns but rather a turn back into the Fathers. Startled at the shallowness and virulence of 1960s radicalism, he looked for theological resources and discovered that Patristic thinkers exhibited a profundity and pertinence that few modern authors could rival.
Oden describes himself as an “orthodox, ecumenical evangelical”, where orthodoxy “is nothing more or less than the ancient consensual tradition of exegesis.” His work aims at articulating, in the spirit of Vincent of Lerins, the faith of the universal church.
Its focus is the consensus of the first five centuries, since “antiquity is a criterion of authentic memory in any historical testimony.” His preoccupation with antiquity means he refuses to renounce his “zeal for unoriginality….the apostles were testy with revisionists.”
Its mood is evangelical, reflecting throughout the gospel’s particularity and inherent militancy. This mood contrasts sharply with a theological modernity whose treachery has rendered evangelism impossible and orthodoxy unrecognizable. An evangelical invitation suffuses his work as he urges readers to decide for Christ, warning them tenderly yet solemnly about the peril of procrastination: “One who neglects an opportunity at hand may not have another.”
Its centre is the rediscovery of ancient ecumenical theology and the recovery of classical Christianity in his evolving Wesleyan tradition.
Its target audience is the working pastor, since Christian teaching is healthy only where living tradition is embodied by an actual community. (Vide his several books on pastoral theology.)
Its orientation is that for which he commends Arminius and those after Arminius; viz., “the gradual Protestant retrieval of the ancient ecumenical consensus on grace and freedom.” In this regard Oden consistently disavows the predestinarianism of the later Augustine (even as Augustine remains one of the ecumenical giants) that emerged so very strongly in the Magisterial Reformers. Oden regards this deterministic misunderstanding of election as a departure and declension from the received faith. Characteristically the church has upheld the inviolability of the humanness of God’s covenant partners. At the same time Oden discerns and denounces the error of Pelagianism, together with the more subtle seductiveness of semi-Pelagianism. His work incorporates everywhere a nuanced discussion of gratia operans/gratia co-operans that, while strange to Protestants who are unacquainted with Patristic thought, is crucial in any approach to him.
Its most recent expression is the project he is masterminding, Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture (forthcoming), whose purpose is the recovery of classical Christian exegesis. A major strength of this project, he maintains, is the reviving of texts so very old that they contain no trace of European imperialism (and therefore no inherent revulsion, for instance, for Asian and African Christians.) These texts will therein prove singularly significant as they are brought to bear on the cultural formation of both West and East. In addition ancient exegesis will expose readers to the intimate connection between prayer and study, to the relation of theology to vibrant Christian community, and to worship as the context in which scripture is read. Oden hopes that Protestants especially will peruse the Ancient Commentary. Their doing so will remedy the theological one-sidedness that arises on account of Protestantism’s neglect of pre-Reformation texts, and also reduce Pietism’s extreme vulnerability to modern consciousness. They can expect to be startled, for instance, by Nazianzen’s theological power and Jerome’s transparency to the Spirit’s energy.
Repeatedly Oden indicates why he has written polemically and prolifically. While theology as the inquiry into God is inherently the most engaging of all subjects, theologians have turned it “into a yawning bore”, boring just because it is so very destructive: heresy is treasonous, and when protracted, tedious. Aware, however, of the presumption that laps at anyone claiming to be a corrective, the stated motive for his three-volume Systematic Theology (1987, 1989, 1992) was an invitation for readers to test his own fallibility.
Everywhere Oden sees his work as setting a limit to the license of “guild” (i.e., academically appointed) theologians and exegetes whose perfidy has summoned him to be “someone to teach you the elementary truths of God’s word all over again.” (Heb. 5:12) For this reason his work as a whole and his systematic theology in particular repristinate the elemental, doctrinal “building blocks” of the faith; specifically, theological matters that are articulated in the creed and that appear in the standard regulae fidei. (Precise studies of more detailed matters such as anthropology, liturgy and ethics will be developed in subsequent works.)
Throughout his writings Oden looks first to the four great Patristic thinkers of the east and west: Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, John Chrysostom, together with Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, Gregory the Great. These exegetes consistently clarify the mind of the believing church; “we are more indebted to these eight exegetes than any since the apostles.” While Oden cites other thinkers frequently (especially Thomas Aquinas, Luther and Calvin) they are invoked where they amplify the aforementioned consensus, not where their work is idiosyncratic. Other thinkers deemed non-consensual (e.g., Menno Simons) are scarcely mentioned at all.
Oden’s single largest work is his Systematic Theology (1500 pages, 15,000 references to classical writings.) Its purpose is “to set forth an ordered view of the faith of the Christian community upon which there has generally been substantial agreement between the traditions of East and West, including Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox.” Unlike virtually all systematic theologians, however, Oden insists that the exposition of the traditional theological topics in his work serves primarily as an introduction to the annotations; i.e., the annotations embedded in the text are more important than the text itself. True to scripture, to his native Wesleyanism, and to the Fathers, he regards God’s holiness as the linchpin of the entire theological enterprise.
Oden’s theological “journey” brought him to this point after earlier starts that if not false were hesitant at least.
He names five theological instructors who shaped his thought: Albert Outler, Rudolf Bultmann, H.Richard Niebuhr, Karl Barth and Will Herberg. Despite the apparent neo-orthodoxy of these men, Oden subsequently criticized neo-orthodoxy for its non-interest in worship, sacrament, pastoral care, the concrete tasks of ministry, and the holiness of the church. His “best” teacher was Outler, who introduced him to Augustine and Wesley. Although his Ph.D. dissertation was a comparative study of Bultmann and Barth, he soon repudiated the favoured Bultmannism that had first brought him to theological prominence and concentrated on Barth. In the 1960s Oden was concerned chiefly with the relation of theology to psychotherapy. Attentive now to the necessity, nature and integrity of human agency, he came to regard the Eastern church fathers as a corrective to Barth’s one-sidedness.
Upon Oden’s appointment to Drew University his friend and colleague, Will Herberg, persuaded him to ground his thinking in classical sources. Ironically, says Oden, a conservative Jew was his chief mentor in classical Christianity. With the arbitrariness and weakness of his earlier liberalism now exposed, and himself repulsed by his former support of the abortion platform, he abandoned situation ethics and with it the entire liberal worldview. Rejecting too his earlier notion that novelty is the task of theology, he jettisoned “creativity”, now convinced, thanks to J.H. Newman, that his responsibility was to listen to the deposit of truth already sufficiently given. Intrigued by the decisions of the ancient Ecumenical Councils, he plunged into patristics. Quickly he identified himself in terms of “paleo-orthodoxy”, an expression coined to indicate the distance now between him and neo-orthodoxy. By his own admission modern psychology had taught him to trust his experience, whereas ancient writers now taught him to trust that scripture and tradition would transmute his experience.
Oden has endeavoured to honour his theological parents by means of two books related to Wesley. Doctrinal Standards in the Wesleyan Tradition (1988) assesses the nature, place and function of normative doctrine in the United Methodist Church specifically and in the churches of the Wesleyan family generally. It aims at healing the doctrinal amnesia that has largely afflicted mainline North American Methodists.
John Wesley’s Scriptural Christianity (1994) expounds Wesley’s theology on all major points, beginning in the time-honoured way with God’s attributes and concluding with eschatology. It is a contemporary exposition and interpretation of Wesley’s thought, aiming always at fidelity to Wesley’s text. Its subordinate purpose is to convey Wesley to other branches of the Christian family in view of the fact that non-Wesleyans are much less acquainted with Wesley’s thought than are non-Magisterial thinkers, for instance, with that of the 16th century Reformers.
Finding Wesley rooted in the patristic, Anglican, holy living and Puritan traditions, he sees Wesleyanism as a bridge between Protestants and Catholics, even as it has profound affinities with the Eastern Church tradition. He deems Wesleyanism’s characteristic resistance to co-optation at the hands of party or fad to be one of its major strengths.
Two areas that seem problematic for evangelicals are his seemingly uncritical espousal of the Fathers and an “ecumenical” view of baptism that some may find indistinguishable from sacramental regeneration.
Concerning the first matter Oden affirms repeatedly his agreement with the Fathers that in the “theandric” (sic) One the humanity suffers but never the deity. Specifically he denies that the Father suffers in the Son’s crucifixion. Nowhere does Oden acknowledge that the risen, exalted Lord continues to suffer. In the same vein the neo-Platonism of the Fathers is unchecked. Oden cites with apparent approval the patristic neo-Platonism concerning sexual matters, such as Nazianzen’s pronouncement that Christ’s birth “didn’t have its origin in weakness…for sensual pleasure did not precede the birth.” A similarly neo-Platonic argument is advanced as to why there will be no marrying in heaven. Circumcision is understood to consecrate “that organ…which…is most likely to be corrupted by idolatry and sin.” (His commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, relieved of uncritical support of the Fathers, upholds a more Hebraic understanding of sexuality.)
Concerning the second matter Oden, to be sure, insists “…it is not baptism of itself that saves”, yet he appears to undo this assertion throughout his discussion of baptism, as in his remark, “The Holy Spirit through baptism offers, calls forth, and elicits regeneration in a spiritually blessed water in which the whole triune God is by grace effectively present”, and “The Spirit remains in those who have received the grace of baptism, who remain indelibly known to God.” He appears impelled to speak this way inasmuch as the Fathers do.
Oden predicts that a sign of hope in 21st Century Christian thought will be its preoccupation with the rediscovery of boundaries in theology: “I would love to find a seminary where a discussion is taking place about whether a line can be drawn between faith and unfaith.”
A diligent student and teacher of Kierkegaard for decades, Oden’s mature work can be summarized in an item cited in his Parables of Kierkegaard (1978.) Faith disrupts, says the Dane, and where public disruption isn’t observable, faith hasn’t occurred. If as “believers” we nevertheless protest that we have faith, we are theologians; if we know how to describe faith, we are poets; if we weep in describing faith, actors. But only as we witness for the truth and against untruth are we actually possessed of faith.
Dr. Victor Shepherd
Professor of Historical Theology and Wesley Studies
Tyndale Seminary, Toronto
A Christmas Meditation on Mary
A Christmas Meditation on Mary
Mary is a key figure in the Christmas story, yet we say nothing about her compared to innkeeper, wisemen, shepherds, even angels. Her place in the birth of the Messiah, and subsequently in the Christian story, is much larger than these.
Protestants, reacting against Marian excesses in the mediaeval church, say nothing beyond sentimental niceties. Roman Catholics and Orthodox say much more: Mary is in essence the church’s response to Jesus Christ; i.e., mother of the Son of God is also a beneficiary of the Son of God, and typifies the response of all such beneficiaries. In a word, hers is the paradigmatic response, model response, to the Incarnate One.
I: — Mary models the response of all believers concerning the address of the triune God.
Luke 1:26-38
In the annunciation Mary is addressed three times, and each time she responds not with idle speculation (all Prot. Reformers disdained speculation) but concretely, appropriately, devoutly.
(i) with respect to the revelation of the Father: she responds with alarm, that fear of God (“greatly troubled”) which reflects the approach of God everywhere in Scripture. “Do not be afraid, Mary, for you have found favour with God.” And everywhere in Scripture “Fear not” is God’s command and assurance in the wake of that fear which his approach has rightly quickened in us.
She is ready for further response and any service she might be asked to render.
(ii) with respect to the revelation of the Son, the one she is to bear, and who will be God’s Son and David’s heir: “You shall call his name ‘Jesus'” — i.e., Yehoshuah, “God saves.” Mary is told what to do and she does it: she names the child she is to bear. (Name has the force of nature, person, presence, power, deserved reputation. The “name” of any person in S. is that person himself present in his nature or character, acting effectively.) She responds by asking a question of her visitor (as all God’s people interrogate him in Israel), “How shall this be?” As a result of her interrogating God she is given even greater revelation.
(iii) with respect to the revelation of the Spirit: “The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Most High will overshadow you; therefore the child to be born will be called holy, the Son of God.”
The episode concludes with that response which gathers up all her partial responses to date: “Behold, I am the handmaid of the Lord; let it be to me according to your word”; i.e., she consents to the word and submits to it.
Note: Mary is addressed by the triune God. In this address she is acquainted with every person of the Godhead. Her response is threefold: she fears God, she reverently questions God where she needs further illumination, and she embraces God’s will for her, submits to it, and contents herself in it.
She honours the Word addressed to her by submitting to it, but not in the submission of servility or resentment or self-belittlement. Rather her submission is a glad, grateful, eager, welcoming self-renunciation for the sake of a vocation and a commission. She has been visited by and addressed by God, knows it, is made aware of God’s will for her, and gladly does it. Her vocation is to discern the will of God and do it. Her commission is to be a handmaid of the Lord.
The church consists of those who are modelled after Mary.
[a] our response bears witness to the triune God: we believers “body forth” God’s son by being the body of Christ; in the course of bodying him forth (as did Mary) we too are overshadowed by the Holy Spirit or else we’d long since have ceased to be the church.
[b] in it all we are to obey God gladly, willingly, cheerfully, non-resentfully (or else we don’t obey him at all), declaring in it all, “Behold I am the handmaid of the Lord; let it be to me according to your word.”
II: — Mary models the church’s enrichment through recollection, the appropriation of memory.
Luke 1:29: “She was greatly troubled at the saying, and considered in her mind what sort of greeting this might be.”
-“considered in her mind”: diatarasso — to be agitated, troubled. Mary was agitated, troubled at the saying, but didn’t dismiss it or give up on it. She understood enough to know it was important, but not enough to understand it completely. She hid it in her heart.
Luke 2:19: “Mary kept all these things, pondering them in her heart.”
-sumballein lit. to throw together, to compare; i.e., to consider from all possible angles.
Luke 2:51: “Mary kept all these things in her heart.”
-diatereo lit. to keep continually, to keep carefully.
All three expressions point to the fact that Mary understood enough to grasp the rudiments of the point at issue and to be aware of its importance, but not enough to pronounce the definitive word about it.
Subsequently she could revisit what she had hidden in her heart, and in revisiting it find it ever richer, ever more fruitful, as she recollected it in different contexts. In other words, she doesn’t stumble ahead in total darkness; instead she is given a pinpoint of light, does what she can with that, and finds as she recollects, revisits memory, that ever greater light is shed upon what she first hid.
Mary is the model of the church’s nourishment and nurture and growth and illumination through recollection.
In the following I have found that revisiting something I learned years ago if not decades ago finds it yielding ever greater riches each time I recollect it. E.g.,
(1) Charles Wesley: “a charge to keep I have”
(2) Luther: the X’n lives not in herself but in another: in Christ through faith and in the neighbour through love (as she shares the neighbour’s need, suffering, disgrace.)
(3) Answer #1 to the Heidelberg Catechism (written in 1563, and surely the crown jewel of the shorter Reformation writings.) “I am not my own, but belong, body and soul, to my faithful Saviour JC”
(4) only ten years ago I came to understand that Jesus is raised wounded. The resurrection isn’t the transcending of the cross but the triumph of the one who remains in the reality of his crucifiedness.
(5) Martin Buber (Jewish philosopher and biblical scholar): to know another person is exactly to be altered through meeting him as person. (as opposed to gathering information about him.)
(6) Thomas Watson (my favourite Puritan thinker): “All Christian growth is finally growth in humility.”
III: — Mary models the church’s pain in giving birth to the Messiah and the church’s consignment to
the wilderness
Revelation 12:1-6
[1] Rev. 12:1-6 refers to Israel, who gives birth to the Messiah.
According to the psalmist the Messiah will rule over the nations absolutely: the Messiah’s power extends over the entire creation, over death, over every power, even over being swallowed by the dragon.
[2] Mary gives birth to the M. Her son is “caught up to God and to his throne” (12: 5), while she flees into the wilderness (12:6).
[3] Mary models the church as Messianic community. The church is always labouring to give birth to the Messiah in the sense that we are always endeavouring to render the visible the one we know to be within us. Yet in our turbulent, treacherous world the Messiah is seemingly always being snatched away by the dragon, and the Messianic community always finds itself amidst the harsh affliction and tribulation of the wilderness (the wilderness, in Scripture, being the venue of unclean beasts and unholy spirits.)
Then what are we to do as the church finds itself in pain in the wilderness? We are always and everywhere to render to God that Mary rendered and therein modelled for all of us:
Behold, we the church are the handmaid of the Lord;
let it be to us according your word.
Victor Shepherd
Advent, 2001
God and Gender: How Do We Address God?
from an address at Woodbridge Presbyterian Church, 28October 2001
God and Gender: How Do We Address God?
I: — Prostitution is tragic under any circumstances. Prostitution is demeaning. Prostitution, however, that is enjoined as a religious act and defended by a religious argument is more than tragic and demeaning: it’s disgusting.
In the city of Corinth one thousand women were attached as religious prostitutes to the temple of Aphrodite. Needless to say the Christian congregation in Corinth stood out starkly against the backdrop of the temple and its sordid traffic in devotees who did obeisance to Aphrodite and all that the goddess represented. At least the Christian congregation in Corinth largely stood out starkly against the backdrop of sexual irregularities. We know, however, that the spirit of Aphrodite always lapped at the Christian congregation and occasionally infected a member or two of it.
Centuries earlier the Canaanite nations that surrounded Israel had trafficked in religious prostitution too. The word to Israel that had thundered from Sinai, however, had repudiated such degradation. The prophets in turn denounced it unambiguously. Even so, the spirit of sexual irregularity always hovered over Israel, always had to be guarded against, and occasionally had to be exorcised.
Throughout the history of humankind, whenever a goddess has been worshipped as the arch-deity, wherever “Mother-god” has been held up, the final result has always been religious prostitution and widespread sexual promiscuity. For this reason Israel refused to call God “Mother”, and refused as well to speak of the deity as “goddess”.
Throughout the history of humankind goddess-worship (Mother-god-worship) has been associated with the worship of fertility. The worship of fertility includes fertility of all kinds: agricultural fertility, animal fertility, human fertility. A key element in such worship, a key element in the chain of events, has been “sympathic magic”. Sympathic magic means that when humans are sexually active the god and goddess are sexually active too. The sexual activity of god and goddess in turn ensures the fertility of animals and crops.
When Israel was led to call God “Father”, Israel didn’t think for a minute that the God of Israel was equipped with male genitalia rather than female. Israel knew that the true and living God is not equipped with genitalia of any kind; God is not gender-specific in any sense. In calling God “Father”, however, Israel was deliberately refusing to call God “mother”; Israel was deliberately repudiating everything that the fertility cults around it associated with female deities. Israel repudiated the notion that the deity is sexually active, the notion that human sexual activity is sympathically magical, the notion that the entire enterprise is sacramentally abetted by sacral prostitution, the notion that the concomitant promiscuity has any place at all in God’s economy. Israel repudiated all of it.
Yes, Israel did occasionally use female imagery to describe God. In scripture God is said to be like a mother or a nurse or even a she-bear not to be trifled with. But while God is said to be like a mother, for instance, God is never said to be a mother, never called “mother”. On the other hand God is said to be a father and is called “Father”. Why the difference? — because of everything detailed above.
As soon as we name God “mother” and “goddess” we play right into the hands of Canaan and Aphrodite where sexual intercourse among the deities creates the universe. (In the creation stories of the bible there is no suggestion anywhere that the universe came into being as the result of sexual activity among the deities.) We also play into the hands of the old notion that when a worshipper is sexually joined to a religious prostitute, worshipper and prostitute themselves become the god and the goddess. In other words, to speak of “Our Father and Mother” lands us back into everything that Israel’s prophets fended off on account of the character of Israel’s God. A contemporary hymn exclaims, “Mother and God, to you we sing; wide is your womb, warm is your wing.” This hymn squares perfectly with the fertility cults of old, together with their sacral prostitutes and their religiously sanctioned promiscuity.
II: — All of this denies the transcendence of God. By transcendence we mean the truth that God is “high and lifted up”, as Isaiah tells us. Later a Hebrew prophet, knowing himself addressed by the holy One Himself, finds seared upon his own mind and heart, “…my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, says the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts.” (Isaiah 55:8-9) God is radically different from His creation, radically other than His creatures.
The distinction between God and His creation is a distinction that scripture never compromises. “It is He that hath made us, and not we ourselves”, cries the psalmist. This distinction is the heart of God’s holiness. The root meaning of “holy” is “set apart” or “different”. God is holy in that He is radically different. God is uniquely God. His creation is other than He, different from Him. To be sure, His creation is good (good, at least, as it comes forth from His hand, even though it is now riddled with sin and evil); but while God’s creation is good it is never God. The creation is never to be worshipped. Idolatry is a horror to the people of God. The creation isn’t God; neither is it an extension of God or an aspect of God or an emanation of God. God remains holy, high and lifted up. He and His creation are utterly distinct. He alone is to be worshipped, praised and thanked. We who are creatures of God are summoned to trust Him, love Him, obey Him, and therein know Him. We are summoned to know God (faith is such a knowing); but we are never summoned to be God. Indeed, the temptation to be God, to be our own lord, our own judge, our own saviour — this is the arch-temptation. Any suggestion that any human activity can render us divine (as is the case with sacral prostitution) is a denial of God’s transcendence. The old hymn known as “The Doxology”, “Praise God from whom all blessings flow/Praise Him all creatures here below…”, reflects God’s transcendence. A modern version of the Doxology has been altered to “Praise God from whom all blessings flow/Praise Him all creatures high and low…”. “All creatures here below” affirmed the truth that God is above us; “All creatures high and low” makes no such affirmation. In the mother-goddess mind-set God is no longer radically other than His creation; God is no longer discontinuous with the world; God and the world are a function of each other. Here God is an aspect of the world — which is to say, God (so-called) is useless to the world.
The loss of God’s transcendence is reflected in the near-disappearance of “LORD” from contemporary hymnbooks. The reason given for this disappearance is that “LORD” is hierarchical and therefore oppressive. The hymnbook committee is correct concerning one matter here: unquestionably “LORD” is hierarchical; God is above us; He is “high and lifted up”; he does transcend us infinitely. But does this make Him oppressive? So far from making Him oppressive, the fact that God is above us is the condition of His being able to bestow mercy upon us. Only if God is above us, only if God transcends us, is He free from us and therefore free to act for us.
The loss of God’s transcendence shouldn’t surprise us in view of the fact that the New Age movement has infected everything in our society, the church not excepted. The New Age movement endorses pantheism (that heresy, says C.S. Lewis, which always tempts the church). Pantheism insists that God is the essence of everything or at least that God is in everything. If God is in everything or the essence of everything, then there is nothing that isn’t God. However, if there is nothing that isn’t God, then evil doesn’t exist, since evil is that which contradicts God and aims at frustrating Him, that which He in turn opposes. And if evil doesn’t exist, then neither does sin, since sin is that expression of evil that has overtaken humans. In other words, the loss of God’s transcendence plunges men and women into a confusion, a maze, where such crucial bearings as sin and evil are lost too.
Yet we are plunged into more than mere confusion; we are plunged into hopelessness. When God’s transcendence is denied, God is unable to judge us (the New Age movement finds this convenient). However, the loss of God’s transcendence also means that God is unable to save us. Only He who transcends the world so as to be able to judge it is also free from the world so as to visit it with mercy. Only the “hierarchical” God can finally be for us. Hierarchy is the condition of God’s helpfulness. The God who isn’t LORD is the God who has been handcuffed.
III: — As soon as God’s transcendence is compromised, the foundational doctrine of the Christian faith, the doctrine of the Trinity, is undervalued. God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. This is no surprise. After all, if God isn’t to be called “Father”, then God certainly isn’t going to be known as “Father, Son and Holy Spirit”.
Why is the doctrine of the Trinity important? How is it foundational to the Christian faith? The question “Who is God?” is a question scripture never answers directly. By way of answering the question “Who is God?” scripture always directs us to two other questions: “What does God do?” and “What does God effect?” “What does God do?” refers us to God’s activity on our behalf, what he does “for us”. “What does God effect?” refers us to God’s activity “in us”.
What does God do for us? He incarnates Himself in Jesus of Nazareth. He redeems His creation in the death of Jesus, restoring its access to Him. He raises Jesus from the dead, vindicating Jesus and declaring him to be sovereign over all, Lord and Messiah.
What does God do in us? He visits us with His Spirit and seals within us all that He has done outside us. He steals over our spiritual inertia and quickens faith. He forgives the sin in us that He had already absorbed for us on the cross. He brings us to submit to the sovereign One whose sovereignty He had declared by raising him from the dead. In short, the God who acts for us in His Son acts in us by His Spirit so that all the blessings provided in the Son may become ours as well.
What God does for us in the Son is known, in theological vocabulary, as Christology. What God does in us through the Spirit is known as Pneumatology. Christology and Pneumatology add up to theology. Who God is is made known through what He does for us and what He does in us. God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
In place of the Trinity (“Father, Son, Spirit”) we are hearing increasingly “Creator, Redeemer, Sustainer”. But the two expressions are not equivalent. “Father, Son, Spirit” speaks of God’s being, who God is in Himself eternally, as well as of God’s activity, what He does for us and in us in time. “Creator, Redeemer, Sustainer”, on the other hand, speaks only of God’s relation to the world in time. According to scripture God’s relation to the world means that He is also judge, sovereign and inspirer. Then instead of “Creator, Redeemer, Sustainer” we could just as readily say “Judge, Sovereign and Inspirer” — plus ever so many more. We could say them all with equal justification, even as we still wouldn’t be saying what is said by “Father, Son, Spirit”: namely, that God is for us and in us in time what He is in himself eternally, and He is in Himself eternally what He is for us and in us in time.
There is another point to be made here. “Creator, Redeemer, Sustainer” is sub-personal. But God isn’t sub-personal. God is Person in terms of whom we understand what it means for us to be persons. Again, for this reason, we must call God “Father” even as for reasons already mentioned we mustn’t call God “Mother”.
There is yet another point to be made here. When we speak of God (or speak to God) as “Father, Son, Spirit” we are calling God by that name wherewith He has named Himself. My name is “Victor”. I always introduce myself as “Victor” because I expect to be called Victor. I don’t care to be called “Vic” or “slim” or “mack” or “You, there”. I think it’s only courteous to call me by that name wherewith I name myself.
Surely we can be no less courteous to God. Yet more than a courtesy/discourtesy is at stake concerning God. According to our Hebrew foreparents name means nature. A change of name means a change of nature. “Jacob” means “cheater”; his name is changed to “Israel” — “he who wrestles with God”. Why the name change? Because the man himself has ceased to cheat and has become someone who will wrestle with God for the rest of his life.
To change the name of God from “Father, Son, Spirit” to anything is to repudiate the nature of the true God and to pursue a false god. To trifle with the name of God at all is to reject the One who is our only God and Saviour.
IV: — It’s only fair to admit that there are some modern hymns are very fine. The puzzling feature, then, is why the fine and the wretched are mixed up together in many contemporary hymnbooks.
On second thought I don’t think there’s a puzzle. I think the mix-up is the result of the age-old temptation of syncretism. We human beings are exceedingly uncomfortable when we face a fork in the road anywhere in life. We prefer to “have our cake and eat it too.” We don’t want to have to say “No” to anyone or anything. It’s always easier to include all the options and endorse all the alternatives. We are syncretists in our fallen hearts.
Syncretism is a temptation that has always tempted God’s people. When Joshua, successor to Moses, confronted the people with his ringing challenge, “Choose this day whom you will serve. The deities of the Amorites? The deities of the region beyond the Jordan? Choose! But as for me and my house, we will serve the LORD!” — plainly Joshua knew that his people could serve either the LORD or the Amorite deities but not both.
As a matter of fact Israel wasn’t customarily tempted to repudiate God; Israel was tempted customarily to combine God and Baal, God and Ashtareh, God and whatever deity the neighbouring nation was extolling. The temptation is easy to understand. God promised His people His fatherly care and protection; Baal promised the people unrestrained licence. Why not have both? Why not have holiness and hedonism at the same time? Holiness guaranteed them access to God, while hedonism guaranteed them endless self-indulgence. Why not have both? Why not have God and mammon? Why not? Because Jesus said it’s impossible. Because the prophets before him said it’s impossible.
All of which brings us to a refrain that reverberates repeatedly throughout God’s history with His people. The refrain is, “I am a jealous God.” God is jealous not in that He’s insecure and He needs to have His ego strengthened; neither is He jealous in that He craves what someone else possesses just because He lacks it. God is “jealous”, rather, in that He insists on our undivided love and loyalty. He insists on our undivided love and loyalty for two reasons. One, since He alone is truly God, He alone is to be worshipped and obeyed. Two, since He alone is truly God, He wants us to find our true wholeness in Him. He knows that since He alone is truly God we shall fragment ourselves if we don’t worship Him alone. He cares too much for us to allow us to fragment ourselves. If we persist in gathering up the gods and goddesses and add the Holy One of Israel for good measure we shall fragment ourselves hopelessly.
Everybody knows that exclusivity is of the essence of marriage. To say that exclusivity is of the essence of marriage isn’t to say that husband and wife live in a universe of two people, ignoring everyone else. But it is to say that at the heart of marriage there is that which can be shared with no one else. Two married people who relish the marvel and the riches their union brings them don’t then say, “Since marriage is so rich with the two of us in it, let’s make it richer still by adding a third person.” So far from enriching a marriage, adding a third person annihilates the marriage. To the extent that exclusivity is of the essence of marriage, then, there is a kind of jealousy that is necessary to marriage.
Israel always knew that “God and…” , “God plus…” meant “not God at all”. Syncretism is fatal to our life in God.
Some contemporary hymnbooks combine fine hymns and terrible hymns on the assumption, apparently, that “nothing should be left out; no one should feel left out; there should be something here for everybody.” For this reason what we call the “Lord’s prayer” has been re-written, “Our Father and Mother.”
But the one God we are to adore knows that if our hearts go after Him and after some other deity then we shan’t have Him and we shall fragment ourselves utterly. Apart from the folly of our self-fragmentation, He insists on being acknowledged for who He is: the One alongside whom there is no other God, even as the Hebrew language reminds us that the word for “idols” is the word for “nothings”. He is a jealous God, knowing that adding another deity will affect the marvel and richness of our life in Him exactly as adding another party affects the marvel and richness of marriage: it terminates it.
V: — What’s at stake in all that has been discussed tonight? Is only a matter of taste at stake (some people like old-fashioned hymns while others don’t)? Is only a matter of poetical or musical sophistication at stake? What’s at stake here is a matter of life or death, for what’s at stake here is nothing less than our salvation.
As soon as we understand what’s at stake here — everything — we understand the intransigence of our foreparents in matters of faith. Jude insists that we are to “contend for the faith once for all delivered to the saints.” (Jude 3) Why must we contend for it? Because the faith once for all delivered to the saints is under attack. It is assaulted from without the church and undermined from within the church. The assault from without isn’t unimportant; nevertheless, the undermining from within is far more dangerous. Unless we contend for, fight for, the faith once for all delivered to the saints, the truth of Jesus Christ will be cease to be known.
Peter cautions his readers against false teachers. Peter tells us that false teachers “secretly bring in destructive heresies, even denying the Master who bought them.” (2 Peter 2:1)
Paul accosts the Christians in Galatia who are already flirting with gospel-denial, “…there are some who trouble you and want to pervert the gospel of Christ….Who has bewitched you?” (Galatians 1:7; 3:1)
Jude, Peter and Paul aren’t horrified because an alternative religious opinion is being made known; they aren’t heartsick because disinformation is being disseminated; they react as they do inasmuch as they know that where the gospel is diluted, denied, compromised, or trifled with, the saving deed and the saving invitation of God can’t be known. Where the gospel is sabotaged through “destructive heresies”, the salvation of God is withheld from men and women whose only hope is the gospel.
We must be sure we understand something crucial. We don’t contend for the faith once for all delivered to the saints because we are quarrelsome people who relish controversy. We don’t contend because we are ill-tempered people are annoyed with anyone who disagrees with us. We don’t contend because we are doctrinal hair-splitters who wish to make conceptual mountains out of molehills. We contend, as apostles and prophets contended before us, because we can’t endure seeing neighbours whom we love denied access to that truth which saves.
Then contend we shall. But of course we can contend properly only if we are discerning. For this reason John writes, “Beloved, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are of God; for many false prophets have gone out into the world.” (1 John 4:1) Will our discerning, our testing, and our contending prevail, or are we going to be defeated? We shall prevail, for “faith is the victory that overcomes the world.” (1 John 5:4) Once again the apostle John writes, “…you are of God, and have overcome them [the false prophets]; for He who is in you is greater than he who is in the world.” (1 John 4:4)
Victor Shepherd October 2001
The Methodist Tradition in Canada
(to appear in HarperCollins’ “Religion in Canada “)
The Methodist Tradition in Canada
The Methodist tradition arose chiefly from the activity of John Wesley (1703-1791), born to Samuel Wesley and Susanna Annesley, Dissenters in the Puritan mould who affiliated with the Church of England in their youth. John was nurtured in Anglicanism, was ordained priest and remained a life-long member of it. At Oxford University he, together with several others, formed a group derisively labelled the “Holy Club.” It met to encourage study of the classics and the Church Fathers, frequent attendance at Holy Communion, and assistance to the poor and imprisoned.
Still groping spiritually after ordination, in 1736 Wesley moved to Georgia hoping that his work among English colonists and aboriginals would imbue him with spiritual vitality. Upon his return to England in the wake of an unsatisfying ministry in the new world he came to the assurance of saving faith and of sins forgiven on May 24, 1738. Thereafter his ministry, formerly a not uncommon 18th century Anglican blend of mysticism and moralism, was grounded in the Reformation understanding of justification by grace through faith on account of Jesus Christ.
John recognized that “Scripture, from beginning to end, is one grand promise”; namely, salvation known and enjoyed as a present reality, as contrasted with the current Anglican understanding of blessedness in the life-to-come. With his theological emphasis on soteriology, John insisted that God had “raised up Methodism to spread scriptural holiness throughout the land.” Whereas his pre-1738 pronouncements (see his sermon, “The Circumcision of the Heart”) had declared that people became holy by means of humility, he now insisted — and never recanted — that holiness was a divine gift, owned in faith, and humanly exercised with unrelenting rigour. While classical Protestantism had stressed justification (pardon, remission of sins, free acceptance), Wesley retained this yet stressed deliverance: God could do something with sin beyond forgiving it; namely, release people not merely from its guilt but especially from its grip or power. In this vein he endorsed “Christian perfection”, maintaining that no limit could be set to the scope of God’s deliverance in this life. Herein he merged the Puritan emphasis on godliness that he found in his predecessors with the similar emphasis on sanctity found in the church catholic. Strenuously disagreeing with Calvinism’s notions of predestination and limited atonement, he maintained that Christ had died for all: all needed to be saved, could be saved, could know they were saved, and could be saved to the uttermost.
Since, Wesley insisted, “the New Testament knows nothing of solitary religion”, Methodism characteristically developed the communal dimension of its corporate life. Converts were expected to join in public worship weekly and to receive Holy Communion as often as possible. In addition they were formed into “societies”, “classes”, “bands”, and “select societies” in order to expose themselves to stringent examination from peers and thereby promote self-honesty, mutual correction, encouragement, edification, and service. The “societal” emphasis was marked too by a concern for every aspect of human well-being. To try to mitigate suffering Wesley wrote a textbook of primitive medicine, begged money to establish London’s first free pharmacy, developed schools for the disadvantaged children of coalminers, built houses for widows, gathered funds for start-up loans to Methodist entrepreneurs whom the chartered banks would not consider.
In all these endeavours John’s brother Charles (1701-1788) supported John, matching him in outdoor “field” preaching. Charles’ greatest contribution to Methodism, however, remained his hymn-writing (9,000 poems and hymns), as Scripture-saturated hymns rooted themselves in minds and hearts as often as Methodist people hummed the tunes amidst their daily work.
Following Wesley’s death, Methodism ceased to be “leaven” in the Church of England and became a separate denomination. One of its missioners, Laurence Coughlan, arrived in Newfoundland in 1766 and began working among Protestant English and Irish settlers. Five years later William Black, born in England but raised in Nova Scotia, commenced evangelizing in the Maritimes, his work falling under the supervision of British Wesleyans in 1800. In 1855 this body formed the Wesleyan Methodist Conference of Eastern British America.
Under the leadership of William Losee, meanwhile, the Methodist Episcopal Church (U.S.A.), established on Christmas Day in 1784, began work in 1791 among British immigrants to Upper Canada. By 1828 the Methodist Episcopal work in Canada had formally severed ties with the U.S.A. In 1833 most of it joined with the British Wesleyans to form the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Canada, adding to itself the Methodist people of Lower Canada in 1854. That part of it which absented itself from the union re-formed into the Methodist Episcopal Church of Canada (1834), eventually growing into the second largest Methodist body in Canada.
In turn the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Canada and the Wesleyan Methodist Conference of Eastern British America united in 1874, annexing as well the Methodist New Connexion Church in Canada (itself an amalgam of several small groups), thereby forming the Methodist Church of Canada.
In 1884 this body joined with the Methodist Episcopal Church in Canada, together with the Bible Christian Church of Canada and the Primitive Methodist Church in Canada, bringing to birth the Methodist Church (Canada, Newfoundland and Bermuda.) This lattermost union made the Methodist Church the largest Protestant denomination in Canada. It now included all Canadian Methodists with the exception of several very small groups: the British Methodist Episcopal Church (a development of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, serving chiefly people of colour), two German-speaking bodies (the Evangelical Association and the United Brethren in Christ), and the Free Methodist Church (a body that had begun in New York State in 1860 and extended itself into Canada.)
In 1925 the Methodist Church united with 70% of the Presbyterian Church in Canada and 96% of the Congregational Union of Canada to form The United Church of Canada.
Canadian Methodism distinguished itself on several fronts.
Methodists were committed to missions among aboriginals. The “first nations” had been exploited since the days of the fur trade, the exploitation manifesting itself in alcohol-abetted destitution. Eager to avoid paternalism, the Methodists sought to put mission leadership in the hands of aboriginals themselves. Peter Jones, Chief of the Mississaugas, was ordained the first aboriginal itinerant. Egerton Ryerson, soon to be the best-known Methodist minister, represented Canada in the Society for the Protection of Aboriginal Inhabitants of the British Dominions.
Missions overseas paralleled those in Canada. In 1873 the Wesleyans were the first of the Canadian Methodist “family” to begin working in Japan, concentrating on evangelism, medical assistance, post-elementary education and theological training for Japanese ministers. By 1884 Canadian Methodists had established a theological college in Azabu, supported by the Women’s Missionary Society’s efforts in training Japanese women for church work. Canadian Methodist missions commenced in China in 1891 amidst circumstances that were uncommonly dangerous.
In the meantime the social position of Methodists was changing in Canada. Earlier the Church of Scotland and the Church of England had formed social elites inaccessible to Methodists, the latter being poor and frequently despised. Zealous in evangelism and ardent in their pursuit of godliness, however, their sobriety, industry and thrift fuelled their social ascendancy. Some Methodist families became wealthy: the Goodherams from grain and railways, the Masseys from farm implements, and the Flavelles from meatpacking. By mid-18th century they were able to challenge the Anglican monopoly on education and political power.
From this position Methodism was able to make its unparalleled contribution to the public good, a system of high-quality public education. Insisting that education subserved not only the evangelical cause in particular but also the human good in general and the social good more widely still, Methodism’s educational architect, Egerton Ryerson, undid the Anglican Church’s exclusive control over education. Ryerson implemented the system operative in Canada today: high quality education available to all, without a religious or doctrinal means test.
In addition the Methodists built Victoria College, offering instruction in arts and sciences, later expanding it under principal Samuel Nelles to a full-fledged university by adding faculties of law, medicine and theology, eventually moving the institution from Cobourg to Toronto in order to federate it with the University of Toronto.
Aware of John Wesley’s legacy, Canadian Methodists dedicated themselves to the alleviation of human distress on any front, their vision here being no less than social transformation. They exerted themselves on behalf of convicts and ex-convicts, prostitutes and impoverished immigrants, all the while campaigning for better housing, improved public health, unemployment insurance, pensions, compensation for injured workers, the eight-hour work day, humane working conditions and homemaking skills. Salem Bland and James Woodsworth were the most visible exponents of the Social Gospel movement in Methodism, the latter eventually leaving the ministry in order to co-found the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. The prosecution of social justice, it was thought, would largely eliminate the sources of social disharmony. At the same time leaders such as Samuel Chown continued to uphold the necessity of personal regeneration.
Concern for education and social transformation naturally gave rise to a commitment to publishing. Books, magazines and pamphlets were produced in ever-greater numbers; even by 1884 the circulation of Methodist-backed publications stood at 160,000, excluding the materials produced for overseas missions. Under William Briggs and Lorne Pierce, Methodists became instrumental in promoting a Canadian literary tradition, producing vast quantities of Canadian fiction, poetry, history and textbooks for schools.
Since 1925 much smaller denominations such as the Wesleyan Church, the Free Methodist Church, the Standard Church, the Church of the Nazarene (extensions of American bodies), and The Salvation Army have endeavoured to maintain the spiritual tradition of Wesley. Collectively, however, these groups do not have the influence in public life that the Methodists exerted prior to church union.
Victor Shepherd June 2001
Jacobus Arminius
(from Biographical Dictionary of Evangelicals, Inter-Varsity Press)
Jacobus Arminius
Arminius, Jacobus (c.1559-1609), Dutch Remonstrant Reformer, was born Jacob Harmenszoon in Oudewater near Utrecht. His middle-class family was devastated when his father, a maker of kitchen utensils, died during Arminius’ infancy and his mother, together with all his siblings, were slain during his adolescence in the Spanish massacre of Oudewater in 1575. Thereafter family friends raised him. Like most classically trained humanist scholars of his era, he eventually Latinized his name, recalling the “Arminius” who had been a 1st century Germanic leader noted for his resistance to the Romans.
In 1574 he began his studies at Leiden, venue for a tradition reaching back into the pre-Reformation ferment of the North Netherlands. The atmosphere included a biblically-informed piety, a sacramentarianism that viewed medieval sacraments as largely superstitious, and a humanist perspective that identified Roman Catholic corruption of the church. It would be anachronistic to speak of this movement as (proto-)Lutheran or Zwinglian, as these latter descriptions entail a doctrinal specificity that was not operative in what had flowed from the 14th and 15th centuries. Studies followed at Geneva, Basel, and Geneva again, culminating, after years of leadership in city, church and university, in a doctorate from Leiden in 1603.
Leiden accommodated the older reform as well as the precise Calvinism that Reformed refugees had brought with them. The ensuing conflict was less concerned with predestination (albeit never far from the surface) than with the relation of Calvinist consistory (an ecclesiastical court in Reformed churchmanship) and the city (reflecting the less doctrinally exact, humanist-informed piety indigenous to the Low Countries.) The consistory, for instance, in the spirit of Calvinist rigour, opposed observing Christian festivals (e.g., Christmas and Easter) that happened not to fall on Sundays.
Financed by Amsterdam merchants, Arminius began studying under Beza at Geneva on New Year’s Day, 1582. Beza, Calvin’s 62-year old successor, was venerated in Reformed constituencies everywhere. By rearranging Calvin’s emphases Beza largely retained the major tenets of Calvin’s theology while significantly altering its spirit. While Calvin, for instance, had spoken of the grandeur of God and the majesty of God but not of the “sovereignty” of God, Beza thrust into the centre of his thought a sovereignty that was to appear to Remonstrants indistinguishable from the arbitrary assertion of naked power. And where Calvin had focussed on the believer’s life or participation in Christ, with predestination merely the means whereby sin-deadened people come to be “in Christ”, Beza made predestination a controlling principle. Calvin’s emphasis on the living person of “Christ clothed with his gospel” gave way to assorted decrees and a preoccupation with their respective priority.
Having been graduated from Geneva, Arminius studied next at Basel, and then at Geneva once more. A trip to Italy in 1587 found him accused of compromising himself with Roman Catholic potentates and also of having “lost his [Calvinist] faith” through exposure to Jesuits.
Upon returning to Amsterdam he was ordained pastor to the “Old Church”, the focal point of church life in the city. In 1590 he married Lijsbet Reael, an aristocrat who thereafter ensured that he orbited among the most influential merchants and leaders of the city. Like all the Magisterial Reformers before him, Arminius would remain a pastor for virtually all of his working life, spending 15 years in the Amsterdam pulpit and six in the Leiden. (It is interesting to note his conviction that exercising the pastoral office, rather than theological wrangling, facilitates the holiness of the minister.) From 1603 until his death in 1609 he was professor of theology in Leiden, where he was also elected Rector (president) of the university even as a theological minority opposed him. In Leiden he gathered up the fruit of his writing in behalf of earlier controversies and in 1608 published his most mature work, Declaration of Sentiments.
While the notions pertaining to the name “Arminius” are commonly thought to suggest exclusive rejection of all things Calvin, his appreciation of Calvin’s Commentaries is noteworthy. They occupy, he said, second place only to Scripture: “I recommend that the Commentaries of Calvin be read…. For I affirm that in the interpretation of the Scriptures Calvin is incomparable, and that his Commentaries are more to be valued than anything that is handed to us in the writings of the Fathers — so much so that I concede to him a certain spirit of prophecy in which he stands distinguished above others, above most, indeed, above all.”
His preaching through Romans became the occasion of a theological controversy that he was never to escape. His first opponents were humanists who denied original sin. Uncompromisingly he replied to them, “I believe that our salvation rests on Christ alone and that we obtain faith for the forgiveness of sins and the renewing of life only through the grace of the Holy Spirit.” Opposition arose next from the Calvinists who differed from him on his insistence that Romans 7 describes the pre-Christian. Immediately he was accused of Pelagianism, Socinianism (unitarianism) and non-compliance with the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism. Not trusting the Calvinist clergy of the church courts, he defended himself on charges of doctrinal deviation only in the presence of civic officials whom he recognized as his assessors. They acquitted him.
Differing from Gomarus, his principal opponent in his latter days as professor in Leiden, he continued to claim that the “wretched man” of Romans 7 is not the apostle speaking autobiographically but is rather the unbeliever. He added in support:
– this viewpoint has been defended through the church’s history and has never been deemed heretical;
– no heresy, including Pelagianism, can be derived from it;
– the viewpoint of modern theologians (e.g., Beza) that Romans 7 speaks of the Christian is a viewpoint that none of the Church Fathers upheld — including Augustine, the Father dearest to the Calvinists;
– to say that Romans 7 describes the Christian is to slight the grace of God (grace appears impotent in the face of sin) and to foster wanton behaviour (even the regenerate cannot help doing the evil they do not want to do).
– the pre-regenerate person can possess an awareness of sin.
In his detailed exposition of Romans 9, another major area of protracted controversy, Arminius articulated a doctrine of grace that recognizes the irreducible humanness of the beneficiaries of grace and that unfailingly honours then as human agents, certainly not synergistic contributors to their salvation and therefore co-authors of it, yet just as certainly God’s covenant-partners made in God’s image. The “co-operation” implied in his understanding of faith as covenant-dialogue recalls the Patristic subtleties around the Fathers’ repudiation of co-redemption and their affirmation of gratia operans/co-operans. Arminius protested any suggestion that even sinful humans are entities like sticks and stones to be manipulated mechanically. Fallen humans, admittedly “dead in trespasses and sins”, are nonetheless fallen humans, and as graced by God, “response-able” and therefore “response-ible”. This notion underlies Arminius’ distinction between the act of believing as belonging to grace and the ability to believe as belonging to nature.
Concerning Romans 9 Arminius insisted
– the question that his opponents said predestination answered, namely, “Why do some individuals believe and others do not when all alike are dead coram Deo?”, is neither asked nor answered in the chapter;
– the chapter does not discuss individuals but rather classes of people: those who affirm righteousness by faith in the Righteous One and those who seek to merit God’s recognition;
– to speak of the predestination of individuals before they have been created, and therefore to speak of the reprobation of individuals before they could have sinned, is to render God monstrous;
– to postulate both a hidden and a revealed will of God is to falsify the New Testament’s declaration that in Jesus Christ (whom everyone admits to be God’s revealed will) “the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily;” (Col. 2:9 RSV)
– God’s command and God’s promise are co-extensive. It is not the case that God commands all to repent and believe but visits only some with the mercy that quickens both repentance and faith. God does not predestine who will or will not believe; rather God predestines to salvation in Christ all who believe in Christ;
– the position of Beza and his supporters can only mean that God is deemed to be the author of sin. (Cardinal Bellarmine agreed with Arminius, adding that the high Calvinist position rendered God the only sinner.) This notion undercuts human culpability and renders God’s judgement pointless.
Arminius’ chief writing during his pastorate in Amsterdam, Examination of Perkins’ Pamphlet, has often been judged his single best contribution to theological discussion. Perkins (1558-1602), the major spokesperson for English high Calvinism, maintained as a strong supralapsarian that creation and fall are (merely) the means whereby the decree of election or reprobation is implemented. Arminius’ arguments here are those found throughout his works. However, their exposition is more detailed and more nuanced in the Examination than anywhere else. Most pointedly Arminius insists that grace is the love of God meeting humankind as sinful; grace is not a synonym for “decree” or “will” or “sovereignty”; i.e., grace is God’s love addressing humans in their depravity rather than “affecting” them as creatures without reference to their sin.
While Perkins maintained that Christ died only for the elect, the parameters of the atonement being identical with the parameters of faith, Arminius countered that Christ had died (and thereby gained salvation) for all, but only some are saved; i.e., the cross is sufficient for all but effectual only in believers. Arminius’ distinction here reflected his convictions concerning the bondage of the will. He insisted that the will of fallen humans was “bound” in that of itself it can will only its depravity. He insisted too, however, that the fallen will is never merely “of itself”; grace attends all fallen creatures, with the result that the graced will is enabled to affirm or endorse the grace that has elevated it beyond mere (fallen) nature. The graced will is “free” in that it is the non-coerced act of a genuine human agent. In other words, the graced will does not contribute to its salvation yet necessarily concurs in it, or else it is not a human creature that is saved.
Consonant with his understanding of the free will, Arminius eschewed the notion of the Christian life as the “state” of grace (and therefore static), preferring to understand it as dynamic: graced concurrence acknowledges and appropriates greater grace in an upward spiral that also finds the believer advancing in godliness through greater immersion in grace. Whereas Perkins had denounced this position as Pelagian, Arminius maintained that Pelagianism predicated the will’s response to grace entirely of nature or partially of nature (in the case of semi-Pelagianism), whereas the will’s response to grace is grace-wrought without being grace-wrenched. A concomitant of his position is that believers can “make shipwreck” of faith. Yet they need not fear doing so, paradoxically, in that the gift of grace (and therefore of faith) includes a gift of filial fear that renders believers non-presumptuous and non-cavalier but ever spiritually vigilant and therein “kept” by the power of God.
While those who esteem Arminius frequently do so on account of his views concerning predestination, he must not be thought to be a one-issue thinker. Unlike the 1st and 2nd generation Magisterial Reformers, Arminius is a scholastic evincing immense affinities with the scholastic “family” whether Roman Catholic and predestinarian (Banez and Baius), Roman Catholic and non-predestinarian (Suarez and Molina), Protestant and predestinarian (Junius and Gomarus) or Protestant and non-predestinarian (his successors, Episcopius and Limborch). While the non-predestinarian, biblical humanism of the older North Netherlands is found in Arminius, it does not typify him. Rather he is indebted to late medieval and Renaissance Aristotelianism.
Like all scholastics Arminius has a metaphysical concern foreign to the earlier Reformers, and unlike the latter, a debt to Thomas Aquinas. In fact Aquinas is the most frequently quoted thinker in Arminius’ works, and the only scholastic whom he names as an ingredient. Certainly not a Jesuit, Arminius nonetheless preferred the Jesuit reading of Aquinas to the Dominican reading with its Augustinian cast of Thomas.
None of this is to suggest that Arminius is crypto-Roman Catholic. Still, he stands squarely in a tradition indebted to Thomistic metaphysics and Aristotelian logic (despite an appreciation for the bifurcationist logic of Ramus). Protestants typically are unaware that these features characterize the theologies of the 17th century.
Whereas the Reformed schools differed markedly on the issue of supra- or infralapsarianism, Arminius differed from both with respect to his understanding of God’s will and foreknowledge. Here he owed much to Molina’s scientia media: God foreknows future contingencies without thereby determining them. Molina furnished him with a matrix that included God’s foreknowledge, the efficacy of grace, and a freedom of the will that is genuine rather than seeming. In short, Arminius adopted the Jesuit-Thomistic tradition of scientia media that denied divine determination yet preserved the infinitude of the divine intellect and the scope of human freedom.
Arminius’ life unfolded amidst relentless conflict. Denied external tranquility, he was never distracted from the practical, non-speculative understanding of theology he absorbed from his reading of the medieval Duns Scotus, and credibly stated that his sole ambition was “to inquire in the Holy Scriptures for divine truth…for the purpose of winning some souls for Christ.”
Dr Victor Shepherd
Professor of Historical Theology and Wesley Studies
Tyndale Seminary
July 2001
Running the Race in the Pursuit of Excellence
(address to the graduates of Tyndale Seminary, May 2001)
Running the Race in the Pursuit of Excellence
I: — You have asked me to speak to you about excellence, the pursuit of excellence. I am glad to do so, for I relish excellence as much as I abhor mediocrity (mediocrity here defined as contentment with less than our best.)
Yet in eschewing mediocrity I am not advocating perfectionism. Perfectionists fall into two classes: those who neurotically pursue perfection yet bewail their inability to achieve it (these people can’t live with themselves); and those who neurotically pursue perfection and boast that they have achieved it (no one else can live with them.) Perfectionism, deep-down, is self-rejection born of self-contempt, even where the self-rejection masquerades as self-importance. Let me say it again: when I say I abhor mediocrity, I am not advocating perfectionism.
In the same way, in rejecting mediocrity I am not rejecting ordinariness. We should shun mediocrity; but we should cherish ordinariness. We should pursue excellence, but we should never aspire to be extraordinary. Extraordinary people are those think they have transcended their humanness, think they no longer put on their trousers one leg at a time, think they have risen above the earthbound humanness of inferior mortals. I’m convinced that people who want to be extraordinary, or think they are, are dangerous. Virtually all the damage wrought in the world is wrought by those who want to be extraordinary or think they are extraordinary.
We should aspire after humility. “Humility” is derived from the Latin word humus, “earth.” We are created earth-creatures and therefore glorify God by our earthliness, which earthliness, I am convinced, should always include more than a little earthiness. When I speak of excellence I never mean extraordinariness. I mean rather the utter repudiation of mediocrity, for mediocrity is sin.
II: — Let’s think for a moment about someone whose entire life bespoke excellence of many sorts, not the least of which was intellectual excellence, particularly intellectual excellence as it pertains to books. I speak now of the apostle Paul.
“I know a man”, says Paul, “who, 14 years ago, was caught up to the third heaven…. and this man heard things that cannot be told, which no one may utter.” The apostle is talking about himself. He was caught up to the third heaven. The “third heaven” was an ancient way of speaking of the most intimate, most intense, most vivid apprehension of God. At that moment, 14 years ago, the apostle wasn’t “seeing in a mirror dimly”. (1 Cor. 13:12) At that moment, rather, he was bathed in splendour and scorched by fire. Simultaneously he was transfixed by the purity of God and prostrated by the enormity of God and irradiated by the grandeur of God.
Isn’t it odd, then, that the fellow whose experience of God is so intense that he can’t speak of it then writes to the young man, Timothy, and asks for books? “When you come, bring the cloak that I left with Carpus at Troas, also the books, and above all the parchments.” (2 Timothy 4:13) “Be sure to bring me the books.” Books? Why would he need books? What could a book do for him?
Paul’s experience of 14 years ago wasn’t the only time he had had an astonishing encounter with God. Three years before he was “caught up to the third heaven” he had been crumbled on his way to Damascus when the risen Lord had arrested him. In addition to the Damascus road experience Paul had had a vision of the man from Macedonia who had pleaded with Paul to go there with the gospel. In addition to the Macedonian episode Paul had fallen into a trance while praying in the Jerusalem temple, and while in the trance had been told unmistakably to get out of Jerusalem. The apostle’s experience of God had been vivid over and over.
And now he wants books? Compared to his experience of God, reading a book sounds so flat, so pedestrian, simply so dull. Yet he wants books! Obviously he thinks he needs books. Books are essential to his discipleship as a Christian as well as to his vocation as an apostle. Obviously he thinks that his vivid experience of God doesn’t render books unnecessary; his startling apprehension of God doesn’t render reading superfluous.
In his novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell depicted a society crushed in the tentacles of cruel totalitarianism. One feature of such a society, Orwell insisted, was the banning of books. The oppressor would continue to oppress his victims by many means, not the least of which was the banning of books.
Aldous Huxley, in his novel, Brave New World, didn’t fear a society where books were banned. He feared something worse: a society where books weren’t banned simply because no one wanted to read a book.
Do we want to read one? read many? Some people who lived a long time before us, and who are foreparents in faith, certainly wanted to.
Like the Jewish people, in whose house all Christians are guests of honour. On Christmas Day in the year 800 Charlemagne was crowned emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. At the coronation he was supposed to sign his name to a document. But he couldn’t write — or read. However, he remembered having seeing his name written in Latin: CAROLINUS. He recalled that one letter (“U”) had two vertical strokes in it. Whereupon Charlemagne grabbed an instrument of some sort and made two crude strokes on the document. Meanwhile, the Jewish people were 100% literate. In whose house are Christians guests? Abraham and Sarah are our foreparents in faith, not Charlemagne.
And then there are the Puritans. Don’t listen to those who defame them wickedly! When persecuted Puritans left the old country and settled in New England, every Puritan minister was given 10 pounds with which to start a church library. Between 1640 and 1700 the literacy rate among men in Massachusetts and Connecticut was 93% — while it was only 40% in England. (The rate of literacy among Puritan women in the new world was 62%, 10% in England.) Six years after these people landed in Massachusetts they voted 400 pounds “towards a school or college.” The “school or college” they built was Harvard (1636).
By 1650 virtually all New England towns had developed grammar schools. As people there learned to read, the effect of the printed page was immense. People were released from the domination of the immediate and the local. People who don’t read live in a very small world, a world of the immediate (in time) and the local (in space). Books are vehicles that convey us to a different era, a different history, a different culture. Books free us from the domination of the immediate and the local. They free us not only from the domination of the horizontally immediate; they free us as well from the vertically immediate. On the one hand they free us for a deeper immersion in creaturely riches; on the other hand books — at least those which speak of the gospel — free us for a deeper immersion in the riches of the Creator himself.
Books have to do with a word-culture rather than an image-culture. The difference between a word-culture and an image-culture is huge. The word encourages critical reflection; the image encourages uncritical absorption. Words present us with ideas for thoughtful evaluation; flitting images provide for titillation and amusement. As soon as the politician goes on TV what he says is of no importance; what matters is how he appears. Is his tie knotted properly? If it isn’t, he can’t be elected. When Menachem Begin sought political office in Israel his media advisors told him he had to stop wearing shirts with oversized collars, since a shirt with an oversized collar makes a man appear terminally ill. John Turner’s media advisors told him he had to break his habit of licking his lips. Night and day they hammered him, “Who is going to vote for a man who looks like an anteater at a picnic?”
The word encourages thinking; the image, by and large, encourages emoting. Words present us with arguments that we have to assess; images present us with impressions that we merely blot up. Visual stimulation is a shabby substitute for thought, just as emotional manipulation is a shabby substitute for verbal precision.
A society given to mediocrity despises excellence. In resisting all mediocrity I am making a gospel-plea for intellectual excellence; particularly intellectual excellence fostered through books.
III: — Yet I should never want to suggest that intellectual excellence is the only kind. In fact it isn’t even the chief kind of excellence. What is? John Henry Cardinal Newman knew what is. Newman tells us that when he was a young scholar he realized one day that he had almost succumbed to the liberal heresy, namely, “prizing intellectual excellence above moral excellence.” Now when Newman speaks of “moral excellence” he doesn’t mean “moralistic” or “legalistic.” By “moral excellence” he means the excellence of a human being who is a spiritual/ethical agent. Our life in the Spirit is lived, lived out, in the integrity of our honouring Christ’s claim upon our obedience. This is the excellence.
The excellence of that life which has been apprehended by truth and thereafter aspires to do the truth; this excellence has an inherent winsomeness, attractiveness, appeal.
Have you ever pondered the Greek wording of our Lord’s self-description in the fourth gospel, “I am the good shepherd”? Ego eimi ho poimen ho kalos. “I am the good shepherd.” “Good”? There are two Greek words for “good”, agathos and kalos. Agathos often has the force of “correct, proper, upright.” It has the force of “good” in the sense that Mark Twain has Huckleberry Finn pray that God will make all the bad people good and all the good people nice. This isn’t quite the sense in which Jesus speaks of himself as the “good” shepherd.
Kalos, on the other hand, has the force of “good” in the sense of all that agathos includes PLUS attractive, winsome, appealing, compelling, comely, desirable, endearing, inviting, prepossessing, fine. That’s it: “I am the fine shepherd.” Malcolm Muggeridge found himself ravished by the comeliness of his Lord, and discovered the same comeliness in Mother Teresa of Calcutta. For this reason he titled his book about her, Something Beautiful for God.
What seized Muggeridge is precisely what has startled and moved the Israelite writers who speak of “the beauty of holiness.” Among our more recent spiritual foreparents no one grasped this, or was grasped by it, more profoundly than Jonathan Edwards. When Edwards has in mind what our Hebrew ancestors called “the beauty of holiness” he rarely uses these exact words. Instead he speaks of the “excellence” of God. And when he speaks of the excellence of God he is careful to distinguish those predicates which describe who God is from those which describe what God is.
What is God? God is spirit. But what if this spirit were demonic? God is infinite. But what if God were infinitely malicious? God is immense, omnipresent, inescapable. But what if God were everywhere lupine?
Who is God, on the other hand? God is infinite, yes, and infinite in mercy. God is eternal, and precisely eternal love. God is omnipresent, which is to say his judgement is inescapable; and his judgement is the only judgement in heaven or earth administered by a judge who is first and last our saviour.
Without any suggestion of saccharine sentimentality Edwards speaks of “the loveliness of God.” It is a sign of Christian maturity to love God for the sake of God’s inherent, compelling, irresistible loveliness. Edwards insists that when we are newer in the faith we love God because he first loved us; we love God on account of all that he has done for us and continues to do for us. Yet the day comes when the incomparable excellence of God transfixes us; our apprehension of it mesmerizes us and in turn reshapes our love for God. Now our love for God is transmuted as it assimilates to itself the excellence of God himself. The point to which Edwards returns endlessly is this: to apprehend God’s intrinsic beauty and glory is not only to love him out of gratitude for his mercy but even to love him out of self-forgetful adoration of his inherent worthiness.
In light of all that Edwards says in this regard we shouldn’t be surprised when he insists, “Holiness is the only virtue.” Why is holiness the only virtue? Edwards knows that any virtue (so-called) — chastity, for instance — can cloak and will cloak ever so much that has nothing to do with godliness unless holiness is its ground and guide. Am I a chaste person? Yes. Do you know why I am chaste? It might be because I’m afraid of contracting an S.T.D. It might be because sexual impropriety could issue in me, a clergyman, being defrocked. I might be chaste inasmuch as I’m neurotically averse to sex. Or I might be afraid my wife would otherwise leave me and thereby deprive me of access to her schoolteacher’s pension. It might be because I’m a moralist who, qua moralist, wouldn’t know Jesus from a gerbil. It might be because my distorted theology has left me believing that chastity merits “justification” before God.
There is only one adequate reason for being chaste, as there is only one ground and guide: an apprehension of a splendour in God that finds his winsome holiness fostering in me a holiness that I welcome. Holiness is the only virtue. There is a singularity to excellence, a singularity that is the profoundest simplicity.
Now I am as put off as you by an unrealistic simplicity that refuses to admit the enormous complexity of everything human. When genuine complexity is denied (likely because complexity is threatening) we speak of such simplicity as simplistic inasmuch as we know it’s false. Then we shouldn’t succumb to the simplistic. And I maintain that any simplicity “this” side of complexity is artificial and merely simplistic. But I want to maintain with equal force that on the “other” side of complexity there is a genuine simplicity that is the simplicity of the gospel.
According to two superb philosophers, Emil Fackenheim and Ludwig Wittgenstein, the greatest thinker to arise in Christendom is Soren Kierkegaard. Plainly Kierkegaard can never be accused of being simplistic. Yet just as plainly Kierkegaard knows the simplicity born of the gospel when he writes, “Purity of heart is to will one thing.” One thing. Simplicity and singularity ultimately coalesce.
While we are speaking of singularity and simplicity we should also speak of elegance. Elegance — plainly a manifestation of excellence — doesn’t mean here what it is usually taken to mean: showy, gaudy, ostentatious, pretentious. In the realm of mathematics or logic “elegance” describes an argument whose conclusion is generated from the fewest possible premises. If a conclusion is generated from three premises rather than from four, elegance is emerging. (Obviously the most elegant argument is one that generates a conclusion from one premise only.)
In this sense there is an elegance to excellence just because there is an elegance to simplicity.
“Purity of heart is to will one thing.”
“This one thing I do.”
“Where is your brother?”“My sin is more than I can bear.”
“Once I was blind; now I see.”
Elegance, simplicity, excellence is found in many dimensions and expressions of the Christian life. In the early 1800s a French priest, from the town of Ars, a priest noted for his pastoral diligence, Jean Vuillamy, remarked, “If we knew, really knew, what it is to be a pastor, we couldn’t endure it.” I was a pastor for 30 years, and in that time I found pastoral work — excellent with all the meaning that only Jonathan Edwards could lend to “excellent”; I found such excellent work simple. I didn’t say easy. I said simple. “If we knew, really knew, what we pastors mean to people in their suffering and bewilderment and sin as we are transparent to the comfort and consolation and mercy of God, we couldn’t endure it.”
IV: — Remember, I said simple; I never said easy. Pastoral work isn’t easy. The Christian life isn’t easy anywhere at any time. Then for how long are we going to pursue excellence? “Pursue” suggests diligence, ardour, perspicacity. For how long are we going to maintain all this?
The author of Hebrews tells us that the Christian life isn’t a sprint that ends in 9.97 seconds; it’s a long distance race. A sprint ends so quickly that no runner has time to get discouraged. But discouragement can take any long distance runner out of the race.
In the Christian life all of us face disappointment, frustration, betrayal, unforeseen potholes and pitfalls and pit bulls. Who wouldn’t become discouraged amidst all these? Then our discouragement is as understandable as it is excusable.
“Not so!”, shouts the author of Hebrews. “Understandable, yes; excusable, no. What would be the excuse?” Then in Hebrews 12:3 this writer points us to what will always render our discouragement inexcusable. “Consider him, Jesus, who endured from sinners such hostility against himself, so that you may not grow weary or faint-hearted.” Or as J.B. Phillips puts it in his splendid paraphrase, “Think constantly of enduring all that sinful men could say against him, and you will not lose your purpose or courage.”
The Christian life, the pursuit of excellence, is a particular kind of long distance race; it’s a relay race. Each generation of believers passes on the baton to the next. The one thing we mustn’t do is fumble the baton. In the 1992 Olympic Games two women were running side-by-side in a relay event when suddenly one jabbed the other with a sharp elbow. The elbowed woman, in pain now, gasped and slowed up slightly; whereupon the nasty runner surged ahead; whereupon the victimized woman lost her temper and threw her baton at the woman who had fouled her. As soon as she threw her baton she threw the race away; she disqualified herself and her team. Years and years of preparation and training and sacrifice; it was thrown away in an instant. And it all happened because she allowed victimization to deflect her from her pursuit.
In our pursuit we are going to be victimized endlessly. But if it is ever the occasion of our quitting the race we had better not offer it as an excuse, for we are mandated to keep on looking unto Jesus lest we lose our purpose or courage.
The writer of Hebrews tells us that the relay race of the Christian life is an unusual relay race in that Christians throughout the centuries who have already run their leg of the race go to the finish line in order to cheer on those who are still running. These people, having run valiantly, make up “the great cloud of witnesses.” You and I and all God’s people have been appointed to be added to the great cloud. We shall be added as surely as we run with perseverance. For then it will be said of us as it was said of another Christian, now himself in the great cloud, “…fought the good fight; …finished the race, …kept the faith. “
Victor Shepherd May 2001
It isn’t the size of the dog . . . .
It isn’t the size of the dog . . . .
Since I was only eight years old when the guest teacher spoke to my Sunday School class I can’t remember all the details. Still, I shall never forget Rufus Spooner, the tall, lean, fiery fellow who touched me and torched me that afternoon. He claimed to stand in the tradition of John Wesley, and he was telling us stories of how Christians in the Methodist heritage continued to “fight the good fight of the faith.” (1 Timothy 6:12) The gist of his story was that we must never waver on account of discouragement or capitulate in despair or surrender through fear. The illustration that gripped us was his vivid depiction of a gentle, small dog dragged unwillingly into contending with a slavering Doberman. The conclusion that climaxed it all and thereafter seared itself upon my mind and heart was, “Remember! What counts isn’t the size of the dog in the fight, but the size of the fight in the dog!” And I have remembered.
When John Wesley was asked what he needed to unleash the mission for which he believed God to have raised up Methodism (the mission being “to spread scriptural holiness throughout the land”) he replied, “I need only a dozen people who hate nothing but sin and fear no one but God.”
Only a dozen? Would so very few be enough to spread, or even begin to spread, scriptural holiness throughout the length and breadth of England? The people who gathered around him worked and witnessed and sometimes wept; still they won. The story of how they leavened English life and laws and church and populace has been told in history texts beyond number. When I was a teenager and beginning to read of the eighteenth century Awakening I thrilled to the accounts of the diminutive Englishman forthrightly addressing crowds that exceeded twenty thousand. Naturally enough I imagined the numbers gathered into the burgeoning movement to resemble a tidal wave. Decades later I learned that by 1750 the Methodist people totalled no more than 10,000 amidst Great Britain’s ten million. In other words, even after twelve years of unrelenting love and labour (he began in 1738) his people were only one-tenth of one percent of the general population.
“Only”? It’s the size of the fight in the dog! By 1790, one year before Wesley’s death, Methodist membership had swelled to 71,463 in a population of twelve million. On the one hand they were proportionately six times larger at six-tenths of one per cent. On the other hand, they were still far less than one per cent. Was Wesley dismayed? I have never read that he quit or ever thought of quitting. Did he abandon his convictions or sell his soul or hide the hardships of discipleship in order to attract hordes and allow him to boast a howling success? On the contrary he never slackened in his insistence on “doctrine and discipline.” His Journal tells us that when he visited the Methodist communities in Newcastle or Leeds or Bradford or Bristol he sat down with local leaders, queried them concerning the spiritual condition of the people, and then proceeded to delete names from the rolls. Members who had made a profession of faith at one time but who were never found now at worship or who flaunted their dissolute ways or who sneered at the gospel and its spokespersons — these people Wesley unhesitatingly pronounced as “no longer walking with us.” To be sure, upon repenting they would be welcomed without qualification. Until then, however, he would not use their names to pad rolls dishonestly. The truth is, as small as the Methodist movement was, Wesley never worried about making it smaller. In the wake of his visit, however, the same community was always stronger and more effective.
There are other Sunday School lessons I remember, especially the oft-told story of God’s rescuing the Israelite people from slavery in Egypt and bringing them safely through the Red Sea. The old flannel-graph lesson board always depicted the Red Sea waters piled twenty feet high like snowbanks in the Rocky Mountains. The portrayal was so very dramatic that those beholding the event would have to be startled, know that God alone had done it, and forever suspend their unbelief in the Holy One of Israel. Actually, the event appeared so very ordinary to the Egyptians that their annals record no more than that a relatively small group of slaves escaped during a storm and were never missed since they were never going to accommodate themselves to Egyptian ways in any case. Then what did happen? Something happened apart from which our civilization is unthinkable. Can you imagine our civilization without the Ten Commandments? Can you imagine public institutions or our social environment or our society’s “illumination by indirect lighting” in such areas as care for the marginalized or the value of the individual or the nature of the criminal justice system apart from what Israel has always called the “Ten Words”? And all of this from a handful of recalcitrant slaves so few in number and so despised in any case as never to be missed!
During the eleven years my father lived in Edmonton he visited the Fort Saskatchewan Penitentiary every Sunday afternoon in order to provide piano accompaniment at a service of worship and also to address the convicts. Years later when I was a temporarily frustrated clergyman I asked my dad if he had ever seen any fruit of his eleven-year sacrifice. “I didn’t do it because I expected to see fruit,” he corrected me, “I did it because it was right.” But of course there was fruit. (An ex-convict thanked him on an Edmonton streetcar in front of my mother.) And of course a vastly greater reward awaited him the day he was “sent home.”
Elijah came to know that there were far more than he once thought who had neither bowed their knee to Baal nor kissed him. (1 Kings 19:18)
“It isn’t the size of the dog in the fight, but the size….”
Victor Shepherd
(written for the Community of Concern Newsletter, March 2001)
Pentecost
PENTECOST
The tower of Babel was titanic, trivial and tragic all at once. Titanic, for its boastful “let us make a name for ourselves” attempted to erect a structure that elevated self-important braggarts to the heavens, letting them rival God. It was trivial, for their achievement turned out to be a pipsqueak; when God heard about it he couldn’t see it and had to “come down” (Gen. 11:5) just to have a look. It was tragic in that they succeeded in giving themselves a name, an identity: God-defiant, disobedient, contemptuous men and women whose ingratitude was as hard-hearted as their self-congratulation was silly. The tragedy was only compounded when God visited his judgement upon them, rendering them unable to understand each other, unable to communicate, unable to forge community. He scattered them abroad over the face of the earth (Gen. 11:8-9), enforcing their estrangement. Like magnets improperly aligned they could only repel each other. In one sense they triumphed, for they had rendered themselves “somebodies” irrespective of God’s will and way. In another sense they failed abysmally, their isolation giving rise to babbling no less hostile for being incoherent.
Yet since God’s judgement is the converse of his mercy (or as Luther liked to say, his judgement is his love burning hot), God immediately set about rescuing them from their folly and its consequences. Abram (“exalted father”) is summoned and obeys, the model of any and all who gladly allow themselves to be named by God. Now called Abraham (“father of multitudes”), he is blessed by God where the Babel/babblers were cursed. He is promised descendants in faith as numberless as the sand on the seashore and the stars in the firmament (Gen. 22:17).
Still, God’s rescue operation taxed him unspeakably. It took him centuries and cost him vastly more than it had cost even Abraham. (After all, at the moment of inexpressible anguish Abraham’s son had been spared while God’s had not.) Still, God couldn’t be discouraged or deflected. There finally appeared one who gloried in the name his Father had bestowed upon him, Yehoshuah, Jesus, “God saves.” God had designated him such “in power…by his resurrection from the dead.” (Rom. 1:4) Throughout the seven weeks between Easter and Pentecost the risen one had appeared to his followers, instructed them in the truth concerning himself and released them from the misunderstandings of him and his work that had dogged them ever since he had called them. He had directed them to remain in Jerusalem, hier shalem, “city of salvation”, until they were “clothed with power from on high.” (Luke 24:49) Then obedient disciples, honouring the risen one’s promise, found the promise fulfilled as the Day of Pentecost unfolded.
“Pentecost” was a word coined in Israel of old to commemorate the ingathering of the harvest. Later the Pentecost festival recalled as well the giving of the Torah at Sinai. Israel had been freed from bondage in Egypt, delivered through the Red Sea, and then fused into a people at Sinai as they were acquainted with God’s will for them. The events in Israel’s history all served the definitive rescue operation when Israel’s greater Son absorbed in himself humankind’s bondage to sin, made provision for its deliverance, and schooled disciples in the Way they were to walk (“walk” being the commonest Hebrew metaphor for obedience.) Regardless of what had been done already, however, something remained to be done in that Christ’s people were gathered in Jerusalem eager, expectant, but as yet unleashed.
As surely as the descent of the Spirit signalled the public ministry of him who was “sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel” (Matt. 15: 24), the descent of the Spirit at Pentecost signalled the world-wide ministry of those sent “to the end of the earth.” (Acts 1:8) Pentecost found the Spirit kindling them for a mission that included people from every tongue and tribe throughout the world. Pentecost conferred an identity no enemy could deny them. Pentecost commissioned them the hands and feet of the risen, victorious one whose victory now ruled the cosmos. Henceforth they would do in his name the work he had done prior to his ascension. (John 14:12)
While the disciples had obeyed their risen Lord and had waited in Jerusalem for the Spirit, they hadn’t been waiting around. They had praised God publicly in the temple and privately in their homes. On the day of Pentecost their conquering Saviour, himself the bearer and bestower of the Spirit, flooded them with the selfsame Spirit in whose power he had preached, taught, healed, and announced the coming “Day of the Lord.” Pentecost was the final act of God’s saving mission before the End. It equipped the disciples with all that they needed to fulfil their commission. It inaugurated the era of the Spirit, which era Hebrew prophets like Joel had foretold. (Joel 2:28) And not to be overlooked, it was the first instance of revival, revival occurring when the sovereign Spirit of God overtakes large numbers of people at once, convicts them of their sinnership, convinces them of the coming judgement, brings them to repentance and faith through vivifying God’s mercy, and admits them joyfully to the people of God.
Concerning this awe-full event Luke tells us that the disciples were aware of what sounded like hurricane-force winds. Hadn’t Jesus earlier likened the Spirit to wind? (John 3:8) Wind can’t be seen yet also can’t be denied. Uprooted trees, racing clouds, tumbling waves: the effects of wind attest its power.
And on the day of Pentecost there appeared to be fire licking at each of the 120 assembled in the upper room. Hadn’t Christ’s ancestors in faith found in the properties of fire a startling reminder of what God does when he draws near to his people and “torches” them? As fire illumines it dispels darkness and confusion. As fire refines it consumes corruption, even mere worthlessness, leaving what is pure, attractive and useful. As fire warms it dispels iciness and suspicion. Most characteristically, fire sets on fire whatever it touches.
At Pentecost the Spirit moved disciples to “speak in other tongues.” The significance of the proclamation in other languages of God’s mighty acts was epoch-making in view of the diverse people gathered at that time in Jerusalem. These God-fearing Jews happened to be in the city at this time but they weren’t native to Jerusalem, having been neither born nor raised there. They had come from the diaspora, “from every nation under heaven.” (Acts 2:5) Luke means, of course, the nations of his world, the Graeco-Roman world of the Mediterranean area where Jewish people had thrived for centuries. In speaking of the “other tongues” Luke lists the languages of five groups: people west of the Caspian Sea, Asia Minor, North Africa, visitors from Rome (Jews and converts to Judaism), and finally “Cretans and Arabs.”
This linguistically diverse, international crowd was transfixed by the simple Galileans. Galileans were known to lack cultural sophistication. (“Can anything good come out of Nazareth?” John 1:46) Permanent residents of Jerusalem looked upon the Galilean visitors as bumpkins. Miraculously, these unlettered people were now proclaiming Jesus in the visitors’ own languages at the centre of the city of salvation. A few sour-faced onlookers sneered, “They’ve had too much to drink.” Nervous about making a realistic assessment, they distanced themselves from the truth through self-excusing mockery.
Luke left no doubt as to his understanding of the Galileeans’ speech. In the power of the Spirit the gospel of Jesus Christ transcends and bridges every barrier that people bent on making a name for themselves erect and behind which they scoff in pretended superiority at those on the other side of the wall. Such barriers are legion: language, nationality, race, education, social class, wealth, gender, ethnicity. Luke knew that Babel had been reversed. At Babel God had descended in judgement and curse when he had had to descend in any case in order to see the tinker-toy trifle by which its builders had thought themselves giants who could rival him. Now at Pentecost God descended in blessing when he found obedient followers of Jesus who wanted only to exalt the name that is above every name (Phil. 2:9) Glad to have their lives, reputations, identities “hid with Christ in God” (Col. 3:3) they rejoiced in the “name” whereby God knew them. Babel pride gave place to Pentecost humility, a humility that is never self-belittlement but rather self-forgetfulness born of preoccupation with the one whose servants they were glad to be.
Since Pentecost forges and inflames Christ’s people (mission being as essential to the church as burning is to fire), Pentecost celebrates the birth of the church. Then could a day that celebrates its birth be followed eventually by a day that laments its demise? Never! No power can prevail against the church, for since the “Spirit isn’t given by measure” (John 3:34), the Pentecost-suffusion will always be adequate.
Pentecost was nothing less than a miracle. How could it be anything else? Creation had certainly been a miracle, creation ex nihilo. Then re-creation had to be no less a miracle too in view of the calcified perversity of the human heart. For Pentecost meant that life could begin again, but not “again” in the sense of déjà vu, one more time; “again”, rather, in the sense of the reversal of all that had distorted the creation into a hideous parody of what God had intended originally. The tower of Babel, remember, had been thought to be huge when in fact it was tiny. Now the new-born church was thought to be tiny but would quickly become huge. While the world regards the church as either stillborn or impotent (“How many troops does the pope have?”, Stalin had jested), it is precisely the church which the rightful ruler of the universe appoints to be his hands and feet. Henceforth it does that work which he will crown one day as he brings to perfection his work of cosmic restoration. Admittedly, the church has prostituted itself repeatedly, yet the bestowal of the Spirit ensures that it will ever be the bride of Christ. Admittedly, the church has often compromised itself inexcusably, yet the Spirit’s wind and fire will ultimately render it worthy to “judge angels.” (1 Cor. 6:3) Deformed at times to the point of being grotesque, the church lives by the promise of one day standing forth resplendent, without spot or blemish. It has been attacked but never slain, for it is more ridiculous than ghastly to think of the Lord Jesus Christ living with head and body severed.
The builders of Babel/babble had made a name for themselves, only to find themselves scattered and their name forgotten. Pentecost generated the ever-burgeoning cloud of witnesses, the gathering together of those whose names were now written in the book of life and would be remembered eternally. The Babel/babblers had boasted, “We did it our way.” Pentecost created a world-wide fellowship of those who continue to prove that “his commandments are not burdensome” but in fact are “sweeter than honey.” (1 John 5:3; Psalm 19:10) Where Babel’s frustrated communication was tragic, Pentecost was a triumph as it proved there is no communication problem, whether between God and us or between us and others, that the Spirit cannot solve.
Apart from Pentecost the 120 in a second-storey room in Jerusalem would have waited with hope haemorrhaging, one more heart-breaking instance of many false messianisms. Apart from Pentecost evangelism would be little more than propaganda and the church’s mission mere self-promotion. Apart from Pentecost our efforts at binding the wounds of a broken world would be indistinguishable from do-goodism. And apart from Pentecost, evangelicals should note next winter and spring, no Gentile would ever have heard of Christmas or Easter.
As it is, Pentecost is the only reason the gospel gives rise to “a great multitude which no man can number, from every nation, from all tribes and peoples and tongues, standing before the throne… crying out with a loud voice, ‘Salvation belongs to our God who sits upon the throne, and to the Lamb!” (Rev. 7:9-10)
Victor Shepherd
Abraham and Isaac in Genesis 22
(presented November 4 , 2000 at the Annual Sixteenth Century Studies Conference, Cleveland)
Hope as the Reconciliation of Command and Promise
Concerning the account of the akedah (“binding”) Gordon Wenham comments, “No other story in Genesis, indeed in the whole OT, can match the sacrifice of Isaac for its haunting beauty or its theological depth.”. With respect to its beauty von Rad maintains that “the narrative [is]…the most perfectly formed and polished of the patriarchal stories”, and cites this as evidence that the story existed independently long before it was gathered up into the redacted work. In other words, its literary beauty helped keep the story in the forefront of the people’s consciousness even as its theology informed and formed Israel for centuries throughout the people’s engagement with its God and the surrounding nations.
Yet the story does more than haunt. It overwhelms, and none more thoroughly than Soren Kierkegaard in his preoccupation with Abraham as the “knight of faith” (which knight is to be contrasted everywhere with the ethical hero, even the tragic hero.) Stricken by the story of Abraham and Isaac, Kierkegaard can only conclude, concerning the faith which any believer exemplifies, that “faith begins precisely where thought stops.” Just because thought stops at the inception of faith, no advice can be proffered those children of Abraham — believers — even at the outset of their journey. For in the nature of the case advice is not so much useless as impossible with respect to those whose faith is incomprehensible: “he who walks the narrow road of faith has no one to advise him — no one understands him.” Anyone who has pondered the story of Abraham and Isaac, the paradigm of scriptural faith, and still thinks she understands faith; anyone who thinks her new-found understanding enables or even impels her to “explain” it is no better than a “pious and accommodating exegete who by dickering in this way hopes to smuggle Christianity into the world.”
But of course only an ersatz Christianity can be smuggled into the world. Faith as exemplified by Abraham can never be. And since Abraham’s faith is not only the model for that of his spiritual descendants but also the condition for theirs as well (see section V), Abraham’s faith elicits unbounded admiration from Kierkegaard (“in a certain demented sense I admire him more than all others”), even as it elicits unprecedented horror as well (“he also appalls me”.) Kierkegaard knows that the faith that Abraham exemplifies and to which all others are summoned entails a confrontation with unprecedented horror and therefore the need for unparalleled courage in the face of it: “I have seen the terrifying face to face, and I do not flee from it in horror, but I know very well that even though I advance toward it courageously, my courage is still not the courage of faith and is not to be compared with it.”
I: The Story
Courage befits a test so very extreme. The “test”, of course, is not “temptation” in the sense of seduction into sin. It is Anfechtung (Luther), trial, that occasion of torment which discloses the nature, depth and scope of one’s faith; in a word, what is undeniably the state of one’s heart. In many respects the command is stupefying. Isaac, after all, has been granted to Abraham and Sarah when realistically no child could be expected. More to the point, Isaac’s survival is essential to the fulfillment of God’s promises to Abraham. Having cut himself off from his entire past — “Go from your country and your kindred and your father’s house to the land that I will show you” (12:1) — Abraham must now renounce his future, and with it the future of his people, including not only the future of his descendants but also that of innumerable nations who are to be blessed through his descendants.
The crux of the story is this. Abraham, the prototype of the person of faith, has been promised spiritual descendants as numerous as the sands on the seashore. If the promise is to be fulfilled, two conditions must be met: Abraham must persevere in faith (or else he cannot be the foreparent of descendants-in-faith), and Isaac must survive (or else there will not be descendants-in-faith.) Abraham, then, is racked with this dilemma: if he obeys God and offers up his Son, then God’s promise is null and void, since Isaac has not survived. If, on the other hand, he second-guesses God and preserves Isaac, then God’s promise is null and void, since his disobedience exemplifies unfaith. Abraham’s obedience nullifies the promise as surely as his disobedience nullifies it. Abraham decides to stake everything on trusting God to fulfil God’s promises in ways that Abraham cannot imagine at this point. He will obey God even though such obedience, from a human perspective, ensures the non-fulfillment of the promise.
God tests Abraham. By means of the definite article (lit. “the God”) the text forbids the reader from finding relief in such vagaries as “Perhaps Abraham merely thought he heard God speak, merely projected an intra-psychic oddity.” While “God” (without the article) is used in the story wherever the narrator refers to the deity, the article is added whenever God himself addresses Abraham. It is the one and only, true and living God who speaks to Abraham, the God whose address is as undeniable as it is unmistakable. It is little wonder that the text obviates all sought-after speculations concerning all reductionist psycho-religious “explanations”: the story has point and force only if the God has spoken unambiguously and Abraham has heard unambivalently.
Testing as such is nothing new for Abraham. He has been tested before; e.g., with respect to the famine (12:10ff) (at which he behaved ingloriously), and again with respect to the three visitors (18:1ff.) New here, however, is the agenda of testing in the very first verse of the story, as well as the severity of a test that appears wantonly destructive.
Yet the severity of the testing does not preclude sensitivity on God’s part. “Take (your son)” has the force of “Please take.” The enclitic (“please”) is rare in a divine command, and lends the force of entreaty to the command. God manifests his awareness of the outrageous nature of his request.
As jarring as the outrageous request is, the terrible tension it engenders is heightened yet again as Abraham is told to take “your son, your only son, Isaac, whom you love.” By now the narrative has slowed to a crawl as the reader is forced to linger over the perseverated detail, Isaac who is loved unspeakably, and therein forced to reflect on a command whose ever-narrowing specificity fosters ever-increasing anguish. “Whom you love”, exquisitely drawn out, precludes any “escape-suggestion” that Abraham’s love for his son was deficient in any case.
The content of the test pertains, as already noted, to the promise and its (apparent) nullification. The context of the test is Abraham’s unsurpassable love for Isaac. Both are needed. Nowhere is it implied that Abraham’s love for Isaac is inordinate. God approves its intensity. Apart from a love as intense as it is proper, the dilemma concerning the promise would be but a cold abstraction devoid of human significance. Apart from the dilemma concerning the promise the story would not be trivialized (the loss of a child can never be trivial), but it would none the less lack the creation-wide significance it is meant to have.
Abraham is to give up Isaac as a “burnt offering.” Later Levitical ritual will designate this particular offering as the only one to be completely consumed. While the reader’s awareness of the conclusion of the story — the provision of the ram, God’s staying Abraham’s knife-wielding hand, the promises of God promulgated as a result of Abraham’s obedience — mitigates the story’s horror and incomprehensibility, for Abraham himself the instant of the command’s enunciation finds nothing mitigated. The test remains consummate test only if horror and incomprehensibility perdure.
The earlier command, “Go from your country, your kindred, and your father’s house to the land that I will show you” (12:1) was undoubtedly heart-wrenching for Abraham. As difficult as this command was, that of 22:1 is qualitatively different. The earlier command included the promise of a rich future, new land, numerous descendants, blessing for all nations. The most recent command includes no such promise. In fact, obedience to it precludes future, land, descendants, blessing — for all of these presuppose Isaac’s survival.
Was Abraham in torment? He cut the wood for the holocaust after saddling the asses. Surely it would make more sense to cut the wood first. Is he trying to conceal the nature of the test from those looking on? Is he postponing the most painful part to the last? Plainly he is distraught. One would expect servants to prepare animals and split wood. Yet Abraham wants to elicit no questions since he has no answers. His sole involvement in the ordeal means that it cannot be shared in any way; no relief can attenuate his pain.
No word is spoken throughout the journey to Moriah. Father and son arrive on the third day, “on the third day” being a Hebrew idiom indicating the elevated significance of an unusually dramatic moment. Abraham lifts up his eyes and sees the place “afar off.” To lift up one’s eyes before seeing similarly suggests throughout Genesis that what is to be seen is of momentous import. Abraham can recognize it, of course, in that it is the place “of which God had told him.” The reader is not made privy to what God has told him. Still, Abraham has plainly been told as much as he needs to know in order to identify the place. The fact that the reader is not told focuses attention all the more pointedly on Abraham’s determination to obey God at all costs; i.e., the details Abraham needed to know for the test to occur are extraneous to the test itself. If included, such details would only sidetrack the reader.
The drama takes a remarkable turn when Abraham, intending nothing but that resolute obedience which undeniably includes the death of Isaac, departs for the site with Isaac alone and, upon leaving the servants behind, adds, “[we]…will come again to you.” (22:5) On the one hand Abraham releases the servants in that he cannot endure seeing anyone else behold the ghastly event. On the other hand he indicates that he expects to return with Isaac, however illogical or inchoate his expectation here. Even now, then, Abraham is trusting God to fulfil the promise in a manner wholly unforeseeable yet not to be doubted. Paradoxically, the narrator speaks in such a way as to leave the reader understanding that Abraham intends nothing but the slaughter of Isaac and is therefore beside himself, even as he is relying on the promise fulfilled, an event that presupposes Isaac’s being spared.
Isaac, meanwhile, is aware that he and his father are on their way to worship, and aware, of course, that worship entails sacrifice. Unsuspecting, he calls out, “My father.” Abraham replies, “Here am I, my son.” Abraham’s heart remains knit to Isaac’s as strongly as it was the day he received the baby from Sarah. The iron-fast bond of affection only magnifies the tension as Isaac, not suspicious but certainly bewildered, notes that all is on hand for the sacrifice except the victim. “Where is the lamb for a burnt offering?” Isaac’s trust in his father is one with his father’s trust in God.
While much religious art depicts Isaac as a child, if not still an infant, the story makes plain that Isaac is strong enough to carry wood sufficient for that conflagration required to consume his remains. He is also sophisticated enough to apprehend the accoutrements of sacrifice. Not surprisingly, then, Jewish tradition deems Isaac to be 37 years old. Then Isaac can only be willing to be sacrificed. A vigorous young adult could readily overpower a very aged father. The test for Abraham is therefore a test for Isaac as well. Isaac, after all, could not be bound unless he complied.
When an animal was on the point of being sacrificed it was not bound; rather its throat was cut, it was dismembered, and then burnt. Since Isaac submits to being bound he is not mere piacular victim. He is as much an agent in the event now as his father. To the extent that Abraham is ready to obey God at all cost, Isaac is ready to obey his father — and therefore obey God through his father — at all cost. Lest the subtlety of all such considerations distract the reader from the shock-aspect of the deed, the narrator comments, “Abraham …bound Isaac his son.” (22:9) In addition, the “knife” that Abraham poises above the prostrate Isaac is the “knife” used elsewhere to dismember a ravished concubine into twelve pieces. (Judges 19:29) The event at Moriah remains grisly. Nothing can reduce the bizarreness, horror and enormity of what is about to happen.
Precisely at the moment of the knife’s descent God (I am reading “angel of the Lord” as a circumlocution for “God”) calls, “Abraham, Abraham.” The name repeated is a Hebrew way of denoting urgency, typically a way of stopping an action that someone is on the point perpetrating. God’s forbidding the dreaded act is now as pressing as his command was heretofore persistent. God has “seen enough.” Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice is sufficient proof of his undeflectable obedience to God and unalloyed trust in him. God’s unaffected awareness and artless acknowledgement, “Now I know that you fear God” (22:12), dovetails exactly with Abraham’s utter surprise at the provision of the ram. Earlier (22:8) Abraham had attempted to remedy Isaac’s bewilderment with “God will provide a lamb”, and then had moved ahead in obedience to God on the assumption that there were no this-worldly grounds for such intervention (the proof of Abraham’s mind and heart being his raising the knife over Isaac), when the ram was brought forth. Abraham’s surprise is no more feigned than his intent to obey God at any cost. Both dimensions must be underscored: it is true simultaneously that Abraham never doubts that “God will provide” (or else he has abandoned faith’s trust in the promise-fulfilling God) and that he is genuinely astounded at the appearance of the ram (or else he has abandoned faith’s obedience to the uncompromising claim of God.) Abraham is genuinely surprised, profoundly surprised, that the promise has been fulfilled in this manner.
Abraham names the place “The Lord will provide.” In naming the place he does not mention himself. He does not seek to exalt himself, never mind memorialize himself. He wants only to magnify the act of God wherein God’s mercy and wisdom are enlarged. Nothing in the story suggests that Abraham understands himself to be anything more than an “unprofitable servant.”
The second address of the “angel of the Lord” to Abraham (22:15-18) is by no means an “add-on”, let alone embellishment, but is rather an integral aspect of the story itself. Indeed the angel’s words “are the last and most emphatic statement of the promises given to Abraham.” For nowhere else does a divine oath, “By myself I have sworn” (22:15), occur in the patriarchal stories. Again, the singularity of the divine oath (emphasized by “by myself”) is matched by the divine acknowledgement of Abraham’s singular obedience: “Because you have done this”; “[because you] have not withheld your son, your only son”; “because you have obeyed my voice.” On account of Abraham’s obedience blessing will abound. “I will indeed bless you, really bless you” (22:17), the infinite absolute of “bless” being used here alone in Genesis to underline the truth that this promise surpasses all others.
As enormous as the ordeal has been, the blessing is “super-immense.” Abraham himself will be blessed, as will his descendants, as will (by his descendants) all the nations of the earth. The content of the blessing is specified in the case of his descendants. They will be uncountable (“as the stars of heaven and as the sand which is on the seashore”), victorious (“shall possess the gates of their enemies”), and used of God in his prospering others (“shall all the nations of the earth bless themselves.”) Abraham’s faithfulness is the occasion, under God, of a divinely ordained beneficence whose scope and profundity are inestimable.
In all of this one must be careful not to undervalue the unsubstitutably human. Abraham’s faithfulness and obedience and unwavering trust are a human event/act/affirmation upon which the blessing of the whole world hangs. The thrice-uttered “because you…” can only mean that the human “dialogical partner” of God conditions God’s response. What God will do (can do?) for all the nations turns on the integrity of a human agent. Heretofore the promise of God has been grounded in the will of God; now it is grounded in both the will of God and the will of Abraham. Not only has the test found Abraham unbroken; the test has been the occasion of the crown and climax of his walk with God. And the test has permitted God to bless the whole Gentile world.
It is little wonder, then, that the oath God has sworn to Abraham will be recalled repeatedly throughout scripture (e.g., Luke 1:55), for this oath gathers up and guarantees all God’s promises to the patriarch.
II: Luther
Luther knows what is at stake in the akedah: Isaac “had the promise of God concerning the future blessing of the entire world.” Yet the command of God, in light of the promise of God, has issued in a “contradiction with which God contradicts himself.” It is humanly impossible to understand this, for we should “inevitably conclude that God is lying — and this is blasphemy — or that God hates me — and this leads to despair.” Whereas God formerly seemed to be Abraham’s friend, God now appears to have become “an enemy and a tyrant.” Confronted by the God who is enemy and tyrant, Abraham is unable to believe that he is merely being tested, since he would know that in the face of Anfechtung he must recall, cling to and declare the promise of God — and this Abraham appears unable to do, no longer having “remained sure of the promise.” As profoundly discomfited as Abraham is by the ordeal, the episode is recorded for our comfort “in order that we may learn to rely on the promises we have.”
The dialectic Luther suggests here seems bizarre. Since the promise is now the occasion of logical contradiction, Abraham cannot be sure of the promise. Yet the purpose of the story of Abraham is to teach us that we must ever rely on the promise. Notwithstanding the oddity, Luther knows that Anfechtung does not arise ultimately in the face of “woman, gold, silver, life or death”; it arises, rather, when God “shows himself differently from the way the promise speaks.” Anfechtung overtakes us when God’s self-disclosure contradicts God’s self-utterance. When faced with contradiction (apparent or real) between God’s self-disclosure and the promise, what are we to do? Luther’s answer is unambiguous: we are to cling to the promise. And yet Luther appears to contradict himself immediately as he declares that “Abraham’s faith shines forth with special clarity in this passage, inasmuch as he obeys God with such a ready heart when He gives him the command.” Here Luther identifies faith as obedience to command rather than as trust in promise. At once, however, Luther adds, “And although Isaac has to be sacrificed, he nevertheless has no doubt whatever that the promise will be fulfilled even if he does not know the manner of its fulfillment.” “No doubt” can only mean “faith.” Here, then, faith is confidence in the promise fulfilled.
Nowhere in his commentary on Genesis concerning the matter under discussion does Luther speak of the command of God in terms of the law of God, and then contrast it sharply (as is his custom) with the gospel (promise.) Were he to do this, of course, he would have to relegate the significance of the command to fostering in the hearer that despair which drives one to the gospel (promise.) Were command to be understood as law, however, the tension in the incident would disappear and the “trial” would evaporate. Throughout his exposition of Genesis 22 Luther presupposes promise and command as the one gospel of God seen from two different angles. While the law/gospel distinction is crucial in Luther’s thought as a whole and therefore characteristic of him, it is plain that so far as Abraham is concerned the command is not to be understood in terms of law but in terms of gospel. When Luther probes the three-day journey to Moriah he notes that Abraham’s reliance on the command “strengthened and preserved him.” Everywhere in Luther the law, so far from strengthening and preserving, breaks people down for the sake of that which does: the gospel. Plainly Luther relates obedience to command even as he implies promise (rather than law.) The obedience he has in mind, of course, is that obedience which pertains to (promise-quickened) faith. Obedience “does not exist where this is no divine promise.” Clearly there is a subtle mutuality between promise and command. While from a human perspective promise and command may appear to contradict each other, ultimately the promise is the meaning of the command.
Obedience to the command is no small matter. For when Abraham heard the command of God “he hastened without hesitation to carry it out. This is an extraordinary example of a description of perfect obedience.” Unlike Adam, Luther notes, Abraham does not ask why. Adam’s Anfechtung, whatever else it may have involved, did not involve contradiction. Then how did Abraham manage to meet it? He met it only “through the power of the command of God.” Although, from a human perspective, Abraham “did not have a heart of iron but was of a very tender nature…emotions undoubtedly were accompanied by inexpressible groans, sighs, sobs, and fatherly tears”, his obedience “extended to his innermost being”, there being no room in him for doubt, let alone defiance. The resilience of his obedience, insists Luther, was attributable to the fact that the command “rules and lives in him.”
Immediately the reader recalls the New Testament insistence that Jesus Christ (i.e., the gospel) alone rules and lives in believers. Once more, then, Luther is relating obedience (to the command) to gospel- (promise-) quickened faith. In this context it should be noted that Luther maintains faith to arise as we open our ears and shut our eyes. Ears (metaphorically) receive the Word of God; eyes behold what is everywhere a contradiction of the Word of God. Abraham “hears” the (promise-grounded) command, and “sees”, as it were, Isaac slain — and then proceeds to slay Isaac, trusting God to fulfil the promise.
Reason, Luther rightly sees here, is helpless before the conundrum: “If Isaac must be killed, the promise is void; but if the promise is sure, it is impossible that this is a command of God.” Reason aside, Abraham cannot doubt that God has announced both promise and command.
At this point Luther brings forward a theme that will recur throughout his discussion of the episode; viz., the sacrifice of Isaac, and Isaac’s subsequent restoration (necessary if Isaac is to have descendants) is an anticipation of the resurrection of the dead. Within a few lines, however, Luther recognizes that to rely on Isaac’s being resurrected after he has been slain is to denature the event as incomparable trial. If Isaac is to be resurrected and thereby rendered the progenitor of a people, then strictly speaking there is no trial. There remains psychological tumult for Abraham (he must still slay his son), but no theological/spiritual conundrum, no trial with respect to faith in the promise of God and the future blessing of the world. Admittedly, God can continue to “try” Abraham’s trust in and love for One who visits assorted afflictions on Abraham, but appealing to the resurrection of the dead undercuts the nature of that trial which tries faith in the promise of the God whose promise has become an impossibility; i.e., tries faith in the God who has himself become an “impossibility.” Luther maintains that the Word of God is “equal to God”, as is God’s “spoken word” (i.e., God’s self-utterance.) The contradiction between the spoken utterance (command) and the Word (promise) renders God self-contradictory. God is an impossibility.
In reflecting on the akedah Luther reminds us that the Word of God and faith in that Word are correlative, and wherever “these two are, there follows the third, namely, the cross and mortification. These three make up the Christian life.” And what is the extent of mortification? Mortification entails self-denial, to be sure, yet a self-denial so far-reaching as to involve the cancellation of everything and everyone whose significance is connected to the “self” undergoing trial. Mortification, self-denial, is nothing less than utmost deprivation. In this regard Luther comments, “Abraham has now [i.e., upon hearing the command] nothing more, so far as the promise is concerned, than he had before Isaac was born; and yet, because of God, he is ready to give up not only his son, Sarah, an inheritance, his house and his church, but even his own life. Isaac’s death included all of this inasmuch as the promise was attached to Isaac.” Isaac’s death entails an obliteration that is nothing less than total. And since, as was noted earlier, a self-contradiction in God renders God an impossibility, obedience to the command of God will not only cancel the promise of God but thereby effect the ultimate nihil. Abraham, faced with an obedience to God that effects the ultimate nihil, finds a sympathizer in Luther who suggests why Abraham told no one of his trial: no one would have understood it (the same conclusion Kierkegaard was to arrive at independently centuries later.)
As Isaac’s initial bewilderment (“Where is the lamb for the burnt offering?”) gives way to his awareness that he is to be the offering, Luther highlights the obedience of father and son. On the one hand Luther maintains that so profound, so moving, is this development that nothing is said about it in that “the subject matter is greater than can be expressed by any eloquence.” On the other hand, he does manage to say something: “With the exception of Christ, we have no similar example of obedience.” With his subtle grasp of so very many ramifications Luther points out that Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac is not only Isaac’s self-sacrifice but also Abraham’s as well. For “death has a soul and a body”, and to die “in the truest sense of the word” is not to undergo biological cessation but rather “to feel the violence of real death.” In this sense “both are killed, since they see and feel nothing but death.” And while Abraham is everywhere commended for his faith in the promise, Isaac’s faith is no less remarkable. For at the moment that the knife is held to Isaac’s throat, Isaac insists, “I am the son of promise. Therefore I must beget children even if heaven collapses.” God’s promise is so very sure, and so very sure is Isaac’s faith in the promise, that heaven will “collapse”, the cosmos will de-create, before the promise fails — even as obedience to the command precipitates the ultimate nihil.
Plainly Luther views the Abraham-Isaac story as having cosmic significance. It is no surprise, then, that he ruminates, concerning the appearance of the ram that dies in place of Isaac, on two possibilities: the animal could have been brought to the site or been brought into existence at the site. He prefers the latter. For Luther God’s provision is not a providential rearranging of what already exists; God’s provision is nothing less than creatio ex nihilo. The Abraham/Isaac promise/command matrix, together with the blessing soon to be pronounced, means that the world’s life can begin again.
The resolution of the trial finds God swearing by himself. Such singular swearing has the force, says Luther, of God’s saying, “I desire so greatly to be believed and long so intensely to have my words trusted that I am not only making a promise but am offering myself as a pledge….If I do not keep my promises, I shall no longer be who I am.” The promise made to Abraham must be fulfilled or God has annihilated himself. That God does not (cannot) annihilate himself is God’s pledge that this promise is not merely something that God has said and now makes good; i.e., as related to the faithfulness of God this promise is integrally related to the being of God. This promise, then, is like no other. For this reason Luther rhapsodizes that by the aforementioned pledge God “enlarges His promise to such an outstanding extent that it surpasses all thinking and faith.” In other words, this promise transcends thought so as to leave us unable to comprehend it, even as the enlarged promise dwarfs our faith. Yet since promise and faith are internally related, an enlarged promise must issue in enlarged faith. For precisely this reason Luther adds, “What could be said or thought that is surer and more powerful for increasing faith?”
With respect to the scope of the blessing spreading out from Abraham, Luther speaks first of David. David apprehends (Psalms 89:35; 132:11) that by God’s oath the promise “has come into my [i.e., David’s] tribe, into my line, person and body….I am he to whom the promise is attached, just as it was attached to the person of Abraham.” In short, David is now the embodiment of the original promise. But then David’s enemies must have been anticipated in Abraham’s enemies and those of Abraham’s immediate descendants. Not unexpectedly, then, Luther comments that regardless of however “powerful and violent” the enemies of Abraham’s descendants might be, victory “will be with the sand and the stars, but especially with the Son.” With the Son? Luther’s final word concerning the scope of the ever-expanding boon could not be stronger: “The blessing promised Abraham is eternal.”
III: Calvin
In his Institutes Calvin admits that Abraham’s trial concerning Isaac is quantitatively different from all tests and afflictions (the greatest of which was childlessness) visited upon Abraham earlier, since “for a son to be slaughtered by his father’s hand surpasses every form of calamity.” All such tests, however, have merely facilitated Abraham’s mortification. Now, however, Abraham is pierced by a wound that is qualitatively different, “a wound far more grievous than death itself.” Here Abraham is tormented not merely at the prospect of bereavement, but rather at a faith-obedience wherein “the whole salvation of the world seemed to be extinguished and to perish.” The exercise of faith issues in “the destruction of faith.” It is little wonder that Abraham finds his “piety” a consuming “distraction.”
Calvin’s reference to “piety” is significant. For him pietas is a noble word and carries none of modernity’s pejorative freight; viz., a saccharine, cloying, ethereal, self-indulgent and meritorious religiosity. Pietas, rather, is “that reverence joined with love of God which the knowledge of his benefits induces.” In his earlier catechism, written more expansively than the compressed Institutes, Calvin had said, “True piety consists rather in a sincere feeling which loves God as Father as much as it fears and reverences Him as Lord, embraces His righteousness, and dreads offending Him worse than death.” Paradoxically it is Abraham’s piety that is now ultimate spiritual threat. To adore God is now one with abhorring him. Previous tests presupposed the veridicality of the promise; this test ensures its cancellation, and with it even the possibility of humankind’s salvation. The cancellation here, moreover, entails an inconsistency in God that renders God thoroughly opaque and therefore utterly untrustworthy. If trusting a treachery “proves” faith, what is the nature of the faith proved thereby? If to exercise faith is to be left with none, and not to exercise faith is to be left with none, then what is meant by “faith?” Lest the reader think that Abraham might be “hearing things” in all of this, Calvin, reading the text with exquisite attentiveness, insists Abraham cannot doubt that God has spoken.
In view of the fact that Calvin is notorious for insisting that word and faith cannot be sundered, he displays his own “distress” when, in the context of proving faith, he speaks uncharacteristically of the “disappearance of the word.” While Calvin everywhere else maintains that the word can no more disappear than God vanish, here he magnifies the uniqueness of Abraham’s test by insisting that God tries Abraham’s faith by drawing Abraham into a contest with God’s own word. Amplifying this, Calvin avers (again uncharacteristically) that “God would shake the faith that Abraham had placed in His word, by a counter-assault of the word itself.” In short, God would test Abraham by juxtaposing word as promise (previously vouchsafed to Abraham) and word as living voice of the One whom Abraham knew with undeniable immediacy, “since all occasion of doubt is removed.”
It is impossible to exaggerate the manner in which Calvin has heightened, in expounding this narrative, the tensions in his own theology. Calvin rigorously maintains that the word alone is the author and object of faith. “Word” and “faith” always imply each other. Any deviation here bespeaks the “fanaticism” of the 16th Century radicals. Since the word is now self-contradicted, no human reasoning can reconcile the immolation of Isaac (word) and the promise concerning his descendants and the salvation of the world. This singular simultaneity of self-contradiction has the force of making “full trial” of Abraham’s faith. Such a trial is “full” not in the sense of “not partial” but rather in the sense of a novum, unprecedented, categorically different from the trials that have tested Abraham and all believers. Whereas temptation to disobey God is normally “shaken off” by recalling and clinging to the promise, such recourse now appears impossible, since “God, in a certain sense, assumes a double character.” While word-quickened faith is kept constant as we “apply all our senses to the word of God”, such application is now useless since the word itself (God himself) has become the problem, God now being two-faced. God’s “forked tongue” can only bespeak a Jekyll-and-Hyde monstrosity. Calvin reminds the reader that when believers are assaulted they are always to arm themselves with the word, “the sword of the Spirit.” Now, however, he asks rhetorically what the predicament of believers must be if God at this moment attacks believers with that weapon wherewith he had previously protected them. While the predicament cannot be untangled at the level of thought, the predicament can still be lived. Abraham, forswearing the futility of immobilizing himself before it or speculating beyond the concrete occurrence of the unmistakable summons, wrestles with the test by faith. In it all he remains the paradigm of the person whose faith keeps him fixed on the immediacy of the command of God. Faith, in moments of dreadful testing, fixes itself to the immediacy of the command, obeying the command while trusting the promise. Calvin exalts the obedience of Abraham by pointing out that while believers of less rigorous faith are prone to be carried off “in whatever direction the breath of a doubtful vision may blow”, Abraham resolutely obeys God when, from a human perspective, he is faced not by a doubtful vision but by undeniable nightmare; and when from a believer’s perspective, he is faced with a command incomprehensible in itself, ruinous for his family, and catastrophic for the wellbeing of the world. As if the “double character” of God were not enough, horrible on account of the confusion it engenders, God appears to gloat in his torturing Abraham by mocking him: God’s requiring Abraham to exercise faith by obeying the command to wield the knife becomes itself the knife that dismembers the promise. As a result Abraham is commanded, as an act of faith, to “cut in pieces the charter of his salvation” — and that of the whole world’s.
Then is Abraham’s faith anything more than irrationality or impulsiveness? Is he merely a self-negating inverted romantic? Little if anything could be said to spare Abraham (and therefore Calvin) this accusation were Genesis 22 the whole history of Abraham’s engagement with God. While the test with Isaac is certainly unparalleled, it is not the only test or the first. In light of Abraham’s decades-long, rich acquaintance with God and his understanding of God arising from this intimacy, Abraham, Calvin insists, concludes, notwithstanding the present crisis, that God “could not be his adversary.” Abraham’s having concluded this much, however, still does not permit him to see “how the contradiction might be removed.” All of this is to say that Abraham, not yet permitted to walk by sight, must continue to walk by faith; he can reconcile promise and command only “by hope.” Again, however, such hope is never wishful thinking; Abraham’s history of “walking” with God saves hope from the charge of irrationality, impulsiveness or romanticism even as it allows Abraham to affirm the fact of such reconciliation, content to leave the manner of it with God.
At this point in his amplification of the narrative Calvin appears to have said as much as he wants or needs to say. Apparently mesmerized by the story, however, and unable to let it go, he circles back relentlessly upon the contradiction between command and promise and all its consequences for a world unaware. Having already told his readers that God has contradicted himself by reason of his word (something Calvin will admit here in light of the intractable text of Genesis 22 yet something he will deny as absurd everywhere else in his theology), Calvin now directs our attention to a similar problem: Isaac is the only pledge of grace. This sole pledge is now to be taken away, leaving — leaving a graceless God? (Again, such an implication occurs nowhere in Calvin outside the Abraham/Isaac story.) Admittedly, in view of the age-facilitated infertility of Abraham and Sarah, the occasion of the conception of Isaac was one of human impossibility. The destruction of the only pledge of God’s grace, however, is the occasion of a divine impossibility, for the pledge and he of whom it is pledge cannot be separated: destruction of the pledge is the self-willed destruction of God. Whereas the promised conception of Isaac had required Abraham to trust God in a way that redounded to Abraham’s praise as well as God’s, now Abraham is to trust God in a situation that renders God, promise, faith and blessing a farrago of inconsistency and incomprehensibility. Still, says Calvin, in all of this there remains the fact of a promise whose meaning is affirmed in the face of what appears to void the promise of meaning. Abraham’s test, Calvin adds laconically, is the prototype of test for every believer: God “reduces all their senses to nothing, that he may lead them to a complete renunciation of themselves.” With self renounced and understanding immobilized, Abraham suspends trying to “measure, by his own understanding, the method of fulfilling the promise.” Instead Abraham relies on the “incomprehensible power of God.” He will cling to the promise of God not only in the face of human impossibility but even divine.
At this point it is important for the reader to understand, in view of what Calvin has said already, that God’s power is “incomprehensible” not in the sense that God is to be counted on for a mighty act whose mightiness is beyond human comprehension; rather, God’s power is “incomprehensible” in that God is to be counted on to resolve his “double character.” He whose nature is mercy now wills the disappearance of his only pledge of mercy (grace.) Since “pledge” and “promise” imply each other, God’s power is “incomprehensible” at present in that the promise is to be vindicated (and Abraham’s faith with it) precisely where promise (and therefore pledge) wills its self-obliteration.
Still mesmerized, Calvin circles back yet again, examining the story from yet another angle of vision. Isaac is the “mirror of eternal life and the pledge of all good things.” “Mirror”, one of Calvin’s commonest metaphors, is never mirror only. When Jesus Christ, for instance, is said to mirror God, Calvin never means that those beholding the Nazarene are given a substance-less reflection. Similarly, when the sacraments are said to mirror Christ, Calvin never suggests that believers receive elements that somehow deceptively depict Christ but are devoid of him. The purpose of a mirror, for Calvin, is to render substance accessible. Then the death of Isaac as “mirror” can only mean the disappearance of eternal life. And since “eternal life” is uniquely the life of God, the death of Isaac entails the death of God. It is this human opacity and divine impossibility, “incomprehensible”, according to Calvin, that God’s power can remedy.
Unable to let the matter go, Calvin returns to it once more, stating that the death of Isaac does not merely wound Abraham’s “paternal heart”; it tramples upon [God’s] own benevolence.” Everywhere in Calvin God’s “benevolence” is his inmost nature turned outward salvifically upon the world. If God’s benevolence has been “trampled” (i.e., pulverized), then God himself has been de-natured.
Still haunted, Calvin comes back to the conundrum, this time stating that Isaac “was not a son of the common order but one in whom the person of the mediator was promised.” Calvin insists in Institutes and Commentaries alike that there is no knowledge of God (i.e., no participation in God’s life) apart from the mediator. Then the death of the person of Isaac plainly implies the non-existence of the mediator. Abraham’s obedience incontrovertibly deprives humankind of its sole saviour and thereby dooms it.
Calvin is so very reluctant to move past the perplexity he needs to point out only once in that he is evidently aware of its inherent shock: the person who embraces all of the foregoing embraces it as an act of faith. Calvin appreciates the correlation between an affirmation of the “incomprehensible” and a risible instance of the ludicrous, for he maintains that Abraham left the servants behind, on his way to Moriah, lest they find him “a delirious and insane old man.” While Calvin is speculating here, the speculation is none the less profound. Abraham is “insane” in that he is about to do what only psychotics do; “delirious” in that Calvin assumes Abraham to be hysterical. Abraham is understandably hysterical, for Isaac’s cry, “My father”, is a “new instrument of torture.”
Like Luther before him, Calvin maintains that Isaac is no infant but rather is middle-aged. Isaac “voluntarily” surrenders himself, and does so, says Calvin, only because he is “acquainted with the divine oracle.” In view of Isaac’s willing collaboration, therein rendering his death self-sacrifice, Isaac is bound not lest he change his mind and bolt at the moment of immolation but rather lest anything extraneous impede his act. Again like Luther before him Calvin states that the sight of Isaac slain would be enough to kill Abraham. In other words, Isaac’s willing submission renders Abraham’s obedience a joint perpetration on the part of father and son, even as it renders father and son joint victims. Abraham’s unalloyed obedience in faith destroys faith, son and Abraham himself. There is no other conclusion. And in view of Calvin’s understanding of the person of God inherent in all the acts of God, the destruction of the promise (act) is also the destruction of the promiser.
As a result of Abraham’s unvarying obedience God has come to know that Abraham fears him. Did God not know as much already in light of earlier tests? Yet as Calvin has averred repeatedly, this test is categorically distinct; this text exposed a “double character” in God and summoned Abraham to obey and trust the God self-exposed as such. Isaac’s release completes and terminates Abraham’s “true trial.” Verus, (“true”) has the force of real, actual, genuine. The concrete actuality of the akedah has become the reality of Abraham’s life, even the reality (albeit hidden) of the world, since the akedah lends the world its unacknowledged but no less real truth and substance: a divine blessing whose ramifications are inestimable.
Yet something can be “estimated”, even counted on: (i) even though Israel’s enemies will overrun her occasionally, Israel’s enemies can never defeat her definitively; (ii) the victory promised to Israel is fulfilled in Jesus Christ and his people “so far as they adhere under one head.” Calvin, it should be noted, adduces both without indicating any inconsistency or even tension in the two-fold outcome. Israel will never be exterminated; neither will the church (Christ and his people.) While Calvin does not develop at this point in his Genesis commentary anything approaching Paul’s treatment of Israel and the church in Romans 9-11, or even his own understanding that Jesus Christ, the one and only mediator, was salvifically present to Israel under the economy of the torah, his unelaborated conclusion to the story that preoccupies Israel to this day (no ram appeared at Auschwitz) is as sobering as it is pregnant.
In his examination of Genesis 22 Calvin says nothing about the relation of Isaac and the church. Yet the reader may legitimately ask after and probe this relationship, for in his exposition of Genesis 21:1 Calvin writes, “in his [Isaac’s] very birth God has set before us a lively picture of the church.” What does Isaac’s birth portend for the church, even as the arm of the sacrificer is stayed, but only at the moment of the church’s unconditional willingness to give itself up to death in demonstration of its trust in the promise? And how firm is the church’s confidence that “God never feeds men with empty promises”?
IV: Kierkegaard
Throughout Fear and Trembling‘s sustained reflection on Abraham Kierkegaard appears always to have two adversaries in mind: philosophical speculation (especially Hegel’s metaphysics) and ethics.
Hegel maintained that Christianity was merely a pictorial representation in concrete, colourful images of a truth that the philosopher could apprehend by means of rising to the standpoint of the Absolute through pure thought. To say this, Kierkegaard knew, is to say that the philosopher can apprehend a supposed higher unity in which God and humankind have been brought together, “God” now being no more than the essence of humankind.
Hegel’s understanding of religion, of course, includes his understanding of faith. And since philosophy “goes further” than religion, philosophy necessarily goes further than faith — only, says Kierkegaard, to turn wine into water. Similarly, a society popularly imbued with Hegel’s dilution is unable to comprehend the significance of Genesis 22 even as it disdains the biblical narrative as no more than “bourgeois philistinism.”
Philosophy, meanwhile, is not aware that it denatures faith, for philosophy insists that it comprehends faith even as it supersedes faith. In all of this theology is seemingly unaware that its mandate is theos, God. Instead theology “sits all rouged and powdered in the window and courts its favours, offers its charms to philosophy.” Theology has prostituted itself to philosophy while preening itself on an intellectual sophistication superior to the crudeness of Abraham and Isaac. After all, “it is supposed to be difficult to understand Hegel, but to understand Abraham is a small matter.” With mordant irony Kierkegaard turns the vocabulary of “further” back upon his opponent: overwhelmed at Abraham, Kierkegaard glories in the fact that in 130 years the patriarch “got no further than faith.” While “got no further” waggishly suggests that Abraham was stalled, Kierkegaard knows that Abraham, not the philosophical speculators, had alone moved on to existence. Existence cannot be gained or entered upon by means of the “thought experiments” of the metaphysicians, but only as the detachment of “worldly understanding” is left behind in favour of radical commitment.
The radical commitment is to God; not the “God” of philosophical constructs but the One who summons every would-be believer to Abrahamic trial. Such trial has nothing to do with the glib summaries of those who “recite the whole story in cliches: ‘The great thing was that he [Abraham] was willing to offer him the best.'” Neither is such trial the facile escape into religious ethereality of those who speak offhandedly of a post mortem resolution to Abraham’s conundrum. The trial, rather, is enduring the contradiction between promise and command. This contradiction is nothing less than “absurd.” As faith paradoxically embraces the absurd (in all of this the “this-worldliness” of Isaac and promised blessing must be kept in mind), faith is vindicated and confirmed not in an ethereal eternal but in the temporal: Isaac, having been given up, is given back in this world. Isaac lives, and the promised blessing is operative in the temporal. For this reason Kierkegaard underscores, for the benefit of philosophers and romantics alike, “Abraham had faith for this life…specifically for this life.” By way of reminder of the link between the absurd and the temporal Kierkegaard adds, “Only he who draws the knife gets Isaac.”
The second major adversary for Kierkegaard is the realm of ethics. Everywhere in this part of Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard relentlessly contrasts the “single individual” (or the “knight of faith”) with the universality of the ethical.
To act ethically is to embody a universal principle. Put more sharply, to act ethically is for the agent to “annul his singularity in order to become the universal.” From an ethical standpoint a father ought always (i.e., universally) to love his son more than he loves himself. For this reason a legitimate ethical protest would be Isaac’s crying out, “Do not do this: you are destroying everything.”
In light of the legitimacy of the ethical protest, why does Abraham set off with fire and knife, one thing only in mind? He does so for God’s sake and for his own sake; i.e., he does it because God has commanded it, and he does it inasmuch as faith exists only as faith is exercised, it being impossible for faith to be “thought” philosophically.
As different as faith and the ethical evidently are, they remain frequently confused. Such confusion is manifest whenever it is argued that since the ethical is universal, the ethical is also divine. The argument here traces duty back to God, since ethical duty (e.g., with respect to neighbour) is “essentially duty to God.” Perceptively Kierkegaard draws our attention to the crucial consideration here: “in the duty itself I do not stand in relation to God.”
Commensurate with the aforementioned contrast Kierkegaard distinguishes the ethical hero from the knight of faith. In giving up himself for the universal the ethical hero enjoys the security of knowing that others understand him and admire him; and if his heroism is tragic too, others will weep over him as well. No one, on the other hand, understands or admires the knight of faith. It would be preposterous to suggest that anyone would weep over Abraham. Instead Abraham can be approached only with a horror religiosus, akin to that with which Israel approached Sinai. At the same time there is a singular privilege vouchsafed to the knight of faith: she alone says “you” to God, whereas the ethical hero, related ultimately to a principle (the ethical universal), merely speaks of God in the third person. This lattermost point is pivotal: in the realm of ethics we do not meet, engage, or contend with the living God himself; we can do no more than speak about him at the level of hearsay.
None of this must be taken to suggest that the ethical is unimportant. Kierkegaard’s point, however, is that since faith alone is “an absolute relation to the absolute”, the single individual determines his relation to the universal by his relation to the absolute, never vice versa. The single individual may be summoned to what ethics forbids (e.g., the slaying of Isaac), but the single individual is never summoned to stop loving. Abraham loved Isaac — or else Isaac’s death was no sacrifice but simply murder — for Abraham was no Cain. Needless to say, however, the loneliness of Abraham (and therefore of any believer) is his inability to make any of this understandable to even one other human being. Since no one can foster the understanding requisite for faith, no believer can help someone else into faith: “either the single individual himself becomes the knight of faith by accepting the paradox or he never becomes one.”
All that Kierkegaard has said to this point about the ethical, the universal, faith, and absolute relation to the absolute yields his notorious assertion concerning the “teleological suspension of the ethical.” With the regularity of a tolling bell Kierkegaard avers throughout the latter half of Fear and Trembling that either there genuinely is such a suspension, either Abraham does exist in an absolute relation (higher than the category of the ethical) to the absolute (God), “or else Abraham is lost.” In light of philosophy’s incomprehension of all that Kierkegaard has said about the suspension, together with the human horror that surrounds the particular absurdity pertaining to Isaac, he does not hesitate to say that not only is Abraham’s life the most paradoxical that can be thought; it is so paradoxical that it cannot be thought. Still, the foregoing must never be regarded as unique to Abraham. He is prototype, to be sure, but as such is always to be imitated by those who have never settled for the cheap edition of him that the church is forever trying to sell. He remains the “guiding star that saves the anguished.”
Kierkegaard repeats several times over that what passes for faith in Christendom in fact is not; viz., “infinite resignation.” Infinite resignation is a movement prior to faith; in fact it is the last stage before faith, but never faith itself. Infinite resignation, it must always be understood, is a movement in thought not in existence. It is born of a concentration of the person in a goal or purpose which integrates that person. Infinite resignation gains the person an eternal consciousness; specifically an eternal consciousness “in blessed harmony with my love for the eternal being.” Kierkegaard’s point (contra Hegel) is that even an eternal consciousness is still only consciousness; it is not yet existence. Faith alone embraces existence, and does so only by means of a “leap.” This leap is always a qualitative transition that nothing can precipitate or effect incrementally. Again, infinite resignation yields peace and rest, the irreducible pain of life being yet the occasion of a peculiar kind of comfort. The pain of existence (i.e., of faith), on the other hand, can never be lessened.
While infinite resignation is the last stage before faith, it is not for that reason to be slighted. Indeed, in infinite resignation we become aware of our eternal validity, without which we could not “grasp the whole temporal realm”, albeit only by virtue of the absurd. Aware of our eternal validity, at the point of infinite resignation we resign the infinite (here I am convinced that Kierkegaard is distancing himself from Hegelian metaphysics with its preoccupation with the infinite as well as from a popular religious romanticism that likes to speak languorously of the infinite); we resign the infinite precisely in order, as knights of faith, to inherit the finite. Finite Isaac, it must be said again, once given up is given back, with untold blessing for a finite world. At the point of infinite resignation we are convinced that the impossible is just that: impossible — and hence the resignation. Faith, on the other hand, moves “beyond” infinite resignation (here Kierkegaard turns Hegel’s vocabulary back on Hegel himself) and “passionately acknowledges” (i.e., endorses or owns) the impossible. The single individual knows that we can be saved only as faith, itself a paradox, grasps the absurd. Such faith is forever the antithesis of the detachment of philosophy and forever the antithesis of the immediacy of the heart’s spontaneous inclination. Such faith is always the paradox of existence.
In light of all that has been said concerning the absurd, paradox, leap and existence, and the fact that the single individual can be neither understood nor admired, Kierkegaard is correct when he contends that the believer is finally a witness, not a teacher. A witness to what? A witness to grace, certainly, and also a witness to faith. For it is the single individual who alone can affirm, in the face of the absurd, Jehovah-Jireh, “God will provide.” And Abraham’s total existence, says Kierkegaard, is gathered up in that one Hebrew word. Existence, contra Hegel, is indeed “beyond” all philosophical thought-experiments.
Kierkegaard’s exclamation remains challenging, profound, and dismaying all at once: “No one is as great as Abraham. Who is able to understand him?”
V: Comment
A
Martin Buber, likely the Jewish thinker of greatest influence on the church in the 20th century, watched with sadness and horror as the best of his philosophy students at Berlin University in the mid-1930s appeared in class wearing swastika armbands. Soon these students were telling Buber that the horizon-filling goal of serving Naziism’s restoration of Germany’s glory was the telos that asked of them the suspension of all ethical considerations. Shortly they were highly-placed officers in the dreaded SS.
While the concept of “the teleological suspension of the ethical” may have much or little credibility in the context of Kierkegaard’s exposition of Abraham’s existence and therein that paradigmatic faith whose nature cannot be subsumed by either metaphysical thought or popular romanticism, in the context of Nazi ideology such a “suspension” has none. Grave danger attends any claim to such a suspension in any context. If a telos can suspend ethics, then the question has to be asked if any telos can suspend any ethical consideration. If not, then there have to be specified both those tele that do effect such a suspension and the reason for the suspension.
Imagine someone announcing in church that she has received a divine summons to slay her offspring. It is inconceivable that fellow-congregants would nod knowingly, all the while telling her they understood why she must proceed and assuring her of their support throughout it. Instead they would insist she undergo psychiatric assessment, thinking her to be psychotic. Now imagine that she submits to such assessment and is shown to be non-psychotic. It is still inconceivable that anyone would agree that, horrific as the deed appears, she must proceed as an act of faith. Most likely assertions would tumble out of many that God does not ask such hideous things of his people. If the woman in question were to reply, “Why not?”, then likely it would be said that God would not or cannot, on the grounds of the character of the God we apprehend through his self-disclosure. Willful slaying of one’s offspring is not the sort of thing that the God known in the church asks of his people, not the sort of thing that can be regarded as bringing honour to him in any way. This being the case, the question must be asked concerning Abraham: why would anyone concur that Abraham was divinely summoned to slay Isaac? If God’s character forbids such today, why would it not have forbidden it then? Conversely, if God’s “voice” rendered sacrifice non-murder then, why would it not do as much today?
A clue to coming to terms with the aforementioned question is suggested by Luther and Calvin in their insightful discussion of the akedah: in view of Isaac’s consensual complicity, the son is as much sacrificer as the father; and in view of the fact that Isaac’s death is tantamount to a fatal knife-thrust in the heart of Abraham, the father is as much the sacrificed as the son. Father and son are one in offering up and in being offered up; father and son are one in their obedience, their suffering and their trust.
I am convinced that a fruitful way ahead, in light of the critical comments adduced already in this section, is to consider the simultaneity of Father and Son with respect to the Atonement, presupposing as it does the homoousion as reflected in the apostolic confession of Jesus Christ and articulated in Athansius’s assertion at the Council of Nicaea. In the context of the Arian heresy, Athanasius insisted, following the apostles, that the Son was of the same nature as the Father, not merely of a similar nature. If Father and Son were merely of a similar nature, then the Father’s appointing the Son to the cross on behalf of humankind would be no more than the Father’s appointing an innocent yet hapless third party to misery in the interests of appeasing a wrath the Son did not share. Yet precisely because Father and Son are of the same nature, same substance, same identity and being, the Son’s free, self-willed identification with sinners is the Father’s; the Son’s sinbearing love is the Father’s; the Son’s cry of dereliction is the Father’s heart-cry of self-alienation for the sake of sinners that demonstrates Father and Son to be one in their judgement of humankind, one in their determination to redeem it, one in their self-identification with it, and one in their pain suffered for its restoration.
The Son’s God-forsakenness (not merely his feeling he was) for the sake of humankind, together with the Father’s self-same “God-forsakenness” means that no human being is — or can be — God-forsaken. Looked at from a different angle, the cross means that that to which God appointed himself at Calvary no human being will be appointed to now: namely, the sacrifice of one’s offspring.
Abraham and Isaac are together a prolepsis of God the Father and Son. The prolepsis, however, having been fulfilled in actuality in the event of Good Friday, is thereafter rendered impossible as prolepsis; i.e., any slaying of one’s offspring could thereafter be regarded as murder only, never as sacrifice. Abraham and Isaac are not an instance, or even the instance, of the “teleological suspension of the ethical.” They are, rather, an instance of the unity of Father and Son in the event of the cross, no subsequent “anticipation” ever being possible in the light of this anticipation’s definitive fulfillment. What Father and Son did in the cross is nothing less than that “one oblation…once offered, a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation and satisfaction, for the sins of the whole world.” Such an act needs no supplementation or duplication; neither does it permit one.
B
The force of Genesis 22:1-19 is that hope alone reconciles promise and command of God. Such hope, however, must always be distinguished from wishful thinking. Wishful thinking is but “dead” hope; “living” hope, on the other hand, is rooted in the event of the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. (1 Peter 1:3) From a biblical perspective, hope is always a future certainty grounded in a present reality. Any lessening of hope as certainty merely denatures “hope” and moves it in the direction of wishful thinking. The resurrection of Jesus Christ is that reality which is ultimately the fulfillment of the promise of Exodus 3:14: “I shall be who I shall be.” In the resurrection of his Son, God definitively resolves any suggestion or imputation of a “double character” (Calvin) in his kingdom-establishing event. The resurrection is that act of God whereby promise and command are reconciled; hope is the human counterpart that finds promise and command reconciled in the believer. Accordingly, the resurrection of Jesus Christ is ultimately the truth and reality that gave Isaac back; hope, that which gave him back to Abraham, the resurrection beings the guarantee of all the promises of God to all believers. Because Jesus Christ has been raised from the dead; because his resurrection and all it implies is the truth of the world (albeit hidden and therefore unacknowledged), as well as the truth of the church (an “open secret” and therefore acknowledged in faith), hope can never finally disappoint God’ s people. The future certainty of what is hoped for pertains to all the promises of God, whether now only partially fulfilled or not yet fulfilled at all. They will be fulfilled, and will be seen to be such.
Instances without end can be recited with respect to promises that appear to remain unfulfilled, as well as of commands that seem to perpetuate the non-fulfillment. One such promise/command appears to be the promise that the powers of death will not prevail against the church (Matt. 10:18), even as the church, defined by the gospel and charged to live by the gospel, must announce Jesus Christ with no little urgency in season and out of season. (2 Tim. 4:2) Related to the command to announce the gospel is the promise that God’s word does not return to him fruitlessly (Isaiah 55:11), as well as (among others) the promise that whoever hears the herald of the Lord hears that selfsame Lord himself. (Luke 10:16)
Yet the command appears to vitiate the promise, as the church dwindles numerically (at least in the west) week by week. The gospel has been promised to be fruitful beyond our imagining, while the command to declare it appears to ensure the church’s fruitlessness. After all, the gospel appears too narrow in an age of inclusiveness, too sharply-defined amidst the blurred vaguenesses of pluralism, too confident of its effectiveness in a time of polite opinions, too real for an era that prefers romanticism, too specific for those who like generalities, too precisely parameterized to suit the taste of those who want no boundaries. It appears that insofar as the church attempts to live by the gospel it will die by the gospel. Then what is the church to do?
Like Abraham of old it can trust God to fulfil promises in ways that the church cannot see at present. It can obey the command of God even though its obedience must render all such fulfillment hope. Or it can second-guess God and attempt to ensure the fulfillment of the promise by “improving” on the command as it resorts to gimmicks, entertainment, sure-fire techniques, agendas that “work” with other institutions and whose “success” the sociologist can explain.
For those who have agonized with Abraham there is only thing to be done: live in hope, confident that hope will see, in God’s own way and in God’s own time, the reconciliation of promise and command.
Victor Shepherd January 2000
The Cross of Christ
(delivered at Knox Presbyterian Church, Toronto, August 2000)
The Cross of Christ
“For I decided to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ and
him crucified.”
1 Corinthians 2:2
“I decided to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ and him crucified”, the apostle Paul wrote to the Christians in Corinth. “I’ve got only one sermon in my briefcase. It’s about the cross. If you don’t like it, too bad, because you won’t hear anything else from me.” Why did he tell them they’d hear about Christ crucified only as long as he had breath? Paul knew how prone the Corinthian Christians were to disdain the cross of Jesus, and having disdained their Lord’s cross to disregard their own cross and instead embrace the “glitzy”, the sensational, the showy, the self-indulgent. He knew that unless they were reacquainted with the cross their faith would erode (since faith is always faith in and faith quickened by the crucified himself). Unless they were reacquainted with the cross their understanding would unravel until it became no more than a caricature of Christian truth. Unless they were reacquainted with the cross their discipleship would cease to be cruciform as cross-bearing was forgotten and self-indulgent ease took over. The Christians in Corinth were undoubtedly Christians; Paul never denied that they were. He was also convinced, however, that their spiritual life had declined and was in danger of sinking even lower. Their faith was at risk; their understanding was at risk; their discipleship was at risk. Only the word of the cross could correct them. Then the word of the cross was the only word they were going to hear from him.
I: — If we are going to understand the cross as it is attested in scripture, then we must begin where scripture begins. Scripture begins with God’s holiness.
God’s holiness is God’s own Godness, that which constitutes him uniquely God. In the first place God is holy in that he is utterly distinct from his creation. God is not to be identified with any part of his creation or any aspect of it.
In the second place God’s holiness means that he can’t be measured or assessed by anything other than himself. God is the absolute standard of himself.
In the third place God’s holiness means that God’s character is without defect or deficiency. God’s character is free from taint of any sort. God’s love is free from sentimentality; God’s anger is free from ill temper; God’s judgement is free from arbitrariness; God’s patience is free from indifference; God’s sovereignty is free from tyranny.
In the fourth place God’s holiness means that all the aspects of God’s character just mentioned are gathered up into a unity. Just as every shade of the spectrum from infrared to ultra-violet is gathered up into what we call “light”, so every dimension of God’s character and God’s transcendence is gathered up into God’s holiness.
God’s holiness is what scripture is actually about from cover to cover. To be sure, scripture is also about the holiness of God’s people, but always about this derivatively, secondarily. Primarily scripture has to do with God’s resolute assertion of his uncompromised holiness.
This lattermost point is important, for in our era the cross isn’t seen to be about God’s holiness. In our era the cross is viewed simply as one more instance of human virtue. The world has never been without its martyrs, for instance, and the cross of Jesus bespeaks his martyrdom. The world has never been without those possessed of the courage of their convictions, and Jesus plainly possessed the courage of his convictions. The world has never been without those victimised by political and religious power brokers, and Jesus is one more victim.
But the apostles never speak like this of the cross of Jesus. John the Baptist was victim; John possessed the courage of his convictions; John was a martyr; yet the apostles never speak of the death of John as they do of the death of Jesus. The cross of Jesus has a force, a significance that the beheading of John doesn’t approach.
What’s more, the cross of Jesus is that one, singular event that looms over everything in scripture. While the public ministry of Jesus lasted up to three years, over 50% of the written gospels concerns one week only (the death-week) of Jesus. The apostles see that the older testament anticipates the cross on page after page, from the story of Abraham and Isaac to the pronouncements of the prophets. They insist, together with Paul, they will preach only “the word of the cross.” They understand the resurrection of Jesus to seal the sacrifice of the cross; they understand the Holy Spirit to vivify the preaching of the cross. Then what it is about the cross that renders it the event in human history, the event in the drama of salvation, the event in the life of God himself apart from which, say the apostles, there is no possibility of life eternal for us?
Here we return to the centrality of God’s holiness. In view of the centrality of God’s holiness, everything about him and us must be understood in terms of his holiness. Sin is our defiance of God’s holiness. God’s anger (his reaction to our sin) is the reaction of his holiness. God’s patience with us is the persistence of his holiness. And his love? God’s love is his holiness refusing to compromise itself even as it refuses to abandon us. If God’s holiness refuses to compromise itself even as it refuses to abandon us, where does it all come to expression? What is the outcome? It all comes to expression in the cross. And the cross, the outcome of it all, is the triumph of God’s holiness.
Let us be sure we understand something crucial. Because God is holy, he is jarred by our sin. Jarred? Sin does more than assault him; sin offends him. He is repulsed by it. He finds it loathsome, so very loathsome, in fact, that he can’t tolerate it. Since there’s no sin apart from sinners, God finds sinners loathsome and can’t tolerate them. Then he has only two choices: either he annihilates sinners, or he remedies their sinfulness. It’s plain that God has chosen not to annihilate sinners (for the time being, at least.)
To be sure, he has every right to annihilate us. For we are ungrateful, defiant, insolent people who owe him our existence and our every blessing, even as we persist in ignoring him, never thinking that our ignoring him is an insult to him as life-giver and a slander upon his goodness.
Our society assumes that to ignore the God whose holiness is his very Godness; our society assumes that to ignore him is merely an option, a preference, a taste. A few people seem to relish “religion”; most do not. But in any case there’s no disputing taste. Fools! To ignore the one to whom we owe our existence and our every blessing is colossal ingratitude, inexcusable ingratitude, as offensive as it is unreasonable. Such ingratitude, however, is never mere ingratitude; it is also contempt. Yet our contempt of God is also folly for us. To perpetuate such folly when God sustains us moment-by-moment, and sustains us despite our folly; this is more than folly; this is folly-induced blindness. In view of our ingratitude, insolence and self-willed blindness it shouldn’t surprise us that God finds us loathsome. Anything else would mean that his holiness had disappeared; which is to say, that he himself had ceased to be God.
Revulsion, we should note in this context, is an affective reaction to human sin: it’s how God feels about us. Anger, on the other hand, is a volitional response to sin: it’s what God does about us. What does he do? He debars us; he denies us access to him. He can’t pretend that we are glad, grateful, obedient sons and daughters when we aren’t. He can’t pretend that we are fit to enjoy his presence when we are no more fit for him than the tone-deaf person is fit to enjoy a concert or the person whose voice resembles a dial-tone is fit to be an opera singer. God’s holiness has brought us to this point: either in his holiness he has to banish us or he has to remedy us.
Because God’s love is holy love he is going to provide what the apostle John calls “the remedy for the defilement of our sin.” To say that God’s love is holy is to say that his love is neither sentimental nor petulant. Because his love isn’t sentimental his love won’t let us off; yet also because his love isn’t petulant his love won’t let us go. In other words, not only is God’s love righteous, it is also resolute. His holy love will provide the remedy for the defilement of our sin.
The reason that the cross dominates all of scripture is that in the cross God’s holy love absorbs his holy anger and his holy revulsion. In the cross the judgement of the holy God is enacted and displayed. In the cross of Jesus the judgement of the holy God is borne by the Son of God — which is to say, borne by the Father himself, for Father and Son are one in nature, one in judgement, one in the execution of that judgement, and one in its absorption. The cross is the triumph of God’s holiness in that God’s relentless opposition to sinners and his unending love for them; his revulsion before sinners and his patience with them; his authority over sinners and his self-willed humiliation beneath them; all of this is concentrated in the cross and finds pin-point expression there.
I have said that in the cross the judgement of God is seen to be operative: his face is set against sin, and sin must issue in alienation from him. Were there no judgement upon sin, God would cease to be holy. Were God to remain unaffected by our sin; were God to be aware of our sin but indifferent concerning it; were God to know of our sin yet not react to it, all the while remaining stolidly impassive, he would be possessed of the grossest character defect. Our sin provokes God’s wrath. His wrath in turn mobilises his judgement. Then in the face of our sin there has to be anger-fuelled judgement.
Yet if there were judgement only, the wrath of God would be fulfilled but the purpose of God would be frustrated, for now God would have given up that for which he made us in the first place, people dear to him who live for the praise of his glory. In the cross, however, God honours all that his holiness entails even as he fulfils his purpose in fashioning holy people who love him, obey him, serve him and lend glory to his name.
I am a clergyman in The United Church of Canada. Which is to say, I serve in a denomination whose moderator, Rev. William Phipps, has denied the fact and significance of the incarnation not once but many times, not inadvertently but knowingly, not in isolation but supported in his denial by officials and dignitaries throughout the denomination. What Phipps and his supporters appear not to understand is this: the incarnation is essential to the cross, to the atonement. We can be made “at one” with God only as God the judge does two things: one, as God the judge exercises his judgement on sin and the penalty (alienation from him) is enforced; two, as God the judge absorbs that judgement in himself. Without the first, God’s character would degenerate and he would cease to be holy; without the second, God would remain holy but our predicament would remain hopeless. God can condemn sin and absorb that condemnation himself only if the human bearer of that judgement is also the divine bearer. Apart from the incarnation the cross is nothing less than monumental injustice: Jesus is punished undeservingly by a God who is simply unfair. Apart from the incarnation the cross has nothing more to do with our destiny and our future than has the death of John the Baptist. In the light of the incarnation, however, the just judge whose holiness will not permit him to wink at sin is also the loving father whose absorbing his judgement in himself creates a future and a hope we should otherwise never have. This is the point Phipps never gets.
In the cross God’s judgement is unmitigated, as our Lord’s cry of dereliction makes plain. In the cross too God’s love is undiminished, for how much more could he love us than to submit himself to humiliation, torment, and self-alienation in the Son?
To deny the incarnation isn’t to get rid of excess baggage, an intellectual encumbrance in the 20th century. To deny the incarnation, rather, is to cut the nerve of faith, for the only God there is to believe in is the one whose holiness can’t be compromised; and the only future we sinners can have depends on the God who in the Son incarnate bore his own judgement on us and bore it away. No incarnation, no atonement; no atonement, nothing but condemnation for humankind without hope of reprieve.
The atonement, the cross, is the triumph of God’s holiness in the face of human sin as God’s character is unimpugned and his truth is unaltered and yet his purpose is fulfilled and his people are recovered to be and remain the apple of his eye.
In biblical Hebrew there is no word for “doubt.” There is no word for “doubt” just because God’s inescapable holy presence, charged with his power and purpose, renders doubt groundless. In Hebrew thought God is the omnipresent, inescapable, immeasurably weighty reality. Doubt here, however understandable in terms of human psychology, is in reality as unsubstantial, groundless, as doubt of the presence of air, doubt of the fact and significance of breathing, when all the while the “doubter”, so called, is breathing air. While there is no word in biblical Hebrew for “doubt” there are, however, many words in biblical Hebrew for “wonder.” There are many words for “wonder” just because God’s inescapable holy presence, charged with his power and purpose, calls forth no end of wonder.
We hear such adoring wonder in the hymn, “How Great Thou Art”:
And when I think
That God, his Son not sparing,
Sent him to die,
I scarce can take it in.
And in a hymn older still Isaac Watts exclaims, “When I survey the wondrous cross” only to conclude,
Love so amazing, so divine,
Demands my soul, my life, my all.
God’s holy love is brought to effectual focus in the cross. The cross in turn is the triumph of God’s holy love over sin and ingratitude and unbelief. Then the one thing we must do is suspend our unbelief. We should suspend our unbelief, especially since unbelief is as groundless, as unsubstantial, as the psychotic person’s raving about an imaginary world that doesn’t exist. More to the point, we should suspend our unbelief since God hasn’t suspended his mercy but rather prolongs the day of grace.
Faith is our grateful surrender to God’s holiness, therein to be rendered holy ourselves and made fit to glorify him and enjoy him forever.
II: — Yet it isn’t enough to be possessed of that faith which glorifies him and enjoys him. Faith always seeks understanding, and therefore we who are the beneficiaries of the cross must have our understanding refined in the crucible of the cross, for then our understanding will be purified as dross is melted out and discarded.
Think, for instance, of how we understand power. In my 1st year SystematicTheology class I always ask the students about the Christian meaning of such words as “power” or “almighty” or “sovereignty.” I always ask the students, “In Calvin’s Institutes, the 2000-page magnum opus that is Calvin’s single largest work, how many times does the expression ‘the sovereignty of God’ occur?” The answer is “none.” Nowhere in the Institutes does Calvin speak of God “the sovereignty of God.” Since the post-Calvin Calvinist tradition has virtually identified Calvin with this expression, the fact that he doesn’t use the expression ought to make those of us who love him pause and think.
Now I am not denying that Calvin believed in the sovereignty of God. Of course he did, as all Christians do. The crucial point here, rather, is what is meant by God’s sovereignty? How is that sovereignty exercised? Next I tell my students that since the cross dominates scripture, we must understand sovereignty in the light of the cross.
Now to be sure the cross means ever so much. (Part of the meaning of the cross we have already examined tonight.) Yet it can never be denied that the cross means too that there is no limit to God’s vulnerability. God’s wrestling with Israel throughout Israel’s history highlighted God’s vulnerability again and again. God is Israel’s creator and sustainer yet is treated as if he were an intruder. God is Israel’s judge yet is mirthfully dismissed. God is Israel’s lover yet his love is thrown back in his face, wrapped in insult and ingratitude. God stands by Israel when Israel is assaulted, yet Israel doesn’t stand by God when God is affronted. The history of God’s engagement with Israel is God’s self-exposure to contempt and ridicule and abandonment. Yet in all of this God’s vulnerability hasn’t reached its zenith. His vulnerability will expose him ultimately to a cross. The cross means there is no limit to God’s vulnerability.
And the resurrection? The resurrection means there is no limit to the effectiveness of God’s vulnerability. (And here is where I pick up again those 1st year students who had given up on me, thinking, no doubt, that their beloved professor of theology didn’t believe in God’s sovereignty.) God’s sovereignty is the triumph of his vulnerability. God’s sovereignty is his vulnerability rendered everywhere victorious.
We must never think that because God has given himself into the hands of evil men and women he has given himself over to them. We must never think that because God is willing to suffer for those he loves, and suffer immeasurably, God is therefore useless. On the contrary, just because his suffering is effective his suffering can save us.
Most Christians, I have found, look upon the cross as an episode in Christ’s life, an episode he put behind him in much the same way that he put his infancy behind him and then his childhood and then his adolescence. His public ministry, another episode, was unfolding (not without difficulty) when one day (a Friday, it so happened) he had a bad day, a really bad day, the worst day he’d ever had. But never mind, he got over it as Easter Sunday followed; things have been looking up ever since.
But the cross of Christ isn’t an episode in his life. It isn’t a bad day that he put behind him as things took a turn for the better. Let us never forget that the crucified one is raised wounded. Our Lord is not raised healed; he is raised wounded. Let us never forget that the ascended Christ suffers yet. Scripture is perfectly clear on this matter. The hymn writer knew whereof he spoke when he wrote, “Rich wounds, yet visible above.”
Since the ascended, glorified, omnipotent Lord suffers yet, it’s plain that his rulership of the cosmos is a rule he exercises from the throne of his cross.
No one grasped all of this better than Martin Luther. Over and over in his writings Luther speaks of the “theology of the cross”, theologia crucis.
When the world beholds the crucified it sees only shame. The apostle John, however, rightly discerned the cross to be the “hour” of Christ’s glory.
The world sees the cross as weakness so weak it couldn’t be weaker. The apostle Paul, however, knew the cross to be God’s strength, a strength so effective it couldn’t be stronger.
The world sees the cross as nothing more than folly. (Imagine the folly of someone who identifies himself so thoroughly with condemned men and women that their condemnation spills over onto him.) Yet the church knows the cross to be that wisdom of God which only the Spirit-illumined can recognize as wisdom.
The world sees the cross as that hideous moment when death gloats. Disciples know that the cross yields life, life eternal.
Luther knew that the cross is the crucible of all Christian understanding. For this reason Luther knew that in the crucible of the cross the world’s understanding is transmogrified as the resurrection renders the cross victorious and therein renders Christian understanding truth.
Luther knew that while the world regards the cross as proof of God’s uselessness, the cross in fact is the venue not only of God’s mightiest work but also of his characteristic work.
III: — Did I say “characteristic work?” I did. But if the cross is where God acts most effectively because most characteristically, then our discipleship is characteristically Christian and therefore effective only if it is cruciform. Then vulnerability for the sake of Christ’s kingdom has to characterise our discipleship. And such vulnerability will always be invigorated with the selfsame resurrection that rendered our Lord’s vulnerability victorious.
I want you to form in your mind’s eye the following picture of an old man.
He is age 81.
He has been trudging from door to door for four consecutive days, begging money.
It is wintertime, and as he tells us himself, his feet have been immersed from morning
to night in ice-cold slush.
He stops begging at the end of the fourth day inasmuch as he has been overtaken by
what he calls a “violent flux.” (Today we should say “uncontrollable diarrhoea.”)
By this time he has garnered 200 pounds wherewith to purchase food, clothing and
coal for poor people who are very dear to him.
He is not a stupid man. In fact he has written 35 tomes, including a textbook on logic.
Let me say it again: he is not a stupid man. In addition to his native English he knows
thoroughly eight other languages: Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, German, Dutch,
Italian, and Spanish. In fact he knows these eight languages so very thoroughly that
he has written a grammar in seven of them. He reads comfortably in more languages
than Luther, Calvin, Jonathan Edwards, Joseph Butler or Immanuel Kant. Still, in his
transparent humility he will undergo any humiliation and endure any suffering for
the sake of a cruciform ministry modelled after the cruciform ministry of his Lord.
His name is John Wesley.
Discipleship is always cruciform. Take the simple matter of forgiveness. It is a simple matter. Simple, I said; I didn’t say easy. Forgiveness is never easy. Is a cross ever easy? Remember, what we forgive is precisely what can never be excused. Most people confuse these two matters. Most people, I have found, assume that to forgive is to find an excuse for something or accept an excuse for something. In any case, they think that to forgive is to excuse. But in fact forgiving and excusing are mutually exclusive. We excuse the excusable. We forgive, on the other hand, what is inexcusable, utterly inexcusable. We forgive precisely what can never be excused. It can only be forgiven. But will it be forgiven? Only those people forgive who have been seared and stamped with the cross. Forgiveness entails vulnerability before an offender when this offender has wounded us more than she will ever know.
All discipleship is cruciform. All Christian service is cruciform. I was a pastor for 30 years. I know how difficult, understandably difficult, it is to have people commit themselves to arduous tasks of major inconvenience over a long time. Long before I became a pastor I learned that my late father, during the 11 years our family lived in Edmonton (where I was born); my late father visited Fort Saskatchewan Penitentiary every Sunday afternoon for 11 years. As soon as we moved to Winnipeg my father began spending Sunday afternoons (he was in his own church Sunday morning and evening) at the Stony Mountain Penitentiary. He visited penitentiaries weekly to befriend and conduct worship for convicts who were as dear to him as the poor were to Wesley.
Let’s come back to Luther. Luther said that the Christian never lives in himself. The Christian lives in another. He lives in Christ by faith, and he lives in the neighbour by love. Living in the neighbour by love: what does this entail? How much love is love? What does it cost?
In the first place, said Luther, we live in our neighbour by sharing her need. This is not especially difficult. Out of our abundance we share our goods with our neighbour in her scarcity.
In the second place we live in our neighbour by sharing her suffering. This is considerably more difficult, since proximity to another person’s pain is itself painful for us. (Here love has been “notched up”, as we like to say today.) At the same time, we feel rather good about sharing our neighbour’s suffering because we feel somewhat heroic, virtuous; we feel even better if we are recognized and commended for this.
The cost of love can be “notched up” still more, we should note soberly. In the third place, said Luther, we live in our neighbour by sharing her disgrace. Now no one commends us for it. In fact people despise us for it. They whisper that we’ve compromised our standards. They wag their heads all-knowingly and repeat the supposed, self-evident truth that those who lie down with dogs get up with fleas. They remind us that you can always tell a person by the company she keeps.
Have they lost sight of the one who was numbered among the transgressors? Yes, they have. Was he a transgressor himself? No, he was not. He who knew no sin was made to be sin in order that inexcusable sinners like you and me yet might be forgiven and therein be rendered the righteousness of God.
But those people of shrivelled heart and acidulated spirit; they don’t grasp the logic of a love that finds us living not in ourselves but in the neighbour for the sake of the neighbour. Not grasping the nature of such a love, they also fail to grasp the cost of a love that becomes ever costlier as we move from sharing the neighbour’s need to sharing her suffering to sharing her disgrace.
All discipleship is cruciform.
IV: — The apostle Paul told the Corinthian Christians that the one sermon they were going to hear from him concerned Jesus Christ crucified. Just because the cross — sin-absorbing mercy — preoccupies prophet and apostle alike, the cross must preoccupy us as well.
For the cross is that event in which the holiness of God is recognized even as the wrath of God is averted and the love of God is visited upon disobedient men and women.
The cross is the crucible in which our understanding is transmogrified so as to reflect the truth and reality of him who acts most effectively and most characteristically precisely where he is most derided as useless.
The cross is the pattern of our discipleship, for no servant is ever going to be greater than his master, just as no one who now bears her own cross in the light of the master’s will ever fail to be crowned.
The cross is, and ever will be, that act of God whereby his holiness remains uncompromised and his love unimpeded, as holy love fashions
a people that is the apple of his eye,
a people that lives for the praise of his glory,
a people that reflects his goodness.
This people, as stark as it is strong, is a city set on a hill. It may be harangued; it may be harried; it may be harassed; but in any case it can never be hid.
Victor Shepherd August 2000
The Origins of the Operative Theology of The United Church of Canada
published in Theological Digest & Outlook (Burlington, March 2000)
How Did We Get Here?
or
The Origins of the Operative Theology of The United Church of Canada
I
In 1990 Bishop Donald Bastian of the Free Methodist Church in Canada gave me a copy of Rev. Wayne Kleinsteuber’s book, published in 1984, More than a Memory: The Renewal of Methodism in Canada. In the course of reading the book with relish and profit I was startled to find myself quoted in the text. I had no recollection of saying what was imputed to me. When I checked the endnotes, however, and saw the reference to the CMHS meeting of 1978, I recognized immediately the context and content of my assertion.
In the “question and answer” period following my CMHS address in 1978 I had been asked, “Which has had the greater influence in the theological formation of The United Church of Canada: the Calvinist tradition or the Wesleyan?” And I had responded, without reflection or hesitation, “Neither. Schleiermacher, the German romantic liberal, has been the determining influence…..”
I was reading in 1990 a book published in 1984 that quoted my comment from 1978. In 1978 several developments that continue to haunt the United Church had not occurred: the publication of In God’s Image (1980), the distribution of Sexual Orientations, Lifestyles and Ministry (1988), the decisions of the General Council later in 1988, the adoption of Membership, Ministry and Human Sexuality (1990). These pronouncements and promulgations reflected the United Church’s theological understanding underlying its statements concerning sexual conduct deemed to conform to a profession of faith. The theology of John Wesley was evident in none of this. Apart from Wesley’s doctrinal standards (the Sermons, Articles of Religion, and Notes on the New Testament), one would need to read only the single largest tract Wesley penned, that concerning original sin, to see that a chasm loomed between his theological tenor and that of United Church documents and developments.
Once the denomination’s highest court had rendered the “sexual revolution” denominational policy, other theological pronouncements followed, all of which were similarly remote from anything Wesley would have owned. I speak now of Membership, Ministry and Human Sexuality (1988), The Authority and Interpretation of Scripture (1992) (where the most that could be said of Jesus is that he is “mentor and friend”), Mending the World (1997), Voices United: The Hymn and Worship Book of The United Church of Canada (1996), Renewed Understanding of Ecumenism (1995), and not least the response of the executive of General Council to Moderator Phipps’ interview with the Ottawa Citizen (1997). When Phipps publicly announced, defended, and was supported officially in a Christology that was manifestly non-apostolic, and when Phipps’ declaration and defense were located in a succession spanning the last two decades, it could only be concluded that liberal theology of the late 18th century and the entire 19th century had become the operative theology of the denomination.
I am not pretending that liberal theology is monochrome. Undeniably there are significant differences in the work of Ritschl, Harnack, and Troeltsch. None the less, in many respects they all stand on the shoulders of Schleiermacher. The lattermost thinker is the progenitor of the theological movement.
Can my thesis (that Schleiermacher is the inspiration of the operative theology of the United Church) be supported? The thesis can be tested only as Schleiermacher himself is examined.
II
Early in his adult life Schleiermacher (1768–1834) became aware of the contempt that cultured (but not necessarily snobbish) people poured on the contemporary articulations of the Christian faith. He insisted that these people were held off faith not because of the offense of the gospel but rather because of the offensiveness of its current, less-than-sophisticated expression. Knowing that these people were part of that world which “God so loves”, he maintained that the church, and especially its theological spokespersons, were to love them no less. To love them meant at least to take seriously the reason they found faith repugnant (S. said it was merely the crude way faith was voiced that these people found unacceptable), and to address their objections sincerely.
Moreover, S. knew that the Christian mission is never served by the church’s deliberately refusing to relate the gospel to human reflection at its profoundest and human achievement at its loftiest. Here he could only recall God’s word to Jeremiah millennia earlier, “Seek the welfare of the city [i.e., Babylon, the place of exile where Israel was thoroughly despised], for in its welfare you will find your welfare.” (Jeremiah 29:7) The church is never to huddle inwardly in attempted self-survival; it must always face outwardly, forever wrestling with the connection between the substance of the gospel and the thought-forms of the culture. To fear for the gospel in its engagement with society is only to declare one’s lack of confidence in the gospel’s inherent integrity and vitality and militancy. In a word, not to adapt “the faith once for all delivered to the saints” (Jude 3) to modernity is to render the church and its proclamation museum pieces that nostalgically recall a bygone era but lack all relevance to the world around us.
Schleiermacher was born in Breslau, Germany, where he was schooled at the hands of Moravian Pietists. S.’s philosophical brilliance, however, soon transgressed the intellectual boundaries of the Pietists, and he found himself studying modern philosophy and classical Greek at the University of Halle. Here he supported himself by tutoring aristocratic families who in turn exposed him to the higher reaches of German culture, his exposure issuing in his epoch-making Addresses on Religion to it Cultured Despisers. At the University of Berlin he taught several hours per week in every subject of the theology curriculum (apart from the Older Testament), published volume after volume, and never skimped on the preparation for his weekly sermon. He remained a much-loved pastor at the same time that his intellectual gifts found him appointed to the highest echelons of the Academy of Berlin. His misshapen body, ill health and near-chronic pain never found him bitter or resentful.
From 1880 to 1930 S. was studied more than any other theologian in Europe (Luther excepted.) His thinking dominated the church in the 19th century and continues to dominate most of it in the 20th.
Schleiermacher begins his theology by identifying the nature of religion. Religion isn’t morality. (People can be moral without being religious. Furthermore, the truly free person doesn’t submit to an external moral law.) Neither is religion the rational apprehension of doctrine. (People can finesse doctrine yet remain unacquainted with God.) Neither is religion philosophical insight. The seat of religion is neither the will (as with moralists) nor reason (as with philosophers) but feeling. The religious consciousness is the “feeling of absolute dependence.” Did S. mean “the feeling of absolute dependence upon the Absolute“? Alas, he never resolves the ambiguity that surrounds him here, often speaking of “God” and “nature” interchangeably. Pantheism (the notion that God is the essence of everything) or panentheism (the notion that the essence of everything includes God) haunts S.’s theology throughout. Since religion consists in the feeling of absolute dependence, doctrine is virtually insignificant. S. assigns no weight to any statement we formulate concerning God. We can merely represent God to ourselves pictorially, imagistically, as shepherd, king, father, etc., without every saying something true of God himself.
Not surprisingly, S. everywhere reinterprets Christian vocabulary, with the result that biblical distinctiveness is forfeited and the substance of the faith evaporates. While S. retains the word “redemption”, for instance, his doing so appears pointless (even misleading) when his understanding of “sin” bears virtually no resemblance to what prophets and apostles and the church have always understood.
In the same way all the major building blocks of the Christian faith are recast. Convinced that the particularity of Jesus’ Jewish background is simply something that the “universal” Jesus must repudiate (and no doubt aware too of virulent anti-Semitism in Berlin), S. denies that Jesus is the Messiah of Israel. His denial of Jesus’ messiahship is matched by his silence concerning the Incarnation. Instead of the Incarnate “God-with-us”, Jesus happens to one who possesses intensified God-consciousness. To be sure, all humans possess it in some degree; Jesus, however, more than anyone else. Jesus’ mission is to stimulate our God-consciousness until it becomes the determining influence in our life. Whereas the apostles everywhere confess Jesus of Nazareth to be the Son of God, and are careful to distinguish the Son as begotten from sons and daughters who are made such by faith, S. is content to speak of Jesus as quantitatively superior in terms of God-consciousness.
Insisting on the feeling of absolute dependence (God-consciousness) as the focus and origin of all theological expression, S. draws attention to the fact that no reflection upon religious awareness yields anything remotely resembling the church’s historic statements concerning the Trinity. The Trinity too is an instance of antiquated theological “baggage” that now understandably occasions the contempt of the cultured. Then the Trinity must be jettisoned. (Needless to say, as soon as S. forfeits the doctrine he forfeits what the doctrine always preserves; namely, the bedrock truth that what God is in himself eternally he is toward us, and what God is toward us he is in himself eternally.)
Since Incarnation is the presupposition of atonement, pivotal distortion in the former can be expected to garble the latter. S. omits any understanding of atonement as God’s making “at one” with himself those who are unable to “rightwise” their relationship with God. Reconciliation with God isn’t primarily wrought by God and owned by believers in faith. Rather, it’s something we effect as our God-consciousness frees us from self-rejection. Where scripture speaks of propitiation and expiation, the averting of God’s wrath and the sacrifice which effects this, S. says nothing. His silence here is one with his silence on other matters that loom so very large in the bible: the forgiveness of sins or justification. S. never acknowledges that sinful men and women are exposed to the judgement and condemnation of God.
In view of the fact that S. has set aside as non-essential all the historically-affirmed building blocks of the Christian faith (the election of Israel, the Incarnation of Israel’s greater Son, and the Incarnation’s raison d’etre, Christ’s atoning death — the cross being the one “word” that the apostles insist gathers up all that God as ever said or will ever say) we can only ask where S. appears to have set out on the wrong path. Most elementally he went wrong when he set aside the Older Testament. (Recall he taught every subject except the Older Testament.) This omission was his Achilles’ heel. When he denied that Jesus is the fulfillment of God’s promises to Israel; when he denied that Jesus’ relationship to Israel’s scriptures differs in any way from Jesus’ relationship to pagan religion; when he insisted that Jesus even contradicts the Hebrew bible (since the Hebrew bible is essentially legalistic(!) while Jesus is not), modern theology was undone.
The Hebrew bible provides the unsubstitutable grammar and logic of faith in Jesus Christ. Whenever it is rejected the Newer Testament is invariably skewed to the point of being falsified. Whenever the Newer is read without the Older, the Newer becomes merely a collection of moralistic teachings (the teacher himself rendered superfluous as soon as his teachings are appropriated), or merely the depiction of a model to be imitated (imitation of the person now superseding the claim of his teachings), or merely a popularized, pictorialized illustration of existential philosophy.
S. enormously undervalues the significance of the sole physical description we have of Jesus: he was circumcized. For the apostles, plainly, it’s crucial for Christian faith that Jesus is a son of Israel. For S., however, the Jewish provenance of Jesus is an impediment to the faith of us Gentiles — and therefore must be erased. The resulting de-judaized Jesus isn’t the fulfillment of God’s centuries-long struggle with Israel. This “universal” figure is now “ideal manhood (sic) achieving itself under the conditions of history.” Religious reality isn’t the result of God’s incursion in Israel; instead it’s the product of human achievement, world history ultimately generating Jesus’ God-consciousness.
Everything in S.’s theology, every aberration in 20th century liberal theology, unravels from this point. According to scripture faith in God begins (and continues) with the fear of God — fear of the One who transcends his creation and is never to be identified with it, whether in whole or in part, or be viewed as an extension of it. S., however, illogically makes his understanding of the creation (specifically, of the contents of humankind’s consciousness) the “whence” and “whither” of his understanding of God. (Here he anticipates the “creation spirituality of the 1980s.) S.’s anthropology everywhere controls his understanding of God (so-called.) He could have avoided the disaster that overtook his theology (even as he never perceived it) if he had begun with theoanthropology, the Incarnation. If he’d begun with a full-orbed Christology he would have found himself emerging amidst the riches of the 16th Century Protestant Reformers, for whom theology ultimately is Christology — as it is in scripture. When he began, however, with anthropology alone (albeit anthropology of religion), he couldn’t avoid the abyss into which he fell, taking all of 19th and most of 20th Century Protestant theology with him. Man, even man at his noblest, is simply not the measure of God.
Victimized by his failure to grasp the Holy One of Israel’s uncompromised “Otherness”, S. appeared to confuse God with nature or at least with some aspect of nature. Not surprisingly, S. characteristically confused an experience of the admittedly awe-full, mysterious depths of the creation with an experience of the mystery of God. “God” was simply the exclamation of someone moved by the creation’s inherent beauty and depth. The confusion, while easy to make and easy to understand, wasn’t thereby rendered any less idolatrous.
S.’s misunderstanding with respect to the creature leads to his misunderstanding with respect to sin. For him sin appears to be the arrears or residue of biological primitivism. He maintains (correctly) that God ordains the conditions of human existence; he goes on to say (incorrectly) that sin arises from these conditions. Plainly he’s confused sin with creatureliness, depravity with finitude. To be sure, creatureliness is the human condition (we aren’t divine), but the human condition as created, not as fallen. Moreover, it’s human creatureliness that God fashions uniquely for dialogical partnership with him. (In scripture God clearly loves all his creatures but he speaks only to men and women. His speaking to us renders us “response-able” and therefore “response-ible.”) Sin doesn’t arise from this! S. fails to grasp the essence of sin. It’s not a carryover from biological primitivism; rather it’s disdainful, disobedient rebellion against and perverse defiance of the One to whom we owe everything. With sad but appropriate consistency S. never deploys the appropriate (biblical) categories for discussing the remedy for sin: reconciliation rooted in atonement and issuing in regeneration.
Displaying his era’s the immense confidence in the outcome of historical processes, S. regarded process as progress. And just as obviously the Hebrew mind doesn’t. S. denied that Jesus is the Son of God Incarnate according to the purpose and act of God, and affirmed instead that Jesus is someone whom history inexplicably spawned as extraordinarily God-conscious. His affirmation concerning historical processes contradicts the logic of scripture. Biblical thought, illuming this point through the Virgin Birth, insists that history cannot generate the redeemer of history. History’s redeemer must be given to it. History’s prideful insistence that it can redeem itself is reduced to absurdity by history’s oft-repeated horrors, as the genocides of our era alone attest.
Perhaps the nature of S.’s theology is most evident in his discussion of doctrine. He maintains that doctrine says nothing about God; doctrine merely reflects an aspect of human consciousness. For this reason he can say virtually nothing about truth. In scripture “truth” is used as a synonym for “reality”, and also as a predicate of statements that express this reality. Doctrine, then, is the articulation of the truth of God on the part of those who have been included, by God’s grace, in God’s self-knowing. Doctrine is the human expression of the truth of God vouchsafed to believers through God’s self-disclosure. Since it’s a human expression, any doctrinal expression is provisional; there’s no formulation concerning the being or activity of God that is beyond re-articulation. To say this, however, isn’t to say that all such formulation is dispensable with respect to the church’s life and mission. Neither is it to say that all such formulation is presumptuous. S. appears to have thought that either doctrinal statements are purely speculative (guesswork) or such statements presumptuously and prematurely (even preposterously) claim to comprehend God, humans taking it upon themselves to speak “the last word” about God. He appears not to have understood that doctrinal statements are the grace-wrought apprehension of God. Believers are admitted, by God’s grace, to a genuine knowledge of God without claiming an exhaustive knowledge of the One whose depths can never finally be plumbed. While it’s plain that knowledge of God born of an encounter with him can never be reduced to any statement about God, it’s also plain that the truth of God and faith in him can never be commended as true (i.e., real) apart from such statements. S.’s failure here meant he could never commend Jesus Christ as truth; S. could only attempt to foster the emergence of a God-consciousness that he assumed somehow to be contagious.
Yet even the crux of S.’s approach overlooked a simple point. Since nothing can be articulated of God himself, said S., and since what is commonly affirmed to be the Holy One of Israel is no more than religious primitivism that cultured people rightly despise, exactly who is the “God” of whom we are supposed to be conscious? of whom Jesus was conscious? It can’t be the God of whom the prophets spoke and whose Son the apostles recognize Jesus to be. Then “God-consciousness” is a vacuous term.
S.’s approach to doctrine (at best, undervaluation; at worst, out-and-out dismissal) continues to characterize much liberal theology, while the vacuity of his major item appears undetected.
S.’s attempt at “adapting” was commendable; his unwitting move from adapting to adopting, however, was fatal. For in adopting the assumptions of the world he de-natured the gospel, turning wine into water, when all the while water can be found everywhere and wine nowhere. Here the gospel was reduced to little more than a mirror reflecting the world’s self-understanding back to the world, even as the world’s aching spiritual need remains unaddressed because unnoticed. In moving from a commendable “adapt” to a fatal “adopt”, S. ultimately confused the offensiveness of a less-than-cultured expression of the Christian faith with the irremovable offense of the gospel itself. S. assumed the truth of the world’s postulates. Liberalism always does. These postulates are (a) the world has an accurate and adequate understanding of its own condition, (b) this condition, while perhaps needing adjustment or even correction here and there, isn’t grievous, let alone both grievous and blind, (c) if the gospel is to be heard, the church must fit its proclamation to the world’s self-understanding.
Surely the horrors of our century alone have exposed the liberal theology of the last two centuries to be intellectually shallow and substantively dilute. Then why does it continue? Why is some variant of it still the dominant theological ethos of mainline North American churches and seminaries? The reason is, liberal theology doesn’t challenge the assumption that the world has access to the ultimate truth about itself. It doesn’t question the facile confidence that the eyes through which the world sees itself have no need of corrective lenses. It doesn’t show that the presuppositions of the world contradict those of the kingdom of God. It doesn’t highlight the truth that morality and religiosity (and much “spirituality” today) are neither the same as the kingdom and therefore the solution to the world’s ills, nor even the vestibule to the kingdom. Rather they are monuments to humankind’s defiance of God and barricades behind which it attempts to hide from God. It leaves unchallenged the biblical conviction that the worst consequence of sinnership is blindness to one’s sinnership, and in the wake of such ignorance of one’s sinnership, further immersion in it.
The most chilling aspect of S.’s theology, and that of the theology of his offspring, is this: S.’s God doesn’t so transcend the world as to be able to visit it with mercy. Chilling or not, this aspect of his theology only magnifies the tenacity of those for whose theology mercy would be but an alien category. Liberal theology dominates the ecclesiastical landscape in that the majority of humankind, including the church, remains unaware that in light of the undeflectable judgement of God mercy is the one thing needful and humankind’s only hope.
Victor Shepherd
The Educational Ministry of the Church
published in Theological Digest & Outlook (Burlington, March 2000)
The Educational Ministry of the Church
The problem with the person suffering from amnesia isn’t that he can’t remember where he’s left his umbrella and will have to spend another $15 to replace it. The problem isn’t even that he’s going to get wet and will be inconvenienced before he arrives home. The problem with the amnesiac, rather, is that he doesn’t know where home is and therefore will never find his way there. More tragically, the person with no memory doesn’t know who he is. No less tragically, the person with no memory can’t be trusted. This isn’t to say that the amnesiac is unusually nasty. It is to say, however, that the person with no awareness of his identity behaves erratically, and behaves erratically just because he has no sense of anything that might be “out of character.”
The church’s educational ministry seeks to prevent a similar development from overtaking the church. A congregation or denomination that suffers from collective loss of Christian memory lacks a Christian identity. Lacking Christian identity, it can only behave erratically, all the while thinking itself to be the soul of consistency. Once again, this isn’t to say there’s treachery here born of mean-spiritedness, but it is to say that without a Christian memory people meander without knowing themselves to be meandering, forever losing their way without knowing the way.
Concerning the church’s educational responsibility, the Protestant Reformers liked to speak of the church as “the school of faith.” While “school” may call up “schoolish”, replete with associations that many find dull if not distasteful, our Reformation predecessors were at least aware that the church’s educational ministry has to do with truth, with substance, with elementary beginnings that develop cumulatively with the result that “everyone may be presented mature in Christ.” (Colossians 1:28) Our foreparents knew, as did the Hebrew prophets before them, that the living God is anything but ephemeral, vague, “will-o’-the-wispish”, abstract. The Holy One, rather, is concrete, denser than the utmost density we can imagine, opaque, solid, substantive. And not only dense but so very immense too – filling all space – that God is the one prophet and apostle know to be inescapable. God can always be fled, to be sure, but not escaped. Then who this God is whom we can’t escape and who – thanks to the Son’s absorbing in himself the God-forsakenness of Gethsemane and Golgotha – will never forsake us; who this God is is the “Other-with-us” in which the church endeavours to school its people from the youngest to the oldest.
Mind and heart must be steeped in the truth of God as relentlessly as a youngster learns the alphabet, then assembles words and phrases, then grasps something of the grammar that orders human discourse and without which what is known can never be communicated profoundly. That’s it! It’s only as grammar is learned too can we commend to others what we’ve come to comprehend for ourselves. And of course we soon discover that to commend what we comprehend is to find our own comprehension gaining depth and breadth. “Force-feeding”, however, is like “cramming” for exams: the momentary glut disappears as quickly as it was acquired. Better by far is the gradualist approach that Isaiah cherished when he spoke of “teaching knowledge” and “explaining the message”: “For it will be precept upon precept…line upon line…here a little, there a little.” (Isaiah 28:10) Surrounded as he was by Canaanite nations, Isaiah knew that that as surely as the unique substance of Israel’s faith thinned out through dilution, distraction and detraction, “faith” would become indistinguishable from the idolatry that faced his people wherever he looked.
It is God who is to be loved with the mind. Apart from the church’s ceaseless effort at educating its people, the Holy One won’t be loved with the mind; which is to say, won’t be loved at all.
With respect to children, I still think Northrop Frye’s advice to be sound: there’s no substitute for scripture’s delight in story telling. The stories are to be told and re-told at every age and stage of the younger person’s development. Needless to say, this doesn’t mean that the stories are to be regurgitated year after year in mind-numbing monotony, devoid of subtlety, sophistication and application. Neither does it mean that these stories only are to be told. But it is to say that regardless of pedagogical technique, and regardless of the much-needed variety in the content and manner of presentation, somehow the ongoing educational task of the church always manages to recycle the “old” stories. For to recycle the stories is to find them newly pertinent to the newly-recognised problems and perplexities besetting humankind. Northrop Frye argued that only as these stories sank down to the bottom of the English student’s mind and remained embedded there – but not buried “out of sight, out mind” – would that student have any chance of understanding the tradition of English literature and of western culture in general. How much more is it the case that only as these stories remain embedded in the developing Christian’s mind can they be revisited at any period of that person’s life and be found to speak with ever-fresh relevance. More to the point, because they speak with conclusive relevance they are acknowledged to speak authoritatively.
Admittedly, at first the youngest child won’t be able to make much of many of the stories, despite the best efforts of parent or Sunday School teacher. Still, as long as the stories remain part of the hearer’s mental (and cardiac!) furniture, the stories can be probed in ever-greater depth as the hearer is granted ever-more intimate access to the One of whom they speak.
Think of the story of Abraham and Isaac on Mount Moriah. For the many the story’s grotesqueness will be bizarre at best; for others, repulsive at worst. Still, for good or ill, the story is a vivid aspect of the church’s memory. Abraham, the prototype of the person of faith, has been promised spiritual descendants as numerous as the sands on the seashore. If the promise is to be fulfilled, then two conditions must be met: Abraham must persevere in faith (or else he can’t be the foreparent of descendants-in-faith), and Abraham’s son, Isaac, must survive (or else there won’t be descendants-in-faith.) Abraham, then, is wracked with this dilemma: if he obeys God and offers up his son Isaac, then God’s promise is null and void, since Isaac hasn’t survived; if, on the other, hand, he second-guesses God and preserves Isaac, then God’s promise is null and void, since his disobedience exemplifies his unfaith. Abraham’s obedience nullifies the promise as surely as his disobedience nullifies it. With an anguish that the old story heightens by means of such literary devices as “Take your son, your only son…” (Genesis 22:2), Abraham decides to stake everything on trusting God to fulfil God’s promises in ways that Abraham can’t even imagine at this point. He will obey God even though such obedience, from a human perspective, ensures the non-fulfilment of the promise.
Years later, the child-become-adult, now part of a church growing ever smaller in a secular society, understands with fresh comprehension the force of Christ’s promise concerning the inviolability of the church before the powers of death. (Matthew 16:18) The child-become-adult is equipped, able to assess assorted responses to the church’s retraction. Some responses, of course, are gospel-generated; other “solutions” are little more than techniques, tools, gimmicks of one kind or another. Of all the proffered programmes for assisting the church today, which are to be endorsed and which declined? The person possessed of Abraham’s faith will continue to uphold the gospel, even though it is fidelity to the gospel that appears to be shrinking the church in an era and a society that insists the gospel to be obsolete. The dilemma, again, is Abraham’s: do we obey God, counting on God’s fulfilment of the promise concerning the church, or do we second-guess God, assuming we “know better”, preferring to do what we think will ensure the church’s future, even though this latter approach entails forfeiting the gospel? Abrahamic faith means that we trust God to fulfil God’s own promises in ways that we can’t imagine now.
While it’s one thing to speak of the need to preserve biblical substance in the church’s educational ministry, finding the vehicle for this is another. Twenty-five years ago, in one of my postgraduate courses, James D. Smart, well-known bible scholar, theologian, translator and Christian educator, commented that any minister would be fortunate to find 10% of the worshipping congregation in an adult study group. The 10% of 25 years ago has shrunk, I fear, to 5% in 1999. Still, there remains a place for the small group. Streetsville congregation had a C.S. Lewis reading group that met monthly for four years, reading its way through all of Lewis’s popular writings. Alpha and Bethel courses in our congregation continue to help many. Again, our congregation has had a bible study that meets one Sunday evening per month, or meets Sunday morning before worship for six consecutive Sundays only. (People will commit themselves to a study programme with a predetermined conclusion when they often won’t to one that remains ongoing.) I have found that the latter arrangement (Sunday morning) attracts far more people, since they were coming to worship on Sunday morning in any case. (Modernity’s busyness finds even Sunday evening too much for many to manage.)
While not unappreciative of the vehicles I’ve just mentioned, I have yet found, over a 21-year ministry in the same congregation, that the Sunday morning sermon remains a most effective “delivery system.” Each autumn for over a dozen years now I have placed a small insert in the bulletin, “I should like a sermon on….” Worshippers fill in the insert and place it on the offering plate. These requests are gathered up and become the roster for my preaching throughout the following spring. In addition to providing “fodder” for sermons, the requests tell me where people are living, what they are thinking, how they are suffering, and why they are perplexed or angry or anxious. The requests vary from the expected (the struggle for faith in a world riddled with evil) to those that I didn’t foresee (the neurophysiology of endogenous depression.) By means of this vehicle I’ve found myself schooling the congregation in such matters as euthanasia, the sin against the Holy Spirit, whether the bible should be censored, the nature of psychopathy, angels, life-as-relationships, gossip, the meaning and timing of confirmation, the ethics of organ transplants, and even “revival and Jonathon Edwards.”
The opportunities here for deepening a congregation as contemporary issues are related to the “old, old stories” and such stories are seen to be normative; such opportunities are limitless. The congregation also prints each sermon for pick-up the following week. With the chance to read the sermon at their leisure, people find they absorb far more than they do when they hear it from me once only at 130 words per minute. Frequently the vehicle of the sermon fosters another vehicle; namely, formal and informal conversations on the same topic.
Evidently the educational ministry addresses two kinds of needs: the perennial human need rooted in the human condition, as well as contemporary needs arising from the modern-day situation. The human condition – we are fallen creatures, alienated from God on account of our defiance and disobedience – is the deeper of the two. In other words, the human condition always underlies the human situation, while the situation, changing from era to era, finds symptomatic expressions that vary kaleidoscopically. Still, in addressing the situation the educational ministry has every opportunity to address the human condition.
Yet in all of this we must take care to understand that the educational ministry of the church isn’t one-sidedly cerebral. (I say “one-sidedly” rather than “over”: since God is to be loved with the mind and is never honoured by slovenly thinking, we can’t be over-cerebral, whereas we can always be one-sidedly so.) Jesus both taught and healed. His teaching rendered his healing intelligible, while his healing embodied his teaching. If he had merely taught, his kingdom would have remained unembodied, a “head-trip” for amateur, armchair philosophers who like to muse on religious themes. If he had merely acted, his action would have remained ununderstood with respect to the kingdom. The kingdom of God (which is to say, the whole creation healed), is found in the singular fusion of his head, heart and hand. Throughout Christ’s public ministry the person healed (or in need of healing) was related to the community and restored to the community, as was the case with the Gadarene demoniac, now found not only seated and right-minded but clothed; i.e., he belonged to that community to which he had been readmitted. (Mark 5:15) Community ever remains essential to the educational ministry of the church. Without community and the suffering found in it, the educational ministry of the church will inevitably slide from a much-needed reasonableness into a dry-as-dust rationalism. If this happens a Christian anthropology is denied, for then reason, rather than spirit, has come to be regarded as the essence of humankind; and reason, rather than spirit (Spirit too), has come to be viewed as both ultimate reality and the access to it. The community ever remains the venue of the church’s educational ministry; which is to say, human suffering is always the context that lends the educational ministry of the church as much credibility as it will ever need.
The collective memory of the church is like the ballast in a sailing ship’s keel. The ballast consists of lead, isn’t particularly pretty, and is found below the waterline in any case. Without ballast, however, the ship, top-heavy with sail, capsizes in the first squall. Everyone knows that the more sail a ship carries above the waterline, the more ballast it needs below it. A ship with no sails never leaves the docks. Herein it resembles Admiral Nelson’s Victory: the brass is polished every day, the ceremonial cannon is fired for reasons of nostalgia, people even pay significant sums of money to climb on board – but the ship never goes anywhere. A ship with no ballast, on the other hand, naively thinks it can best the sea, only to find that the first storm leaves it foundering. The lesson here for the church is plain.
The church today is eager to hoist sails to catch the wind of the Spirit (not always recognising, however, that some spirits are less than holy) while disdainful of adding weight to the ballast. The educational ministry of the church, however, always pertains to both sails and ballast. And in our era, impatient with history and tradition and anything substantive, renewed attention must be given to ballast. For the neglect here has been long and persistent. We aren’t the first generation of Christians. Appreciating the wisdom of those who ventured before us will ensure that our immediate parents in faith weren’t the last.
Victor Shepherd
May 1999
A Comment on Postmodernism
A Comment on Postmodernism
Victor Shepherd
I: — What is postmodernism or postmodernity? Plainly we have to know what is meant by “modernity” before we can grasp “postmodernity.” Some people maintain that modernity begins with the French Revolution with its explicitly secularist, anti-religious outlook. Others date modernity from the Enlightenment with its development of science. Others still (here I include myself) date modernity from the Renaissance with, among other things, the rise of market-capitalism, the development of transnational banking, the nation-state. Modernity, then, runs from mid 15th century to mid 20th century, or from 1450 to 1945.
Let’s think first of modernity. There are several features of modernity that we all recognise as soon as they are mentioned: technoscience, for instance. Think of how the telegraph was followed by the telephone, followed in turn by the wireless, followed yet again by satellite communication, and so on.
Mass production is another feature of modernity. At one time goods were produced in what were known as “cottage industries.” Someone with a few sheep spun wool in her living room and then wove it, eventually having a garment of some kind she could sell. When mass production arrived a newly-invented mechanical loom hummed night and day in a factory, producing wool far more quickly, and thus permitting a vastly more efficient means of manufacturing and distributing huge quantities of woollen goods. Horse-drawn carriages used to be made by one or two men who spent weeks building one carriage completely before beginning another. With the advent of the horseless carriage, the automobile, Henry Ford developed the assembly line. The number of units manufactured per week skyrocketed. Not only did the factory-housed loom and the automobile assembly line speed up the manufacturing process, they also lowered the price per unit so that the manufactured goods were affordable to large segments of the population.
Developments in industrial efficiency, we should note, created what economists call “real wealth” and distributed it in such a way that a middle class arose and mushroomed. Prior to modernity there were two classes: the noble or aristocratic class (very few in number) and the rural peasant class (very large.) In other words, there were a few rich land-owners and hordes of poor land-workers. The few possessed immense wealth and power; the many possessed neither wealth nor power. Industrialisation, a major feature of modernity, gave rise to a middle class that was larger than either the rich or the poor. And of course together with the expansion of the middle class there occurred the representative democracy we all cherish.
The nation-state was a feature of modernity. The purpose of the state is to subdue lawlessness, punish evildoers, promote the public good. At the close of the Middle Ages it was noted that a people that had much in common could band together and thereby promote the public good much more efficiently. At the close of the Middle Ages there were 300 fiefdoms or principalities in Germany , with a prince presiding over each. It was obvious that if many German-speaking peoples forged themselves into a single German-speaking people, a nation-state would arise possessed of a domestic and international power that 300 fiefdoms could never hope to have.
By far the most readily recognised feature of modernity, I think, is what I mentioned first: technoscience. “Labour-saving devices” are only a small part of it. The devices that we now take for granted weren’t merely labour-saving (a tractor that ploughs in an hour what a horse ploughed in a day.) The technoscience we admire had to do with vaccinations, inoculations, surgeries (chest surgery was virtually impossible prior to the invention of the heart-lung machine). As well as the technoscience that provided safety: radar, electronic navigation, weather-predicting. As well as the technoscience that “greened” large parts of the world with wheat that was impervious to rust, corn impervious to blight, fertilisers that multiplied crop yields a hundred fold, and methods of transportation that were quicker, safer, cheaper, more comfortable than anything our foreparents could have imagined.
Modernity was characterised by a belief in progress, a manifest mastery over nature, and the magnification of efficiency everywhere.
II: — Then what about postmodernity? What are its features? Let’s begin here where we left off: technoscience. There is now widespread loss of confidence in technoscience as a blessing. While nuclear science generated electricity more efficiently than steam turbines, nuclear science has spawned nightmare after nightmare. (Not to mention propaganda to cloak the nightmare: there are on average 500 major nuclear accidents per year, most of which are never reported to the public.) As for nuclear weaponry, we entered the cold war, seemed to pass out of it in 1989, and now appear to be on the edge of it again. At the height of the cold war (1945-1989) the USA and the USSR were aiming at each other nuclear weaponry that guaranteed what the military-industrial complex called “Mutually Assured Destruction”: MAD. Conventional weaponry had been used to win wars; nuclear weaponry would guarantee loss on all sides. Yet nuclear weaponry proliferated.
Developments in electronics were hailed as glorious. Electronic surveillance has eroded privacy already and brought depersonalisation and dehumanisation in its wake. And we haven’t seen anything in this regard compared to what we are going to see.
In the postmodern era pharmacology has become suspect. Drugs to relieve pain are one thing; what about drugs that don’t merely relieve pain, don’t merely elevate moods (from depression to contentment), don’t merely subdue agitation or compulsiveness, but alter personality? If drugs can alter personality, then what do we mean by “personality?” Since personality is intimately connected to personal identity, has personal identity evaporated? Then what has happened to the person herself? What do we mean by “self?” Is there a self? Furthermore, if self and personality are related to character, what has become of character?
While we are speaking of character we should be aware that the United States Armed Forces have developed drugs that eliminate fear. Courage, of course, is courage only in the context of fear. Drugs that eliminate fear therefore also eliminate bravery. No American combatant need ever be awarded a military honour! More to the point, drug-induced fearlessness renders someone a robot; robots are never afraid, robots are never brave, robots are never human. That’s the point: the drugged soldier is no longer human.
What modernity called progress postmodernity deems anything but progress. Where is the progress in ecological damage so far-reaching that air isn’t fit to breathe or water to drink, while ozone-depletion renders our skin irrecoverably cancerous? Where is the progress in schooling that finds university-bound students unable to write or comprehend a five-sentence paragraph?
To no one’s surprise, postmodernity has suffered widespread loss of confidence in reason. We may call postmodernites cynics or we may call them realists; in any case postmodernites see human reasoning as a huge factor in the postmodern mess. They see reason (so-called) as simply a means to an end that isn’t reasonable itself.
One feature of the collapse of confidence in reason is the disappearance of truth. Truth is now reduced to taste. Postmodernity denies that there is such a thing as truth, or denies that we can access truth. Instead of knowing truth we express opinions, or we indicate preferences, or we “go with our gut.” Truth? What is truth, anyway? And if it existed, what makes us think we could know it? And even if we could know it, how would we know when we had found it? Truth? You have your opinion and I have mine. Who or what is the arbiter between you and me?
Needless to say the disappearance of ethics is related to the disappearance of truth. Postmodernites don’t speak of ethics; they speak of values. Everyone knows that different people hold different values. But this isn’t to say one value is superior to another. What any one person values is up to him or her. No one is to be told his values are defective or inferior. Lest we feel sorry for ourselves, thinking that the newness of this feature of postmodernism is brandnewness, we should read again the concluding sentence of the book of Judges: “In those days there was no king in Israel ; every man did what was right in his own eyes.” (Judges 21:25 ) We aren’t the first to reduce what is right to matters of taste. Three thousand years ago there were those who regarded themselves and their fancies as the measure of the universe. As Israelites, they had even made themselves and their fancies the measure of God. It all came down to taste; and, as everyone knows, there’s no disputing taste. Taste, preference, opinion, whatever – it all adds up to the sufficiency of the subjective.
If someone, nervous about all of this, speaks up, “But shouldn’t opinions or preferences be grounded in something, grounded in reality?”, such a person will be reminded, “Asking whether they should be grounded in reality is pointless when no one knows what reality is or how it might be recognised.” “But can’t the smorgasbord of opinions be considered and weighed rationally?” Raising this matter is pointless when reason is already suspect. Besides, to challenge someone else’s values or opinions is to excite emotion, and everyone knows that when emotion and reason meet, reason always takes second place.
Another feature of postmodernity is the weakening of the nation-state in the face of tribalism. All over the world tribalism is reasserting itself. It is especially strong in Africa . Quebec ’s growing self-advancement, however, is a form of tribalism too, as is the United Church ’s all-aboriginal presbytery. The most vicious form of tribalism (“vicious”, of course, is a value-laden term, my value) is ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansing is on the increase. Internally the nation-state is fragmenting; externally the nation-state is increasingly the pawn of international finances and multinational corporations.
Another feature of postmodernity is the mushrooming of consumerism, consumer-driven everything. In the modern era economics were producer-driven; in the postmodern era, consumer-driven. Consumerism determines what church-congregations offer, what pulpits declare, what school boards program. Reginald Bibby, sociologist at the University of Lethbridge , maintains that there’s a huge demand throughout the society for religious consumer-products. “If the church wants to survive”, says Bibby, “it should meet consumer demands.” In other words, the church should forget what it believes to be the truth and substance of the gospel. The church should merely prepare the religious buffet that allows consumers to pick and choose according to taste, whim, preference. It must never be forgotten, of course, that it’s consumers who fund the church. Consumerism? My daughter Mary has just finished her B.Sc.N. program at McMaster University . When she began the course she was told that patients are no longer patients; what used to be known as patients are now clients. Patients are sick; clients are consumers who are purchasing a service.
My wife, Maureen, came upon three Grade one students writing obscene graffiti. She deemed this to be an “actionable” offence, and action was taken. Next day the parent of one of these three children came to see Maureen. The parent remarked, “How unfortunate it was that my daughter signed her name to the graffiti she wrote.” “It wasn’t unfortunate that your daughter signed her name, thereby giving herself away”, Maureen replied; “It wasn’t even unfortunate that she wrote the obscene graffiti in the first place. It was simply wrong; wrong.” The category “wrong” has no meaning for that parent. The parent has already disavowed everything that might be logically related to the word “wrong.” Her attitude encapsulates postmodernity. Besides, as a taxpayer she’s a consumer who is purchasing a service for her child. And since consumers are paying the piper, they are now calling the tune.
III: — Is postmodernity all bad? Has the sky fallen on Chicken Little? Is our situation hopeless? No. Think of something familiar to all of us: the writing of history. We all studied history in school. We all studied it thinking it to be the soul of objectivity. History dealt with facts, unarguable facts. Postmodernites tell us (and tell us correctly) something different. A few years ago I addressed a group of curriculum planners at the central office of the Toronto Board of Education. I was speaking about prejudice in general, racism in particular. I told the group that while racial segregation had always occurred spontaneously in Ontario , it had been mandated by law in one institution only: the school system. Yes, schools were segregated along black/white lines beginning in the 1850s. (Most of the curriculum planners were completely unaware of this.) Then I asked them, “In what year was the last racially segregated school in Ontario closed?” Two planners shouted, “In 1965.” They were correct. They were also black. The black educators knew about racially segregated schools in Ontario ; the white planners had never heard of it and were aghast to learn of it. When I was studying Ontario ’s history, I was never informed of this matter. Were you? The postmodernites are going to keep asking us, “Who writes history? Whose viewpoint is reflected? Whose interests are advanced? And what despised group is silenced?” Here postmodernism is doing us a favour.
Is postmodernity all bad? No. Before we deplore the hastening demise of the Church of Scotland (to name only one denomination sick unto death); before we lament the morbidity of the Kirk we should remember that many people are already ambivalent about it. My earliest Old Testament professor, Scottish himself but belonging to a denomination other than the Church of Scotland, told me that when he was a young man in Scotland you couldn’t get work in the post office, a bank, or schoolteaching unless you were a member of the Kirk. You didn’t have to attend; you didn’t have to worship; you didn’t have to believe anything. But your name had to be on the roll. No one today laments the disappearance of such an arrangement.
Is postmodernity all bad? No. Admittedly confidence has collapsed in technoscience as something that can promote the human good. (Technoscience, of course, can always promote the technically efficient. But the technically efficient is a long way from the human good.) While technoscience has done much to ease physical toil and bodily discomfort, done much to promote longer life and reduce the likelihood of sudden death, Christians are aware that technoscience was never going to promote the human good. Then the public loss of confidence in technoscience is loss of confidence where Christians had none in any case.
Is postmodernity all bad? No. So what if postmodernites insist that reason (reasoning) is suspect, reasoning being little more than rationalisation serving any number of subtle or not-so-subtle ends. Christians have always known that sin blinds so thoroughly as to blind humankind to the speciousness of its reasoning. Christians have always known that only grace, God’s grace, frees reason and restores reason to reason’s integrity. Then postmodernity reminds us all of a human predicament that Christians know the gospel alone to be able to cure.
Is postmodernity all bad? No. While tribalism is to be deplored, the radical relativising of the nation-state isn’t to be deplored. Surely the development of hydrogen warheads rendered the nation-state obsolete. Surely the nation-state has been a reservoir of old wounds and resentments and recriminations and national aggressions that we’re all better off without. Surely we don’t need a cess-pool whose toxic wastes seep into neighbouring aquifers.
IV: — Then what are Christians to do about postmodernism? Specifically, what are the concrete challenges that postmodernism brings to the church?
First of all we are challenged to remember at all times and in all circumstances that “The earth is the Lord’s and the fullness thereof.” (Psalm 24:1) “The Lord of hosts is the king of glory.” He is; he alone is. Christians aren’t dualists. We don’t believe that the cosmos is stuck fast in an interminable struggle between two equal but hostile powers, God and the evil one, neither able to defeat the other. We don’t believe that the Fall (Genesis 3) has obliterated the goodness of God’s creation. Yes, Jesus says that the creation lies in the grip of the “prince of this world”. But the prince is only that: prince, never king. The earth is the Lord’s, and no one else’s.
The gospel of John, the anonymous epistle to the Hebrews, and Paul’s letter to the church in Colosse; all these documents declare that the whole world was made through Christ for Christ. He is the agent in creation, and the creation was fashioned for his sake. He is its origin and end. He is its ground and goal. And no development in world-occurrence can overturn this truth.
We are told in Colossians 1:17, “In Jesus Christ all things hold together.” However fast, however violently, the world spins (metaphorically speaking), it can never fly apart. “In him all things hold together.” Why doesn’t the creation fly apart (metaphorically speaking)? Why doesn’t human existence become impossible? Why don’t the countless competing special-interest groups, each with its “selfist” savagery, fragment the world hopelessly? Just because in him, in our Lord, all things hold together. What he creates he maintains; what he upholds he causes to cohere. “Hold together” is a term taken from the Stoic philosophy of the ancient Greeks. But whereas the ancient Greek philosophers said that a philosophical principle upheld the cosmos, Christians knew it to be a person, the living person of the Lord Jesus Christ. He grips the creation with a hand large enough to comprehend the totality of the world. In other words, the real significance of postmodernism can’t be grasped by postmodernites; the real significance of postmodernism can be grasped only by him whose world it is and in whom it is held together. The real significance of postmodernism, its bane but also its blessing, can be understood only by those who are attuned to the mind of Christ. The sky hasn’t fallen down.
Another challenge, the second challenge, that postmodernism brings to the church: we are to meet everyday challenges and opportunities each and every day. Many Christians think that the first thing to be done is a philosophical rebuttal of postmodernism’s tenets. I’m a philosopher myself (or like to think I am), and I agree that a philosophical critique, a philosophical rebuttal, is entirely in order. At the same time, there are relatively few people with the training and the equipment for this sort of thing. All Christians, however, can meet everyday challenges and opportunities each and every day.
You must have noticed that Jesus doesn’t merely illustrate his ministry with everyday matters (a homemaker sweeping the house clean in order to find her grocery money); he directs us to everyday matters as the occasion of our faith and obedience, trust and love. I mentioned earlier the concluding verse of the book of Judges: “In those days there was no king in Israel ; every man did what was right in his own eyes.” (Judges 21:25 ) In a postmodern world that is therefore postchristendom as well, Christians must exemplify the truth that there is a king in Israel ; there is a Lord whose claim upon the obedience of us his subjects we neither dispute nor deny nor disregard. We who are Christians must embody our conviction that we don’t do what is right in our own eyes. We are preoccupied, rather, with what is righteous, and what is righteous reflects the heart of the Righteous One himself. Everyday matters remain the occasion, the context, the venue of everyday obedience. Discipleship isn’t suspended until philosophers can dissect postmodernism; discipleship is always to be exercised now, in the context of the ready-to-hand. We trust our Lord and his truth right now (or we don’t); we grant hospitality right now and discover we’ve entertained angels unawares (or we don’t); we uphold our Lord’s claim on our obedience in the face of postmodernism’s ethical indifference (or we don’t). We recognise the approach of temptation and resist it in the instant of its approach, or we stare at it like a rabbit staring at a snake until rabbit-like, we’re seized. We forgive the offender from our heart and find ourselves newly aware of God’s forgiveness of us, or we merely pretend to forgive the offender and find our own heart shrivelling. The apostle John insists that we do the truth. We have countless opportunities every day challenging us to forthright faith and obedience and trust regardless of whether or not we can philosophically rebut postmodernism’s philosophical presuppositions.
The third challenge postmodernism brings to the church is as profound as it is simple: Christians must recover the Christian truth that human existence is relational. A few minutes ago I mentioned, for instance, that one feature of modernity’s modulation into postmodernity was the shift from production economics to consumer economics. We should note, however, that neither form of economics impinges upon a Christian understanding of human profundity. God intends us to be creatures whose ultimate profundity is rooted not in economic matters but in relations.
Think of the old story concerning the creation of humankind. “God created man in his own image. In the image of God created he them.” (Gen. 1:27) Adam is properly Adam; Adam is properly himself, only in relation to Eve. To be sure, Adam isn’t a function of Eve or Eve a function of him. Neither one can be reduced to the other; neither one is an aspect of the other. None the less, each is who he or she is only in relation to the other.
I am not reducible to any one of my relationships or to all of them together. I am not an extension of my wife or an aspect of my parents or a function of my daughters. I am me, uniquely, irreplaceably, unsubstituably me. Still, I am not who I am apart from my relationships.
Every last human being is a dialogical partner with God. This isn’t to say that everyone is aware of this or welcomes this or agrees with this. It isn’t to say that everyone is a believer or a crypto-believer or even a “wannabe” believer. It isn’t to say that everyone is going to become a believer or be considered one. But it is to say that the God who has made us all can’t be escaped; can’t be escaped by anyone. God can be denied, he can be disdained, he can be ignored, he can be unknown, he can be fled, but he can’t be escaped. Not to be aware of this truth is not thereby to be spared it. To ridicule this truth is not thereby to be rid of it. The living God is always and everywhere the dialogical “Other”, the relational “Other” of everyone’s life, even as there are many creaturely “others” in everyone’s life.
Decades ago the Jewish biblical thinker Martin Buber wrote, “All real living is meeting.” He was right: what isn’t profoundly a “meeting” isn’t living; it’s death. What isn’t a “meeting” isn’t real; it’s illusory. Reality, said Buber, is the “between”; the “between” between person and person, the “between” between person and the Person. Jean Paul Sartre, the French existentialist philosopher, complained that the mere existence of another human being diminished the individual’s freedom. The existence of God, Sartre continued, suffocated the individual, so suffocating was God in his immensity compared to the human individual gasping to exist. Therefore, said Sartre, God had to be denied if humankind was to thrive humanly. Buber (who always maintained that Sartre was a novelist who thought himself a philosopher) correctly saw that Sartre had inverted the picture: the relation of “I-it”, how we approach things, isn’t bedrock reality, the “I-thou” relation being no more than an ethereal fantasy. It’s the other way around: “I-thou” is bedrock reality; “I-thou” is the primordium of the cosmos, “I-it” being a mere abstraction. Postmodernity is suspicious and cynical and bitter all at once, and often for good reason. It denies the category of the real. Right here there is challenge and opportunity a-plenty for Christians: the real is the relational.
The fourth challenge postmodernism brings to the church: we have to work out much more thoroughly what we understand to be the human, the quintessentially human. Our society is beset on all sides with depersonalisation and dehumanisation. We are now facing the technological novelty known as “virtual reality” or “synthetic reality.” Soon we’ll be sitting in front of our TV screens with a contraption on our head that allows us to experience the sensations of touch, smell, taste, sight. When so much of the human can be counterfeited electronically, what does it mean to be human? Surely Christians have something to say and do here.
The fifth challenge postmodernism brings to the church: we must reappropriate the category of the holy. Here postmodernity forces us to come to terms with something the church has considered too slightly if at all: the polar opposite of evil isn’t good, not even the good. The polar opposite of wrong isn’t right, not even the right. The polar opposite of evil, rather, is the holy. The polar opposite of wrong is the holy. Plainly the holy and the good are not exactly the same. The holy and the right are not exactly the same. Wherein lies the difference?
In order to answer this question we must spend a few minutes refreshing our understanding of God’s holiness.
God’s holiness is God’s own Godness, that which constitutes God uniquely God. In the first place God is holy in that God is utterly distinct from his creation. God is not to be identified with any part of his creation or any aspect of it.
In the second place God’s holiness means that God can’t be measured or assessed by anything other than himself. God is the absolute standard of himself.
In the third place God’s holiness means that God’s character is without defect or deficiency. God’s character is free from taint of any sort. God’s love is free from sentimentality; God’s anger is free from ill-temper; God’s judgement is free from arbitrariness; God’s patience is free from indifference; God’s sovereignty is free from tyranny.
In the fourth place God’s holiness means that all the aspects of God’s character just mentioned are gathered up into a unity. Just as every shade of the spectrum from infrared to ultra-violet is gathered up into what we call “light”, so every dimension of God’s character and God’s transcendence is gathered up into God’s holiness.
When we are faced with evil in any of its manifestations we must find ourselves driven ultimately not to a consideration of good, even the good, for even the good is but a philosophical category, not the living person of the Holy One himself. When we are faced with wrong we must find ourselves driven ultimately not to a consideration of right, even the right, for even the right is but a moral category, not the living person of the Holy One himself. Instead we must find ourselves driven to contemplate afresh and own anew the One whose uniqueness and awesomeness and splendour left our Hebrew foreparents in faith prostrate and adoring. For God alone is that to which (to whom) the deficits of postmodernism point us: God.
And if postmodernism is used in God’s inscrutable providence (Calvin’s description) to turn the hearts and minds of many to him, then even postmodernism is a harbinger of hope: hope for the church, to be sure, but hope as well for that world which God so loved as to pour himself upon it without measure and bind himself to it without end.
1999 Congregational Address
The Lord is a stronghold for the oppressed,
a stronghold in times of trouble.
And those who know thy name put their trust in thee,
for thou, O Lord, hast not forsaken those who seek thee.
Psalm 9:9-10
Israel of old always insisted that the first responsibility of its king was not to preen himself or increase the lustre of his court or even triumph splendidly in feats of military prowess or political wizardry. The first responsibility of its king was invariably to safeguard the poor.
And who were the poor? They could be the financially deprived, of course. Yet they were also those whose finances were adequate but who had been rendered unusually vulnerable for any number of reasons: reversals, illness, defamation, conspiracy, enemies manifest and hidden. Who spoke up on behalf of the oppressed? Who succoured them? Who endeavoured to provide “armour” where they were most exposed? It was Israel’s conviction that God did. Yet regardless of God’s capacity to act as he had promised, regardless of his eagerness to, the oppressed would entrust themselves to him only as they knew his “name”; that is only as they were acquainted with God’s nature, character, person, presence. (Plainly “name” is a very rich notion in Hebrew.) Just as it was the vocation of the king to safeguard the vulnerable in the service of the King, so it was the vocation of the prophet to acquaint the people with the heart of the King himself. Then, and only then, could needy people be expected to abandon themselves to the One whom they now knew would never abandon them.
Will God abandon us? Why wouldn’t he, in view of the fact that he abandoned even his Son precisely when his Son needed him most? Paradoxically, it is just because the Son was forsaken for us that no human being anywhere, at any time, in any predicament, is ever God-forsaken now or can be. Because the Son was left so thoroughly derelict, and because the pang of that dereliction pierced the heart of the Father, God has taken upon himself that dereliction which we sinners deserve, which we should otherwise have, and which we should rightly fear yet could never fend off. In other words, the anguish endured by the Son and absorbed by the Father now spares us that anguish which we are sure we feel even as our feeling is in fact without foundation or substance. “I will never fail you nor forsake you” (Joshua 1:5; Hebrews 13:5) is now the cry of God’s heart to us.
Then entrust ourselves to him we must. For from the perspective of cross and resurrection we understand that what Father and Son together did for us, they did so that it never need be done to us. God is a stronghold for the oppressed. We know his “name” and will therefore put our trust in him.
The truth of the psalmist’s word I have proven time and again. And as surely as I have proven it for myself I know that I am called to be an icon of it for you. Because God doesn’t abandon, neither do I. And neither must you. For just as the king’s vocation was to reflect the characteristic behaviour of the King himself, so our vocation is to exemplify the Stronghold himself. He who provides refuge for the oppressed commissions us to do as much for each other in any and all circumstances. We, then, shall not fail or forsake one another.
Victor Shepherd
Has The Church A Future?
This paper appeared as an article entitled “Has The Church A Future?”
in Horizons (Toronto, The Salvation Army, November, 1997).
WILL THE 21ST CENTURY BE AN AGE OF CHRISTIAN REVIVAL?
I think so. Mainline liberal Christianity is declining rapidly. Having joined itself naively to the spirit of one era, it found itself bereft in the next. Theological liberalism assumed the world’s self-understanding to be true, and therefore adopted it as the starting point and controlling principle of Christian reflection. Eventually theological liberalism came to be seen for what it was: the world talking to itself about itself, albeit while deploying a Christian vocabulary. As a result the liberal churches have spent untold resources and energies mirroring what the world already knew — and often what it had tried, found wanting, and left behind as it moved on to other aspects of its ideational orbit.
The Christian revival will stand out starkly against the aforementioned in several respects.
* There will be a recovery of classical Christian foundations. The Incarnation, for instance, will be cherished anew as the underpinning of Christian faith and life. (The Word becoming flesh is qualitatively distinct from the Word becoming words.) In the same way the doctrine of the Trinity — who God is is known by what God does on our behalf and what God effects within us — will be honoured again as the matrix within which Christian existence and activity unfold, in accordance with the eternal being and creative activity of God.
* There will be a recovery of the meaning, burden and privilege of discipleship, as discipleship reflects afresh biblical convictions concerning service and sacrifice. Christian discipleship will be much more intentional, self-renouncing and self-forgetful. As Christians become an even smaller minority there will be added to them only those who are serious about imitatio Christi in a recalcitrant world. The church will consist of those who both identify and identify with the victimized, the marginalized, the voiceless, the defenceless — and more widely, with the creation’s frustration and self-contradiction. Sustained by the triumph of Jesus Christ over the powers of death, such discipleship will eschew any notion or display of triumphalism, knowing that the resurrected Lord still suffers (according to apostolic testimony), and being reminded every day that the society of the 21st century permits it no opportunity for triumphalism in any case.
* In light of the hunger for the transcendent, the mood and style of Christian worship will be increasingly charismatic. While it is impossible to be over-cerebral, it is certainly possible to be one-sidedly cerebral. This latter imbalance, rendering the church lop-sided for too long, will be redressed as community-life and personal devotion are re-equilibrated: head and heart, understanding and effusiveness, doctrine and dancing, ardour and affection. The worship, self-understanding, and service of the Christian community will be formed and informed, moved and driven by the “ballast” of the Catholic and Anglican tradition, the “sails” of Pentecostal exuberance, and the careful “charting” of Reformation conviction.
* As denominations disappear (they were often centuries-old imports from European political squabbles in any case), church-bureaucracies will collapse. A nineteenth century church leader (William Booth) was not without insight when he spoke of bureaucracy as “mediocrity in purple.” The autonomous church-community will see readily that mediocrity is an impediment, while purple is mediocrity’s face-saving disguise. Autonomous churches will be in touch with their constituency and their service-opportunities in ways that bureaucracies neither apprehended nor assisted.
Throughout history there have been fresh incursions of the Spirit of God and, called forth by such incursions, new manifestations of the people of God. While the 21st century will not see a replication of 19th and 20th churchmanship, it may indeed see a manifestation of the people of God in their unity, uniqueness (holiness), and catholicity — thanks to a fresh appropriation of the prophetic/apostolic testimony to the One whose victory means that his continuing vulnerability remains effective within a world that he refuses to abandon.
Victor Shepherd
September 1997
Repentance and Life
This paper first appeared in The Free Methodist Herald
(Mississauga, Free Methodist Church in Canada, December, 1997)
Repentance and Life
Breast-beating, tears, dredging up spiritual sludge — isn’t this what “Repent!” brings to mind? It’s little wonder that our society shuns the word and disdains what it things the word represents. People understandably shy away from rubbing their nose in their personal garbage pail, especially when guilt and depression and self-belittlement are expected to effervesce.
Nonetheless, our Lord Jesus Christ, who comes only to impart healing, help and wholesomeness — life — summoned people to repent every day of his public ministry. His summons was always urgent. “Don’t put it off for a minute. Can’t you see it’s the only sensible thing to do? The kingdom of God, his end-time restoration of a world in bondage to sin and evil ever since the Fall, is upon you. Abandon yourself to God’s deliverance!” The urgent summons to repent is one of the major building-blocks of our Lord’s ministry. Pull it out, and his ministry would be unrecognizable.
In view of the good news of the kingdom, an about-turn is needed. Repentance is this about-turn. To make an about-turn is plainly to return. And in fact everywhere in the older testament to repent is to return. To turn into the kingdom of God is to return to the God made us, who grieves over our defiant departure from him, and who longs for our return to him.
When our Lord cries, “Repent, return”, he has in mind three startling pictures painted by the Hebrew prophets before him.
(i) The first image is that of an adulterous spouse returning to wife or husband. Adultery is horrific at any time. For adultery is the betrayal of the most intense intimacy; adultery is the violation of a promise; adultery is personally degrading; and adultery is a public humiliation of the faithful partner.
To repent, then, is to return to God and recover that intimacy with God which we were created to know and enjoy as covenant-partners with him. To return is to uphold the promise we have made to him on countless occasions throughout our lives. To return is to leave off our self-degradation (for make no mistake: however much our society ridicules a doctrine of sin as “Victorian” or Puritan” or even “mediaeval”, sin remains invariably degrading.) To return is to turn from publicly humiliating God to publicly praising him for his incomprehensible patience.
(ii) When the prophets, in the name of God, urge their people to repent, they speak of pagan idol-worshippers returning to the worship of the true and living God. The Hebrew word for “idols” is literally “the nothings.” At the same time, only a fool would pretend that “nothing” is inconsequential. A vacuum is nothing, yet a vacuum has immense power: it sucks down everything around it. A lie is nothing, for a lie is a statement without substance. Yet lies destroy people every day. Delusions are nothing, for a delusion is without foundation. Yet deluded people are at best utterly misled and at worst out-and-out insane. Most tellingly, perhaps, is the fact that we are inevitably conformed to what we worship. To worship any of the “nothings” is to become nothing ourselves.
Since stubborn refusal of the kingdom of God is self-annihilation, why don’t we repent, return, and become someone, that child of God created in his image and impelled to cry, “Abba, Father”, eternally? When our Lord pleads with is to repent he is pleading with us to renounce our pursuit of nothing (the lie, the delusion, the spiritual vacuum) only to find ourselves plunged into truth and reality, the kingdom of God.
(iii) The third prophetic picture of repentance is that of rebel subjects returning to their rightful ruler. The rebel subjects have thought they could rule themselves, only to find that their inept attempts at self-rule have left them chaotic and fragmented. Their rebellion was born of ignorance of themselves, and their ignorance was born of ingratitude to their sovereign. Grateful now to that rightful ruler who alone can subdue disorder, and possessed now of the self-knowledge that without him they will be forever self-destructive, they return. Then the only sensible thing to do is suspend foolish rebellion and fall at the feet of the king himself.
As the meaning of “Repent!” permeates informed hearts, the command is understood as invitation: “Come unto me….” And repentance itself is now known to be nothing less than resurrection and life.
Victor Shepherd
October 1997
Predicament and Provision
Published in The Free Methodist Herald,
(Mississauga, Free Methodist Church in Canada, Feb. 1998)
PREDICAMENT AND PROVISION
“God gave them up!” These have to be the most chilling words that describe the human predicament. Three times in five verses (Romans 1:24-28) Paul reiterates, “God gave them up.” He means that God has handed us over. Handed us over to what? Handed us over to what we keep telling God we want. We don’t want him? We don’t have to have him. He’ll give us exactly what we want. (Satan, we should note, is never this generous; Satan invariably gives us what he wants.) We don’t want God’s truth? We don’t have to have it — which is to say, of course, we’re going to be left with falsehood and illusion. We don’t want God’s claim on our obedience? Then we shan’t have to obey him. But then we’re going to have a pretender claiming us, and this claimant won’t be the slightest bit benevolent. At bottom humankind keeps telling God it doesn’t want him. Then Godlessness is what we want. Godlessness is what we have. God gives us up to it, hands us over to it, abandons us to it.
Needless to say, there are consequences to what we have or want, anywhere in life. Not to want God is to be stuck with the consequences of not wanting, not having him. Paul lists the features (or at least some of them) of the human self-expression that displays itself as God hands us over to the Godlessness we crave: slander, murder, ruthlessness, covetousness, boasting, gossip, deceit, parent abuse, sexual perversion, and so on. (Rom.1:28-32) This is the sorry state to which God “gives us up, gives us up, gives us up….” It reverberates like a bell tolling the death knell of the entire human race.
But it isn’t the death knell! By God’s mercy it’s the wake-up call. It’s the huge electric shock administered to jar the heart-patient back to life. Because God is love, because love exhausts God’s nature (1 John 4:8), God can never be indifferent. (Indifference is the opposite of love, not hatred, contrary to what most people think.) While God abandons us to what we want — together with its consequences — he doesn’t abandon us. In fact he “gives us up” just because he has never given up on us. God gives us up to the miserable consequences of our disobedience and defiance just because he’s never ceased loving us and wants to bring us to our senses. At no point in the downward spiral has God given up on us. To be sure, our predicament is evidence that God’s anger has been aroused. But since his anger is only his love burning hot, his anger is simply his love shaking us awake. (We must always remember that since God is love, his every attitude and act are actually expressions of his love for us.)
If God were indifferent, the human predicament would now be hopeless, since indifference would simply not bother with us henceforth but simply leave us alone in our self-willed mess. An angry God, however, plainly cares; his caring means that he bothers; he bothers in that he not only shakes us awake to our predicament, he also awakens us to the provision his love has made for us. He has given us his Son, given us himself in his Son. In the words of the Anglican Prayerbook, our Lord was given us to make “by his one oblation of himself once offered a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world.” God’s provision blesses all humankind in that atonement which Jesus Christ has wrought as he makes “at one” a wayward human race and the God who can’t bring himself to give up on us, and can’t bring himself to give up on us inasmuch as he can’t will himself out of his nature, love.
As eager as God is to bless us, however, he won’t bulldoze us, won’t tyrannize or coerce. Everywhere in his provision for us his self-giving sounds the note of the tender, the wooing, the winsome. Centuries before the event of Incarnation and Atonement the prophet Hosea overheard God, whose wrath had just flayed the people Israel, sobbing in God’s own innermost heart, “How can I give you up?” Centuries later provision would be made for us just because he who has already given us up to all that our depraved hearts crave has never given up on us — and can’t. In Hosea’s era God had said to Israel, his wayward people, “I will allure her…and speak tenderly to her.”(Hos. 2:14) It is love’s plea. “I will betroth you to me in faithfulness, and you shall know the Lord.”(Hos. 2:20)
The human predicament is remedied in love’s provision, the crucified Son. The spiritually quickened see him now and are destined to glory in him eternally.
Victor Shepherd
December 1997
What Are We?
Published in The Free Methodist Herald
(Mississauga, Free Methodist Church in Canada, June, 1998)
WHAT ARE WE?
All of us glow every time we read the question and answer. Q: “What is man that thou art mindful of him?” A: “Thou hast made him little less than God, and dost crown him with glory and honour.” (Psalm 8:4-5) We should glow every time we read it. All men and women are the pinnacle of God’s creation, only slightly less than God himself. Because we are crowned, all of us, without exception, are meant for the royal family; before God there are no commoners. We are crowned with an honour that no one else can snatch from us, an honour we can’t even forfeit ourselves.
Yet this isn’t all we are. When the psalmist asks the same question again, “What is man? woman?”, the answer is different this time: “Man is like a breath; his days are like a passing shadow.” (Psalm 144: 3-4) Our “glow” has given way to sobriety as we are reminded that we are short-lived creatures for whom life passes speedily. In addition we are vulnerable creatures for whom life unfolds perilously.
When Job provides yet another answer to the same question our sobriety gives way to disagreement or disgust or even simple bewilderment. What is man? “A maggot! A worm!” (Job 25:4-6) Before we settle into bewilderment or seethe with disgust, however, we should examine the context of the question. “How can a man be innocent (NEB) or clean (RSV)?” Can a man be righteous in God’s sight? pure?” (NIV) “Maggot! Worm!” It’s the writer’s way of reminding us that we sinners are defiled in God’s sight.
Now I’m the last person to belittle what the psychologists tell us about the importance of positive self-image and self-confidence and ego-strength. The person whose self-confidence has eroded utterly or who has never had any is a truly pathetic creature. Then what are we to make of “Maggot, Worm!”, especially when we all know that maggots frequent rottenness and worms frequent excrement? Is scripture simply fostering a negative self-image, destroying what little self-confidence we have, and ruining the ego-strength we’ve struggled for years to build up?
Not at all. When scripture pronounces us “Maggot, Worm!”, it’s reminding us that sin defiles; we are defiled before a holy God. Defilement is always loathsome. Our sin repulses him. Specifically sin’s defilement deprives us of our access to God; sin’s defilement disqualifies our acceptance with God.
Yet the marvel of God’s grace is that as loathsome as our sin renders us to him, he has made provision for us in the cross of that Son who identifies himself with the loathsome. The paradox of grace is that the more loathsome we are to God the more he longs for us. The glory of the gospel is that while we can (and do) sin our way into God’s mercy, there’s always more mercy in God than there is sin in us!
“Maggot, worm!” So far from being a putdown, an ego-crusher, it’s the most positive thing that can be said of humankind. It’s positive in the first place because it’s the truth about us, and no falsehood, however sweet-sounding, is ultimately helpful or positive. It’s positive in the second place in that such a pronouncement is riddled with hope: sinners can be salvaged and restored.
Years ago I came to see that the most positive thing to be said about human beings is that we are sinners. The alternatives are unrelievably negative. If instead we say that humankind’s root problem is that we are uninformed, we make ourselves the ready victims of propagandists. If instead we say that we are socially maladjusted, we welcome the cruelty of social engineering. If instead we think our root problem to be our material deprivation, we embrace a statist economy; and statist economies, we have seen repeatedly in our century, are human horrific. It’s supremely positive to say that we are sinners: there’s hope for us!
To be sure, it’s the creature crowned with glory and honour that is also the sinner whom the Hebrew writer pronounces “Maggot, worm!” Yet it’s we maggots who, despite our best efforts at doing our worst, cannot forfeit the glory and honour in which we are created. What’s more, the provision God has made for us in his Son declares God’s unqualified longing to have us rid of our defilement and to have our inalienable glory and honour displayed in full splendour.
This is God’s intention for all of us. Some people have recognized it, now affirm it, and are stepping ahead in it. Others continue to scorn it and thrust it away. Yet the invitation and summons remain. And therefore we are to look upon every man and woman as urgently summoned and warmly invited to the fellowship of that Son in whom humankind’s destiny is realized. For God aches to see everyone the beneficiary of it.
As is so often the case, Charles Wesley gathers it all up most compellingly: “O let me commend my Saviour to you.”
Theology of Life
Published in Theological Digest & Outlook,
(Burlington, September, 1998)
THEOLOGY OF LIFE
“Sunstroke” and “moonstroke” are alike dreadful, albeit each in its own way. Yet the psalmist (Ps.121) insists that the Lord, helper and keeper of his people, has guaranteed that the “sun shall not smite you by day nor the moon by night.” When our foreparents in faith spoke metaphorically of sunstroke they had in mind the frontal assaults that crumble people: war, rape, torture, intra-family savagery. “Moonstroke”, however, was something else. To be “moonstroked” was to be submarined insidiously by what we do not see, cannot anticipate, and against which therefore we aren’t forearmed. To be moonstroked was to be victimized unknowingly, victimized helplessly, victimized utterly. It was also the conviction of our foreparents that the same Lord who safeguarded his people against “sunstroke” and “moonstroke” alike would also “keep them from all evil”, “keep their life.”
Our foreparents’ conviction notwithstanding, we can’t help asking, “Are people “kept” in the face of evil? What does it mean to say they are kept when they manifestly aren’t kept alive? How are the 1.2 million unborn children aborted each year in the U.S.A. kept? And the brain-damaged daughter of Robert Latimer, the Saskatchewan farmer, on the day her father killed her?
We can move toward answering such questions only as we patiently probe the witness of scripture to the truth. God can “keep our life” only because God is the author of life; and he is the author of life inasmuch as he is the “living God” himself. God’s very nature is life. For this reason alone he is able to impart life to his creatures, and it is his sole prerogative to do so. God “breathes” the breath of life into his creatures, who thereby are rendered living themselves.
We are not to think that the God who lives “makes alive” by sharing his deity with his creatures. (This would be but an anticipation of New Age pantheism); neither is it the case that creatures possess life as an immanent creative principle. God alone has life in himself; all others have life on a loan. The God who lives himself and makes creatures distinct from himself alive too ever remains sovereign sustainer. While God’s sustaining of life is not episodic or spasmodic and can therefore be trusted, any presumptuousness on the part of beneficiaries is inappropriate. The king of Israel knew as much when he replied to Naaman’s messengers when they sought help, “Am I God, to kill and make alive?” (2 Kings 5:7)
Since life belongs to God, individuals do not have the right to destroy their own life or wantonly take the life of others. In short, since God is uniquely “living” and sovereignly imparts life to the work of his hands, the older testament everywhere esteems life as the supreme earthly good, particularly since life is meant to be fulfilled in intimate communion with God. This latter point needs to be underlined, for it is precisely what distinguishes humankind from the animals. The animals, after all, possess life too. Created on the same “day” as humankind, and possessed of “soul” as well (according to Genesis), they are yet not the crown of creation and are not made in the image and likeness of God. While God loves the animals and protects them (as environmentalists rightly remind us), God speaks to men and women alone. God’s addressing us, however, is never idle chit-chat. His Word is freighted with his gift of salvation and his claim upon our obedience. The Hebrew word for “word” (dabar) means both “word” and “event.” By his Word God summons the creation into being; by his Word he renders us alive; by his Word our obedience is voice-activated. The event that all this is is meant to issue in the event of communion with God. Since such communion with God is the goal or purpose of human life, only the life of grateful, loving obedience is ultimately satisfying. While life is “life” by definition (i.e., by God’s decree, lest we etherealize life and undervalue bodily existence), biblical thought consistently insists without fear of contradiction that only the life that is shaped by obedience to the Word is properly called “life.”
What does it mean to say we are created “in the image and likeness of God”? God’s free resolve, “Let us make man in our image”, indicates once again that no power inheres the creaturely in such a way that the creation itself can give rise to human existence. (Any power inhering the creation that could originate humankind independently of God could also annihilate us similarly; and this the sovereign One does not permit — for our blessing.) Instead, nothing can ever deprive a human being of humanness just because we have our existence by God from God. Succinctly put, man is “of” the creation (because forever creaturely, never divine) but not “from” it (because God-fashioned for a particular relationship with him and therefore especial.) At the same time bible-readers have long noticed that scripture nowhere specifies in what the “image of God” consists. Is the image a stamp or impression engraved upon us, or is it that pulsating relationship with God, unique in the creaturely realm, to which all are called? If the latter only, then we can only conclude that all who repudiate this relationship, frustrate it, even forfeit it are accordingly devoid of the image. If the former only, then with equal rigour we must conclude that the image, without reference to a relationship and to this extent “thingified”, doesn’t have to do with the profoundly personal. In both cases the uniquely human has been lost. The witness of scripture is plain: having being created response-able (to God), we are thereby rendered response-ible. We may honour God’s intention for us or disdain it, fulfil God’s purposes or frustrate them, love God or remain indifferent. What we can’t do, however, is escape it all! While we may attempt to flee our vocation as covenant-partners of God (and the Fall means, among other things, that everyone without exception attempts such a flight), the attempt is forever futile. And precisely here is our blessing, our hope, and the only ground of our dignity and ultimate inviolability! The “substantial” aspect of the image is that God unfailingly knows us and loves us, thereby giving us our identity and our worth, together with our capacity and desire for knowing and loving him. The “relational” aspect of the image is that fully human now on account of the Creator, we can (paradoxically) become “fulfilledly” human only as we abandon ourselves to our Redeemer. While we can and do stumble with respect to our vocation, we cannot rid ourselves of its glory.
It all means that we fallen creatures are “bent in on ourselves” (as the Protestant Reformers speak of us), and because “bent” in this manner find ourselves going ’round in circles instead of stepping ahead on that way which is also truth and life. Still, God has set a limit to the disaster we bring upon ourselves: we can’t fall so as to plunge ourselves beneath our human status and render ourselves animal or even demonic. However depraved we might be, we can’t cease to be the crown of God’s creation, singularly identified for an especial bond with him and destined for a glorious future in him. It all means too that no human being, however temperamentally vicious, psychologically twisted, physically malformed or intellectually disadvantaged; none of these is to be viewed as sub-human. It also means that no one can deprive others of their God-ordained identity, preservation and protection. Regardless of how terribly people are abused, they remain what they are (human) and who they are (their identity) before God. In view of the unspeakable horrors of the twentieth century, it must be emphasized that the worst violation of a human being cannot overturn that person’s ultimate inviolability. Because of the image of God, our reality as human beings and our identity are guaranteed.
This is not to say that sinful men and women cannot and do not deny this truth in themselves and others. We need only call to mind the commandants and their S.S. assistants in the death camps of the Nazi era. Lest the victims slated for execution appear to have been murdered, they were first degraded and made to appear as less-than-human. (Only human beings are properly described as having been “murdered.”) Camp-bosses cleverly sought to preface the destruction of detainees with the latter’s self-destruction. Such self-destruction need not have entailed suicide; self-destruction as humans was fostered by the “Catch-22” of insisting that prisoners maintain personal and communal cleanliness by defecating only in specified areas and at the same time forbidding prisoners to absent themselves from work or roll-call. This “excremental assault” (the title of Chapter three of Terence des Pres’s, The Survivor) aimed at a humiliation and degradation so thoroughgoing as to relieve guards of the last twinge of conscience. For who would ever be conscience-stricken at disposing of sub-human vermin? Even the victims’ death was to be deprived of any significance for the victims themselves and their peers: the extermination of vermin bespeaks only sanity and sanitation! And of course the treatment meted out precluded even the consolation of martyrdom. Martyrs, we know, choose to die for their faith, and these people had no choice. Moreover Jewish camp-victims were slain not because of their faith but merely because of their ancestry: they happened to have had at least one Jewish great-grandparent Now at least one-eighth Jewish, they “qualified” for inhuman treatment as sub-humans.
Just as others may deny any person’s humanness (but never deprive him of it), so any one person may contradict her own humanness. We admit as much in everyday speech when we say to someone whose conduct is deplorable, “Be a man!” We never say to an alligator, “Be an alligator!” Because an alligator can be only an alligator, anything it does perfectly reflects its nature. “Be a man!”, on the other hand, means that someone is falling short of what he is created to be. He is contradicting himself; his conduct fails abysmally to reflect his nature. The glorious, humanity-saving paradox is that the imperative,”Be a man!”, lefthandedly suggests that someone can fail to be human even as the fact of the address means that he can’t! The subtle ambiguity here is grounded in the twofold significance of the image of God.
G.K. Chesterton was surely correct when he said that the Christian doctrine of the Fall is the only doctrine that is verifiable! In view of the world’s ongoing violation of defenceless humans, Christians aren’t inclined to lose sight of the truth of the doctrine. Christians often are inclined, however, to lose sight of the complementary truth that God wills to preserve a fallen world, and wills to preserve it with a view to its redemption and its eschatological renewal in Christ. In other words, God’s judgement on a fallen world includes his determination not to let it sink so far into evil that it becomes uninhabitable, his determination not to turn his back on it in disgust or abandon it as hopeless. In the wake of the Fall the creaturely, unqualifiedly good as it came from God’s hand, is now known as the “natural”; i.e., the “natural” is the creaturely warped by the Fall. On the day of “the new heavens and a new earth in which righteousness dwells” (2 Peter 3:13) the natural will be rid of its Fall-imported frustration and futility, distortion and disfigurement. In the meantime the natural remains the means whereby God providentially protects the creaturely good whose goodness he hasn’t allowed to disappear completely. To say the same thing differently, God’s providential care for a fallen world is exemplified as we see how the natural safeguards life against the unnatural. To be sure, the unnatural can prevail for a time; in the long run, however, the natural reasserts itself and prevails by its providentially-lent strength. Adolf Hitler spoke of his “Thousand-Year Reich” that was to usher in a wholly new humanity, the race of “supermen.” The result? The Reich lasted only a decade, and fifty years later the unnatural horrors of the Nazi era continue to fill even the most convinced atheist with loathing. The depredations of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, the cruelties of Mao Tse Tung and the Cultural Revolution, the throat-cutting of children and the raping of women in Bosnia, the genocide in Rawunda; the unnatural is as unmistakable as it is undeniable. At the same time the Nuernburg war-crimes trials, public outrage and economic sanctions and military interventions and international correctives: these are the reassertion of the natural in the face of the unnatural, the ever-watchful providence of God preserving the life of a fallen world for its ultimate liberation in Christ.
All that has been said concerning the natural as the means whereby God preserves life in a fallen world has specific application to the right to bodily life. It is incontrovertible that God wills human life to be bodily life. While the human person cannot be reduced to the body, the body must none the less be preserved for the sake of the person. Human beings (persons) are neither disembodied spirits nor bodies only. Yet since the body is essential to the person (no one has ever seen, met or known a person apart from encountering that person’s body), the preservation of the right to bodily life grounds all other rights. The importance of this is incalculable, particularly when the Hemlock Society speaks of the “right” to kill oneself and totalitarian societies speak characteristically of the “right” to sacrifice individuals for the sake of the collectivist good.
Then is the life of the body an end-in-itself or only a means to an end? To say only that the body is an end-in-itself is to reduce persons to bodies and to invoke the pagan cult of the body. Yet to say, on the other hand, that the body is only a means to an end (e.g., only a means to one’s personhood), is to suggest that the means can be ignored as soon as the end is obtained. If, again, the body is only a means to an end, then we have no right to bodily joys (a misapprehension that scripture corrects on page after page.) And of course if the body is only a means to an end, then any injury done to my body isn’t an injury done to me. This needs only to be stated in order to be set aside.
As the gospel-story of the rich man and the socially-useless Lazarus makes clear, life is good regardless of its utility. (Luke 16:19-31) To arrogate to ourselves the capacity to distinguish between life that is worth living and life that is not is to “Nazify” our society and welcome the unnatural. As often as I hear it suggested that we should do this I think of the severely physically disabled people, known to me, who relish life; and of the severely mentally ill people whose faith I have found radiant. And in view of the sanctuary afforded the defenceless through the many “L’Arche” communities, no more than a moment’s reflection is required to imagine Jean Vanier’s comment on the arrogance of those who take it upon themselves to “select” those whose life is deemed worth living and those whose is not.
Running throughout scripture’s nuanced discussion of life is the eschatological goal of life. Jesus Christ claims all of life as he reclaims it from the disfigurements of sin, evil and death. God protects and preserves natural life in that he has always intended its redemption and fulfilment. Scripture accordingly uses “life” of both bodily existence and this existence fulfilled in that relationship with God which Jesus Christ effects. The writer of Proverbs records the unembroidered assertion, “He who finds me finds life.” (Prov. 18:35) While God is said to have animated humans by breathing into them the breath of life, the business of humans thus rendered able to breathe themselves is to praise God. (Ps. 150:6) Over and over scripture speaks of life as an unqualified good just because there hovers above all such discussion the conviction that life is really life only as God’s purpose for it is realized: a bond with him that nothing will break. Typical is the older testament’s insistence both that life-as-such is of inestimable value and that God summons us, “Seek me and live.” (Amos 5:4) In the same vein, while God puts life and death before people who are bodily alive now and bids them choose, he doesn’t proffer life and death as if each were weighted equally. Instead God urges us, pleads with us, warns us, woos us, “Turn [i.e., repent] and live.” (Ez. 18:32) God’s pronouncement over the valley of dead bones is that people who are alive at present will yet live only as God puts his Spirit within them. (Ez. 37:14) In numerous places throughout scripture “life” means “relationship with God.” In the newer testament “life” has this meaning virtually exclusively. In the same vein “image” in the older testament speaks of our inalienable humanness; in the newer testament “image” speaks of our transformation in Christ, who is himself “the image of the invisible God.” (2. Cor. 3:18;4:4)
Jesus insists that he is life. (John 11:25) The essence of life is not to be expressed simply as biological or intellectual activity, but expressed rather as indissolubly linked to his person. Jesus never says that he has life, only that he is life. The question, “What is life?” therefore gives way to the question, “Who is life?” We must be careful, in our psychology-conscious age, lest we subtly psychologize our Lord’s insistence, as happens when people remark, “Were it not for Jesus Christ, my life would lack meaning” or “Were in not for my Lord, life wouldn’t be worth living.” While these psychological assessments are unobjectionable in themselves (because no doubt true), they are not what the apostles have in mind when they bear witness that Jesus Christ is life (John 14:6) and that he is our life. (Phil.1:21 and Col. 3:4) Despite the fact that the spiritually unquickened do not know this, affirm it or celebrate it but rather direct themselves against it, it remains the hidden truth of their existence. In the proclamation of the gospel they are summoned and equipped to “see” it, own it, confess it and praise God for it. As the definitive reversal of life’s enemy, death, the resurrection of Jesus Christ grounds the God-ordained goal of all human existence. Believers, united to their Lord who is life, know and enjoy “eternal life” now. For them, future life can only be greater intimacy with God’s “steadfast love.” Here the psalmist’s profound acquaintance with “life” — intense intimacy with his Lord — is so very rich that in contemplating its becoming richer still he finds language inadequate; he can only say, blissfully oblivious to verbal inconsistency, that God’s steadfast love (i.e., life) is even “better than life.” (Ps. 63:3)
If the nature of God’s safeguarding is to preserve us against “sunstroke” and “moonstroke”, what is the scope of God’s keeping? The psalmist says that God can be trusted to keep our “going out and coming in.” This is a rich Hebrew expression with three distinct meanings.
“Going out and coming in” is a Hebrew way of expressing entirety or totality; it comprehends every eventuality. Nothing that befalls us will ever undo God’s keeping; nothing will ever handcuff God so as to leave him unable to keep us. He who wasn’t handcuffed by the death of his Son won’t be handcuffed by anything now.
“Going out and coming in” refers to the important ventures, efforts and undertakings of life. To have these kept is to have our diligent efforts rendered fruitful. Psalm 126 promises, “He who goes out weeping, bearing the seed for sowing, shall come in with shouts of joy, bearing his sheaves with him.” We may have seen little fruit to date for the energy we have poured out, the sacrifice we have made and the prayers we have pleaded. Still, it all isn’t finally going to dribble away!. It’s going to be crowned.
“Going out and coming in” refers also to the early and sunset years of life, infancy and old age, when we are helpless, frequently voiceless, and always vulnerable. At he beginning of life and at the end we are kept. The child who dies in infancy, the still-born child, the aborted child, the brain-damaged child — all are kept inviolate before God, by God. The most senile person in the nursing home whose befuddlement has left her virtually unrecognizable, the most “scattered” schizophrenic whose inner torment wasn’t relieved for decades; the humanity and identity of these are kept inviolate before God as well.
It is “our great God and Saviour” (Titus 2:13) who will ever keep our life.
Modern Saints and Prophets?
Published in The Free Methodist Herald,
(Mississauga, Free Methodist Church in Canada, March/April, 1998)
Modern Saints and Prophets?
Recently I was asked if there are modern prophets and saints. To answer the question we need to ask more questions. “Is God alive?” “Does God speak?” “Does God still call, equip, commission and appoint?”
Let’s think first about the prophets of the biblical era. The Hebrew prophet is summoned before God, addressed by God, and appointed by God to a specific task. When the prophet is singled out (Amos said he was singled when he was a mature adult, a shepherd in Tekoa; Jeremiah, in his mother’s womb), the prophet is brought before the “heavenly council”, as it is called. Once admitted to God’s deliberations with himself, the prophet is allowed to overhear God talking to himself out loud, or even addressed by God directly. Now the prophet has been given (burdened with!) a specific word reflecting the mind and heart, the will and way and purpose of God.
But haven’t all God’s people been made aware of the mind and heart of God? Yes. All God’s people know that God has disclosed his will and way and purpose at Red Sea and Sinai, at Calvary and empty tomb. Then who needs a prophet? To be sure, Red Sea and Sinai, Calvary and empty tomb form the people of God and inform them after God’s heart. Yet in the pilgrimage of God’s people from deliverance to promised land they need specific directions for specific crises or opportunities in the midst of specific developments. Sometimes the prophet’s word is directed to the people as a whole, as was the case when the Israelites were exiled in Babylon and floundered in the midst of foreigners who taunted them and tempted them. At other times the prophet’s word is addressed to an individual, as was the case when the prophet Nathan told David, after David’s violation of Bathsheba and murder of Uriah, that the king of Israel was nonetheless a “creep.”
In all of this the prophet is different from the teacher. The teacher expounds and interprets the whole body of the truth of God. The teacher mines the rich deposits in the goldmine of the gospel. A modern teacher will expound the Sermon on the Mount or the Ten Commandments or the message of the Psalms or the parables of Jesus.
While the prophet must never contradict the whole body of the truth of God (if he does, he’s manifestly a false prophet), he has yet been called and equipped to speak God’s special word to a special development.
Since life is punctured only occasionally by special crises, since life unfolds ordinarily most of the time, it’s obvious that teachers have to be many while prophets are few. Teaching is common while prophecy is unusual. Yet both are essential. The teacher acquaints God’s people with their identity and self-understanding as God’s people; the prophet imparts specific direction in the midst of unique developments. Both are essential.
Are there modern prophets? Of course there are.
In the same way there are modern saints. “Saint” translates hagios, holy. In the New Testament saints or holy people aren’t super-spiritual Christians; all Christians — even weak or immature or sin-riddled Christians — are called “saints” without exception.
The root meaning of “holy” is “set apart.” To be sure, Christians are set apart to do much: to do the kingdom-work that obedient subjects do gladly, to labour and struggle while it is still day. Yet before they do, Christians are set apart to be. We are to be light, salt — just be.
Whenever I think of what it means to be set apart, a saint, I think of Paul’s graphic images in his Corinthian correspondence. We are to be an aroma, the fragrance of God. (2 Cor. 2:15) Now I’m exceedingly fond of perfume. I’ll even stop on the sidewalk and continue sniffing after a woman fragrant with perfume has walked on down the street. As fond as I am of perfume, I loathe stenches — and would loathe even more being a stench. We shan’t be, however, for we’ve been set apart to be an aroma, the fragrance of God, rendering God attractive.
Paul says too that Christians are God’s letter. (2 Cor. 3:23) We are the letter that God sends to others. The purpose of a letter is to convey information — and of a love-letter, to disclose the letter-writer’s heart as well. We are God’s letter, “written not with pen and ink but with the Spirit of the living God on the tablets of the human heart.”
The apostle insists too that the saints are set apart to be God’s garden, God’s plantation. (1 Cor. 3:9) A garden is meant to feed people; God’s garden is feed them ultimately with him who is the bread of life.
Saints today? All who have embraced our Lord in faith have been set apart to be — saints! And among them will also be found those prophets the church needs to hear in every era.
Victor Shepherd
February 1998
A Wedding Homily
A WEDDING HOMILY
I: — “Marriage”, says the Anglican Book of Common Prayer, “is not to be entered into lightly”. Indeed it is not, for marriage is the most significant human relationship any man or woman will ever enter upon. So momentous is marriage, so telling, so pervasive is it that it penetrates to our innermost core as no other human bond can. God deems marriage the most pertinent metaphor for his most intimate relationship with his people. Throughout scripture marriage is the commonest analogy for faith. The apostle Paul draws an explicit comparison between marriage and the life Jesus Christ lives with and in his people. So momentous is marriage, so telling is it, that adultery, everywhere in scripture, is the commonest metaphor for idolatry — where idolatry is that violation of the first commandment which entails the violation of all others. So momentous is marriage, again, that both it itself and that faith of which it speaks metaphorically are described as “mystery”. Mystery, according to our Hebrew foreparents, is never something vague or abstract or spooky; rather it is everyday concrete reality, even as this concreteness remains profound — so profound that while it can be pointed to, experienced, commended, and described it can never be explained, much less explained away. No words can finally do justice to mystery.
II: — Jesus insists that marriage involves both leaving and cleaving. “Leaving” implies this: while we are not to neglect, despise, abandon or forget our families once we marry, nonetheless we must understand, as they must understand, that they are no longer the chief source of our human comfort and consolation: our spouse is and ever must be. In the same way we must understand, as they must understand, that they no longer have first claim upon us: our spouse has and ever must have.
And “cleaving”? Jesus insists that as we leave others and cleave to spouse we become “one”, “one flesh”. “One flesh” means one, unitary organism of body, mind and spirit. It does not mean that we become clones of each other or mere functions of each other. It does not mean that personality and individuation have been surrendered. Yet neither does it mean that our new union can be likened to two blocks of wood now glued together. For regardless of how tightly glued they might be they never interpenetrate each other. A “one flesh” union, rather, must be likened to a tree-graft. The graft occurs when two living organisms are opened up to each other, are allowed to pervade and suffuse each other, immerse themselves in each other — and thereafter are fused forever. As this occurs they bring forth fruit in a splendour and munificence they otherwise could not.
When two trees are grafted together each is first slashed sharply. The slash exposes what has been heretofore hidden; it lays bare the innermost substance of each. In this development what each possesses uniquely is made available inimitably to the other. At the same time the slash undeniably renders each tree vulnerable. Plainly, risk of and exposure to vulnerability is the condition of any union worthy of the description, “one flesh”. If two people are to be married in that union of which our Lord speaks then there must be defenceless openness and self-forgetful self-exposure, together with the sober recognition that the fearsomeness of this rent is the condition of the fusion’s fruitfulness.
III: — Yet while all Christians aspire after such a union the ubiquity of the Fall finds anyone’s marriage molested by sin. We ourselves are fallen creatures in whom the image of God is now partially obscured and defaced (even as its lineaments remain recognizable). Individually and collectively our humanity is distorted by depravities within and dangers without. Then marriage will remain resilient, in the face of such depravities and dangers, only by grace, God’s grace. Which is to say, marriage thrives as it aspires to reflect God’s resolve to be faithful to his promises declared to us in Christ Jesus. And since when God’s faithfulness meets our sin it assumes the form of forgiveness, marriage thrives as we extend that pardon which has been quickened by the greater pardon we have received. We must recall the foundation of God’s covenant-faithfulness whenever our proximity to each other fosters friction and magnifies irritability.
Marriage endures by faithfulness. The current myth that has left so many people tasting dust and ashes is that it endures by sentiment. Marriage must continue to thrive even on those occasions — whether short-lived or protracted — when two people are feeling less than enraptured.
A corollary to faithfulness is patience. When grass turns brown in the summer sensible people do not tear up the lawn; they know that in another month the heat will pass and the lawn become green again. Impatience here is not only inappropriate but utterly destructive; it betokens not so much silliness as folly.
IV: — Finally we must remember that while marriage promises a most intimate, rich, and satisfying communion it cannot provide what it was never meant to provide; namely, that profoundest contentment found only in God. To expect husband or wife to provide what no human partner is able to provide; to expect husband or wife to give what only God can is to burden marriage unrealistically. Then we shall always need to hear and heed and cling to him whose burden is light, whose yoke is easy, and whose name is the only name given to us whereby we may be saved.
What God joins together let none of us put asunder — ever.
Amen
Victor A. Shepherd
November 1993
The Holiness of God & the Holiness of God’s People
I: — “I have been crucified to the world, and the world has been crucified to me,” the apostle Paul declares in his Galatian letter. (Gal. 6:14) Is he boasting? Is he putting himself forward as a spiritual super-achiever whom we are to recognize and congratulate?
On the contrary, he insists it’s by the cross of Christ he’s been crucified to the world and the world to him. He claims no credit at all for whatever has happened to him. The crucified One has turned him from Saul to Paul, from persecutor to apostle, from someone who bragged “blameless” in terms of the law to someone who shamefully acknowledges he’s the “chief of sinners” in light of the gospel. Boasting about himself is the farthest thing from his mind. If he’s going to boast at all he’s going to boast in – that is, extol – the cross of Christ and this only.
Crucifixion always has to do with rejection. At the cross our Lord was rejected by religious authorities and civil authorities alike. He was even rejected by uncomprehending disciples. Not least, he was rejected by his Father – “Why have you forsaken me? – even as Father and Son alike owned the Just Judge’s judgment on sin and alike absorbed the Just Judge’s condemnation of sinners, thereby pardoning all who cling to the Son in faith and find themselves at home with the Father. Crucifixion always entails rejection of some sort.
When Paul exclaims that the world has been crucified to him he means he’s rejected the world’s tinsel and trifles and toys. None of it appeals to him. The world’s superficiality, its tawdriness, its hollow promises; he craves none of it.
What doesn’t appeal to Paul can’t ‘hook’ him. Since there’s nothing in the world Paul craves there’s nothing in the world that can seduce him or seize him. He can’t be ‘hooked.’
At the same time Paul insists he has been crucified to the world. The world has rejected him. The abuse he’s received over and over amply attests the world’s rejection of him. To say he’s been rejected by the world is to say there’s nothing in him the world wants. Therefore there’s nothing in him he can sell. There’s nothing in him the world can co-opt.
Think about it. There’s nothing in the world the apostle craves and by which he can be ‘hooked.’ There’s nothing in him the world wants and by which he can be co-opted. If he can’t be ‘hooked’ and he can’t be co-opted then he’s free. It’s only as we are crucified to the world and the world crucified to us that we are free. As long as there’s something in the world we crave we risk being enslaved by it. As long as there’s something in us the world can co-opt we risk being swept up into schemes that aren’t God-honouring. But insofar as we are beyond such risks we are free.
“Am I not free?” Paul cries to his detractors in the church in Corinth. “Have I not seen Jesus our Lord?” It’s his sight of the crucified One and his transformation by the crucified One and his public identification with the crucified One: this has made him free. He is free by the cross of Christ.
II: — What is freedom? Most people think of freedom as the capacity to choose among alternatives; i.e., we are free if we can choose to watch TV or study Hebrew grammar or attend an event at Tyndale. Choosing among alternatives, however, is mere non-determinism. Non-determinism has nothing to do with freedom.
According to Scripture to be free is to be freed from every impediment that hinders us from acting in accord with our true nature. When Paul declares in Gal. 5 “For freedom Christ has set us free” he doesn’t mean that Christ has made us able to choose between obeying him or disobeying him, honouring or not honouring him. Paul means only that Christ has removed every impediment to our obeying him; therefore freedom is obeying Christ. Christ has removed every impediment to our honouring him; therefore freedom is honouring Christ.
Think of it this way. If a de-railing switch has been placed on railway tracks, a train running over the switch will come off the tracks and stop. However, if someone removes the derailing switch, the train will be free to run along the rails. Now if someone says “But is the train free to fly like a bird?” we must hasten to answer that it isn’t a train’s nature to fly like a bird; it’s a train’s nature to run on rails.
You and I were created as sons and daughters of God. Our nature is to obey God and love him and love all whom he has made to live with us. On account of our depravity, however, we don’t obey and we don’t love. We are self-absorbed. Our self-absorption is a giant impediment to our acting in accord with our true nature. The impediment has to be removed. Only Jesus Christ can remove it. For this reason the apostle John exclaims, “If the Son makes you free you will be free indeed.” (John 8:36)
Because Paul is the beneficiary of Christ’s cross he and the world are crucified to each other. He is free. He has been freed from every impediment to acting in accordance with his true nature: he is a child of God called to be an apostle.
Who called him into the company of Jesus Christ? Who called him to be an apostle? God did. Not deity-in-general; not one deity among others. The God who called him is the God who is unique, comparable to no one; the God who admits no rivals and whom no one else approximates; in a word, the God who called Paul is the God who is holy.
III: — To say that God is holy is to say that God is incomparably himself. He belongs to no class. He is predicated of nothing. He isn’t one among several deities; he isn’t even one among several deities albeit the best or the greatest or the most important. He, Yahweh, alone is God.
Everyone is aware of how crucial Deut. 6:4 is to Israel’s faith: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one.” If this text (“…the Lord our God…”) is read by itself, however, it might suggest that Yahweh happens to be Israel’s God but Shiva could be no less the deity of Hinduism and Devas of Buddhism. In order to avoid this misunderstanding we must always read Deut. 6:4 alongside Zech. 14:9: “And on that day Yahweh will be king over all the earth. On that day Yahweh will be one and his name one.” Yahweh isn’t a deity among the deities or even the highest of the deities. Yahweh alone is God. Foundationally God’s holiness is God’s uniqueness. The Holy One of Israel alone is God.
[i] Because God’s holiness is God’s unique Godness; because God’s Godness is derived from nothing else and is shared with nothing else, God is not to be identified with his creation as a whole or with any part or dimension or aspect of his creation. While pantheism maintains that God is the essence of all that is, prophet and apostle insist that God is not the essence of anything God has made. The being of God is divine. The being of the creation is creaturely. There is a qualitative discontinuity here, an ontological discontinuity that can’t be compromised. The being of God is infinite and necessary. The being of the creation is finite and contingent. Any suggestion that a creaturely item is divine is an affront to the holiness of God.
A minute ago I spoke of pantheism, the notion that God is the essence of all that is. Panentheism, a near relative, insists that God is in the essence or of the essence of all that is. If God is the essence or of the essence of all that is, then there’s nothing that isn’t divine. And if there’s nothing that isn’t divine, then by definition sin and evil can’t exist. (Now we understand why our secularite ‘yuppie’ friends flirt with or are even devotees of the New Age Movement. The New Age Movement, pantheistic or at least panentheistic, legitimates, even divinizes, all human behaviour while denying any human behaviour to be sinful or wicked.)
[ii] In the second place God’s holiness means that God can’t be measured by or assessed by anything other than himself. God is the absolute standard of himself.
[iii] In the third place God’s holiness means that God’s character is without defect or deficiency. God’s character is free from taint of any kind.
Whereas human love is often mixed with sentimentality, God’s love is devoid of soppiness of any sort.
Whereas human anger – even genuinely righteous anger, the sort of anger that God mandates – nonetheless remains mixed with irascibility or petulance, God’s anger is devoid of ill-temper of any sort.
Whereas human judgement, however just, is never without bias, God’s judgement is devoid of arbitrariness at all times.
Whereas human patience can masquerade indifference or detachment, God’s patience is never disguised detachment or disguised indifference.
Whereas human sovereignty is usually little more than coercion, God’s sovereignty is utterly devoid of tyranny. (What, after all, is less tyrannical, less coercive than God the Son dying between two criminals at the city garbage dump, abandoned by friends and Father?)
[iv] In the fourth place, God’s holiness means that all aspects of God’s character are gathered up into a unity. Just as every shade of the spectrum from infrared to ultraviolet is gathered up into what we call ‘light,’ so every aspect of God’s character and God’s loftiness and God’s lordship is gathered up into God’s holiness.
IV: — The God who is holy insists that his people be holy too. Needless to say, we can’t be holy with God’s Godness, since God’s Godness he shares with no one. Nonetheless we are appointed to reflect God’s holiness, to reflect God’s character, in a way that is appropriate to us whom he has made in his likeness and image. To say we are made in God’s image is to say we are to mirror God in such a way that when people look at us they see God imaged in us.
It should surprise no one, then, that from cover to cover Scripture is preoccupied with holiness. Scripture is preoccupied, we have to admit, where the church hasn’t been. For instance, Christians have contended vociferously over predestination. We should note, however, that the predestination word-group occurs approximately fifteen times in Scripture, while the holy/holiness word-group occurs 835 times. Scripture is obsessed with holiness, both God’s and ours.
I am convinced that the overarching, all-inclusive theme of Scripture is two intertwined matters: God’s re-assertion of his holiness in the face of our denying his, and God’s re-establishing our holiness in the wake of our contradicting ours. We deny God’s holiness and we contradict our own. According to Scripture God is ceaselessly at work to re-assert his holiness and re-establish ours. The holiness of God and the holiness of God’s people are Scripture’s preoccupation.
Both these concerns are gathered up in what I call the ‘root’ commandment of Scripture. The ‘root commandment’ is found in Lev. 19:2 and repeated elsewhere: “You shall be holy as I the Lord your God am holy.” This commandment is heard over and over throughout the bible. It’s the bass note; it’s the downbeat; it’s the refrain; it’s the pulse: “You shall be holy as I, the Lord your God, am holy.”
The ‘root’ commandment, I have called it? But look at the grammatical form: “You shall be….” “You shall be” can be read as command or as promise. Read as command it means “You ought to be holy, you had better be holy.” Read as promise it means “One day you will be rendered holy; I guarantee it: you will be found holy.”
It is our friends, the seventeenth-century Puritans, who insist that all God’s commands are “covered promises.” The Puritans always knew that what God requires of his people God gives to his people. What God commands his people to exemplify God promises his people will display. Put another way, “You shall be holy as I, the Lord your God, am holy” is the command of God underlying all Scripture and no less the promise of God crowning and adorning all Scripture.
V: — Holiness is both God’s gift and humankind’s task. What God gives us, we are to exemplify. Holiness is both by grace and by grit. How gritty is the grit? Very gritty, according to the single most protracted discussion of holiness in all of Scripture. The single most protracted discussion of holiness is found in Leviticus, chapters 18-27. Leviticus 18 begins, “And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying, ‘Speak to the people of Israel, and say to them I am the Lord your God. You shall not do as they do in the land of Egypt, where you lived, and you shall not do as they do in the land of Canaan, to which I am bringing you.” Plainly holiness has everything to do with our doing. It doesn’t matter how we feel or what we intend or what ecstatic religious experiences we have undergone if we fail to do.
Do what? Holiness, so far from being so heavenly as to be of no earthly good, is startlingly mundane, according to Lev. 18-27. Consider the following. We are never to disrespect the elderly but rather to stand up when we meet them in order to honour them. We are to treat the stranger (the stranger is always vulnerable, lonely and anxious) as one of us. If we are merchants we are to use just balances and weights and measures. If we have to go to court we mustn’t attempt to bribe the judge. And if we happen to be the judge then we must judge justly, favouring neither the rich nor the poor.
We mustn’t offer up our children to pagan deities. Surely the discussion of holiness in Leviticus is irrelevant right here, for who would sacrifice their own children today? As a matter of fact millions offer up their children to pagan deities every day. How many parents are there in Thailand who have consigned their children, more or less twelve years old, to a horrific sex-trade catering to wealthy Europeans and North Americans while the Thai government looks the other way, so incomparably lucrative is the tourist sex-trade for the Thai economy?
Do you think children today aren’t offered up to pagan deities? Surely a child is sacrificed to a pagan deity when the little boy is told from infancy that he must become an NHL player, and everything in the family is given over to this all-consuming preoccupation.
Do you think children today aren’t offered up to pagan deities? Then why is it a handicapped child has the right to special education and the right to social assistance and the right to special access in public buildings and, not least, the right to her own toilet – but she doesn’t have the right to be born? The government of Canada (the people of Canada) will ensure that she has her own washroom but won’t ensure that she gets to use it.
Leviticus says more. God’s people aren’t to reap a field of grain right to the border or gather the gleanings after the harvest. Why not? Food has to be left for poor people and sojourners (resident aliens) lest they go hungry. Employers must pay the worker his wages at the end of the day (not next morning or next week) since the worker needs money the same evening in order to feed his family. The deaf aren’t to be cursed or a stumbling block put in the way of the blind. Vengeance is not be exacted upon the offender and no one is to bear a grudge. In short, “You shall not hate your brother in your heart, but…you shall love your neighbour as yourself.”
Lest we think that such down-to-earth holiness is a peculiarity of the book the church manages to avoid (when is the last time your pastor preached on Leviticus?) we should look at holiness in the book of Exodus: “You shall not boil a kid (young goat) in its mother’s milk.” (Exod. 23:19) Why not? A she-goat would never be aware that her offspring was being boiled in her milk.
There are two considerations here. One, even though the goat isn’t aware that it’s her offspring being cooked in her milk, anyone who has watched a mammal nurse her offspring tenderly and defend it fiercely would be utterly insensitive if he did what the command of God forbids. In the second place, in the ancient world to boil a young goat in its mother’s milk was to invoke a foreign deity. If God forbids us now to boil a kid in its mother’s milk then God is forbidding his people now to call upon foreign deities.
Tell me: what deities, so-called, are invoked right now? What deities are invoked when a baseball player who fails to get a hit seven times out of ten is guaranteed ten million dollars per year for the next five years while homemakers are selling daffodils on street corners because cancer patients needing treatment have been told there’s a six-month waiting list for the equipment?
And while we are talking about earthly holiness we might as well talk about earthy matters, like sex. Everywhere in Scripture it is deemed ludicrous to speak of holiness in any respect if sexual integrity is lacking. If you read the Newer Testament carefully you will find that sexual integrity is found in all the apostolic discussions of the holiness of God’s people. Think, for instance, of the apostle’s statement in Colossians 3: because Jesus Christ is the life of any follower of Christ, any follower is by definition a new creation in Christ. The old man or woman has been slain at the cross as surely as Christ was slain. Yet the old man, Martin Luther reminds us, doesn’t die quietly: the corpse still twitches. For this reason, says Paul, we have to keep on putting him or her to death. On the one hand, it makes no sense to speak of slaying what’s already been slain. But Luther, like his Lord before him, relishes paradox. And for this reason Luther glories in Paul’s insistence that we who have already put on Christ must continue to put him on (every morning, in fact), while we whose old man has already been slain must continue to slay him.
When Paul renders more specific what’s involved in slaying the old man/woman he begins with “fornication, impurity….” In case we think his insistence in Colossians 3 no more than Paul’s intrapsychic oddity he says the same in Ephesians 5: “Walk in love, as Christ loved us and gave himself up for us….but fornication and impurity….Take no part in the unfruitful works of darkness, but instead expose them.”
Here Paul is accurately reflecting the Master who electrified him on the Damascus road and scorched him forever. For when Jesus says that nothing going into us makes us unclean; what makes us unclean is what comes out of us, out of the heart – when Jesus speaks of this matter he cries, “What comes out of a man is what defiles a man. For from within, out of the heart of man, come evil thoughts, fornication….” (Mark 7:1-23) To aspire to holiness without aspiring to sexual integrity is oxymoronic.
Yet we mustn’t become one-sided, lopsided, in our understanding. In one and the same sentence Paul speaks in Ephesians 5 of both fornication and covetousness, even pronouncing covetousness to be idolatrous (something he doesn’t predicate of fornication.) And when Jesus speaks of what defilements come out of the human heart, he follows “fornication” immediately by “theft.” It’s obvious that our integrity concerning money says as much about holiness as our integrity concerning sex.
In a discussion of the holiness of God’s people we need to remember that Jesus says more about money, in the written gospels, than he says about any other single topic. Jesus says more about money than about anything else (sex included) for one reason: money is a graver spiritual threat than anything else. In the synoptic gospels money is mentioned in one verse out of ten; in Luke’s gospel, one verse out of eight. (And in the epistle of James, one verse out of five.) Money, we should note, receives an attention in Scripture that it appears not to receive in the contemporary church’s conversation.
Let’s ponder money and its spiritual force. According to 1st John 3:8 the purpose of Christ’s coming is to “destroy the works of the devil.” According to Hebrews 2:14-15 the purpose of Christ’s coming is to “destroy him who has the power of death…and to deliver all those who through fear of death were subject to lifelong bondage.” And then in Luke 16:13 Jesus says briefly and bluntly, “You cannot serve God and mammon.” In other words, according to Jesus the power of God and the power of mammon (mammon isn’t merely a commodity; it’s a spiritual power) are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. God and mammon are rival powers who will agree to no truce in their seeking to win the loyalty of everyone they touch.
John opposes God and the evil one. Hebrews opposes God and the power of death. Jesus opposes God and mammon. Plainly the devil, the power of death, and mammon are related; they are three different angles of vision pertaining to the one actuality, the looming actuality that strives to loom larger than God in his immensity. These three powers – devil, death and mammon – how do you think these three powers are related?
To speak of the devil is to highlight the Christian life as spiritual conflict. To speak of death and bondage to death is to highlight Jesus Christ as resurrection and life. To speak of mammon is to highlight Christ’s exposure of mammon as the chief vehicle that the death-dealing, evil one deploys. In other words, the devil deals out death; and the devil deals out death chiefly through mammon.
If you think me overstated let me refer you to someone wiser than I, John Wesley. So very profoundly had Wesley observed the connection among the three powers that he pronounced mammon to be the talent that gathers up all other talents (intellectual gifts and athletic gifts, for instance, are different kinds of talent. Don’t most people sell their talent to the highest bidder?) Mammon is the temptation that underlies all other temptations; mammon is the snare, “a steel trap that crushes the bones,” Wesley wrote graphically, having in mind an eighteenth-century bear trap. Mammon is the poison that kills the most ardent discipleship. In Scripture money is related to holiness as money isn’t related to holiness in today’s church.
VI: — Yet in our discussion of the holiness of God’s people we must beware at all times of why so very many people are nervous as soon as they hear the word ‘holiness.’ They are nervous because they have seen first-hand, and seen first-hand too often, an uninformed zeal for holiness pursue the holy (so-called) at the price of the human. It’s as though a zeal for holiness were inherently dehumanizing. We must renounce all such nonsense. The truth is, the purpose of God’s sanctifying grace is to render us authentically human. Some people have foolishly spoken of God’s sanctifying grace in terms of their becoming superhuman. But to aspire to be superhuman is to aspire after sin. To want to be superhuman is to disdain God’s gift of humanness. And not to put too fine an edge on it; to aspire to be superhuman is to behave like a subhuman. It is the purpose of God’s grace to render us authentically human.
What does this mean? A few minutes ago I spoke of the ‘root’ commandment of Scripture: “You shall be holy as I the Lord your God am holy.” Now recall the great commandment, “You shall love the Lord your God without qualification or reservation or hesitation, and you shall love your neighbour with total self-forgetfulness.” How is the root commandment related to the great commandment? The connection is plain: holiness is freedom to love. To be holy is to be human (authentically human); to be authentically human is to be free to love.
We must be sure to grasp that the great commandment mandates we love God and neighbour, not that we understand God or neighbour. To be sure, we must understand something of God or else it’s nonsensical to say we love him. It’s ludicrous to say “I love x, and I don’t have a clue as to who or what x might be.” At the same time, we can understand relatively little of God yet love him profoundly. And, regrettably, we can understand a great deal about God yet not love him at all, thanks to our sin-shrivelled heart.
Don’t misunderstand me: I never belittle understanding. God isn’t honoured by human ignorance, and above all never honoured by ignorance of the truth concerning him. In case anyone needs to be reminded, I have spent my entire working life teaching Christian doctrine; that is, I have always endeavoured to help people understand the truth of God. After all, the more we understand of God the greater our capacity to love him. Yet we must never think that the ‘A’ student in systematic theology loves God exceedingly well by virtue of the grade she received in the theology course.
In the same vein I’ll never be found decrying the place of the will in Christian discipleship. I’m saddened to see people who have a wishbone where they ought to have a backbone. Yet I’m aware that love governs willing as surely as love governs understanding. Just as we understand most thoroughly what we love most profoundly, so we do most consistently what we love most profoundly.
In the short run we can always will what we don’t love. If we don’t love studying Greek but we do love basketball, in the short run, tonight, we can always study Greek anyway instead of watching the Raptors’ basketball game because there’s a Greek test tomorrow and if we don’t study we won’t pass. But what happens in the short run never happens in the long run. In the long run we always end up willing, doing, what we love; and in the long run we always come to understand most profoundly what we love. In other words, what we love integrates our understanding and our willing; which is to say, what we love integrates us. For this reason the great commandment isn’t that we understand God; the great commandment isn’t even that we obey him. The great commandment is that we love him, for if we genuinely love him we shan’t fail to understand him and obey him.
What about holiness and love of the neighbour? Once again, we are called to love the neighbour, not understand her. Regardless of what we might understand of her there remain oceanic immensities in her that we don’t understand and never will. When people tell me they can’t understand me, I remind them they should try loving me. In our depravity we prefer to understand the neighbour, and prefer this for two reasons: one, if we understand her we think we’ll have legitimate reason not to love her; two, if we understand her we’ll be able to manipulate her. But the great commandment forbids us to excuse our lovelessness and forbids us to manipulate. We are mandated to love.
Thomas Chalmers, a nineteenth-century Church of Scotland minister, spoke often of “the expulsive power of a new affection.” He meant that only a qualitatively new affection – Holy Spirit-quickened love of God and neighbour – could expel the old affections and passions that haunt us and hurt others. What’s involved in a new affection I have learned most profoundly from my friends who are addicts. The men and women of Alcoholics Anonymous distinguish between someone who is chemically sober and someone who is contentedly sober. The chemically sober person is the addict who is alcohol-free at this moment, in the short run, thanks to his short-run force of will. But everyone knows he’s going to relapse in the long run, still in bondage to his addiction. The contentedly sober person, on the other hand, can continue to will his sobriety just because he’s intimately acquainted with “the expulsive power of a new affection.”
Holiness is finding through God’s grace the integration of the affections together with the integration of affect and understanding and will.
VII: — We began tonight with Gal. 6:14. We noted that to be crucified to the world and to have the world crucified to us means there’s nothing in the world we crave and by which we can be hooked, at the same time that there’s nothing in us that the world can use and by which we can be co-opted. We said too that to find ourselves in this situation is know ourselves free because freed by Jesus Christ.
As we are freed by Jesus Christ we are free from the world and its blandishments precisely in order to be free for the world in its need. Over and over the psalmist insists that God is for us. God is for the world. God so loved the world – and continues to love it – that he embraced the world so as never to disdain it or spurn it or abandon it.
Next we probed the nature of God’s holiness, God’s unique Godness wherein his being is free from the being of the creation in every respect. Now, however, we must be sure to grasp that God as God is free from the world in order to be free for the world. The God whose holiness means he must never be confused with the world is the God who so loves the world as never to fail it or forsake it.
By God’s grace you and I have been freed from our bondage to unbelief. Freed from our unbelief and its attendant self-absorption, we are freed for our immersion in God and our immersion in God’s world. It is God’s holiness that renders him singularly helpful to the world. It is no less our holiness that renders us salt and light in the midst of the world.
In a word, as we are crucified to the world and the world is crucified to us we are profoundly holy and pervasively a blessing to that world which we now love with a love that mirror’s God’s.
VIII: — The Newer Testament characteristically speaks of Christ’s people as hagioi, ‘holy ones,’ ‘saints.’ Saints aren’t spiritual super-achievers of any sort. Saints are simply exemplary human beings. Saints are human beings, restored by God’s grace to human authenticity, who exemplify him who went about doing good inasmuch as he knew that One alone is good, and this One alone is good just because this One is Yahweh, and Yahweh alone is God.
Victor Shepherd 7 June 2012
Why Does God Allow Bad Things Happen To Good People?
I (i) — “Why does God allow bad things to happen to good people” – this is the question I have been asked to address tonight. I’m somewhat bothered by the question. After all, since all of us are sinners – “No one is good but God alone”, says Christ Jesus our Lord – surely the question should be “Why does God allow bad things to happen to anyone?” Since the ‘bad things’ by which we are assaulted are ‘bad’ insofar as they inflict suffering upon us, we could as readily ask, “Why does God allow people to suffer dreadfully?” or even “Why does God allow people to suffer at all?”
When we ask the question, “Why suffering?”, we may be assuming that God, good and powerful in equal measure, should be able to program a universe and design human beings in such a way that suffering would never occur. In asking the question we are assuming that we human beings who are asking the question could remain who and what we are — persons whose intellectual nature is what we know it to be — even if we were redesigned so as to be unable to suffer.
But is this the case? To ask the question, “Why suffering? Why does God permit suffering?”; such a question requires a high level of abstract thought. The capacity for high level, abstract thought presupposes a very sophisticated brain and neural structure. Neurobiologists remind us that as a creature’s neural complexity increases so does that creature’s level of consciousness. A monkey has a spinal cord and brain vastly more complex than that of a toad. As neurological complexity increases, the level of consciousness increases and intelligence increases. Neuroscientists are aware too, however, that increasing complexities in neural structure are quantitative: the shift from consciousness to self-consciousness, from percept-awareness to concept-awareness; this shift is qualitative. Therefore while the human creature is the only instance in the animal world of self-consciousness, the only instance of abstract thought, our capacity for such can’t be reduced to unparalleled neural complexity. But while our capacity here can’t be reduced to unparalleled neural complexity – that is, neural complexity isn’t sufficient to yield the capacity for abstract thought – neural complexity is necessary for abstract thought. After all, a toad doesn’t ask questions like the question in tonight’s address. Neither does a robin. A robin isn’t distressed over the matter of slaying a worm, even though the writhing of the worm indicates that the worm resists being stretched and slain and eaten. The robin merely kills and eats instinctually, as instinctually as the worm itself does whatever worms do to stay alive.
We human beings, however, are different. We don’t act instinctually; we ask questions. To ask the question, “Why suffering in a world governed by God?”; simply to understand that there’s an issue here, simply to be able to formulate the question: all of this requires an exceedingly complex neural structure. The complex neural structure that allows us to understand the problem and formulate the question is the same complex neural structure that gives us our extraordinary capacity for pain; not merely our capacity for physical pain, but also our capacity for emotional pain.
In asking the question we are assuming that we can have the extraordinary privilege, as it were, of being able to reflect as we do without our extraordinary vulnerability to suffering. But – let me say it again – the neural complexity that supports advanced thinking is the same neural complexity that supports increased suffering. Whenever we ask the question, “Why does God allow us to suffer?”, we are asking, in effect, “Why doesn’t God create us so that we can think profoundly enough to ask the question about suffering even as he creates us so that we have no capacity for suffering itself?” In asking for this has it ever occurred to us that we might be asking for something that is logically self-contradictory? If we were to ask, “Why doesn’t God make a square circle?”, we’d recognise immediately the silliness of what we’ve proposed; we’d never fault God for not making a square circle, since a square circle is a logical impossibility, an instance of nonsense, non-sense. No one faults God for not creating non-sense. When we ask the question that has motivated today’s sermon we should pause; we might be asking for non-sense; we might be asking for a logical impossibility.
(ii) In the second place, since we are creatures with enormous sensitivity to suffering, we must admit that some sensitivity to pain is essential to our self-preservation. Sensitivity to physical pain is essential if we are going to survive in a physical world. The elderly person who has lost sensitivity in her hand places her hand on a stove element to steady herself. She burns her hand. Then the burn infects. Now she has blood poisoning in her arm. Because she has diminished sensitivity to pain she can’t protect herself; unable to protect herself, she can’t preserve herself.
In the same way it’s our capacity for mental anguish that facilitates our self-preservation. The person who is working too hard, too long, under too much stress finds himself exhibiting telltale signs that he is close to collapse. The telltale signs he exhibits are in fact different instances of suffering that are nothing less than a ‘wake-up’ call. He’s been warned. The warning signs (his suffering) tell him that he has to make changes for the sake of self-preservation.
(iii) In the third place, our capacity for suffering is also our capacity for pleasure. To be without any vulnerability to pain would mean that we should never know delight. Once more, to fault God for not making us able to experience pleasure without exposure to pain might be faulting him for not creating a logical impossibility, non-sense.
(iv) In the fourth place, when we think beyond our private vulnerability to suffering to our capacity to cause others to suffer, to harm them, the question then becomes, “Why is the universe so arranged that people can be made to suffer terribly on account of someone else’s cruelty?” When we ask this question we forget that that arrangement of the universe which makes it possible for others to harm us also makes it possible for others to help us. (Such help we shall always need in a fallen world. In heaven, however, we shall delight in our Lord and in each other without the capacity for pain, and because we shall lack nothing we shall neither need to be helped nor have the capacity to be harmed.)
(v) In the fifth place, we must never forget what C.S. Lewis holds up before us: “God whispers to us in our pleasures, shouts at us in our pain.” Elsewhere the thoughtful Englishman has said, “Pain is God’s megaphone to rouse a deaf world.” Most often we don’t even recognise sin’s consequences to be consequences of sin until pain has pierced us. Our suffering here is God’s attempt at getting our attention. (I say God’s attempt at getting our attention, since it’s obvious his previous attempts have failed). As fallen creatures self-absorbed in folly we tend to get serious about our sin only as its consequences pain us.
“Why does God allow people to suffer so dreadfully? Why does God allow people to suffer at all?” I trust that what I have said so far provides reason for some suffering at least.
II: — At the same time I admit that when we have reflected upon the five considerations mentioned in the last few minutes we don’t have reason enough for the great weight of suffering afflicting humankind. There is suffering so intense, so relentless, that it’s of no use at all. It doesn’t further our self-preservation in any way. It is vastly greater suffering than appears to be needed for anything.
The Great War (World War I) set a record, an infamous record: never before had nation slaughtered nation on such a hideous scale. Twenty million people perished in World War I, that is, twenty million over the course of four years. Virtually all of them, we should note, were military combatants waging war.
World War I was immediately followed by an outbreak of influenza. The Great ’Flu Epidemic began in October 1918 and lasted until May 1919; the Great ’Flu Epidemic lasted only seven months. In those seven months between 50 million and 100 million people perished. Were those whom the ’Flu Epidemic consumed chiefly the very youngest and the very oldest, those with the least resistance to sickness? On the contrary, those who perished in the epidemic were chiefly young men and women aged 20 to 45. In other words, the ’Flu Epidemic slew young parents whose orphaned children would never recover psychologically or materially.
III: — In all our discussions concerning evil we had better be sure always to insist that evil is evil, unalterably evil, invariably evil. We had better never be found mouthing the ridiculous platitudes that evil (what some ‘merely’ call ‘evil’) is actually a good in disguise. A good in disguise is still good, however unrecognized. Evil, however, can never be good. We must never say that evil is a latent good, for a latent good is unarguably good. Neither is evil good-on-the-way, or the potential for good. Of itself evil is never the potential for anything except more evil.
My aunt’s grandson (my cousin’s son) died at age seven. The little boy was born a normal child and developed normally until age two when he was diagnosed with a neurological disease. His condition deteriorated thereafter. His facial appearance changed — became grotesque, in fact; his mobility decreased; and his intellectual capacity decreased. When I spoke with my aunt at the funeral parlour I said to her, “There’s no explanation for this.” (I didn’t mean there was no neurological explanation; of course there was a neurological explanation.) I meant, rather, “Given what you and I know of God, there’s no explanation for this.” My aunt told me later it was the most comforting thing anyone had said to her at the funeral parlour, for virtually everyone who spoke with her put forth an “explanation”; such as, “Maybe God wanted to teach the parents something.” What were the parents supposed to be taught by watching their son suffer and stiffen and stupefy for five years? “Maybe God was sparing the little boy something worse later in his life.” It would be difficult to imagine anything worse. These aren’t explanations; these are insults. As long as God is love, unimpeded love, there isn’t going to be an explanation for this.
We must always be careful and think 25 times before we conclude we’ve found the meaning (or even a meaning) to such a development. Think of the one and one-half million children who perished during the holocaust. Their parents (four and one-half million of them) were first gassed to death, whereupon their remains were burnt. The children, on the other hand, were never gassed; they were thrown live into the incinerators. If anyone claims to be aware of the meaning of this event I shall say, among other things, “Meaning for whom? for the barbequed children? for their parents? for their survivors? for their executioners? for the shallow pseudo-philosophers who think their question is worth the breath they spend to utter it?” What meaning could there ever be to such an event?
We can ask the same question in the midst of Toronto’s newest: a hospice for children afflicted with incurable, neurodegenerative diseases.
IV: — In light of what I’ve just said I have to tell you how unhappy I’ve been with Harold Kushner’s bestselling book (now twenty years old but still referenced), When Bad Things Happen To Good People. I’m disappointed in the book for several reasons. In the first place there’s virtually no discussion of God’s love in Kushner’s discussion of God. In view of the fact that God is love, that God’s nature is to love, the book is woefully deficient right here. In the second place, because God’s love isn’t discussed, the rest of the book is skewed. Kushner writes, “Let me suggest that the bad things that happen to us in our lives do not have a meaning when they happen to us. [I’ve no problem with this.] They do not happen for any good reason which would cause us to accept them willingly. [No problem here either.] We can redeem these tragedies from senselessness by imposing meaning on them.” I object to this statement. We redeem them by imposing meaning on them? Any meaning that is imposed can only be arbitrary. An arbitrary meaning, something imposed, is just another form of “make-believe”, and no less “make-believe” for being adult “make-believe.” My cousin and his wife whose seven-year old son died of neurological disease; what meaning were they supposed to impose on the event? And why impose that meaning rather than another? And how would the imposition of such arbitrary meaning redeem the tragedy?
Harold Kushner’s book is yet another attempt at theodicy. Theodicy is the justification of God’s ways with humankind, the justification of God’s ways in the face of human suffering. All attempts at theodicy left-handedly put God on trial, so to speak, and then develop arguments that acquit God, allowing us to believe in him after all, allowing us to believe that he really is kind and good despite so much that appears to contradict this. All theodicies assume that we know what should happen in the world; as long as there continues to happen what shouldn’t, God (we think) is on trial; we have to develop arguments and marshal evidence that will acquit him if we are to go on believing in him.
Let me say right here that theodicy, or something approaching theodicy, is a theme of the book of Job. Job, or perhaps more pointedly Job’s friends, ask the question ‘How can bad things happen to good people?’ We must be sure to notice two things about this question.
(i) The book of Job doesn’t answer the question in the sense of giving an explanation. Instead of explaining anything God thunders at Job, “Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? Tell me, if you have understanding.” (Job. 38:4) In other words, Job’s question, a question he regards as perfectly sensible, appears not to be sensible at all.
(ii) The second thing we must notice is this: Job’s question is a marginal question in scripture. It isn’t scripture’s typical question; it isn’t the profoundest question; it’s a marginal question. It’s marginal just because the logic of Job’s question doesn’t reflect the logic of scripture as a whole.
V: — Having brought this matter to our attention I want to move on to my next point; namely, our assumption that the questions we think to be obvious and obviously correct are the right questions. The question, for instance, “If God is all-good, he must want to rectify the dreadful state of affairs so often found in people’s lives; if God is all-powerful, he must be able to rectify such a state of affairs. Since such a state seems not to be rectified, then either God isn’t all-good or he isn’t all-powerful – right?” Next we set about trying to remove the suspicion that surrounds either God’s goodness or his might. We think our question to be the right question, even the only question. But in fact the question we’ve just posed didn’t loom large until the 18th century, specifically the 18th century Enlightenment. The question we’ve just posed was raised by Enlightenment thinkers who weren’t even Christians. Eighteenth century Enlightenment atheists raised the question, and Christians took it over in that they thought it to be a profound question. But this question didn’t loom large in the Middle Ages where physical suffering, at least, was worse than it is today. This question wasn’t pre-eminent in the ancient world; neither was it front-and-centre in the biblical era. The pre-eminent question in the biblical era wasn’t “Why?” or “How?” or “How come?”, because those people already knew why: the entire creation is molested by the evil one. The pre-eminent question in the biblical era was “How long? How long before God terminates this state of affairs? What’s taking him so long?”
Think for a minute of the biblical era; think of John the Baptist. John and Jesus were cousins. Not only were they related by blood, they were related by vocation. John began his public ministry ahead of Jesus. John’s ministry ended abruptly when a wicked woman, angry at his denunciation of her sexual irregularities, had him slain. What did Jesus do when he learned of John’s death and the circumstances of John’s death? Did Jesus say, “We need a theodicy. We need a justification of the ways of God. We need an explanation of how John’s terrible death could occur in a world ruled by a God whose love is mighty. And if no explanation is forthcoming, then perhaps we can’t believe in God.” — did Jesus say this? Jesus said no such thing. When John’s head was severed Jesus didn’t cry to heaven, “You expect me to trust you as my Father; but how can I believe you’re my Father, for what Father allows his child to be beheaded? In view of what happened to cousin John, I can’t be expected to think that I’m dear to you.” Jesus said no such thing. When he was informed of the grisly death of John, Jesus said, “It’s time I got to work.” Whereupon he began his public ministry, and began it knowing that what had befallen John would befall him too, and did it all with his trust in his Father unimpaired.
My point is this: that question which we suppose to be a perennial question, “How can we continue to believe in a mighty, loving God when terrible things keep happening in our world?” — wasn’t the most pressing question in the biblical era or the ancient church or the mediaeval church. It was shouted chiefly in the 18th century Enlightenment, and was shouted by atheists. Having heard the atheists’ question, the church took it over thinking it to be the soul of profundity.
Susannah Wesley, mother of John and Charles, had 19 children. Ten of them survived. As the other nine died (eight of them in infancy), Susannah’s heart broke. Never think that she didn’t care; never think that her heart wasn’t as torn as anyone’s heart would be torn today. Read her diary the day after a domestic helper accidentally smothered Susannah’s three-week old baby. Infant death was as grievous to parents then as it is now. What was different, however, is this: even as Susannah pleaded with God for her babes while they died in her arms she never concluded that God wasn’t to be trusted or loved or obeyed or simply clung to; she never concluded that as a result of her heartbreak God could only be denounced and abandoned.
Until the 18th century Enlightenment there was no expectation of living in a world other than a world riddled with accident, misfortune, sickness, disease, unrelievable suffering, untimely death. There was no expectation of anything else. It was recognized that the world, in its fallen state, is shot through with unfairness, injustice, inevitable inequities, unforeseeable tragedies. When John the Baptist was executed Jesus didn’t say, “If honouring God’s will entails that then I need a different Father.” Instead Jesus said, “I’ve got work to do and I’d better get started.” Susannah Wesley didn’t say, “If I bear children only to have half of them succumb to pneumonia and diphtheria, I should stop having them.” Instead she had twice as many. If today our expectation is so very different on account of the Enlightenment, then what did the Enlightenment cause us to expect?
VI: — The Enlightenment brought us to expect that humankind can control, control entirely, the world and everything about it. The Enlightenment brought us to expect that we are or can be in control of every last aspect of our existence. Specifically, the Enlightenment brought us to expect that the practice of medicine would smooth out our lives. And with the new expectation of physicians there arose as well a new agenda for physicians. Whereas physicians had always been expected to care for patients, now physicians were expected to cure patients. Until the Enlightenment physicians were expected to care: they were to alleviate pain wherever they could, they were expected to ease the patient in every way possible, and above all they were expected to ease the patient through death, which death everyone knew to be unavoidable in any case. But cure? No one expected physicians to cure, at least to cure very much. Nowadays physicians are expected to cure everything. I’m convinced that people unconsciously expect physicians to cure them of their mortality. When physicians can’t cure people of their vulnerability to death, blame for such failure is unconsciously transferred from medicine to God.
A minute ago I said that we creatures of modernity assume (arrogantly) that the questions we ask are the questions that people have asked in every era; our questions are perennial questions, and our answers are the only answers. It’s not so. If people today are asked how they’d prefer to die, they nearly always say, “Quickly. I want to die quickly. I’d like to slip away quietly in my sleep.” During the Middle Ages, however, no one wanted to die quickly; people dreaded sudden death. Why? Sudden death gave them insufficient time to make adequate spiritual preparation for death. What we regard as human expectations as old as humankind are actually very recent. What’s more, these recent expectations weren’t fostered as we reflected on the nature and purpose and way of God; they were fostered by atheists who, at the time of the Enlightenment, came to think that there was nothing humankind couldn’t control.
VII: — Let’s come back to the situation of the young person afflicted with a lingering illness and about to die all too young. Why are we especially upset at this? I think we’re upset in that we feel the young person to have been cheated. The 85-year old who dies has had a life, a complete life (or at least what we regard as complete.) The eight-year old, we feel, hasn’t; she’s been cheated. The elderly person’s life can be told by means of a story; the young person, on the other hand, has virtually no story to be told. I am 69 years old, and if I die tonight others will gather up my life in a story and tell the story. Hearers will identify me, the real “me”, with my story. But let’s be honest: they will regard “me” and my story as identical in that my story is fit to be told (I’ve never been publicly disgraced); my story is positive (I’m a ‘winner,’ a highly successful professional); my story is rich (supposedly). No one would hesitate to tell my story. But if my story were one that couldn’t be told; if my story were bleak or disgraceful or shocking or simply incomprehensible, others would like to think that the real “me” was somehow better, somehow grander, than my shabby story or my incomprehensible story.
It isn’t only the eight-year old child with leukaemia or neurodegenerative disease whose story seems to be sad and sorry and miserable. There are many, many adults whose stories are longer, to be sure, but no better. One Sunday, several years ago, a man wearing a clerical collar sat in the gallery of my church in Mississauga, accompanied by a lawyer-friend of mine. The man with the collar was an Anglican clergyman. He was also a plastic surgeon with a practice in one of the wealthiest areas of Toronto. He was at worship, that Sunday, as he awaited trial. He and his estranged wife had had an altercation, in the course of which his wife was struck, the result of which was that her skull was fractured. Several weeks after the service he attended in Mississauga the fellow was convicted and sent to jail. Upon his release from jail the College of Physicians and Surgeons restored his licence, thus permitting him to do plastic surgery again. The Anglican Church, however, didn’t reinstate him as a clergyman. A year later the man committed suicide. What’s his story? Is it a grand story? Is it a story anyone would envy? Or is it a story better left untold?
Maureen and I were asleep on a Friday evening when the phone rang at midnight. The caller was a man I’ve looked out for for 35 years. He’s paranoid schizophrenic. I’ve followed him around to restaurants, hospitals, jails, and numerous shabby “digs.” Last autumn he was in Vancouver and got into a “discussion” (as he tells his story) with a motel clerk. The clerk phoned the police, and Eric spent the next three months in a provincial psychiatric hospital. A week or two before Christmas I took him to Swiss Chalet for lunch. We had been seated for only a few seconds when he leapt out of his seat and shouted, “It’s bugged. It’s bugged. There’s a tape-recorder under my seat.” I took the shaken waitress aside, told her my friend was deranged, promised her I’d see that no harm befell her, and asked her to find us seats in an area that was free of hidden tape-recorders. A few months after this incident Eric phoned me again. In the afternoon he’d gone to a barber shop, only to have the barber “butcher” his hair. And why had the barber “butchered” his hair? Because the barber too is part of the conspiracy that is putting foreign substances in Eric’s drinking water and causing his urine to stink. Eric had come home; while making supper his sister had burnt the toast; Eric had decompensated and smashed the toaster. His sister had fled the house; the police had been called; Eric had refused to open the door to them – and was now in a great deal more trouble. Eric was phoning me at midnight. He wasn’t angry and he wasn’t violent: he was frightened, terribly frightened. He feared he was going to be sent back to a provincial hospital. Eric is 75 years old. He was diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic when he was a 20-year old university student. Eric has suffered atrociously since then. He hasn’t had one torment-free day in 55 years. What’s Eric’s story? Do you want to hear all the details? Would anyone want his story (all of it) told at his funeral? Tell me: are Eric and Eric’s story identical?
The truth is, none of us is identical with our story. Our story isn’t big enough, comprehensive enough, grand enough. None of us has a story (whether tellable or untellable) that does justice to who we are truly in ourselves because of who we are truly before God. Our story is small and feeble and miserable and frustrated. Often our story, so far from reflecting who we truly are, contradicts who we truly are. Our story has to be taken up into a much bigger story.
Then what’s the bigger story, grander story, for Eric? It’s the story of a man who once lived in a cemetery. (Mark 5:1-20) He was violent, anti-social, and an inveterate “streaker.” One day Jesus came upon him and asked, “What’s your name?” “My name?”, the fellow replied, “I’ve got lots of names. I’m your local nut-case; so why not call me ‘Peanut, Pistachio and Pecan’, ‘P-cubed’ for short.” Some time later the townspeople saw the same man seated, clothed and in his right mind. By God’s grace that gospel-story has been appointed to be Eric’s story, Eric’s true story. That story is the final story into which Eric’s story is taken up and in which Eric’s story is transfigured.
And the eight-year old who has just died of leukaemia? Her story too is bigger, grander than most people know. A distraught man cried to Jesus, “My daughter is sick unto death. Won’t you come with me?” Our Lord is delayed by a needy woman who is distressed herself. While he’s delayed, the daughter dies. Now all the relatives are beside themselves. Jesus declares, “The little girl isn’t dead; she’s asleep.” The relatives scorn him. Plainly she’s dead; anyone can see she’s dead. But you see, in the presence of Jesus Christ (only in the presence of him who is himself resurrection and life, only in his presence but assuredly in his presence) death is but sleep. The girl is awakened shortly — as the eight-year old has been appointed to be awakened. This is the story into which the leukaemia patient’s story is taken up and in which it is transfigured.
VIII: — If you ask me why such things as leukaemia and neurodegenerative disorders mental illness happen I shall not attempt an answer. When tragedy befell John the Baptist Jesus didn’t say, “I can’t figure out why these things happen; therefore I can’t trust my Father.” Jesus knew that in a fallen world such things happen and will continue to happen until God’s patience, finally exhausted, ends the era of the fall and with it forecloses the day of grace. Jesus didn’t explain John’s wretched death; Jesus responded to the news of his cousin’s death by launching his public ministry.
Let me conclude by recalling Aaron, my cousin’s little boy who was diagnosed with a neurological disease at age two and who declined hideously for the next five years. Our Lord offers no explanation. (What help would an explanation provide?) Our Lord, rather, whose risen life is grander even than his life from Bethlehem to Golgotha; his risen life is that larger, grander story in which Aaron’s story is transfigured. Furthermore, our Lord is the occasion of a response: the response of Aaron’s friends and relatives and neighbours and congregation. The response we make to all such developments is an expression of our caring. (Not an expression of our curing; ultimately I can’t cure you, you can’t cure me, and medical practice can’t cure any of us, ultimately.) Such a response will be caring enough until that day when we see our Lord face-to-face, the sight of whose face will transfigure our face, for the sight of his face will be enough to wipe away every tear from every eye.
Victor Shepherd Westminster Chapel 2013
David Lauber. Barth on the Descent into Hell: God, Atonement and the Christian Life.
David Lauber. Barth on the Descent into Hell: God, Atonement and the Christian Life.
Burlington , VT : Ashgate, 2004. Pp vi + 186. cloth, us$89.95. ISBN 0-7546-43341-1
The purpose of David Lauber’s book is an investigation of Karl Barth’s understanding of Christ’s suffering of the wrath of God on our behalf and in our place.
The foil for this book is Wayne Grudem’s article, “He Did Not Descend into Hell: A Plea for Following Scripture Instead of the Apostles’ Creed” [Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 34 (1991) pp. 103-13.] Contradicting Grudem at al points, Lauber asserts relentlessly that the descent into hell is intrinsic to a complete understanding of the substitutionary suffering of Jesus.
The immediate conversation partner throughout is Hans Urs von Balthasar in his perspective on the descent.
Lauber explores Barth’s grasp of the divine condemnation that Jesus Christ bore on behalf of humankind. While Barth has affinities with Anselm, his understanding of the atonement moves beyond the static, mechanical – even non-biblical transactional – aspects of the Latin view of the cross. Insofar as Barth relocates the descent in the doctrine of God he avoids the liabilities that have haunted the Latin view of the atonement and its espousal of penal substitution; namely, how the sacrifice of an innocent human changed God’s nature from wrath to love and allowed grace to succeed judgement. Love, rather, provides the sacrifice even as grace precipitates saving judgement.
With Calvin, Barth insists that the curse, punishment and ordeal that Jesus endured in the cross as God’s reaction to sin – specifically, the humanly incomprehensible horror of the dereliction – is the descent; for here Jesus, the ever-obedient Son, was cast into an abyss that no one else can mine or measure. Unacceptable, then, is any notion that the descent is the exalted Christ’s “journey” wherein he “harrows hell” as he engages the devil and releases captive believers. Neither Friday’s finished work nor Easter’s disclosure of it lends the Church anything to say concerning Holy Saturday.
Lauber contrasts the lattermost point with Balthasar’s exposition of Holy Saturday wherein Balthasar affirms the descent to be distinct from the cross (albeit never separated from it), viewing the descent as marking the defeat of sin and death and acting as a transition from death to resurrection.
Balthasar distances himself from the language of “descent”, arguing that Jesus qua dead can do nothing. Jesus, rather, is taken to the dead. Jesus’ “descent” is first to Sheol of the Older Testament. In Sheol Jesus, the God-forsaken one, fulfils the judgement that was adumbrated in God’s judgement on covenant-breakers, the judgement that had been pointed to in God’s abandonment, e.g., of Moses, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Job and the Suffering Servant. Beyond Sheol, however, Christ’s “descent” is an experience of the ‘second’ death. Here Balthasar departs from Barth, as Balthasar insists that God-forsakenness prior to Jesus’ death (“Why have you forsaken me?”) is not the same as God-forsakenness after death. While diverging here from the Reformed tradition, Balthasar maintains nonetheless that there is nothing insufficient or incomplete in Friday. Still, on Friday Jesus, actively obedient, endures God’s wrath; on Saturday, utterly passive, Jesus is one with the poena damni. In complete solidarity with the dead, he, alone the Son of God Incarnate, is uniquely subject to the arch-torment of rejection at the Father’s hand – which rejection forges hell; i.e., hell is a product of the world’s redemption.
What are the implications of the descent for the Trinitarian life of God? Having exposed Karl Rahner’s discussion of the descent briefly yet convincingly as disguised naturalism, Lauber criticizes Juergen Moltmann at length. Moltmann maintains that the dereliction introduces a rift into the divine life. At the cross God “becomes” or “turns into” (p. 122) what God formerly was not. God isn’t love eternally. God becomes love only as there is a creation to be loved; i.e., God creates the world as an act of divine self-completion. More to the point, God has to suffer at the hands of the world in order to be God. Lost here is the particularity of the dereliction as the enacting of sin-bearing atonement. Instead God is now qualified to be an empathic fellow-victim of creaturely brutality even as God is fully constituted God.
Upholding the distinction between immanent and economic Trinities, Barth and Balthasar assess the dereliction regarding Trinitarian implications while avoiding Moltmann’s divagations. Balthasar insists that the eternal intimacy of Father and Son assumes another modality in the economy of the Incarnation as the dereliction occasions a new expression of the eternal love of the Triune God. Unlike Moltmann, Balthasar maintains that the mission of Jesus is grounded in the eternal procession of Father and Son, even as mission is never collapsed into procession. In this way the effectual specificity of the dereliction is recognized as an event in the life of the Triune God (the dereliction enacts; it doesn’t merely illustrate) while the eternal Tri-unity of God is preserved.
The book concludes with an application of the descent for Christian discipleship. Disciples can’t bear Christ’s cross, and he won’t bear theirs. While his is atoning and theirs isn’t, his mandating theirs invites a conversation with Balthasar’s sounding of Colossians 1:24, wherein disciples’ sufferings “complete” what is “lacking” in Christ’s afflictions, even as Christ’s are deficient in nothing.
One mark of a good book is the protracted discussion it catalyzes with its principals and its topic. In this regard Lauber’s book is exemplary.
Victor A. Shepherd
Tyndale Seminary
Toronto
Greschat, Martin; Martin Bucer: A Reformer and His Times.
Greschat, Martin; Martin Bucer: A Reformer and His Times. Louisville : Westminster John Knox Press, 2004. Pp. xii + 340. paper, can$34.50. ISBN 0-664-22690-6. Translated by Stephen E. Buckwalter.
The ligature of Greschat’s fine book is Bucer’s career-long preoccupation: the transmutation – individual, social, institutional, even economic – that Jesus Christ effects in God’s people. Bucer’s formal theology, occasional writing, and day-to-day activity alike orbited around this epicentre. Church discipline was a means to the transmutation of ethic and ethos, and for this reason Bucer insisted that church discipline was a nota or “mark” of the church in addition to Word and sacraments (i.e., discipline pertains to the being of the church, not merely to its wellbeing.) He remained aware, however, that any discipline that was merely imposed could only coerce and antagonize simultaneously; the law of God had to be written on the heart. This could be fostered only through smaller fellowships within a congregation, issuing in greater spiritual intimacy and accountability. Bucer never surrendered his conviction here.
Becoming acquainted with Bucer’s spirit and genius, however, is less straightforward than with other Reformers in that Bucer wrote less. In fact he appeared to his disadvantage when he had to write; he was at his best when face-to-face with those whose hostility his transparency could defuse and for whom his gift of public speaking (vastly more telling than his written articulation) could birth nuances that evaporated standoffs and advanced understanding, even as his non-acerbic wit melted defensiveness. In other words, while he was no less talented than other Reformers, Bucer’s gifts were notably different. He was a conciliator, working indefatigably for Protestant accord amidst intra-Protestant disputes no less jagged than those with Rome . He was the acknowledged father-figure among a constellation of dazzling theological stars in Strasbourg : Matthew Zell, preacher; Wolfgang Capito, theologian; Caspar Hedio, translator from Latin to German. When Calvin sought refuge in Strasbourg (1538-1541) Bucer schooled Calvin in the liturgical order, the singing of psalms, the function of ecclesiastical offices, and the weekly meeting of pastors – all of which Calvin would implement upon his return to Geneva. From 1534 to 1539 he travelled 12,000 kilometres on difficult and dangerous roads on behalf of Protestant unity. Between 1538 and 1541 he addressed colloquies at Leipzig , Hagenau, Worms and Regensburg .
Bucer’s major work, De Regno Christi, together with his commentaries on Psalms and Ephesians, remain landmarks in Reformation theology. Still, they seem lonely alongside the prodigious written output of Luther, Calvin and Bullinger (the lattermost having written more than the former two combined.) Plainly Bucer’s formal theological contribution was eclipsed by his possession of gifts and graces beyond theology that the leader of any era needs if the Kingdom of Christ is to gain visibility.
Bucer insisted on identifying the non-negotiable core of the substance of the faith. One aspect of it, he maintained consistently, was justification by grace through faith. No less crucial was godliness, both individual and social, shaped not by the letter of the Old testament but rather by the justice, equity and mood that the Old Testament aspires to inculcate – with all of this infused by an incursion of the Holy Spirit (in everything he wrote Bucer elevated the Old Testament and magnified the Holy Spirit, grounding both in the Christological concern characteristic of Reformation theology) that alone spared the church deadly, gospel-less legalism. Having identified the core, Bucer then moved outward, in concentric circles as it were, to what was arguable, concluding with the optional, the adiaphora, all the while forging a credibility with Anabaptists, Lutherans and Roman Catholics that would adorn ecumenism today. While Bucer never denied major problems in the Catholic Church of his day (not least of which for him was the sacrifice of the mass), he insisted unrelentingly that the Church of Rome was church, the Body of Christ. For this reason he could write “I do hope, however, that there are many dear children on both sides, improperly named after men, and thus kept divided. We should …use all ways and means in order that all God-fearing persons in all camps become united in Christ, our Lord.” (p.104) Unlike most giants of the Reformation whose written legacy the church will never be without, Bucer’s achievement as conciliator and mentor consisted almost entirely of his influence.
No “Buceran” church or denomination has been named after the man who towered over Strasbourg as surely as Luther did over Wittenberg and Calvin over Geneva . The reason is plain: following Charles V’s defeat of the Schmalkaldic League in 1547, the future of the church lay with territories whose prince-protector could guarantee institutional survival. As a free Imperial city, Strasbourg had no such protector, with the result that the Reformation couldn’t remain fixed there. City authorities made their peace (Bucer would say they compromised) with those bent on overturning the Reformation. Bucer had to move to England .
Feted at Cambridge University , Bucer was awarded its first honorary doctorate in theology. Yet the adjustment to England was difficult. In a letter to William Farel he indicated what grated on him: weather, language, food, customs, housing, wine, inefficient fireplaces, “and just about everything else.” (p.245). Centuries later the scope of his theological contribution to the English church was celebrated; better scholarship, however, has soberly concluded that his noteworthy work in his new home appeared in the theological shift from the Catholicism of the 1549 Book of Common Prayer to the Protestantism of the 1552 revision – even though Bucer died one year before it appeared. When “Bloody” Mary ascended and set about undoing the Reformation in England , she had his remains exhumed and burnt. Her successor, Elizabeth I, rehabilitated him.
And yet there recrudesces in the characteristically conciliatory, irenic Bucer the horrific anti-Semitism that disfigures Humanists, Magisterial and Anabaptist Reformers alike. In this regard Bucer, master-Hebraist notwithstanding, exhibited the Church’s age-long inability to understand God’s covenant as indefeasible (despite the Reformers’ preoccupation with covenant.) Bucer, lamentably, recommended to political authorities that Jews not be allowed to build synagogues; Jews were to be barred from the trades; Jews were to refrain from “blaspheming Christ.” They were to be engaged “in the humblest, most arduous and most trying tasks” (p.157) – namely, sweeping chimneys, cleaning sewers, and disposing of deadstock. Such means, Bucer wrote, would prove to be a “deterrent and a corrective.” (p.157) Subsequently Jews were permitted to engage in commerce even as they were consigned to the accursed role of moneylender, albeit only under the strictest supervision. The Talmud was banned; Jewish attendance at Christian services designed to convert them was mandated; if Jew and Christian were found living together both were executed. While none of this is extraordinary in light of the anti-Jewish miasma of the era, something better could have been expected from Bucer in light of his massive emphasis on the Old Testament in his programmatic Christianizing of Strasbourg’s social order, and in view of his recognition of Torah as God’s loving, salvation-bringing Word and Way – an understanding that Luther never attained.
Greschat’s book is essential reading for all who investigate the Reformation and who know that the wheels of history are turned as much by who people are unselfconsciously as by what they contrive to write.
Victor Shepherd
Tyndale University College & Seminary
Toronto
MacLeod, A. Donald. W. Stanford Reid: An Evangelical Calvinist in the Academy.
MacLeod, A. Donald. W. Stanford Reid: An Evangelical Calvinist in the Academy. Montreal & Kingston : McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004. Pp. xxii + 401. Cloth $80.00 or Paper $29.95
ISBN: 0-7735-2770-2 (cloth) or 0-7735-2818-0 (paper)
This book is the thirty-first in Series Two of McGill-Queen’s Studies in the History of Religion. Like the fifty-six others in Series One and Two it endeavours to acquaint readers with determinative aspects of Canadian history, culture and religious life. In exploring the life and work of W. Stanford Reid (1913 – 1996) it fills two major lacunae, the first being the need for a thorough study of a figure whose mark in both university and church (such a two-fold mark wasn’t rare in an earlier era but has become exceedingly rare more recently) renders him formative. The second lacuna is the need for situating Reid himself in a theological tradition and a Canadian denomination from which he couldn’t be deracinated and on whose behalf he struggled tirelessly, albeit less effectively (it would seem) than he would have preferred.
This book delivers all that it promises. In its seventeen chapters of approximately equal length it judiciously reflects the able historian’s avoidance of “over-determination;” i.e., it recognizes the interplay of religious, social, historical, economic and national factors. It begins with the significance of Reid’s foreparents in Nineteenth Century Anglophone Quebec ; it concludes with an exhaustive bibliography of Reid’s writings. It never drifts, however, from its orientation as advertised in the title: Reid as Calvinist by conviction and history teacher by profession. In substance, style and lucidity it is exemplary.
In the course of mining the profundities, not to say murky depths, of church and university and human psyche, MacLeod traces at least three lodes that are readily discernible. In the first place the book acquaints readers with a man whose theological carriage was as stark, unalterable and unmistakable as was his larger-than-average physical presence. Amidst a milieu of doctrinally diluted, ecumenical accommodation Reid is exposed as an unapologetic “confessionalist” (a term MacLeod uses repeatedly as characteristic descriptor.) In short, while Reid was neither a fundamentalist nor a literalist (his “confessional” conservatism often found him accused of such), he remained possessed of irrefrangible conviction concerning the tenets of the Magisterial Reformers, especially those of John Calvin. Reid’s was not a cultural Presbyterianism, the misty-eyed yen to use the church as a vehicle for preserving bagpipe and haggis. Neither was his a state-Presbyterianism, coveting the place of the Kirk in Scotland while lamenting the denial of a similar place to the Kirk’s Canadian descendant in the New World . While Reid was known outside the Presbyterian communion chiefly as a Professor of History, first at McGill and then at the University of Guelph (where he headed the history department) MacLeod persists in holding up Reid’s vocation to the ordained ministry, his zeal for preaching and teaching in the church even when he ceased to have a pastoral appointment, and his poimenical concern for fellow-congregants and needy students.
While a mind, like the Word of God it apprehends, is commended for being “sharper than a two-edged sword,” a sharp-edged personality is not. MacLeod, however, always does justice to both, pointing out Reid’s inimitable contribution to Scottish Studies (see the list of graduate students whose work in this field he supervised at the University of Guelph), and keening quietly over Reid’s occasional proclivity to excoriate if not lacerate, which proclivity deprived Reid of institutional support when he needed it most.
With respect to this last point it is sufficient to recall Reid’s refusal to extend congratulations to Dr. David Hay upon the latter’s retirement. Hay had served Knox College as Professor of Systematic Theology for thirty-three years. In his penultimate year Hay had publicly described evangelicals in the Presbyterian Church as “Rechabites,” “freeloaders and institutional parasites” (p.232.) Reid, converted at age fourteen by means of a Montreal street-corner evangelist, upheld the evangelical ethos ever after. A graduate of Westminster Seminary ( Philadelphia ) and its trustee for decades, Reid also exalted the Reformed tradition. Hay disavowed Reformed evangelicalism. His remark widened a fissure between him and Reid that would never be bridged. Like his beloved John Knox (Reid had written a major biography of the Scottish Reformer) Reid “neither flattered nor feared any flesh.”
The second lode is MacLeod’s candid tour of the subterranean trade-offs, political favours and power echelons that bedevil any institution. Forthrightly and fairly he identifies, describes and amplifies the machinations riddling the denomination generally and Reid’s situation particularly. In this regard MacLeod helps readers understand what lurked and why when Reid appeared to be ill-treated on several fronts, and how it was that Reid, if not marginalized, was certainly kept away from key positions and professorships in his denomination and its seminaries.
The third lode is MacLeod’s self-exposure. No doubt unintentionally and certainly unobtrusively yet no less unmistakeably, MacLeod’s “heart” is revealed. Trained in history at Harvard, currently pastor to a small-city congregation, like Reid he loves the denomination he will not leave. There is no bitterness here, no self-exempting accusation, no angry denunciation; there is however, the sober acknowledgement that sin blinds and corrupts, with the result that doors providentially opened do close, and opportunities for appointing prophets pass. While MacLeod has spent much more of his working life as a congregational pastor than Reid did, as Adjunct Professor of Missions at Tyndale University College & Seminary he too is “an evangelical Calvinist in the academy.” Yet he remains himself.
Calvin, loved by Reid and MacLeod alike, said that those who try to mimic a giant in the faith without being moved by the Spirit “are not imitators; they are apes.” (Commentary Matthew 9:20) MacLeod is anything but an ape.
Victor Shepherd
Tyndale University College & Seminary
Keith Haartman, Watching and Praying: Personality Transformation in Eighteenth Century British Methodism
(STUDIES IN RELIGION/SCIENCES RELIGIEUSES, Fall 2005 )
Watching and Praying: Personality Transformation in Eighteenth Century British Methodism
Keith Haartman
Amsterdam , NY : Rodopi, 2004. xii, 241
This book is the fourth volume in the series, “Contemporary Psychoanalytic Studies”. Not surprisingly, then, the book aims passim at a psychoanalytic exploration, amplification and assessment of the personality transformations of those who were the immediate beneficiaries of the eighteenth century Methodist movement spawned and sustained by John Wesley. Unlike most psychoanalytic attempts at explanation (the book insists on explaining religious development, not merely describing it), Haartman’s doesn’t regard religious experience as inherently pathological.
Haartman’s debt to two notable psychologists, Melanie Klein and Abraham Maslow, is evident and acknowledged. Klein’s psychoanalytic work with children figures significantly throughout Watching, while Maslow’s concept of self-actualization is melded with such traditional aspects of psychoanalysis as the relation of superego to ego-ideal and the nature of ego reaction.
Drawing on Wesley’s Sermons on Several Occasions (150 sermons in four volumes) and his movement’s journal, Arminian Magazine (published first in 1778, and as Methodist Magazine after 1798), Haartman consistently relates the normative function of the former to the anecdotal function of the latter. Perceptively he grasps Wesley’s insistence on “salvation” as a present reality (rather than a post-mortem occurrence), and relates it to the psychoanalytic agenda of unconscious-conflict resolution and intrapsychic integration. In all of this Haartman indicates how psychoanalysis provides a tool for understanding the process of the doctrinal tenets that early-day Methodists embodied.
Foundational to Haartman’s entire exposition, and according to him the first stage of religious development, is the unconscious conflict pertaining to childhood stresses: parental punishment, unresolved grief and separation anxiety. (In the 1700s parents were urged not to “spare the rod”; the infant/childhood death rate was higher than 50% in many areas of Britain ; and children were frequently traumatized on account of the untimely loss of parents through sickness and accident.)
The second stage, “justification”, is a form of displacement of ordinary consciousness. Here the accumulation of grief, guilt and anxiety issues in a crisis religiously labelled “repentance”, which crisis ought then to be resolved as the penitent is flooded with an awareness of God’s pervasive pardon, free acceptance, and ubiquitous mercy. In psychoanalytic terms, the crisis is defused as it proceeds to a punitive ecstasy where new-born believers, rejoicing in their deliverance, apprehend themselves and the entire creation as unfolding within the sphere of God’s omnipresent love. Concomitantly with this unitive ecstasy, believers recognize and surrender to God’s claim upon them for “inward and outward holiness” (a favourite expression of Wesley’s whereby he means transformation of disposition and conduct alike) – or, once again, unconscious moral insights or ego-ideals can be said to be brought to consciousness.
The third and final stage consists of “watching and praying”. Ever “watching” believers introspect so as to become increasingly aware of threats to their integration that might precipitate “backsliding”, a regression to the pre-justification stage of development. Ever “praying”, they “practise the presence” (of God), therein conforming to the ego-ideal that the Christian tradition has named “sanctification”.
While Haartman insists that religious ecstasies and unitive experiences pertain to the core of Methodist spirituality, they are not (or at least not necessarily) manic denials of the reality principle. Notwithstanding the psychological assessment, there remains an ontological assessment that the book appears to overlook; namely, what do psychoanalysis and Wesley (the Methodist movement) affirm to be ultimately real? The ontology of the former is natural; the latter’s is supernatural, the presence and significance of Spirit, that reality which cannot be reduced to the natural world nor to any aspect or dimension of it. While the book renounces naturalistic reduction, many passages in it suggest the opposite. For instance, in speaking of justification (the Christian affirmation that those “in the wrong” before God are rendered “rightly related” to God), Haartman writes, “In the optimal outcome of the desolation crisis, the lifting of repression allows the ego to regain access to intrapsychic representations of the good parent.”(p.114) Elsewhere he writes, “…psychic integration, what Wesley deemed ‘growth in grace’”. (p173) For Wesley these two developments were ontically dissimilar: one could be growing in grace while lacking psychic integration.
Irrespective of the foregoing, Watching displays a thorough grasp of the classical and contemporary psychoanalytic literature. It is replete with helpful insights concerning the Methodist tradition. It is cogently argued. It is a worthy contribution to the psycho-religious discussion and will foster much fruitful discussion.
Keith Haartman currently teaches at the Institute of Communication and Culture, University of Toronto at Mississauga .
Victor Shepherd
Professor of Systematic and Historical Theology
Tyndale University College & Seminary
Toronto
Molnar, Paul D. Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity
(STUDIES IN RELIGION/SCIENCES RELIGIEUSES, Fall 2005 )
Watching and Praying: Personality Transformation in Eighteenth Century British Methodism
Keith Haartman
Amsterdam , NY : Rodopi, 2004. xii, 241
This book is the fourth volume in the series, “Contemporary Psychoanalytic Studies”. Not surprisingly, then, the book aims passim at a psychoanalytic exploration, amplification and assessment of the personality transformations of those who were the immediate beneficiaries of the eighteenth century Methodist movement spawned and sustained by John Wesley. Unlike most psychoanalytic attempts at explanation (the book insists on explaining religious development, not merely describing it), Haartman’s doesn’t regard religious experience as inherently pathological.
Haartman’s debt to two notable psychologists, Melanie Klein and Abraham Maslow, is evident and acknowledged. Klein’s psychoanalytic work with children figures significantly throughout Watching, while Maslow’s concept of self-actualization is melded with such traditional aspects of psychoanalysis as the relation of superego to ego-ideal and the nature of ego reaction.
Drawing on Wesley’s Sermons on Several Occasions (150 sermons in four volumes) and his movement’s journal, Arminian Magazine (published first in 1778, and as Methodist Magazine after 1798), Haartman consistently relates the normative function of the former to the anecdotal function of the latter. Perceptively he grasps Wesley’s insistence on “salvation” as a present reality (rather than a post-mortem occurrence), and relates it to the psychoanalytic agenda of unconscious-conflict resolution and intrapsychic integration. In all of this Haartman indicates how psychoanalysis provides a tool for understanding the process of the doctrinal tenets that early-day Methodists embodied.
Foundational to Haartman’s entire exposition, and according to him the first stage of religious development, is the unconscious conflict pertaining to childhood stresses: parental punishment, unresolved grief and separation anxiety. (In the 1700s parents were urged not to “spare the rod”; the infant/childhood death rate was higher than 50% in many areas of Britain ; and children were frequently traumatized on account of the untimely loss of parents through sickness and accident.)
The second stage, “justification”, is a form of displacement of ordinary consciousness. Here the accumulation of grief, guilt and anxiety issues in a crisis religiously labelled “repentance”, which crisis ought then to be resolved as the penitent is flooded with an awareness of God’s pervasive pardon, free acceptance, and ubiquitous mercy. In psychoanalytic terms, the crisis is defused as it proceeds to a punitive ecstasy where new-born believers, rejoicing in their deliverance, apprehend themselves and the entire creation as unfolding within the sphere of God’s omnipresent love. Concomitantly with this unitive ecstasy, believers recognize and surrender to God’s claim upon them for “inward and outward holiness” (a favourite expression of Wesley’s whereby he means transformation of disposition and conduct alike) – or, once again, unconscious moral insights or ego-ideals can be said to be brought to consciousness.
The third and final stage consists of “watching and praying”. Ever “watching” believers introspect so as to become increasingly aware of threats to their integration that might precipitate “backsliding”, a regression to the pre-justification stage of development. Ever “praying”, they “practise the presence” (of God), therein conforming to the ego-ideal that the Christian tradition has named “sanctification”.
While Haartman insists that religious ecstasies and unitive experiences pertain to the core of Methodist spirituality, they are not (or at least not necessarily) manic denials of the reality principle. Notwithstanding the psychological assessment, there remains an ontological assessment that the book appears to overlook; namely, what do psychoanalysis and Wesley (the Methodist movement) affirm to be ultimately real? The ontology of the former is natural; the latter’s is supernatural, the presence and significance of Spirit, that reality which cannot be reduced to the natural world nor to any aspect or dimension of it. While the book renounces naturalistic reduction, many passages in it suggest the opposite. For instance, in speaking of justification (the Christian affirmation that those “in the wrong” before God are rendered “rightly related” to God), Haartman writes, “In the optimal outcome of the desolation crisis, the lifting of repression allows the ego to regain access to intrapsychic representations of the good parent.”(p.114) Elsewhere he writes, “…psychic integration, what Wesley deemed ‘growth in grace’”. (p173) For Wesley these two developments were ontically dissimilar: one could be growing in grace while lacking psychic integration.
Irrespective of the foregoing, Watching displays a thorough grasp of the classical and contemporary psychoanalytic literature. It is replete with helpful insights concerning the Methodist tradition. It is cogently argued. It is a worthy contribution to the psycho-religious discussion and will foster much fruitful discussion.
Keith Haartman currently teaches at the Institute of Communication and Culture, University of Toronto at Mississauga .
Victor Shepherd
Professor of Systematic and Historical Theology
Tyndale University College & Seminary
Toronto
John Webster, Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch.
(The Toronto Journal of Theology, Fall 2004)
John Webster, Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch. Cambridge , Eng. Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp vii + 144. paper, $19.00 ISBN 0-521-53846-7.
The ligature of this book is as unmistakeable as Webster aspires to render it irrefragable; namely, while it is never to be denied that biblical texts have a “natural history,” what characterizes such texts isn’t this history but rather their role in the saving economy of God’s self-communication. In short, this function “is ontologically definitive of the text.”(p. 19) Admitting the assistance that cognate social and literary criticism renders the exegete, Webster relentlessly prosecutes his thesis: the essence of Scripture (he capitalizes the word everywhere) isn’t one with the ontologies presupposed by cognate disciplines; the ontology of Scripture is unique just because there is no substitute for the service it renders the self-bestowing God who ever remains ontically sui generis and whose self-communication is therefore logically singular. In short, Webster’s book sustains his conviction that Scripture is rightly understood only as it is apprehended in accord with its dogmatic purpose, fellowship with the Holy God.
While the book is principally about Scripture, it can be about this only as it is simultaneously no less about gospel, church and theology. Accordingly Webster declares concurrently, “[I]n following God’s address of the church in Holy Scripture, theology cannot be anything other than a commendation of the gospel.”(p. 132) Situated in an era where many find theology freighted with almost every concern except the gospel, Webster’s pronouncement will reverberate as both manifesto and gauntlet.
The book consists of four chapters, each of which describes a feature essential to “an orderly dogmatic account of what Holy Scripture is.”(p. 1) In the first chapter, “Revelation, Sanctification and Inspiration,” Webster insists that Scripture is a human artefact and the church’s use of it a human event. Yet since Scripture is acknowledged Holy, it is related to God in a way that the creation-at-large is not. Specifically, Scripture is an aspect of that revelation whose author and content is the self-bestowing God who genuinely gives himself to us salvifically without giving himself over to us. God ever remains Lord of that revelation whose substance God alone is, and Scripture ever remains the unsubstitutable occasion of its reoccurring. In this context sanctification is that act whereby God authentically uses human creatureliness without thereby suggesting that God’s action here renders revelation naturally apprehensible or Scripture’s substance philosophically determinable. Wisely avoiding “naming names” (e.g., post-Reformational Protestant Scholasticism) Webster cogently argues for the subordination of inspiration to revelation. (To invert this is to misconstrue both.) He insists that inspiration is neither objectification (this would elevate the inspired “product” above the activity the reality it attests) nor spiritualization (this would render the church the locus of inspiration rather than the text.)
In the second chapter, “Scripture, Church and Canon,” Webster is unambiguous: “The definitive act of the church is faithful hearing of the gospel of salvation announced by the risen Christ in the Spirit’s power.”(p. 44) Yet he disclaims anything approaching bibliolatry: to speak of Scripture is to speak for the sake of the action of God; i.e., while Scripture is not the object of faith it can never be separated from the faith that God alone quickens.
In a masterly discussion of canon and canonization Webster voices the most direct disagreement of the book when he faults Robert Jenson for the latter’s insufficiently qualified assertion (Systematic Theology, Vol. 1. Oxford : OUP: 1997, p. 27) that the canon is the church’s decision rather than acknowledgement. Jenson’s deficiency here Webster deems to leave Scripture in the church’s control, whereas faithful submission to Scripture defines the church. The same deficiency denatures Scripture as the instrument of God’s judgement on the church. Canonization, Webster argues, is not the church’s achievement but rather the event of the risen Christ’s bringing his people to account for his sovereign efficacy through the witnesses he has commissioned.
In the third chapter, “Reading in the Economy of Grace,” Webster advances his preference for “reading” to “interpreting” Scripture, since the latter term is freighted with literary, psychological and philosophical considerations amounting to qualifications that humans “bring” to the text, when Scripture as viva vox Dei requires self-renunciation as spiritual qualification. Here Webster distances himself from Schopenhauer’s typically modern “anthropology of reading” wherein reading results (supposedly) in an unthinking absorption that obviates the “immediacy of judgement” (p. 69), a free, creative, spontaneous act. The revelation that Scripture attests and in which it is included contradicts Schopenhauer at every point as grace frees cognition from self-deception and spontaneity from arbitrariness. Reading , then, so far from mindless absorption, is a human activity that paradoxically confesses, “Nothing in my hand I bring.” Perspicuity, similarly, is an implicate of soteriology as faith discerns the inherent splendour of the gospel.
“Scripture, Theology and the Theological School ,” the final chapter, explores the place of Scripture in the curriculum of theological institutions. Cherishing the theo-logic of the Magisterial Reformers, Webster ransacks Ursinus’ A Hortatory Oration to the Study of Divinity. He contrasts Ursinus’ preoccupation with the substance of Scripture to the methodological self-consciousness that haunts contemporary theological discussion and obscures the gospel. Like Calvin before him, Webster gladly admits pietas alone to direct theological learning to holiness, without which theological endeavour becomes vicious. At the same time his emphasis on pietas by no means denigrates the place of office. So far from Spirit-less bureaucratization, “office” confesses that theology has been appointed to warn the church where and how it is capitulating to an idolatrous proclivity to domesticate the Word. Theology will honour its authoritative office only as is claims no authority for itself but forever points away from itself to that Word whose authority can never delegated, relegated or shared.
While the book’s thesis tolls the author’s disagreement with approaches to Scripture that claim to be theological yet disdain dogmatics, the tone of the book can only be described as judicious understatement. Aware that his point is unpopular in much of Anglo-American divinity, Webster takes pains to ensure that if there has to be a stone of stumbling it won’t be his style. His most tendentious points never so much as hint at rabies theologorum. At the same time subtlety never fosters opacity. Certainly compressed, the book is nowhere turgid or confused. Modestly it claims to be no more than a sketch when in fact it is a lode whose riches can be mined . Unflinchingly it has planted the flag of dogmatic priority concerning Scripture in that citadel whose putative guardians claim every scholarly reason for recognition except the reason: the God who is known only as he reconciles recalcitrant sinners, thereby relieving their blindness. For they are made partakers of that reality which Scripture attests and whose coherence dogmatics exposes. 1102 words
Victor Shepherd
Tyndale University College & Seminary
Toronto
Oberman, Heiko Augustinus; The Two Reformations: The Journey from the Last Days to the New World . New Haven : Yale University Press, 2003.
(Toronto Journal of Theology, Spring, 2004)
Oberman, Heiko Augustinus; The Two Reformations: The Journey from the Last Days to the New World . New Haven : Yale University Press, 2003. Pp xx + 235. Cloth $65.99 Can. ISBN: 0-300-09865-5
Published posthumously, this book concludes the prolific, always profound writing of a Reformation historian who had previously produced dozens of books in four languages: Dutch (his native tongue), German, French and English. While perhaps appearing anti-climactic in the wake of his prize-winning The Harvest of Mediaeval Theology and Luther: Man between God and the Devil (this earned him the Historischer Sachbuchpreis for what Germany deemed to be the most significant history book, 1975-1985), the work crowns a contribution to church and university that few can equal.
The book consists of ten chapters that illustrate Oberman’s broad expertise concerning the diverse ingredients yielding any event in historical occurrence. Chapter I, “The Gathering Storm”, for instance, probes the manifold aspects of the Fifteenth Century, examining such determinants as the devastating impact of the Black Death, the suppression of Church conciliarism and the simultaneous appearance of political conciliarism, and the role of the Modern Devotion in shifting the common understanding of “religious” life from monasticism to Christian faith. Having begun his career as an intellectual historian at Oxford and Harvard, Oberman moves on, in Chapter II (“Luther and the Via Moderna: The Philosophical Backdrop of the Reformation Breakthrough”) to trace the lodes that are admittedly only one factor in the Reformation but by no means dismissible.
Subsequent chapters discuss, inter alia, the differences between Luther’s anti-Judaism and Erasmus’ anti-Semitism. Soberly Oberman concludes that while Luther admitted the baptized Jew to be Christian while Erasmus did not, Luther’s failure lies not so much in what he did but in what he failed to do: uniquely positioned at the end of the mediaeval period to “detoxify the central poison in Christian doctrine” (p. 83) – namely, supersessionism – Luther instead failed to announce the undeflectability of the covenant-keeping God with respect to the Jewish people.
Thoroughly conversant with the vernacular and classical languages of the Middle Ages and the Reformation, as well as with the most subtle nuances of mediaeval thought and life, Oberman characteristically brought to his métier an appreciation of diverse “locations” and their interconnexion. Here he was ahead of his time for most of his life, maintaining for decades what historians, pressured more recently by social scientists, have come to admit as essential: namely, the matrix of the political, economic, literary, social, intellectual, military, and religious factors that together determine historical developments. Oberman had long known that the isolation or elevation of any one of them rendered the historian’s work one-sided, inaccurate and misleading.
In a moving investigation of the doctrine of predestination, for instance, and its function with respect to the Reformed understanding of faith, Oberman sensitively discusses the location of Calvin and his followers as refugees. Hounded out of France and later out of Switzerland (1538-1541) Calvin remained a refugee virtually all his life, becoming a citizen of Geneva only in 1559, five years before he died. His theology, written for a pursued people permitted no rest on account of Counter Reformation persecution, aimed at sustaining those whose faith could not survive, let alone thrive, unless they knew that Christ’s grip on them was greater than theirs on him; in a word, they had to know that their life in Christ was rooted in an eternal appointment that no earthly treachery could undo. While acknowledging that most people in the Reformed tradition today are embarrassed by Calvin’s doctrine of predestination, Oberman more sympathetically probes the psycho-social situation of the refugee, quoting several times Calvin’s haunting comment, “We have no other place of refuge but his (i.e., God’s) providence.” (p.150) For homeless, stateless, hapless refugees, God’s hand – never to relax and drop them into that “abyss” that Calvin did not doubt – remained the sole, saving solace.
In the same vein Oberman brings to light the role of social location in the well-known fact that the Jewish people have fared much better in Reformed lands than elsewhere. Before Calvin, Luther and Zwingli had adopted the Augustinian notion, pregnant with horrors for Jewish people throughout the Middle Ages, that Jews wandered refuge-less inasmuch as God had consigned them to misery on account of their non-recognition of Jesus. It was only when Calvin and those he sustained found themselves forever wandering just because of their recognition of Jesus that they began to re-read scripture and to find in it the promise that no human violation of the covenant induces God to abandon us. As a result the Jewish people gained the support of Calvinist Christians even as the latter gave up a theology whose barbarity, rooted in ages-old supersessionism, had tormented neighbours wanting only to honour the covenant forged with Abraham. Pursuing the same point, Oberman unobtrusively corrects those who maintain that only in post-revolutionary France , avowedly secular, was the Jew allowed to become a citizen: in fact Jewish people were granted citizenship in Calvinist Holland by the end of the Sixteenth Century.
The book concludes with its longest chapter, “Calvin’s Legacy: Its Greatness and Limitations.” While these fifty-three pages may appear scant satisfaction to Oberman readers hungry for the tome on Calvin he had been working at for fifteen years, they are replete with riches available nowhere else in the literature. Only in Oberman, for instance, do we read that while Calvin is reputed for his mountain peak commentaries on Romans and Hebrews, 2nd Timothy remained his favourite in all of scripture.
Rich in substance, the book is redolent with the humble faith of an intellectual giant who cherished Calvin’s strengths, admitted his weaknesses, and was unashamed to say with Luther, “We are beggars” – and then to add himself, “These beggars are kings.”
Heiko Augustinus Oberman 1930—2001 Requiescat in pace.
Victor Shepherd
Professor of Systematic and Historical Theology
Tyndale Seminary
Toronto .
Jenson, Robert W.; On Thinking the Human: Resolutions of Difficult Notions ( Grand Rapids : Eerdmans, 2003)
Canadian Evangelical Review, Fall 2003
Jenson, Robert W.; On Thinking the Human: Resolutions of Difficult Notions ( Grand Rapids : Eerdmans, 2003) Pp. xii + 86. $23.99 Can.
This brief book’s compression is unparalleled among recent, shorter offerings in theology. Readers of Jenson will not be surprised at this feature, since they have seen as much in his always-rigorous, representative work over several decades: God After God: The God of the Past and the Future as Seen in the Work of Karl Barth — 1969; then more recently America ‘s Theologian: A Recommendation of Jonathan Edwards — 1988; and more recently still, his two-volume, magisterial Systematic Theology — 1997, 1999.
At the same time, his characteristic compression does not issue in opacity; on the contrary it is lucid throughout, even as the most diligent readers will find themselves having to sit straighter in their study chair. For this book is no little challenge for the theological neophyte. It presupposes more-than-modest familiarity with the history of Christian thought, and, equally, considerable philosophical sophistication together with an appreciation of postmodernism.
Then who will profit from the book? Maturer thinkers who need to think in new patterns and with a new vocabulary most certainly will gain from it, along with any and all who by vocation or avocation are concerned with understanding the profundities of what is uniquely human: social scientists, philosophers, cultural historians, literary critics, and politicians (whose work, ultimately, is the trusteeship of what is publicly owned as the human good.) While not written for the theological beginner, the book could well drive such a person, after the pattern of Jenson’s beloved Luther, to a despair that to be relieved only through delving into the cited works, mountain peaks in thought, among which Jenson moves with accomplished ease. Regardless of where a chapter begins or what paths it pursues, it “comes home” invariably where all humankind can alone be “at home”: participation by grace in the innermost life of the Triune God. Plainly the doctrine of God (i.e., the doctrine of the Trinity) is the ad quo and the ad quem of all Jenson’s thought. This fact alone is noteworthy, for in today’s “therapy culture” even theological texts concerned with “thinking the human” are expected to be, and lamentably too often are, religionized glosses of the social sciences. Jenson, however, insists that what it is to be a human being can be known only with reference to the Triune God; and for this reason, any reflection on “difficult notions” pertaining to the human must be reflection ultimately on who God is in himself eternally — which is to say, who and what we are in relation to him, since God has not willed to be God without us.
The book begins with “Thinking Death” and concludes with “Thinking Love. In between are four more chapters, “Thinking…Consciousness, Freedom, Reality, Wickedness.” Each chapter takes one (or several) theologian and philosopher as interlocutor. Thereafter it investigates the topic at hand by viewing it from several angles, always in conversation with philosopher, theologian, assorted assessors of culture, and Jenson’s own evaluation of contemporary social trends. (He is not afraid, for instance, to liken “our eugenics by mass execution” to those of the Nazis. He has in mind, of course, the cavalier deployment of abortion.)
Perhaps the best way that a reviewer can introduce the book is to acquaint the reader with the substance and style of any one chapter. “Thinking Wickedness” was begun the Monday following the terrorist attack on New York City. Denying all facile notions of “moral equivalence” (suffering engendered elsewhere through American foreign policy legitimates the sort of slaughter of “9/11”), Jenson nonetheless acknowledges that human wickedness, however cursorily discussed or denied in shallow pulpits of modernity, has been and deserves to be a matter worthy of theological diligence. He reaches back to the work of Michael Illyricus Flacius, the Gnesio-Lutheran excoriated by the Philipists (intellectual descendants of Melanchthon;) Flacius insisted that fallen human nature is substantially wicked. The Philipists pointed out, of course, that if this were the case then “people” would not be so much fallen as obliterated; redemption would be impossible; and the Incarnation could never have occurred. At the same time, Jenson is unhappy with the Philipists’ wording in the Formula of Concord (Lutheranism’s classical doctrinal statement) that in the wake of the Fall humans are sinners only “accidentally” rather than “substantially” (Concord herein using these terms with utmost Aristotelian precision, since “accidental” leaves our sinnership too remote from who we are, all humankind now “Teflon-coated.”) Next he probes the matter of individual identity, its adherents presupposing that identity has to do with what is “in us” rather than with our relationship to what is outside us. From here he makes a big step (but not a leap) to a discussion of ontological contingency, humans, of course, always possessed of contingent being only. Then he points out that substance, strictly speaking, is substance only if it perdures through time and beyond time, since temporality renders finite substance inherently impossible. (His footnote “reminds” readers that the only serious theological error he finds in Thomas Aquinas is perhaps the latter’s failure to probe eternity/time sufficiently critically.) Next he expands his previous assertion on how we are identical with ourselves not in virtue of what is within us but rather in virtue of what (Who) we are within; for in truth we are within the “within-ness” of the inherently triune life of Father, Son and Spirit. Finally he argues with exquisitely nuanced progression how it is that only when the triune community and all created community are finally one will there be resolved that human wickedness which is more than accidental (despite “therapeutic” protestation) yet cannot be “substantial,” as Flacius’s opponents knew.
In an era when so very much theology appears to have forgotten that theology is to be about God, this book is sustained witness to Jenson’s preoccupation with the doctrine of God — which preoccupation, the reader will conclude, arises just because nothing less than God fills the horizon of Jenson’s thought and life.
Victor Shepherd Tyndale University College & Seminary
Webster, John. Holiness (Grand Rapids : Eerdmans, 2003)
Webster, John. Holiness. Grand Rapids : Eerdmans, 2003. Pp. ix + 116. Paper, $26.99 Can.
ISBN: 0-8028-2215-0
Those familiar with Webster’s magisterial works concerning the practical import of Karl Barth’s theology (e.g., Barth’s Ethics of Reconciliation and Barth’s Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth’s Thought) will not be surprised to find this book exemplifying the same learning, wisdom, and turn of phrase that sears insight after insight upon mind and heart. Neither will they be surprised to find here sufficient evidence that it is precisely the most recondite theology which most consistently and most profoundly assists the Church in its daily life, worship and mission. Webster’s opening sentence, “This book is a Christian theological essay on holiness” (p.1), declares his agenda. The four chapters of the book deliver the promised substance.
Webster is unapologetic concerning his orientation and logic: theology is holy speech; holy just because it is generated by, bound to and disciplined through the Holy One whom it aspires to serve. And since “The self-giving presence of Christ in the Church is the law of the holy” (p.2), theology can be articulated only in the Church. In turn the Church’s stammering attempt at speaking for God can be protected only by a proper fear of the Church’s Lord.
Throughout chapter one, “The Holiness of Theology”, Webster sustains his contention that theological thinking about holiness is itself an exercise in holiness. In this vein he develops the leitmotif of “holy reason.” Here Webster avoids twin pitfalls: capitulation to modernity’s brazen confidence that reason is unimpaired, and capitulation to postmodernity’s lament or sneer that reason’s integrity can never be recovered (or perchance never existed.) Cogently he argues, from several different angles, that it is grace alone, known in faith, which restores reason’s integrity inasmuch as reason is an aspect of humankind in its entirety, and it is this entirety which is included in the history of sin and reconciliation.
In “The Holiness of God” Webster’s Trinitarian focus comes to the fore. Rejecting any non-ostensive understanding of God, he insists that God’s simplicity, for instance, isn’t an undifferentiated unity in God that logically precedes God’s tri-unity (as in much Protestant Orthodoxy) but rather God’s “irreducible ‘this-ness’, executed in the drama of his works.”(p.38) Distancing himself from Rudolf Otto, Paul Tillich and Friederich Schleiermacher, for whom “the holy” was chiefly a religiously generic, humanly experienced phenomenon rather than God’s presence and action, he avers that “the holy” is the undiminished majesty of God in its most intimate saving relationship with us. Here Webster’s ringing affirmation is the ligature for several related considerations: e.g., the positive, sanctifying aspect of God’s holiness is characteristically prior to the wickedness-destroying aspect, the latter being merely the merciful militancy of the former; God’s jealousy is holy love’s refusal to allow the creature to forfeit itself by setting the terms on which it will live before God.
In “The Holiness of the Church” Webster maintains that the Church is holy not because of any ontological participation in God but solely on account of its vocation. For this reason he remains critical of “social trinitarianism”, the notion that the Church becomes not the witness to God’s saving incursion because first an heir of it, but becomes rather part of the being of God on account of the Church’s participation (in Hegel’s sense) in the Triune life of God. Here Webster identifies two implicates: the undervaluation of the free majesty of God and the concomitant drift toward divine immanence, as well as the compromising of the perfection and sufficiency of God’s work in Christ. At the same time he judiciously cautions against a similar two-fold reaction: a false spiritualization in which the humanness of the Church is denied, together with a dualism where God and the human are necessarily deemed mutually exclusive. Denying that the holiness of the Church is visible as if holiness inhered the Church, Webster nonetheless glories in the earthliness of the Church by insisting that the Church’s holiness is visible as the Church visibly hears ever again the promise and command of the gospel, confesses its sin in penitence and faith, bears witness to the world, and pleads with God for God to hallow his own name.
In the final chapter, “The Holiness of the Christian”, Webster highlights the difference between the Christian’s holiness and contemporaneity’s concern with “spirituality”, the latter too often hedonistic self-fulfilment. Instead he maintains that holiness is rooted in and finds its stable basis in forgiveness and reconciliation. He continues this “otherward” direction by complementing a reinvestigation of Calvin’s “mortification” with a refreshing exploration of holiness as divine appointment to obligatory service of the neighbour. Put most pithily, the believer’s holiness in Christ means “by the Spirit’s power I am separated from my self-caused self-destruction, and given a new self, enclosed by, and wholly referred to, the new Adam in whom I am and in whom I act.”(p.84)
Everywhere the book exudes an irenic spirit as Webster gently exposes inadequacies (e.g., Schleiermacher) while identifying strengths (Juengel, Staniloae, Augustine.) It rescues a crucial topic from the hands of religious romantics. It depicts an able theologian at work, zealous for God’s honour and the edification of the Church.
Victor Shepherd
Tyndale Seminary, Toronto
Thomas Clark Oden. The Rebirth of Orthodoxy: Signs of New Life in Christianity. San Francisco : Harper, 2003.
Thomas Clark Oden. The Rebirth of Orthodoxy: Signs of New Life in Christianity. San Francisco : Harper, 2003. Pp. xi + 212. Cloth. $39.99 Can. ISBN: 006009785X
Readers of this book might be advised to begin with Oden’s autobiographical statement, “A Personal Odyssey”( pp. 82-96), wherein he speaks candidly of his captivity to modernity, which captivity he unhesitatingly describes as “chauvinistic” in its arrogant, groundless assumption that the newer is invariably better than the older, the novel better than the tested, the speculative that titillates self-important knowledge elites better than the profound that has gained the consensus of the people of God. He then testifies to a conversion at the hands of God not in a spirit of self-advertisement but in confidence that the grace which brought him up out of the theological “miry pit” will use his testimony to do as much for those who still languish in it.
An American Methodist clergyman, Oden immersed himself in Bultmann’s anti-Incarnation and anti-Resurrection reading of the New Testament, then in Marxist economics, psychoanalysis, the human potential movement, feminism, abortion advocacy. All of this was gathered up in an unabashed politicization of the church’s mission; it issued in the shallowest spiritual faddism.
Oden’s turnaround began when Will Herberg, a Jewish colleague at Drew University whose recent acquaintance with classic Judaism found him returning repentant from the “far country” of communism, insisted that Oden would remain a dilettante until he studied his own tradition, particularly the “paleo” colossuses of the East and West alike: Athanasius, Basil, Chrysostom, Gregory of Nazianzus, as well as Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome, Gregory the Great. Oden’s recovery put him on a theological trajectory that he is still pursuing thirty years later.
Oden’s commitment to orthodoxy (the lower case letter is important, since the churches of the West as well as the East are included) is a repristination of “integrated biblical teaching as interpreted in its most consensual period”. (p.29) By “consensual” he means “the teaching that has been duly confirmed by a process of general consent of the faithful over two millennia.” (p.29) Plainly he honours tradition. Tradition ought never to be pitted against scripture since it is the conduit of scriptural teaching, even as scripture remains the unnormed norm of tradition while tradition aspires to be the faithful recollection of scripture. Without referencing G.K. Chesterton, Oden resonates with Chesterton’s understanding of tradition as the church’s memory. And just as amnesiac people whose lack of memory means they have no identity and cannot be trusted, Chesterton argued, “amnesiac” churches that disavow tradition can only be treacherous.
Oden pretends nothing else, having been himself both perpetrator and victim. Still, just as he is persuaded of orthodoxy’s soundness so is he convinced of the resilience and militancy of the regenerating power of the ancient faith. Orthodoxy has proved itself such, for it has withstood persistent assault at the hands of mainline denominations that have married modernity and mobilized their vast resources in the service of the ideologies and “isms” now characterizing denominational programs, publications, and seminaries. Oden argues that the World Council of Churches, whose outlook is incarnated in the U.S.A. in the multi-denominational collaboration housed at 475 Riverside Drive , New York City , was manifestly unravelling in the 1960s as it veered toward neo-paganism, shamanism and animistic primitivism. By its meeting in 1998 in Harare , Zimbabwe , the WCC had thoroughly betrayed the vision of its founders at the 1948 inauguration in Amsterdam . The only sounds emerging now from this “old” ecumenism are its death rattle.
The “new” ecumenism, on the other hand, is deliberately grounded in ancient consensus, upholds the distillations of the ecumenical councils, recognizes the arrears of sin even in believers, and remains critical of failed modern ideas (e.g., of Marx, Freud and Nietzsche) that have proved lethal amidst world-occurrence.
Oden cautions readers against confusing “new” ecumenism, orthodoxy, with “neo-orthodoxy.” For the latter (he makes some exceptions for Karl Barth) never was really concerned with the Fathers, life in Christ, liturgy, prayer, discipline, spiritual formation, sacramental live and pastoral care. Sound theology and Spirit-invigorated people, always essential to each other, emerge from a worshipping community whose doxological confession is matched by its willingness to suffer for the One it extols.
In light of the emphasis on ancient wisdom written, readers are not surprised at Oden’s reiterated reminder that much modern biblical study amounts to speculation concerning oral traditions that preceded the written text of scripture, together with a magnification of the supposed difference between the oral and the written. The “new” ecumenism, orthodoxy returning, recognizes that Holy writ is the primary source, ground and norm of all Christian (and Jewish) teaching. Unlike their modern counterparts, ancient exegetes looked to the whole of written scripture to illumine each part.
Yet it must not be thought that Oden is naively nostalgic, denying all substance to current concerns. He endorses the legitimacy of the “fairness revolution” (the attempt at redressing social inequities that are sheer iniquities) even if he deplores an approach whose consequences tragically include deepened inequality. He contends, however, that orthodoxy is the ally of the “fairness revolution” in that it corrects the latter’s blind spots, supplies it with a perspective it cannot acquire itself, and lends it staying power. In the same way orthodoxy supports the current concern for diversity, inclusion, tolerance and empathy. What, after all, is more diverse than an ecumenical consensus that included ethno-racially diverse spokespersons from lower Egypt, North Africa , Asia Minor and France ? (Not to mention the fifteen ethnic identities listed in Acts 2.)
While orthodoxy is inherently irenic in its service of the Prince of Peace, it unashamedly upholds the boundary-definitions inherent in Christian teaching. For this reason the critical aspect of orthodoxy, always bent on being constructive, honours in its polemics the faithful who have the courage to say “No”, apart from which their “Yes” would mean nothing. Sophia worship, for instance, is an excrescence whose appearing rightly elicits the faithful’s “No.”
The last chapter in the book, “Recovering the Classic Ecumenical Method,” also the longest, is a masterly presentation of the work and wisdom of Vincent of Lerins (c.450 C.E.) Known for his aphorism, Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est (“What has been believed everywhere, always, by all people”,) Lerins has furnished a key that has repeatedly unlocked the fetters of the church’s cultural captivity. Oden is his most persuasive in his articulation and deployment of Lerins’s “What has been believed….” Skilfully, patiently, cogently Oden acquaints the present-day Christian (who is now beginning to feel almost sectarian) with the nuances that had to be deployed in the fifth century and will have to be deployed in any era. Expansively but not verbosely Oden articulates the force of ubique: the faith that the church confesses the world over; of semper: the faith confessed by the apostles first and confessed thereafter; ab omnibus: the faith confirmed by an ecumenical council or a broad consensus of ancient Christian writers, affirmed by the laity and expressed in the church’s liturgy. Then Oden illustrates his exposition by juxtaposing “What if…?” to each of Lerins’s expressions: What if — a part of the communion rejects the whole? — a “new gospel” is preferred to the apostolic faith? — ancient witnesses themselves might be wrong? — no conciliar precedent is defined? He concludes the chapter by illustrating all of this by means of critical irruptions in the church’s history: the Donatists, the Arians, Mary as “Theotokos,” Appolinaris, Tertullian, Origen. Oden’s pellucid presentation in this chapter is worth the price of the book.
No less valuable, however, is his consistent inclusion of Judaism within the orthodoxy he espouses. Without trace of that supersessionism which has bedevilled the church and therein excoriated the Jewish people, Oden’s exquisite attention to scripture finds him admitting the place of Israel as Israel in God’s economy concerning church and world. Judaism, having awakened too from its modernistic miasma, is recovering its identity in scripture and the rabbinic tradition forged coincidentally in the Patristic era. Never discounting the uniqueness of Jesus Christ, Oden is glad to say that through the Nazarene, Gentiles have been brought into the faith of God’s covenant with Israel, there being only one covenant (albeit renewed in Christ) as surely as there is only one God. In all of this Oden remains convinced that Jews, no less than the church, have something decisive at stake in the recovery of classic Christianity, even as Christians have as much at stake in the recovery of classic Yiddishkeit.
Oden’s challenge is as unmistakeable as it is undeniable: “Can classic Christians and confessors of apostolic faith in the mainline churches cooperatively form a plausible accord that effectively resists the apostatizing temptations endemic within the unregenerate mainline?” (p.141) Since the evangelical churches are now seemingly indistinguishable from the mainline in their neglect of long-term memory and in their cultural accommodation, Oden’s question ought to haunt all Christians alike.
Victor Shepherd
Tyndale University College and Seminary
Perkins, Robert L. (editor). International Kierkegaard Commentary (Volume 21): For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself! Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 2002.
(International Journal of Systematic Theology)
Perkins, Robert L. (editor). International Kierkegaard Commentary (Volume 21): For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself! Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 2002. Pp. xii+374. $45 US.
With the completion of Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the ‘Philosophical Fragments’ (1846) Kierkegaard intended to cease writing. Finding, however, that he could not deny himself, his “second series,” penned non-pseudonymously, began four years later with the appearance of For Self-Examination.
The “second series” highlights theological issues that Kierkegaard finds in Luther or Nineteenth Century Danish Lutheranism. In a country where the church is established a virulent, militant “Christendom” is inevitable. Galvanized by the extent to which the Peace of Westphalia (it rendered the religion of any political ruler the religion of the people) had diluted the gospel, perverted Lutheranism, profaned the church, and misled most concerning the gift, claim and suffering of genuine faith, Kierkegaard’s two works under discussion in the twelve essays of Vol. 21 of the IKC speak to Christians of any persuasion of the insidiousness of “Christendom.”
In the first article Lee Barrett explores the cruciality of “authorial voice” in Kierkegaard’s non-pseudonymous writings; e.g., poet, penitent, humorist, aspiring-yet-deficient Christian. He argues that an appreciation of the differences in authorial voices is not a post-Kierkegaard agenda of literary criticism read back into him; rather it is to see how Kierkegaard himself relates voice and meaning. Drawing on British philosopher J.L. Austin’s understanding of “performative force” in language, Barrett insists that the meaning of existentially significant textual communication does not inhere the text. In other words, the meaning of the text is controlled, at least in part, by the end which the author intends; i.e., by how the text performs or is meant to function. In illustrating his thesis Barrett contrasts FSE & JFY! with Works of Love. The latter aims at clarifying love, stimulating it, and magnifying its attractiveness. The former aims at awakening pained awareness of one’s failure in all of this, together with repentance and self-abandonment to the grace God proffers. This contrast, however, is no contradiction. Liturgically, for instance, both are needed in the service of praise and penitence. Barrett’s point remains, however, that a text’s content is always related to its intent, and this in turn to the form of communication. He concludes, “…a neutral, omniscient authorial metaperspective is not available.”(p.35) Communication is always context-specific.
Craig Hinkson explores Lutheranism’s divagations as successive Luther images, amounting to a contradiction of Luther, appeared in Melanchthon’s humanism, Chemnitz’s orthodoxy, Arnold’s pietism, the Enlightenment’s Rationalism, and finally Goethe’s “Luther personality” giving rise to Germany’s culture and its spirit. First Luther’s thought was co-opted by the orthodox who re-introduced Aristotle as a buttress for theology. The pietists, rightly discerning the dimension of the “heart” in Luther and rightly resisting Melanchthon’s intellectualist veer in the doctrine of faith, pointed out that pure doctrine and pure faith were not the same. At the same time, pietism’s undervaluation of doctrine born of revelation inadvertently supported the rationalism lurking in Melanchthon. Orthodoxy found its zenith in an Enlightenment that claimed to be able to demonstrate doctrine philosophically. By now the operative image was Luther as the champion of autonomous reason (Luther himself had called this a “whore.”) Hegel provided a philosophical legitimization of Kulturprotestantismus. Goethe insisted that Luther’s character was the only noteworthy feature of the Reformation. Kierkegaard set his face against the conglomeration of Luther images, unambiguously announcing the purpose of his authorship: “I have wanted to prevent people in ‘Christendom’ from existentially taking in vain Luther and the significance of his life.”[1] Derided as an eccentric, Kierkegaard found vindication only as Luther was discovered anew in the Twentieth Century.
Lee Barrett returns to argue compellingly that despite Kiergkegaard’s insistence in FSE and JFY! that Christians are characterized by what they do, Luther’s priority of grace-engendered faith is not denied. In fact it is the latter that grounds Kierkegaard’s understanding of the three uses of the law. With respect to the third use Kierkegaard magnifies gratitude for gratuitous salvation as the motive for wanting to follow “Christ the Prototype,” even though this following necessarily entails the world’s hostility and the believer’s consequent suffering. In view of a gratitude that fuels self-forgetfulness, believers are relieved of the “probabilities” inherent in those whose shrewd calculating creates a “self” they can never afford to forget. While gratitude is the Christian’s initial motive, the Christian’s more exalted motive is apprehension of love’s inherent loveliness (God’s). (Here this reviewer finds a parallel to Jonathan Edwards that could have been probed and would have proved fruitful.) At the end of the chapter Barrett teases the reader with the suggestion that the Christian as agent must cooperate with grace in some sense. The reader could wish that Barrett had explored in Kierkegaard the logic of non-synergistic cooperation, presupposed glaringly in “Ludvig-and-his-stroller,” and found lucidly in the Patristic notion of gratia operans/gratia cooperans.
In light of Bonhoeffer David Law examines FSE as a protest against “cheap grace.” “Justification by grace through faith” has been reduced to a formula that can be recited mantra-like as a means of avoiding the gospel. At fault, says Kierkegaard, are the following: meticulous biblical scholarship whose logic is at odds with the logic of scripture and that ends in obscuring the Word it purports to serve, an apologetic whose rationalism is the sphere in which doubt is addressed (supposedly) even as the self-same rationalism legitimates and magnifies doubt, a failure to understand that doubt concerning the truth disappears as truth is done, non-acknowledgement that “new death” (“dying to” self) is essential to “new birth,” and the confusing of “subjectivity” with selfism. Law faults Kierkegaard for failing to grasp the gospel’s redressing of social inequalities. The reader may ask whether all social inequities are ipso facto social iniquities, and ask again if Kierkegaard’s “oversight” is in fact his refusal to reduce the gospel to ideology.
Murray Rae challenges Barth’s assessment that in the dialectic of the gospel Kierkegaard ultimately weights condemnation more heavily than grace. Addressing Barth’s complaint that Kierkegaard’s imbalance issued in a legalism that deadens, saddens and sours, Rae corrects Barth’s misapprehension: Kierkegaard is not guilty of an imbalance wherein the announcement of forgiveness and reconciliation in Christ fails to uplift but leaves hearers despairing still of their unworthiness. Rae brings together Kierkegaard’s illustration of the birds of the air and the lilies of the field (they are alike carefree), the fact that the Prototype with his unconditional demand is also the Redeemer, and the latter’s unconditioned gift of reconciliation that eclipses our condemnation. The aforementioned atonement (incomprehensible apart from our utter condemnation) exalts disciples and renders their discipleship acts of trust in it. Such publicly enacted trust serves as witness. Whereas the Enlightenment, not understanding that reason is culturally conditioned, prefers “reasons” that explain condemnation, reconciliation and obedience, Kierkegaard insists that witnesses alone declare Truth to be accessible by S(s)pirit; which witnesses, he notes, doubt never afflicts. In the same vein Rae exonerates Kierkegaard in the face of Barth’s accusation that believers are left ransacking their hearts for the love wherewith they are to love others. Drawing on Works of Love as well as FSE and JFY!, especially “Ludvig-and-his-stroller,” Rae indicates neighbour-love to be the outworking of God’s transformative love in atonement-embracing sinners; i.e., love is Spirit-facilitated. Rae concludes his correction of Barth by showing that the Prototype’s unconditional demand is also unconditional promise: “You shall love” means both “you must love” and “you will unfailingly love,” for in Christ the law has been fulfilled.
Sylvia Walsh investigates not so much an issue raised chiefly in FSE and JFY! but rather the theme of self-denial everywhere in Kierkegaard. In the course of her examination she introduces English-speaking readers to a protracted dispute between two Swedish scholars, Torsten Bohlin and Valter Lindstroem, on whether Climacus’s understanding of dying to immediacy in the Postscript conforms to Kierkegaard’s subsequent interpretation of it. Is Kierkegaard ultimately sin-denying or life-denying? Walsh, thoroughly acquainted with the subtleties in Kierkegaard and his commentators, adroitly steers the reader through the dispute, then moves on to yet another commentator, Marie Thulstrup, and assesses the latter’s insistence that any shift in Kierkegaard’s understanding of “dying to” arises from a shift in his view of nature. Having identified and probed the many nuances in this disputed topic, Walsh concludes that Kierkegaard’s “dying to” entails not the negation but the transformation of the immediate, natural, pagan and human dimensions. Lest readers regard the conversation as arcane, she hauntingly ends her article with the reminder that “dying to,” according to Kierkegaard, means that the Christian will die twice over: when repudiating selfishness, and when incurring and accepting the hostility of a world whose “self-denial” and “love” are the abysmal inverse of Christianity’s.
Paul Martens expounds the role of the Holy Spirit in FSE and JFY!, maintaining that Kierkgaard here says more about the Holy Spirit than anywhere else. Only the Spirit saves “dying to” from corrupted self-assertion, collapses earthly hope into hopelessness thereby giving rise to “hope against hope” (Romans 4:18), and keeps arduous discipleship from being inherently enervating. Only the Spirit, according to the parables of the Royal Coachman in FSE and JFY! respectively, drives the Christian ahead on the Way and at the same time stills all attempts at self-making for the sake of a self divinely wrought. Martens indicates that for Kierkegaard too the Spirit alone leads people into the Church, exalts the Redeemer and vivifies the Word. In short, the Spirit alone ensures that all that is urged in the two books concerns an encounter with God.
Louise Carroll Keeley confronts the putative misogyny in Kierkegaard with a moving, lyrical exploration of the riches embedded in FSE‘s apparently patriarchal “And You, O Woman.” Arguing that the substance of Kierkegaard’s “silent woman” may be exemplified by men, Keeley searches the depths of silence, domesticity and joy. Silence is not the artificiality of deliberate wordlessness; it is rather attentive listening to the eternal Word amidst the world’s noise. Predated by the Word, silence injects into the present its “beneficent power,” and because pregnant with the Word silence orients one to the future by directing one’s action. Silence alone can render one aware that one is constituted by Another. And since what one hears in silence one subsequently does, so far from isolating one from others silence connects one to them. In the same manner Keeley indicates how Word-besotted silence renders a house a spiritual home, and how Word-fostered joy sheds temptation as joy overcomes the divided mind that temptation always exploits.
In an approach reminiscent of A.J. Heschel who, when faced with younger Jewish people complaining that they did not understand Torah told them that if they only did it they would understand it, John Whittaker explores Kierkegaard’s insistence that only as we do the truth do we believe it. In probing Kierkegaard here Whittaker distinguishes between objective religious truth and the means by which it is known. Objective religious truth can be known only “subjectively,” only in “inwardness,” only as one inhabits truth that is essentially transformative. Herein Kierkegaard insists that the authority of God’s Word is never inferred and never generated by something outside that Word. Aware of the nature of scriptural authority, believers renounce all attempts at explaining why God’s Word is believable. Ultimately, then, the authority of the bible is the capacity of Jesus Christ (the “Prototype”) to transform readers and conform them to him as they read the book that attests him.
Julia Watkin probes the nature of Kierkegaard’s analogy of scripture as “The Letter from the Lover.” In this regard she examines chiefly the matter of biblical criticism and the extent to which it might erode what Kierkegaard calls “one’s acceptance of Christianity.” Rightly she points out that if the “Prototype” and the “God-man” are necessary for faith, and if criticism could establish that Jesus of Nazareth never existed, then no one is “equally free” to “accept Christianity.” (CUP) Concerning the Incarnation Watkins’s work will precipitate protracted discussion for here she points out that Kierkegaard never indicates why the appearance of the God-man is necessary to the occasion of faith, and insists herself that any number of situations may serve as such an occasion. Thereby she supports the agnostic/atheist offspring of Kierkegaard who affirm the possibility of “truth is subjectivity” while denying what Kierkegaard deemed to lie behind it. Since Watkin maintains that the universe’s lover is “capable of writing all kinds of love letters (p.313),” she appears to leave the reader with too little help and perhaps Kierkegaard himself misrepresented when she concludes with, “yet, as with every communication, people need to be alert as to whether it really is a love letter that they are looking at (p.313).”
David Cain probes dialectic in Kierkegaard through Kierkegaard’s rejection of “cheap victory” amidst pseudo-Christian triumphalism: the star (of victory) is in the cross, not the cross in the star. Then Cain returns to an examination of the Law-Gospel arrangement, only this time in a way that recalls the logic of the Heidelberg Catechism: Bad News, Good News, Gratitude born of Good News as the sole, sufficient motivation of Christian discipleship. Gratitude, Cain insists, is “Christian motivation for staying ‘in the striving (p.323).'” Cain crowns his essay on Kierkegaard’s dialectic from the Journals and Papers (1:993): “…infinite humiliation and grace and then a striving born of gratitude — this is Christianity.”
Martin Andic concludes the volume and the four essays on Kierkegaard and scripture through a comparison of the “mirror” of the divine in both Kierkegaard and Socrates. His principal point is that Kierkegaard, in affirming the reading of scripture to be a divine way to self-knowledge, “contrasts the Christian view with the Socratic one too sharply” inasmuch as “Socrates, the pagan…did seek to know himself precisely before God (p. 355).” Andic proceeds to prosecute his thesis that for Socrates “We become like God by selfless righteousness that will never do wrong no matter what worldly good we must forfeit and regardless of what worldly evil we have to endure. Kierkegaard says that we become spirit and… acquire the love of God by doing God’s Word and suffering whatever comes. Both call for dying to self and worldliness, and for both it is humility and justice that unite us to God, the self-effacing service of truth that makes us living mirrors.” (p. 357) Here Andic’s article will surely provoke much discussion as to whether Socrates did or could seek to know himself before “God;” i.e., is Socrates’ “divine” the Holy One of Abrahamic faith who renders himself Incarnate? Is the formal similarity in Socrates and Kierkegaard a material identity? Do Socrates and Kierkegaard remain congruent if Christ-wrought grace and faith are deleted from the latter?
Its angle of vision chiefly theological rather than philosophical, this volume exhibits Kierkegaard’s oneness with key dimensions of Luther; it distances Kierkegaard from theological and ecclesiastical distortions in Lutheranism; it develops themes that Kierkegaard scholarship has overlooked heretofore; and it challenges readers to reread the Dane where contributors’ readings appear tendentious.
Victor Shepherd , Tyndale University College and Seminary, Toronto.
[1] On My Work as an Author, Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.) p.17.
Oldstone-Moore, Christopher; Hugh Price Hughes: Founder of a New Methodism, Conscience of a New Nonconformity
(CANADIAN EVANGELICAL REVIEW, Spring, 2003)
Oldstone-Moore, Christopher; Hugh Price Hughes: Founder of a New Methodism, Conscience of a New Nonconformity (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999) Pp. x + 393. $82.95 CAN.
ISBN: 0 7083 1468 6
This fine book, published in 1999, appears to have lurked in a Sheol-like underworld for several years, only recently to emerge among the living. It ably acquaints readers with the vision, theology, courage and suffering of a Methodist giant who applied himself relentlessly to the challenges his era brought before him.
The book aims at providing a critical analysis of the ideas and work of Hughes. Herein it sheds light on aspects of British history treated only slightly elsewhere. Along the way it schools readers profoundly in the origins of the ecumenical movement in Britain , Methodism’s contributions to the women’s movement, and the nature of the “Nonconformist Conscience.”
Hughes (1847-1902), the most prominent spokesperson for British Methodism during the latter half of the 19th century, maintained that two matters characterized modernity: the rise of learning among the masses (together with the newly politicized workers’ demand for social democracy), and the concomitant rise of cultured Christians. The latter’s apprehension of and zeal for the Kingdom could guide, support and elevate a movement that would heal class divisions (they were worse in Britain than anywhere on the Continent) and defuse the social evils that frustrated society in its appointment to reflect the glory of God. To his life’s end Hughes tolled the six evils that he had identified as especially iniquitous: slavery, drunkenness, the social evil [sexual impurity with its attendant degradation and disease], ignorance, pauperism and war. Yet in all of this he never proffered panaceas, always insisting that a deepening of the spiritual life in clergy and leaders remained Methodism’s most urgent need.
Knowing the allegiance that the Free Churches enjoyed in Britain , Hughes urged them to shed their inferiority and assert themselves as the vanguard of renewal. His first target was the liquor traffic. Knowing that Hogarth’s painting, ” Gin Lane ,” was no exaggeration, he insisted that liquor-abuse and misery were alike cause and consequence of each other. Both would have to be attacked.
Next he turned to the “Contagious Diseases Act”, meant to limit the spread of venereal disease. In fact it amounted to government sanction of prostitution. It also violated the human rights of women, subjecting them to invasive examinations. Since the Act pertained only to women, it enforced a double standard; since it was applied only to “common” prostitutes, it thickened class distinctions; since its real purpose was to provide VD-free fornication for armed forces personnel, it was reprehensible. Prostitutes, said Hughes, were dealt with “as sewers are treated” by sanitation engineers; they were dehumanized. (Congregationalists and Baptists shrank from his “indecent” public pronouncements.) The Establishment “packed” on him, some of its members glad to avail themselves of sexual opportunities rendered as risk-free as possible. Hughes remained unintimidated. His work here typified his lifelong, “holistic” conviction: the spiritual well-being of the individual, together with a just social life, and all of this supported where possible by parliamentary legislation urged by Christians.
Yet it must never be thought that Hughes was a thinly-disguised leftist who advocated social dismantling. He both supported and profited from the meetings of the Holiness Convention, reconsecrating himself to God in 1875, vowing his “all” to God without qualification or reservation. His rededication here coincided with his recognition that he had expected more from politics than it could deliver: only utmost spiritual renewal could effect national transmutation. Not surprisingly, then, his pastorates in an upscale London suburb and in Oxford found his ministry reverberating with evangelistic urgency. Yet always aware that “heat” and “light” belong together, he gained an advanced degree in philosophy from the University of London , and also introduced 1000-seat lecture halls into new Methodist church buildings, insisting that the farthest-ranging education of the laity was now non-negotiable in the Methodist ethos.
At the same time he knew that evil is most entrenched when most systemic. For this reason he came to embrace “socialism”, yet always a socialism informed by evangelism and, reciprocally, an evangelism infused with socialism. He was the first prominent Wesleyan preacher to declare himself a Christian socialist. “Have your right hand on political economy, your left on works of socialism, and before you the open Bible,” he urged every minister. (His “socialism” meant “social alleviation;” it never approached Marxism, advocating neither social levelling nor a state-planned economy.)
Hughes’ greatest achievement was the Forward Movement. The Methodist church was singularly positioned for this in that it was zealous for evangelism, assumed responsibility for the social well-being of people (Anglican claims to social reconstruction Hughes deemed insufficiently evangelical) and could form a new national consciousness. Convinced that Anglicanism was duplicitous on account of its relationship to the governing classes, Hughes felt that only Methodism could address social horrors in Britain . When it was reported that parents sold 13-year old daughters into prostitution for as little as five pounds, Hughes expostulated, “Can there be found a more shameful abuse of the power of wealth?” A colleague made such a purchase to prove it could be done, and then published an account of it in the Pall Mall Gazette. While some Methodists recoiled from tough confrontation, Hughes was adamant. The challenge he recognized here he deemed to be Methodism’s crossroads: either it demonstrated its capacity for effecting spiritual renewal with consequent social and national renewal (private charity, for instance, could never address systemic poverty) or it faded into the obscurity of a backwater sect.
Crucial to the Movement was the formation of the “Sisters of the People.” These “Sisters” were more than the centuries-old deaconesses who had customarily administered material relief. Rather they promoted women’s equality, lobbied aggressively for social transmutation and political liberation, and preached at open-air services. Foregoing vows, they lived together and dressed distinctively. They were anything but mere soup-ladlers.
The Movement’s greatest crisis concerned overseas missions. It came to light that Methodist missionaries in India lived far above the people they were sent to serve, were paid far more than Methodist preachers at home, and accommodated their gospel to the Brahmins among whom they glided. (American Methodist missionaries in India , it was noted, were paid far less yet seemed vastly more effective.) The contradiction was resolved, but not before Methodist officialdom, embarrassed and angry, nearly censured Hughes.
The Movement’s greatest notoriety concerned Charles Stewart Parnell and the controversy around Irish Home Rule. Long a supporter of the latter, Hughes was aghast when the Irish continued to support Parnell despite his protracted adultery with Kitty O’Shea, wife to an Irish member of Parliament. “What is morally wrong can never be politically right,” Hughes repeated as often as he reiterated purity to be a political principle. In the wake of the conflagration Nonconformists gathered around him more tightly than ever.
In the second surge of the Movement he gave himself unstintingly to the recovery of the Church’s unity. Attacked by the high-church faction of Anglicanism, he pronounced it a threat to religious freedom, insisting that Free Church Christians were true “Scriptural Catholics.” His leadership here was recognized in his election as first president of the National Council of Evangelical Free Churches.
Soon elected as well (1898) as president of the Methodist Conference, he reminded everyone that the local congregation remained the heart of the church: “I am very glad you have put a circuit minister in the chair.” From his chair he continued to press for old age pensions, better education for the socially underprivileged, and improved housing for the poor. Yet even more ardently he struggled for Methodism’s emphases: the necessity of conversion and Christian perfection, the latter being self-forgetful love for God and neighbour in self-abandonment to the Kingdom’s future in the world.
Hughes had brought English spiritual life out of 19th century doldrums; he had rendered Nonconformity a political force; he had seen Methodist laity become the people’s leaders through such developments as the Trades Unions. In it all the luminosity of Jesus Christ had remained the “whence” and “whither” of his life and work.
Upon learning of Hughes’ desire to enter the ministry, his father, a physician, had said, “I should rather my son be a Methodist preacher than the Lord Chancellor of England.” Thirteen years after Hughes’ death David Lloyd George, chancellor of the Exchequer and soon to be prime minister of Great Britain, unveiled a portrait of Hughes and told the huge crowd what he had been thinking when he had attended Hughes’ funeral: “There lies silent the greatest spiritual force my generation has produced for a generation.”
[Victor Shepherd: Professor of Historical Theology: Tyndale Seminary, Toronto ]
Jehle, Frank. Ever Against the Stream: The Politics of Karl Barth, 1906-1968.
(Toronto Journal of Theology Fall 2003)
Jehle, Frank. Ever Against the Stream: The Politics of Karl Barth, 1906-1968.
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. Pp. vi + 117. Paper, us$22.00. ISBN 0-80828-4944-X
“A silent community, merely observing the events of the time, would not be a Christian community,” wrote Barth in 1944 as he reflected on his decade-long political struggle in Germany and Switzerland. Jehle relates how Barth exemplified his conviction that Christians, caught in political treachery, may and must act politically just because God’s grace alone lends the state its legitimacy and informs it of its task. So far from being thanked for his contribution here, Barth was never acclaimed in his native land. Four days after his death (December, 1968) a memorial service to honour him was held in the Basel cathedral, with no representative of the federal Swiss government attending. Three months earlier the funeral of Karl Jaspers, Basel’s famed philosopher, had seen many politicians on hand.
The book begins with Barth’s 1906 admission to Zofingia, Switzerland’s oldest student union. Already the twenty-year old was theologically astute and politically alert, thanks to the Swiss Reformation legacy of Zwingli, Oecolampadius and Calvin. Informed by them Barth’s political criticism quickly became diverse and discerning, comprehending a socio-economic arrangement whose “glass ceiling” kept able students out of university on account of their working-class background, as well as Germany’s “unbearable militarism” and Russia’s “Cossack terror.”
In 1907 Barth met Christoph Blumardt (the younger) and owned the latter’s awareness that the entire creation is “sighing for redemption”, and therefore can never itself be the kingdom of God. Soon his exposure to Harnack found him both profiting from the giant’s brilliance and disagreeing with his rapprochement between kingdom and culture. The historical criticism of Harnack’s liberal school was insufficiently critical, Barth concluded, mesmerized by the mystery of documents rather than by the mystery of their subject matter.
While World War I had sealed Barth’s departure from liberal theology, nascent fascism quickened his penetration of that anti-Semitism which he ever after maintained to be its “innermost centre” — never a mere feature of it. As early as 1922 he pronounced German anti-Semitism a “Christian impossibility”, even as church leaders were actualizing it and Barth was telling them they were re-paganizing church and nation alike. In 1925 he denounced Lutheran Theologian Paul Althaus’ sacralization of politics, finding no surprise in Althaus’ subsequent adulation of Hitler as a “pious and faithful sovereign.” In the face of even the theologically sophisticated who announced, “Christ has come to us through Adolf Hitler”, Barth persevered: the enemies of the Jewish people are the enemies of Christ. For this reason he fumed when the Pastors’ Emergency League sought to protect clergy of “non-Aryan descent” but failed to protect Jewish people in general, and then had to oppose benefactor Georg Merz (who had underwritten the publication of Barth’s 1922 Romans) when Merz supported the law forbidding Jews to assimilate, assimilation being an Enlightenment degeneracy. Barth faulted the Confessing Church when its Bishop Wurm commended the minister of justice for the latter’s fight against a Judaism that was inherently subversive morally, religiously and economically. By now he was isolated theologically and politically.
Deported to his native Switzerland, Barth continued to lecture on theology and the state until, in 1941, his telephone was tapped. His outspokenness was thought to threaten Swiss neutrality — even as Emil Brunner’s bathetic bromides were left untouched. At war’s end Barth campaigned for the humane treatment of Germany, never hesitating to endorse its guilt yet insisting that grace always entails a new beginning — only to be accused of harshness when he labelled Nazi depredations “inhuman.”
As World War II gave way to the Cold War, Barth didn’t carry the fight to communism as he had to Naziism. Jehle readily admits a measure of naiveness in Barth. Barth had said that communism was so far from Naziism’s brutalities that “they shouldn’t be mentioned in the same breath.” Stalin couldn’t be compared with Nazi “charlatans.” Barth defended himself: communism aimed at something good, however awry it went; Naziism had aimed at nothing good. Still, Jehle insists that Barth never romanticized communism and soon recognized its hideousness.
Unquestionably the exploration of Barth’s correspondence with East European theologians is a major strength of this book. As vigorously as he opposed those who wanted to make Naziism an article of Christian faith, Barth wrote Bereczky, a pro-Communist Hungarian theologian that no political arrangement can be made such an article. And when Hromadka (Czech) proffered a theological endorsement of communism, Barth wrote that his “theology” was really a “particular kind of philosophy of history” that had been seen in the German Christian theologians as early as 1933.
At least one topic in the book is theologically provocative and should prove fruitful: Jehle maintains that Luther’s “Two Kingdoms” doctrine, pilloried for abetting Germany’s political accommodations, is virtually indistinguishable from Barth’s theology of politics. Both thinkers wanted to desacralize politics, thus freeing Christian obedience in the political realm.
The book brings readers face-to-face with Barth’s discernment, wisdom, realism and energy; above all, however, with his courage — much needed since, according to Jehle, “He never said what others wanted to hear.” Barth strikes this reviewer as a megaphone for the cry of Zwingli, Barth’s Swiss predecessor: “Not to fear is the victory.”
Text of review (excluding publishing details at top): 855 words.
Victor Shepherd
Tyndale Seminary
Toronto
Theology, Music and Time Jeremy S. Begbie
Jeremy S. Begbie, Theology, Music and Time: Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Pp xiv+317 ISBN: 0 521 44464 0 or 0 521 78568 5 (pb)
Books abound on the theological significance of music. (One need think only, for instance, of the many discussions of Bach’s chorales.) There has been, however, a dearth of material on the “musicality” of theology. Specifically, there appears to have been no treatment, theologically learned and musically accomplished in equal measure, of those aspects of the created order for which time is more than merely the complement of space. Here Begbie has filled a lacuna in both the theological and musical disciplines. One of his mentors, Victor Zuckerkandl, points out, “There is hardly a phenomenon that can tell us more about time and temporality than can music”. Begbie illustrates the assertion by exposing the reader to the kind of temporality essential to music, and thence to the kind that he deems to inhere and order the world at large. In light of the role of time in music, Begbie explores features of music (rhythm, metre, resolution, repetition) that he finds helpful additionally in providing new perspective on traditional themes of the faith: creation, salvation, eschatology, election, ecclesiology. The book’s sublime achievement remains an imaginative exploration of gospel truth in which the significance of music’s temporality, together with the assorted temporalities that are constitutive of the cosmos, are theologically related to each other through being related primordially to the temporality of God’s incursion in the Incarnate Son.
Yet Begbie’s book attempts even more: it aims at showing that music can enable theology to do its job better. Despite the fact that music is at best half-articulate (everyone maintains it “communicates” but no one knows precisely what) Begbie insists that music can deepen our knowledge of God. In the course of showing how music may and must sophisticate theology he indicates how music’s deployment of time assists theology in providing resources for understanding the temporality of the created order from a new perspective, for rejoicing in the inescapable “time signatures” of human existence, and for acquainting us thereby with previously unnoticed angles of vision that deepen theology’s grasp of the depths of creation, of our “fit” in it, and of the wisdom of the Creator of it all. Not least, he illustrates how a knowledgeable grasp of life’s “metres” and “rhythms” also highlights several unconscious yet untoward distortions that have skewed theological thinking.
Yet nowhere does Begbie attempt a “natural” theology of music that holds up music as a source of revelation, the nature of music thereby acquainting us with the nature of God. The book, rather, holds up everywhere Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Son of God, as the event in which we are made the beneficiaries of God’s redemptive and creative gifts through the activity of the Holy Spirit.
Similarly the book nowhere submits to the older (i.e., late eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century) notion of Kulturprotestantismus. According to Kulturprotestantismus, supported by many thinkers in one era of Germany’s intellectual history, the kingdom of God is understood in terms of developments within history, the culmination of which is a cultural achievement whose genuine richness only the philistine would deny. Yet as world-occurrence was soon to make manifest, the richest cultural achievements are not the kingdom of God, are not revelatory, have no power to redeem (whatever else they might do as a creaturely good), but rather can be and have been co-opted by powers that few have hesitated to pronounce demonic.
The Introduction includes two groundwork chapters, “Practising music” and “Music’s time.” In the former Begbie acquaints readers lacking musical expertise with the nature of music. Music-making, for instance, is “the intentional bringing into being of temporally organised patterns of pitched sounds.” In accommodating the musically uninformed Begbie points out features of sound that are unarguable as soon as we ponder them yet which we should fail to note had he not drawn our attention to them; e.g., we can see only what our visual “space” contains at one moment. (We can’t see in a room, for instance, what is behind us.) On the other hand, in the same room we can hear simultaneously the several sounds (as in a three-note chord) that occupy the same aural space.
In “Music’s time” he explicates aspects of music that he will return to throughout his book. Tonal music of the west, for instance, “goes somewhere”; its teleology is reflected in the constantly repeated pattern of tension and resolution; the resolution “gathers up” what has preceded and finds rest, even if the rest is only fleeting and an ingredient in the next sequence of sounds (“hyperbar”) that is itself a meta-exemplification of tension and resolution.
Plainly rhythm and metre pertain to music’s directionality. In fact temporality in music is manifested primarily through rhythm interacting with metre, the latter being chiefly a patterned succession of beats (e.g., “waltz time”), while the former is articulated by tones. (We hear the tones that acquaint us with the rhythm, and sense the metre through the rhythm.) Rhythm and metre, together giving rise to waves of tension and release, prevent the “time” of music from being no more than the linear regularity of metronomic monotony.
In this chapter Begbie demonstrates a “realist” conviction that the temporality that is one of the structures of the world at large is just that; it is not projection. Temporal patterns are found, after all, throughout life’s “clocks” from the macro-scale to the micro, from the larger rhythms of sleep and digestion through the smaller rhythms of the central nervous system (e.g., heartbeat) to the micro rhythms of subliminal neural impulses. Time is simply basic to human order; time is a function of the way things are intrinsically related. More to the point, music’s time-intensiveness is connected not merely to the temporality of the human mind and body but to the temporalities of the physical world at large in which diverse human temporalities participate. Begbie maintains, in his consistent realism, that much of the creation’s intrinsic temporality (e.g., bodily kinetic impulses) are implicated in the music we hear; part of what we experience through music is this intrinsic temporality. Temporality, then, is not the environment in which music occurs; it is a crucial part of what music is — of what everything is. Music is meaningful, then, not because of its representational power (unlike some forms of painting it largely lacks this) but rather through the interplay between music’s temporal processes and the manifold temporal processes that shape our lives.
In this regard the reviewer is reminded of a remark he heard from violinist Isaac Stern (d. 2001) when last he spoke in Toronto. A promising young violinist played for Stern and admitted she couldn’t get the phrasing of the music correct despite re-phrasing it repeatedly. Stern told her to sing the part. “I have a poor voice and I don’t want to sing”, she told him. “Sing the violin music anyway”, he told her. She did, and the phrasing fell into place immediately. “You see”, continued the old master, “when you sing you have to breathe. Breathing is a natural, temporal event; the breathing that is part of singing will acquaint you with the natural phrasing — the timing — of the violin music.” The point that Stern made about the relation between the timing and rhythm of breathing, a human occurrence whose “realism” no one denies, and the realism of the phrasing of the music; this relation, an intertwining of music with the temporality of the world at large and also with the temporality of the Incarnate one through whom and for whom all things have been made, Begbie explores ingeniously and articulates compellingly everywhere in the book.
In the second major section of the book “In God’s Good Time”, Begbie exposes and distances himself from the Greek philosophical understanding of time that continues to haunt the church, principally through the influence of Augustine. Hellenistic philosophy undervalued the ontic significance of time, insisting that only timeless existence is true existence. In the light of God’s incursion in the Word Incarnate, however, a proper recognition and affirmation of time corrects Augustine’s neo-Platonic deficits, insisting instead on (i) the world as the venue of God’s salvific activity, with an emphasis on Jesus Christ’s engagement with the totality of the creation; (ii) the work of the Spirit who directs all creation to its fulfilment. Having noted the Hellenistic-Augustinian difficulty with time’s reality, Begbie addresses its comparable difficulty with time’s goodness. Here he probes Augstine’s De Musica, noting that Augustine restricts his reflections on music to rhythmics and metrics concerning the way (thanks to Plato, his successors, and the realm of Forms) the mathematical ratios they illustrate riddle the universe. For Augustine the significance of music lies not in music’s sounds but in its mathematics, musical theory helping us to grasp immaterial reality, and thereby moving the soul from the tainted world of sense (music’s sounds would only fix it there) to the realm of intelligibility. While Augustine can speak positively of music, then, he does so not because of a temporality that God has authored and blessed and pronounced “good” without qualification but rather because music’s mathematics enables the mind to grasp a timeless eternity of pure intelligibility.
Begbie’s emendation is swift and sure. (i) Music demonstrates the possibility of ordered change (i.e., change need not imply chaos); music shows us that subjection to time doesn’t imply a warped creation, a deficient good. (ii) Music shows us that “taking time” — in the several senses of this expression (we need think only of the time Jesus spent “doing nothing” in the wilderness, without which the time he spent elsewhere would have been fruitless) — is inherently good and humanly enriching. (iii) Since a crucial aspect of music is the resolution of tension, the protraction of such tension deepens our capacity for waiting. Begbie notes the place of “waiting” in scripture, and of course never confuses waiting with waiting around or loitering. Waiting, both musically and scripturally, heightens anticipation. Waiting reminds us that we are not the lords of time. (iv) Music reminds us of different time-structures: things happen at different times, in different times, at different rates. (v) Music reminds us of the temporal limits of our finitude. Here Begbie repudiates the Hellenistic identification of finitude with fallenness, temporality and goodness (on this understanding) being mutually exclusive.
Since life is finite or limited, transience is inescapable. The transitions inherent in music (music is always the succession of sounds, never the “piled up” coagulation of sound) are ordered, glorious and enriching, and direct us to the manner in which life’s transience can be fruitful. Furthermore, since Jesus Christ is God’s gracious engagement with time, our temporal limitation and inescapable transience remind us that we live by grace — and die by the selfsame grace. (As a pastor who has stood at deathbeds for over thirty years the reviewer has come to grasp what the writer of Ecclesiastes meant when he wrote, without any hint of bitterness or futility, that in God’s good ordering there is indeed a time to die.)
Exploring yet more deeply the theme of transition in terms of tension and resolution, Begbie notes the theological significance of delay and patience, together with the relation of patience to steadfastness amidst suffering and the refinement of character amidst hardships. Sensitively he unfolds the way in which delays, in music and in the spiritual life, are fraught with provisional gratifications. (Music eschews instant gratification; the spiritual life ought to eschew them.) Each provisional gratification magnifies expectation of final gratification. Each closure in music (e.g., the end of a phrase) is related intrinsically through time to every other closure (the end of a movement) and ultimately to final closure (the end of the piece.) The Christian life, set between Christ’s Resurrection and his Parousia, similarly advances by means of provisional fulfilments, all of which are gathered up in its eschatological crowning, the ultimate “hyperbar” in Christian understanding and living. Music’s temporality, Begbie notes judiciously, not only gives us resources for theological reflection on God-given temporality but even becomes itself an event in the salvific process through the worship and witness of Christians.
Music, everyone is aware, is highly repetitive; good music, never cloyingly so but always “sameness with a difference”. Begbie illustrates this truth from the first movement of Beethoven’s Sixth Symphony where the repetition is unusually protracted. Even as key and instrumentation change, the sound pattern is repeated tirelessly. In the hands of a skilful composer repetition — needed to preserve a musical piece’s identity whenever tonal modifications threaten to obscure that identity — both heightens tension and concurrently effects resolution, only to use the matrix of tension/resolution as the tension feature in the next hyperbar.
As with music, the repetition of the eucharist stabilizes, for through it God recalls the Christian community to the cross and the cross’s transformation. Yet since the eucharist rebinds Christians to the cross of the One who comes only to seek and save the lost, it destabilises by sending Christians back into a world of turbulence, turpitude and treachery, yet always with renewed hope for the world. And just as the proper deployment of variation essential to the profoundest repetition doesn’t deny the integrity of the initial appearance of the theme, so the eucharist’s repetition, modified by liturgical variation that forestalls dreariness, doesn’t deny either the singularity of “crucified under Pontius Pilate” or the sufficiency of Christ’s finished work.
Repetition in music never means that what has been repeated then falls back into vacuity. Musical repetition, then, parallels the biblical understanding of remembrance. Biblically to remember is to have a completed event in the past become the operative actuality in the present. Eucharistic repetition lies within the orbit both of musical repetition and biblical remembrance: what is past becomes the operative actuality of the present in the event of the repetition. Once again Begbie shows the reader how theology can be done through music.
The third section of the book, “Time to Improvise”, begins by discussing the relation of constraint and freedom, proceeds to articulate the place of constraint and freedom inherent in jazz improvisation, and gathers all of this up in a brilliantly argued reinvestigation of the gift-giving and gift-receiving, akin to that found in jazz, which Paul deems to characterize the mutual fruitfulness of Jews and Gentiles within the church.
Begbie introduces this final section by probing the work of two modern composers, Pierre Boulez (French) and John Cage (American). While they represent two contrasting approaches (Boulez is preoccupied with musical organisation, Cage with “just let it happen”), their music sounds similar just because both have shed the constraints of tradition, eagerly cancelling musical memory. Yet just as the amnesic person lacks an identity and is therein wholly determined by occurrences within and without, so Boulez and Cage have forfeited musical identity for the sake of a “freedom” that finds them courting determinations of which they seem to be unaware. To be relieved of constraints is to be in bondage to necessity of some sort, even that of chaos.
While improvisation might appear to the musically naïve to be no more than liberation from constraint, the improvisation characteristic of jazz presupposes uncommon constraint. In fact just because jazz maximizes improvisation it is the musical idiom most subject to the constraint of metre. (The pace of jazz metre is virtually unvarying.) Probing more profoundly the nature of jazz improvisation and its reliance on constraint, Begbie notes that constraint fosters contingency, and contingency is never without risk of mistake, even risk of failure. Yet the contingency that improvisation is by definition is also a contingency that allows musicians to take up “mistake” and weave it into the texture of the work. Plainly, then, jazz’s contingency-improvisation shows us how we are allowed to fail and yet not fail irretrievably. What matters is how “mistake” and “failure” area incorporated finally in the music as performed, heard and cherished. Space to fail ever remains essential to superlative jazz performance.
The foregoing, rich in itself, appears to be propaedeutic to the final chapter, “Giving and Giving Back”. Here Begbie luminously relates the exchange of “gifts” between actors (where one actor’s “gift” to another actor in the course of a performance may be either “blocked” or “returned”) as well as the gift exchange between jazz musicians; Begbie relates these to the mutual gift-giving and receiving of Jewish and Gentile Christians described in Romans 9-11.
In Romans 9-11 Paul agonises over the Jewish rejection of the Messiah. Begbie maintains that a legitimate way of reading these chapters is to understand them as Paul’s attempt at introducing the Roman Church to the improvising strategies of God. Jew gives to Gentile. (Gentiles, wild olive branches, have only lately been grafted into cultivated tree trunk that Israel is.) Yet it is Jewish rejection on a larger scale that has spelled Gentile acceptance. And it is Gentile acceptance that will issue ultimately in unparalleled blessing for Jews.
The ground of the improvised Jewish/Gentile exchange, of course, is the grand exchange enacted by God in Christ on behalf of us all. While this exchanged isn’t mentioned in Romans 9-11, it is presupposed throughout the passage because articulated in detail in Romans 1-8. God’s gift of the gospel presupposes God’s rejection of the refusal rooted in Adam’s sin and the ensuing hostility that issued in the death of God’s Son. Christ is the “return” of the wholly obedient covenant partner. Christians are those whom the Spirit brings to share in the exchange and continue to share in its dynamic.
Begbie then extends all that he has said concerning Romans 9-11 to the pastoral issue between Jew and Gentile in the Roman Church over the consumption of meat previously sacrificed to idols. Each has a gift to give and a gift to receive, the “improvisation” of it all necessary in that nothing could be pre-planned even as the welcome/acceptance/reception both have already received from Christ is the “metre” that alone makes any spiritual giving/receiving possible.
Begbie’s sharpest criticism concerns John Taverner. Transparently sincere in his recognition of Taverner’s genius, Begbie nonetheless takes issue with the theology that Taverner attempts to embed in his music. Taverner regards music as an Ikon (sic), “a real presence…lifting our minds and hearts above this earth (where we are exiled for a time) into Heaven, our true ‘Homeland'”. Begbie advances the following theological cautions. Has Taverner undervalued the Incarnation in which God confirms creaturely reality and its goodness? Has he understood that in Jesus Christ God has embraced all the features of our fallen humanity (deprivation, pain, loss) and made them the material of salvation? Has he grasped the manner in which God’s eternity has been opened up to us not through Ikonic beauty but through an ugly death? Does his understanding of the eschaton deny the restoration of the creation and suggest instead its cancellation?
The philosopher Martin Heidegger maintained that language is the “house of being”. To say the same thing differently, being is a function of language. To be sure, Heidegger would never deny the converse: language is a function of being, albeit in the relatively small sphere wherein words denote or describe objects. Vastly greater, however, is the sphere wherein being is a function of language. Here the force of language isn’t that we have more words in our vocabulary and can thereby bamboozle; expanded language, rather, creates a world and admits us to a world that is vastly richer than the world inhabited by someone with meagre language. Here language doesn’t describe an already-existing world but rather gives rise to a universe imperceptible to those for whom language remains only a function of being.
In the spirit of Heidegger, Begbie’s book acquaints us with yet another house, for metre and rhythm are similarly a “house of being”. For our awareness of the fact, nature and ubiquity of the “rhythm over metre” that is exemplified in music and riddles life everywhere facilitates an ever-expanding universe we should otherwise never know and enjoy.
Dr Victor Shepherd, Professor of Historical Theology
Tyndale Seminary, Toronto.
Calvin: A Biography Cottret, Bernard
( CANADIAN EVANGELICAL REVIEW Spring 2003)
Cottret, Bernard; Calvin: A Biography (Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 2000. Translated by M.W. McDonald. Pp xv + 376. $45.99 CAN.)
In the final pages of his fine book Cottret asks, “Can one attempt a balanced portrait of Calvin that avoids the two usual ruts of monotonous piety or systematic denigration?” Cottret’s biography proves that one can. Written out of “wonder and exasperation”, his wonder arose at the genius of a thinker who not only authored the single most influential book of the Reformation but who also gave rise to a culture whose imprint can be identified throughout the West. His exasperation arose at the “bigotry of fellow Christians” who appeared eager to adulate Calvin but reluctant to admit his frailties.
A Protestant lay-Christian who preaches occasionally in his local congregation, Cottret is the founding chairperson of the Department of Humanities at Versailles-Saint-Quentin University in France. Awarded a prize for his biography Cromwell, he has also published substantive books on the Huguenots in England and the Political writings of Bolingbroke. Regardless of the topic addressed, however, he brings to all his work the skill for which French historians of modernity have gained their deserved reputation: a grasp of social history that forever keeps before readers the truth that intellectual life never occurs in a vacuum; rather it unfolds in a political, economic, military matrix. This matrix need not eclipse an intellectual revolution that is nothing less than Copernican; still, its bearing upon it cannot be denied, particularly with respect to the assaults, afflictions, and reactions that the makers of history evince. In this regard readers need only to note a fact found in few discussions of the Reformation and of the acerbic voice of its proponents; namely, that France was at war with the Hapsburgs from 1521-26, 1536-38, 1542-44, and 1551-59. All students of Calvin are alert to the significance of 1536 and 1559, the publication dates of the first and final edition of the Institutes. Cottret invariably recalls readers to the manifold turbulence and treachery, even occasional triumph, that are the context in which unforgettable theology is written and from which clay-footed theologians and leaders emerge.
Not surprisingly, then, a major strength of this book is found in the learning, discernment and assessment exemplified in the many excurses that adorn the book. His discussion of Renaissance humanism, for instance, details the influence the Renaissance had in providing at least the “tools” for the Reformation, even as it refuses to reduce the Reformation to an aspect of the
Renaissance. While divergences from the Renaissance ultimately overcame the Reformation’s continuities with it, Cottret admits that “Calvin remained, like so many other Reformers, a prodigal son of humanism.” In this regard Cottret probes thinkers who never fully sided with the Reformation as well as to those who did, noting precisely what humanism could do and what it was never going to do for “reformists” like Erasmus or Lefevre D’Etaples and “Reformers” like Calvin. D’Etaples (1460-1536), for instance, continued to believe that internal reform was possible for the Church whereas Calvin insisted it was not. Still, D’Etaples’ work is significant. He translated the bible into French, therein calling down the Church’s denunciation for maintaining that the three “Marys” (of Bethany, of Magdala, and the sinner) were just that, rather than three descriptions of the one “Magdalene.” Despite D’Etaples’ fine work on scripture, however Cottret correctly cautions us against “‘Protestantizing’ to excess this evangelical, who was devoted to the word of God.” Since he was “closer to the Reformers in his silences than in his words”, Cottret judiciously concludes, “What reason is there to annex him to either camp?”
In the same vein readers are brought up to date through brief expositions of Guillaume Briconnet, Marguerite de Navarre, and Gerard Roussel — not to mention his informative “digression” on the 15th century translations of the bible into Italian, Dutch, Spanish, Catalan, and Czech, all of which predated the Reformation, and all but one of which resisted it. And no student of Calvin can afford to pass up Cottret’s recapitulation of the history of Geneva, not to mention the nature, function and history of catechisms in the context of Calvin’s 1542 Catechism.
Yet it should not be thought that Cottret’s concern with social history beclouds his theological perception. Reading scripture aright he concurs with Calvin that even the risen, ascended Christ “must be in agony until the end of the world.” Admitting the place of Romans in the genesis and ethos of the Reformation, he maintains that “justification by faith” does not do justice to the theological identity and power of the French Reformation: Hebrews must be acknowledged as no less influential — paramount, in fact — just because Hebrews consistently extols the sole, sufficient sacrifice of Christ, thereby terminating definitively all discussion of merit, indulgences, and the horribilissimum, the sacrifice of the mass. Non-Reformers like Lucien Lefebvre elevated Romans but not Hebrews, and were able thereby to avoid that break with Catholic theology that entailed a break with the Catholic church.
Similar theological insight is evident as Cottret explores Calvin’s writings — major, minor, polemical, pastoral — as they appeared year after year. Probing Calvin’s first theological publication (his first script was a humanist discussion of Seneca’s De Clementia), Cottret concludes that Psychopannychia both aimed at refuting the Anabaptist notion of “soul sleep” and signalled Calvin’s awareness that Plato’s notion of the immortality of the soul and a Christian affirmation of the resurrection were ultimately incommensurable. And of course Cottret admires the architectonic elegance, symmetry and beauty of Calvin’s best-known work. “One enters the Institutes as though into a cathedral…a stone structure built to last.” Perceptively he acknowledges that Calvin exhausted himself through preaching just because preaching was not merely one of many important features of Protestantism but rather was “the very essence of the Reformation.”
Cottret’s masterly historical treatment explodes many myths, one being the oft-parroted pronouncement that Calvin tyrannized Geneva. In fact Calvin had to struggle relentlessly in the city, not least in order to forfend the encroachment of city’s Council upon matters pertaining to the life and discipline of the church. Only after 1555 was Calvin accorded the civic support he had long sought. Similarly dispelled is the notion that Calvin was self-important and craved seeing everything he said appear in print. Calvin knew that the sermon is an aural event, and the printed sermon is therefore (partially) denatured. Still, he bowed to public importuning and allowed his sermons to be published.
At the same time, Cottret’s book raises questions for this reviewer. While Cottret comes close several times to declaring the Christological revolution at the centre of the Reformation, he seems not to grasp that for the Reformers theology is Christology. To be sure, he admits that succeeding editions of the Institutes indicated that Christ was the “heart of the system”, but he does not exploit the Christo-logic that drove the Reformation theologically and rendered it qualitatively different from Catholicism with abuses subtracted and justification by faith added.
Similarly this reviewer is disappointed to find repeated several times over the misunderstanding that Zwingli expounded a “merely symbolic” notion of Holy Communion. Zwingli did not, and Calvin simply misread Zwingli on this matter. Cottret insists throughout that Calvin was never ordained. Admittedly, no record exists of Calvin’s ordination. Yet in light of what Calvin writes about the ordained ministry and the pastoral office, it is surely unreasonable to assume that the chief pastor of Geneva, who deplored the purported ministerial irregularities of the Anabaptists, would live to fulfil the functions of the ministry (“my ministry is dearer to me than life”) yet resist the church’s authorization.
Quoting Bernard of Chartres, “We are dwarfs, perched on the shoulders of giants; that is why we may be able to see farther than they”, Cottret gladly admits that Calvin remains such a giant for him. At the same time, Cottret has shown himself to be anything but a dwarf.
Victor Shepherd Professor of Historical Theology Tyndale Seminary
10 Dec. 02
The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth
(CANADIAN EVANGELICAL REVIEW Spring 2003)
The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (John Webster, ed. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp xiii+312. ISBN: 0 521 58560 0)
Already recognized for his studies in Barth, Webster has only confirmed the reputation he gained from his earlier discussions (see his Barth’s Ethics of Reconciliation [1995], Barth’s Moral Theology [1996], and Karl Barth [2000]) in the collection of essays he has introduced and edited.
The book will do much to expose those to whom Barth is unknown with the substance, rigour and significance of his theology. It will also help dispel many of the myths that continue to circulate about him (e.g., that his theology is time-worn and reflects a preoccupation with issues that are obsolete today and may even have been in his era.) At the same time it will enhance conversations that look back to him in order to gain theological weight and look ahead from him in order to engage contemporaneity in his spirit.
As expected, the book treats Barth’s articulation of topics that will always be discussed just because they are the essential “building blocks” of the Christian faith: Trinity, scripture, providence, salvation, among others. In addition, however, it engages issues in light of his theology that more recent developments have rendered unavoidable: feminism, religious pluralism and postmodernity.
Some of the authors whom Webster includes are familiar to those involved in current systematic theology generally or Barth studies particularly: Alan Torrance, Colin Gunton, Bruce McCormack, Trevor Hart, George Hunsinger. Others are lesser known:, William Werpehowski, Katherine Sonderegger, J. Augustine di Noia. The roster is chiefly Protestant but does include several Roman Catholics. (In this regard it is important to note that Hans Urs von Balthasar (d. 1986), the major Roman Catholic commentator on Barth, is deemed throughout the book to be a worthy interpreter.)
While it is widely recognized that Barth opposed the Nazi menace, forfeited his teaching position at the University of Bonn, and was deported to his native Switzerland, many non-Europeans failed at that time to grasp how important Barth was in forming, informing, equipping and encouraging beleaguered pastors, parishioners and leaders amidst the trials of the Reich and its Zeitgeist. Without him the Barmen Declaration would never have appeared; with him hope arose in the wake of the newly-exposed insufficiency of liberal theology, ascendant from Schleiermacher (whose ability, if not his orientation, Barth admired) to World War I. In the wake of Hitler’s defeat English-speaking theology discerned his importance for those he had helped, honoured him by reading him and recognizing his role in the “Biblical Theology” movement of the 1950s and 60s, and then quietly set him aside as the newer voices of Moltmann and Pannenberg were heard, not to mention the more radical cries of Liberation Theology and special interest groups. While the Torrance family seemed almost single-handedly to keep Barth from disappearing entirely in the English-speaking world, Barth’s work began to recover a hearing amidst, for instance, the faculty of theology at King’s College, London. Now it appears that the Swiss thinker’s work is regaining appreciation as magisterial in a way that reflects the recognition rightly accorded the Sixteenth-Century Reformers. Webster’s book can only expand this development as the essays highlight the need constantly to rethink the “faith once for all delivered to the saints” in light of present-day challenges and rearticulate that faith in contemporary thought-forms and vocabulary. Barth, of course, never pretended that he had said the last word, wanting only, like the donkey that assisted Jesus, to be of service to his Lord through the church’s proclamation. At the same time, the content of these essays will leave readers knowing that any theology which ignores Barth’s “word” will always lack the density and resilience needed to help the church out of its current malaise.
In his introductory chapter Webster points out the fact and manner of Barth’s putting theology on a new footing and pointing it in a new direction, adding that “The significance of Barth’s work in his chosen sphere is comparable to that of, say, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Freud, Weber and Saussure in theirs, in that he decisively reorganized an entire discipline.” Webster then identifies crucial points in Barth’s formation: his disillusionment with his liberal teachers who deemed theology to legitimate national self-aggrandizement (his disillusionment ultimately giving rise to the “bombshell” Romans commentary), his work on Anselm with its concern to explicate the understanding of the faith that believers always seek, his confessional orientation wherein he saw that theology didn’t need extra-theological considerations to legitimate it or facilitate it. Here (and in other books) Webster differs from many overviews of Barth, insisting that there wasn’t a “turn” in Barth’s work that neatly divided it into two disparate parts, an earlier “dialectic” and a later “dogmatic.” Instead Webster maintains that there were certainly differences in emphasis, but not in substance: Barth’s dogmatic concerns were evident from the start, while his dialectical style he retained to the end. By way of illustrating his point Webster maintains that the earlier Barth underlined, “How is God God for us?”, and the later Barth, “How is God God for us” as Barth’s work on the covenant came to the fore.
The book concludes with Alasdair Heron’s appreciation, “Karl Barth: A Personal Engagement.” Here he indicates his debt to Barth even as he identifies matters that he thinks need to be addressed: Barth’s non-interaction with natural science in a century when scientific concerns were dominant, Barth’s formal recognition of historical-critical biblical exegesis accompanied by his material non-deployment (virtually) of it, and the proclivity of Barth’s ecclesiology towards individualism and congregationalism.
In between these “book-ends” much is found to inform, edify and delight the careful reader. Christoph Schwoebel’s essay, “Theology,” holds no surprises but faithfully, patiently, and profoundly explores the logic of Barth’s work. Francis Watson, a New Testament scholar from Aberdeen, will startle many with his claim that Barth’s use of scripture aids and abets the recovery of theological exegesis when so much biblical scholarship preoccupies itself with theological vacuity. (Critical minutiae are featured, says Watson, when scripture isn’t understood in terms of the economy of God’s self-utterance and self-bestowal.)
The most startling essay appears to be George Hunsinger’s discussion of Pneumatology. While Barth has frequently been criticized for a preoccupation with Christology whose one-sidedness moves him in the direction of doctrinal scholasticism, Hunsinger defends Barth not weakly by reminding us that Barth died before his Church Dogmatics were completed but aggressively by exposing and exploring the dynamic interconnectedness of Barth’s thought; e.g., “Whereas from the standpoint of reconciliation the work of the Spirit served the work of Christ, from the standpoint of the redemption the work of Christ served the work of the Spirit.” Hunsinger follows this with his essay’s manifesto: “A comprehensive discussion would show that, in Barth’s theology, the saving work of the Spirit is trinitarian in ground, Christocentric in focus, miraculous in operation, communal in content, eschatological in form, diversified in operation, and universal in scope.” He then proceeds to develop most of these themes. If his exposition is correct, the accusation against Barth concerning Pneumatology has to be reconsidered.
Colin Gunton, however, upholds the customary accusation in “Salvation,” the essay that appears to be the sharpest disagreement with Barth in the book: “It is here [i.e., participation in Christ] that we become particularly aware of the relative underweighting of the pneumatological and ecclesial dimensions of Barth’s way of speaking of the appropriation of salvation….It simply cannot say all that a doctrine of the Spirit is supposed to say.” Gunton goes on to fault Barth for collapsing Christ’s ascension into his resurrection, for expounding Christ “as a kind of Platonic form of humanity” so that salvation is already achieved and people need only to be informed of it, for restricting the scope of salvation to humans, for understanding the priesthood of Christ in terms on his divinity but not his humanity.
The essay that will do most to vindicate Barth through correcting a misapprehension (especially among North Americans) is Wolf Kroetke’s “The Humanity of the Human Person in Karl Barth’s Anthropology” wherein he highlights Barth’s understanding of the human not in terms of the natural or the religious or the cultural but simply that partner whom God wills not to be without and therefore cherishes eternally.
At his eightieth birthday celebration Barth remarked, “As a theologian one can never be great, but at best one remains small in one’s own way.” In the upside-down (better, capsized-but-righted) world of the Kingdom, the small are rendered great. Webster’s book will find the reader assenting to this gospel paradox concerning the man commonly regarded as the greatest theologian since the Reformation.
Victor Shepherd, Tyndale Seminary, Toronto.
The Methodist Church on the Prairies, 1896-1914 by George Emery
(University of Toronto Quarterly, Vol.72:1, Winter 2002-03)
George Emery. The Methodist Church on the Prairies, 1896-1914 McGill-Queen’s UP xxi, 260
Emery, professor of history at the University of Western Ontario, supplies a scholarly monograph discussing prairie church history in the era of the Laurier settlement boom. Its approach differs from that of John Webster Grant’s The Church in the Canadian Era (1967) and Neil Semple’s The Lord’s Dominion (1992.) Grant’s overview does not feature the magnification of prairie developments in the decade-and-a-half that Emery deems crucial, while Semple’s assessment of Methodist history from the standpoint of the socio-economic privilege and power of central Canada is considered inaccurate. The book focuses on the history of a particular Christian institution (The Methodist Church in Canada, arising from the union of several Methodist bodies in 1874 and 1884), rather than on non-institutional religious history. It prosecutes social history informed through rigorous deployment of quantitative evidence. It traces the shift from an earlier Methodist preoccupation in the west with aboriginal peoples to the concern for Caucasians as the lure of “grain gold” (wheat) saw vast migrations into the prairie provinces from the Maritimes, central Canada, Britain, continental Europe, and the U.S.A.
While owning the Wesleyan root in Canadian Methodism, Emery maintains nonetheless that the Canadian expression, especially on the prairies, evolved as novel and therefore unforeseeable developments required extraordinary flexibility and adaptability. The missioners faced formidable challenges. Prairie hardship, for instance, required men mobile and young enough to be bachelors (bachelors were five times as numerous proportionately in the adult population over twenty as they were in Ontario) when bachelors in east or west were utterly uninterested in the church. The non-Anglo-Saxon people, the “tired and poor” of eastern Europe, lacked the sophistication of North Americans. (Ninety per cent of Alberta’s Ukrainians, for instance, were illiterate, and often regarded schooling as a frill.) Prairie cities, the largest by far of which was Winnipeg, discovered that urban existence chilled concern for the Creator even as it spawned wretched slums. Such challenges, however, merely fanned the enthusiasm of spokespersons such as the principal of Alberta College (Methodist) who predicted a population of fifty million for the North Saskatchewan Valley.
Emery acquaints the reader with the tensions inherent in a denomination when clergy had to be male while women were found disproportionately in church services, when educational standards for ordination were not relaxed even as the west was desperate for clergy, when Methodism was the single largest Protestant denomination in Canada while the majority of Ontarians who claimed Methodist affiliation were never found at worship, when prairie church leaders were divided over whether it was in their interests to have power-wielding boards located in Toronto.
Emery’s macro-investigation of the Church on the prairies is balanced by his micro-approach to Methodism’s two major undertakings: the All Peoples Mission in Winnipeg and the Star Colony of Ukrainians northeast of Edmonton. The Winnipeg mission began with Slavic people but developed quickly into a multi-ethnic outreach. Its first superintendent, James S. Woodsworth, scorned the faith of the church catholic even as scores of workers under him did not. The Ukrainians, meanwhile, preferring the subsistence farming of the old country to incipient agribusiness, forsook prairie grasslands for the forested park-belt northeast of Edmonton. Missioners here laboured indefatigably, not least in providing medical services and schooling for children. Most of the women Methodists were graduates of Victoria College, University of Toronto; Edith Weekes, who pioneered a Ukrainian-English dictionary, had been awarded the gold medal in modern languages at Victoria.
Throughout his treatment Emery recognizes that human beings are endlessly complex. His social history is commensurately nuanced and unfailingly sensitive to wounds and wonders that may puzzle yet perdure. Eschewing both sycophantic hagiography and contemptuous superiority concerning those whose work he assesses, he recognizes Methodist missioners to have done their best with the equipment they had, and all of this amidst hardships so severe, for instance, that the clergy drop-out rate was three times higher in the west than in central Canada.
Emery’s social history includes, perforce, discussions of Methodist popular religious expression. He does not attempt an exploration of the academic Methodist theology ascendant at this point in Canada’s history. That work would complement his book and fill a lacuna in Canadian intellectual history.
(VICTOR SHEPHERD)
The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: Theologians in Dialogue with T.F. Torrance (Elmer M. Colyer, ed.
(book review to be published in the Fall 2002 issue of
CANADIAN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.)
The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: Theologians in Dialogue with T.F. Torrance (Elmer M. Colyer, ed. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. Pp. xi+355. ISBN 0 7425 1293 2
Colyer’s third book on Torrance (following How to Read T.F. Torrance: Understanding His Trinitarian & Scientific Theology and The Nature of Doctrine in T.F. Torrance’s Theology) is a collection of essays by eight American scholars, two British, and one of British extraction (Alasdair Heron, for many years now professor of Reformed theology at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg.)
The purpose of the book is multiform: to provide an introduction to Torrance and his theology; to acquaint readers with Torrance’s career, publications, and the secondary literature he has precipitated; to provide a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of Torrance’s theology; to be a theological event itself through engaging a major thinker of the twentieth century; to assist theologians and natural scientists in their common membership in realist-determined disciplines; to provide resources for historians and historical theologians concerned with Scottish, ecumenical or Reformed theology; to trace the appropriation of Karl Barth’s theology in the English-speaking world.
David Torrance, a younger brother, opens the discussion by acquainting the reader with the influences that helped mould Torrance’s faith, character and missionary zeal as a minister of the gospel. Born to Scottish missionaries in China, Torrance remained throughout his life sensitive to the difficulties surrounding the prosecution of the gospel there, visiting the country several times following retirement. Although an academic theologian throughout most of his working life (he was a pastor for ten years before his appointment to Edinburgh), Torrance thrived on his vocation to the ministry and his commission as missionary to a world whose mind-set was dominated by the natural sciences. This chapter is crucial if Torrance is to be repatriated with those from whom he is currently alienated, for the public image of Torrance is that he is an intellectually reclusive theoretician with no interest in the turbulence of people’s everyday lives, a one-sided cerebralist who, despite his oft-proffered disclaimer, seems to substitute doctrinal refinement for the one to whom it points, an abstract thinker who has never faced concrete danger. Torrance’s wartime decoration (the MBE for bravery) contradicts the lattermost point, while David’s disclosure of the sheer humanness, pastoral concern, and warm heart of Torrance evaporates remaining criticisms.
Alasdair Heron comments on Torrance’s relation to Reformed theology, correctly pointing out that while Torrance cherishes the sixteenth century Reformers he does not follow them slavishly, and wholly distances himself from seventeenth century Reformed scholasticism with its Aristotelian underlay, its notion of limited atonement, its schematizing distortions, and its doctrine of predestination (all of which, Torrance laments, adversely affected Scottish Church life.)
Andrew Purves highlights Torrance’s characteristic use of the homoousion, especially his identification of its epistemological and soteriological significance (as well as deployment of this significance), the relation of incarnation to atonement, and the twofold mediation of Christ (humanward and Godward.)
Gary Deddo provides the only published discussion of Torrance’s doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Here he dispels the myth that Torrance is a crypto rationalist in Reformed disguise. Deddo speaks of the Spirit’s place in the intra-Trinitarian relations as well as in the triune God’s relation to the world. Concerning the former it is apparent that the being of God, for Torrance, has to be “onto-relationality.” Concerning the latter it is evident that according to Torrance Holy Spirit entails the sovereign lordship of God over the creation, thereby forestalling any confusion between Holy Spirit and human spirit, experiences, or subjectivity — even as Spirit ad extra is God most profoundly relating himself to the specifically human.
Colin Gunton explores Torrance’s doctrine of God, drawing attention to three major items. The first is the triune economy where Torrance insists on the homoousion of the Spirit, apart from which there would be an epistemological hiatus between God’s economic action and God’s eternal being. The second is the eternal trinity. Here Gunton describes Torrance’s use of the Cappodocian Fathers, preferring Gregory of Nazianzus to Gregory of Nyssa and Basil of Caesarea inasmuch as the latter two have about them a trace of Origenist subordination. The third is the help Torrance has rendered to the churches of the east and the west by insisting that the Spirit proceeds from the Father’s being, not merely the Father’s person, rending the question of procession “‘from the Father and the Son’ or ‘from the Father through the Son” superfluous, and thereby undercutting the filioque standoff. (It might be noted that while Torrance is gracious and irenic as he responds to contributors in turn, he is uncharacteristically sharp in his reply to Gunton. Repeatedly he says, for instance, “Gunton’s faulty contrast at this point…”; “I wonder whether Gunton is aware…”; and “Prof. Gunton gives little attention to the way in which I have sought to clarify the issues involved….”)
George Hunsinger investigates Torrance’s approach to the sacraments, noting that the vicarious humanity of Christ is the central element in Torrance’s understanding of baptism and the key to his view of the Eucharist. The priesthood of the incarnate Son is the “hinge” as Christ both gives himself to us perpetually in the Eucharist and offers us eternally to the Father. Hunsinger praises Torrance for his improvement on the sacramental positions of both Calvin and Barth. Since Torrance’s reply to Hunsinger is the briefest in the book, it would appear that Torrance has little to add to what Hunsinger has said on his behalf.
Ray Anderson plumbs Torrance as practical theologian, insisting that Torrance’s reputation as practically irrelevant is groundless. Insisting rather that Torrance is “a practical theologian par excellence” on account of the latter’s love for and assistance to the multidimensional praxis of the Church, Anderson also draws attention to Torrance’s rich experience of Christ and his readiness to speak of it. Evangelicals will note that when Anderson concludes his chapter by asking Torrance if he wouldn’t ordain homosexual persons in light of the “new humanity” of Christ that permits the ordination of women, Torrance unambiguously replies that homosexual activity is sin and therefore must be repented of and forsaken.
Kurt Richardson advances a thesis concerning the mystical apprehension of God in the context of revelation and scripture. While Richardson qualifies “mystical” so as to accommodate Torrance on this topic, Torrance is gentle yet firm in his disagreement: “Dr. Richardson seems to presuppose the very notion of mysticism or the mystical which I set aside. What I am concerned with is humility before God, not with some special or esoteric way of thinking.”
Elmer Colyer reviews Torrance’s juxtaposition of “science” and “theology”, reflected most pointedly in the award-winning book, Theological Science. Here Colyer reminds the reader of Torrance’s insistence that any discipline is wissenschaftlich when the specific subject matter governs how we know it, how we think about it, and how we formulate knowledge of it in accordance with its nature and reality. Torrance claims no novelty here, gladly acknowledging his debt to the Alexandrian theologians, especially the sixth century John Philoponos.
The final two chapters examine closely the relationship of Torrance’s thought to that of natural scientists, particularly Albert Einstein. Christopher Kaiser, holding a doctorate in astrophysics, compares Torrance and Einstein on the intelligibility of the cosmos and its correspondence with the structures of human rationality. Mark Achtemeier notes the places where Torrance charts the relationship of theology to science, and concludes by comparing Nicene Christology’s dissonance with Newtonian science and Nicene Christology’s vindication in the newer (Einsteinian) science. In his comments Torrance acknowledges his debt to James Clerk Maxwell’s earlier work in electromagnetism and force fields, even as Einstein admitted Maxwell to underlie his notion of relativity.
Despite having published several volumes on the doctrine of God and despite his scholarship in Reformation theology, Torrance was never allowed to lecture on the doctrine of God at New College, Edinburgh, and upon his retirement was succeeded by a Roman Catholic. Thanks to Colyer’s indefatigable work in the United States, however, Torrance may have found, in the twilight years of his life, an appreciation seemingly denied him in his native Scotland.
Victor Shepherd, Tyndale Seminary
A Scientific Theology, Volume I: Nature by Alister E. McGrath
(book review to be published in the Canadian Evangelical Review)
A Scientific Theology, Volume I: Nature (Alister E. McGrath. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001. Pp. xx + 325. ISBN: 0 0028 3925 8
McGrath established his reputation two decades ago with Iustitia Dei, his landmark study of justification. Subsequently he published much on Reformation themes, then attempted popularizing (e.g., Studies in Doctrine), and now appears to have returned to what seems to be his métier: rigorous reflection that comprehends his twin areas of expertise, historical/systematic theology and natural science. Readers of McGrath’s recent T.F. Torrance: An Intellectual Biography (1999) will recognize in A Scientific Theology his debt to Torrance’s notion of “theological science” (which McGrath prefers to call “scientific theology”), as well as the fruit his immersion in Torrance has borne and promises to bear yet.
While working towards his Oxford doctorate in molecular biology McGrath found himself “commissioned” to explore the relation between Christian theology and natural science, in conversation with history and philosophy. The subordination is crucial for his agenda. He advances natural science as the fitting ancilla or “maidservant” of theology in that science and theology alike are intrinsically realist. Both are “scientific” in the sense of the German wissenschaftlich; i.e., the method of investigating any subject is mandated by the essence and structure of the subject under discussion. Both attempt to give an ordered account of a reality that lies beyond them. Philosophy, on the other hand, has customarily brought to theology metaphysical presuppositions and implicates that have controlled the theological enterprise, effectively denaturing it. History, on the other hand, can be allowed to “converse with” theology but ought not to be its ancilla in that history lacks the realist base found in natural science. In addition, in the hands of social scientists, history becomes historicist; the social sciences move illegitimately from the truism that all knowledge is historically located to the totalitarianism that all knowledge is historically determined. In this regard the social sciences are committed to a naturalist worldview in which theology is disdained; natural scientists, however, more profoundly (and more humbly) recognize the boundaries of their discipline, pronouncing no a priori disqualification.
McGrath has subtitled Volume I Nature. He insists that “nature” isn’t synonymous with “the universe” or “the created order,” in that “nature” is a socially mediated concept, highly interpreted. (One need only think of depictions of nature that vary from “moral educator” to “book of God” to “red in tooth and claw” where only the fittest survive to a “machine” akin to those of the industrial era.) Volume II, Reality, will be a critique of non-realist positions in theology, together with an examination of why theology must be an a posteriori, non-Idealist, discipline in its account of reality. Volume III, Theory, will address parallels between theological doctrines and scientific theories.
In the book’s first chapter, “The Legitimacy of A Scientific Theology,” McGrath maintains that since the Word or logos that became incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth is the ground of creation, the selfsame logos or rationality must be embedded in the creation, thereby giving rise to that intelligibility inhering the contingent realm which renders science possible. Foundational to McGrath’s programme, then, is his conviction that the doctrine of creation grounds the necessity (not merely the legitimacy) of a positive working relationship between Christian theology and natural science. McGrath’s convictions here contrast his critique of process theology’s provincialism, the latter being “a transitory phase in the development of Protestant English-language theology after the Second World War.” Utterly damning, from McGrath’s standpoint, is the fact that while process theology “may be of interest to some, it is implausible to most, especially in the intellectually hard-nosed scientific community.” In other words, process theology is useless in view of McGrath’s exploration of the methodological parallels between Christian theology (which for him entails the Chalcedonian definition of Christ) and natural science.
While upholding genuine science McGrath always remains aware of the danger of an ersatz “scientism.” He recognizes scientific conclusions to be provisional. What is crucial for theology isn’t the ever-shifting “conclusions” but rather the constant methods and assumptions by which scientific investigation proceeds. For this reason theology must always be engaged with science but must never ground itself in science. The church must revisit Scripture continually in order to ensure that scientific assumptions of earlier eras haven’t been incorporated into the teaching of the church.
Returning to his critique of “nature” McGrath maintains that the notion is helpful only if it is given ontological foundation by the Christian doctrine of creation. Naturalists, unaware of the social construction of “nature,” paradoxically remain unaware that “nature” isn’t natural, and therefore remain unaware that the notion is virtually useless in critical intellectual discourse. While deconstructionists have readily pointed out the mere construct, they are unable to deconstruct the natural sciences, since these are inherently impervious to the postmodern agenda.
Having exposed “nature” McGrath proceeds to probe the Christian doctrine of creation. He distinguishes among the understandings of creation found in Genesis (the creaturely is ontologically distinct from the divine), the Prophets (creation is an aspect of God’s lordship of history, therein attesting the subjugation of chaos and the imposition of order), and the Writings (patterns may be discerned in the creaturely realm, which discernment profits the wise.) In turn the New Testament yields the notion of creation ex nihilo, its twofold significance being an affirmation of the Christological determination of the creation and a negation of the world’s eternity and also of Gnostic dualism. Thanks to its having been fashioned at the hand of God, the creation possesses a goodness, a rationality and an orderedness, all of which are essential if scientific probing of contingent being is to occur. In other words, science flourishes in a world understood from the perspective of the gospel.
“Implications of a Doctrine of Creation”, the second last chapter, discusses principally the negative effect of the Fall on God’s knowability, the inversion of Feuerbach’s notion that because we long for God thereforeGod can be no more than human projection, and the role of mathematics as the “language” of the universe.
All of these are germane to McGrath’s final chapter, “The Purpose and Place of Natural Theology.” Following Torrance’s essay, “The Problem of Natural Theology in the Thought of Karl Barth,” McGrath deems illegitimate any natural theology that is a rival of revealed theology or an alternative to it. Agreeing with Torrance and Barth in all respects here he concludes that natural theology “lacks the epistemic autonomy required to permit it to be, or become, a theological resource in its own right.” He agrees with Barth that natural theology is ineradicable, and with Torrance that it is fitting as long as operates within the knowledge of God that grace-wrought faith alone yields. Admitting that natural theology’s conclusion of “Being-in-general” pales alongside the gospel’s disclosure of God as Father, Son and Spirit consubstantially, McGrath insists vigorously that a natural theology that “knows its place” (i.e., resists legitimating humankind’s craving for self-justification and domestication of the gospel) has a crucial role in demonstrating the consonance between revelation and the structures of the world. In light of his accomplishments in both natural science and theology, McGrath’s purpose in preparing this book (along with the two subsequent volumes) looms hugely in the last few pages of the book: “The recovery of a properly configured natural theology can serve as the basis for a critical theological engagement with both the world and the sciences which seek to give an account of it.”
Is this the role of such a reconfigured natural theology? Will it function as a bridge helping to end the isolation of faculties of theology? Is McGrath’s seemingly uncritical, end-of-book co-opting of Wolfhart Pannenberg in the service of his agenda aware of the reservations other theologians have expressed concerning Pannenberg? Need natural science exclude philosophy from philosophy’s customary conversation with theology?
Perhaps we should await the appearance of Volumes II and III before making an assessment. Notwithstanding what he proposes concerning the role of natural theology, McGrath’s book thoroughly acquaints readers with “scientific theology” in the context of creation.
Victor Shepherd, Tyndale Seminary
Law and Gospel: Philip Melanchthon’s Debate with John Agricola of Eisleben over Poenitentia. by Timothy J. Wengert
Law and Gospel: Philip Melanchthon’s Debate with John Agricola of Eisleben over Poenitentia.
(Timothy J. Wengert. Grand Rapids: Baker Books,1997. Paperback Pp.231)
Martin Luther maintained that whether or not one is a theologian is announced by whether or not one can profoundly distinguish law and gospel. In a book that evinces a perceptive reading of history, expertise in the subtleties of Reformation theology, and an ability to discern precisely where and why the gospel may be at risk, Wengert acquaints readers with the relation of law to gospel in two of Luther’s theological sons. He probes chiefly Melanchthon’s commentary on Colossians (in its three editions of 1527, 1528 and 1534), noting the subtle changes Melanchthon made as he interacted with theological publications and correspondence generated by developments in church, princedom and empire. The controversy — is poenitentia to be associated with law (Melanchthon) or with gospel (Agricola) — was the occasion of the first assault Melanchthon sustained from within the Wittenberg “family.” The outcome was plain: Lutheran theology deemed Melanchthon’s conclusions normative, and thereafter repudiated Agricola’s position as sub-evangelical in that it failed to honour a crucial aspect of the Word.
Wengert leaves untranslated both poenitentia and its German equivalent, Busse, on the grounds that the word can mean “repentance,” “penitence” or “penance” (the verbal form poenitentiam agite or tut Busse yielding “repent,” “be penitent” or “do penance”), the nuances here having everything to do with the controversy then and the reader’s assessment of the matter now.
It is in light of the above that each disputant’s characteristic dread must be understood. Melanchthon feared lawlessness and a faith that substituted one’s inner comfort and security for trust in God’s forgiveness through Christ’s sacrifice extra nos; Agricola feared a return to the rules and regulations of Rome. In this regard Agricola eliminated all consideration of law from the Christian life, denouncing Francis, Dominic, Bernard, the Fathers who upheld good works, and even the Council of Nicaea. Deploying an inaccurate (because non-Biblical) analogy, he maintained that faith can live without works just as the soul can live without the body. Christians, needing no law, travel a Mittelstrassen, free from good and evil works alike. Evil works do not deny their righteousness; good works do not attest it. Since the law’s accusation leads only to resentment and anger, never to confession and faith, the gospel alone highlights sin, magnifies grace and induces poenitentia. Christians are free from the law without qualification.
Unlike other Wittenberg theologians, Agricola began not with the distinction between law and gospel but with the Christian’s self-understanding: we are born children of Adam and therefore of wrath; by the promise of Abraham (i.e., the gospel) we are brought forth children of God. God gave the law to render us aware that he is not unmindful of us. When sinners hear the law, however, they are so thoroughly terrified that they attempt to divest themselves of its yoke even as they blame God for their predicament. Largely ignoring Melanchthon’s insistence on the first “use” of the law (to restrain civil disorder), and disagreeing with Melanchthon’s second (to direct the conscience-smitten to Christ), Agricola maintained that law-engendered terror simply drives people away from Christ. Only the gospel promises (including those found in the Old Testament) induce poenitentia. Poenitentia is therefore a mark of faith, not a mark of the person in the process of coming to faith.
As early as 1521 in his Loci Communes and 1525 in his commentary on Exodus Melanchthon had insisted the law to be essential: apart from it we lack necessary knowledge of our sinnership before God, are not impelled to seek help in God’s mercy, and cannot even truly hear the gospel. Agricola replied that humans have an aversion to anything that pains; the law can therefore arouse only hatred of it and of the law-giver himself, never yielding the slightest knowledge of sin.
The controversy, now at full flood, found its way into a plethora of catechetical materials. From 1522 to 1529 Wittenberg saw the production of sixty-two printings of thirteen different instructional booklets. Melanchthon, a prolific contributor, argued that the law-aroused conscience pleases God in that God never fails or forsakes any whom his law has terrified. Agricola replied in an idiosyncratic reading of Colossians 2: Paul says that Christians are to come to a knowledge of God’s great secret, Christ himself, and not be seduced by the face of an angel, pretty words, philosophy — or even God’s laws. Colossian 1:3-8, believers’ necessary fruit-bearing, he simply explained away.
The raging debate was taken up into the Visitation Articles of 1527 when all evangelical pastors were examined concerning their theological understanding; it became the substance of the two conferences in Torgau Castle in autumn of the same year. In it all Agricola insisted that God should be loved for his own sake and not as a provider of refuge. Melanchthon agreed, yet insisted that sinners before the holy God need a refuge; furthermore, since the “old” creature dogs even the “new” creature in Christ, sinners continue to need the law on their way to loving God for his own sake.
As the dispute over the law intensified Melanchthon came to see that his understanding of forensic justification required a third use of the law (his “third use” being subsequently taken up and elaborated hugely in the thought of Calvin and the Puritans after Calvin.) Believers whom the law has directed to Christ are not justified by the law but continue to need the law as the vehicle of their obedience on account of the imperfection that remains in them. From 1534, then, Melanchthon articulated that use of the law which forestalled the facile criticism that the Protestant Reformers, espousing forensic justification, eschewed good works. Believers’ good works please God in that God honours the aspiration wherewith believers express their desire to obey him and their gratitude to him. Unquestionably Agricola’s consistent undervaluation of the Decalogue stimulated Melanchthon in his articulation of the relation of law both to the inception of faith and to the expression of faith.
In view of Karl Barth’s “Gospel/Law” reversal of Lutheranism’s “Law/Gospel” and current Lutherans’ continuing disagreement with him, not to mention a contemporary Christianity seemingly devoid of ethical rigour, the dispute that Wengert’s exemplary research and lucid explication illuminates is as germane today as it was contentious in the Sixteenth Century. Melanchthon’s uncompromising “Where there is no fear there is no faith” needs to be pondered as the relation of fear to faith is probed in every era.
Victor Shepherd Tyndale Seminary
The Binding of God
(This book review will appear in the Canadian Evangelical Review, Spring 2001)
The Binding of God: Calvin’s Role in the Development of Covenant Theology by Peter A. Lillback. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001. Paperback Pp.331.
This book is the latest in a series (of seven so far), “Texts and Studies in Reformation and Post-Reformation Thought.” According to editor Richard Muller (Calvin Theological Seminary) the series aims at filling in gaps in our knowledge of the intellectual development of Protestantism in the sixteenth century and at addressing myths concerning Protestant orthodoxy of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Lillback affirms his book to be the first to provide a taxonomy of assorted views of Calvin’s covenant theology, and the first to provide a complete summation of it. He probes the role of the covenant in Calvin’s theology with a view to assessing the extent to which Calvin’s thought in this regard underlies the preoccupation with the covenant found in later Protestant Scholasticism and the latter’s characteristic use of it. His conclusion is that “Calvin’s hemeneutical application of the covenant is central to his entire system.” As expected, Lillback upholds substantial continuity between Reformers and Protestant Scholastics and disagrees most strongly with Calvin scholars (e.g., T.F. Torrance) who find Scholastic thought a declension from the Genevan’s.
Lillback divides his book into two major sections: “The Genesis of Covenant Teaching: The Conception of the Covenant in Calvin’s Historical Context” and “The Genius of Calvin’s Covenant Thought.”
In the first section Lillback discusses mediaeval covenant motifs, contrasting the stream of Augustine and Staupitz (the Reformed Augustinian Superior whose advice, “Contemplate the wounds of Christ”, enlightened a young Luther perplexed over predestination) with those of the Gabriel Biel’s nominalism and Tauler’s mysticism. While the Augustinians repudiated the notion of merit, the nominalists deployed it thoroughly in their finessing of “congruent” and “condign” with respect to the covenant, even as the mystics insisted on a “natural covenant” that presupposed an ontological structure to humankind which gave it an inalienable spiritual connection to its Creator and a natural capacity to turn to God.
The early Luther’s search for a gracious God edged him away from a merit scheme, and by 1517 the Wittenberger had shed all mediaeval vestige of the covenant as binding God to reward humankind for its having prepared for grace. Luther’s characteristic notion followed immediately: God’s saving promise as the core of the covenant rather than human responsbility. Luther’s conviction here underlies his bifurcation of law and gospel, the covenant pertaining to the latter alone: “alien” righteousness is God’s gift as promised to believers, law lacking any intrinsic relation to the gospel.
As the Reformation gained force in Switzerland the Reformed there, like Oecolampadius, maintained that Christians are found in the same covenant as Israel. Zwingli too insisted on the continuity of the covenants throughout scripture, establishing therein the Reformed conviction that infant baptism is rooted in, and is to be understood in light of, Israel’s practice of circumcision. Zwingli maintained that the ordinances do not confirm faith (nothing external can do this) but instead signify the covenant. Lillback sees Zwingli’s struggle with the Anabaptists and the latter’s denial of covenant-continuity as a watershed: the inception of covenant consciousness in Reformed thought.
In 1527 Bullinger, another Swiss Reformer, penned the first study of the covenant to be produced in the church. It affirmed the covenant to be the “chief point of religion.” All of scripture is to be referred to Genesis 17 (God’s covenant with Abram.) At this point there appeared what has never disappeared from Reformed thought, the conviction that there is ultimately one covenant only that God has forged with Abraham and his Christian descendants, “old” and “new” pertaining merely to modes of administration. In the same vein Calvin’s use of the covenant permeates his discussion of all theological topics, even as Lillback admits that the covenant doesn’t provide the organizational structure for the Institutes.
For Calvin the essence of covenant is the mutual binding of God and people. With respect to God the covenant is unconditional; with respect to the people, conditional upon their obedience. The Abrahamic covenant, operative today, distinguishes believers from unbelievers. Jesus Christ is its “heart”, while justification and sanctification are its two “great benefits.”
Certain to prove controversial, concerning the obedience of believers, is Lillback’s discussion of the form of “works” righteousness that he says appears in Calvin. Calvin scholars have long noted the concept of “double justification” in Calvin whereby believers together with their sin-riddled works are acceptable to God only insofar as grace justifies both them and what they offer. Lillback speaks at length of a “works” righteousness that stands before God, albeit as a “subordinate” righteousness to justification. Here he affirms a contradiction between Calvin and Luther, since the latter “could not see any righteousness in any human action before a holy God.” In the same way Lillback’s pronouncement, “Luther’s understanding of justification by faith alone had no room for inherent righteousness while Calvin’s view required it as an inseparable but subordinate righteousness”, will provoke discussion among Reformation scholars.
Lillback’s discussion of Calvin’s use of the Scholastics’ “Covenant of Acceptance” will prove no less controversial. He maintains that both Calvin and mediaeval scholastics agree that good works are acceptable to God only by a covenant; they disagree insofar as the scholastics understand works to be covenant-graced so as to merit salvation. Lillback adds, “Calvin admits that he is indebted to them.” Again, many Reformation scholars will ask if Calvin didn’t repudiate them.
Lillback expounds with approval elements in Calvin that other scholars find tangential, contradictory, or “surd.” One such is the distinction between the scope of covenant and election, the former being wider than the latter. He maintains that covenant is the means whereby God administers salvation, whereas only the elect are saved. “General election” or covenant, the same as “common adoption”, must be ratified by “special election” before anyone is rendered a beneficiary. Again, what Lillback uncritically expounds, other Calvin scholars have found to be highly problematic.
The question of whether there is a covenant of works in Calvin’s theology is a major consideration in the book. Lillback admits that Calvin never used the expression; this is not to deny he used the concept. Still, Lillback’s thesis here appears less substantial as he argues that there are concepts in the Institutes that are “conducive” to the notion of a pre-fall covenant, which covenant “appears warranted” to be called a covenant of works, since this is how it “functions.” He admits Calvin’s exposition here to be merely “rudimentary and inchoative”, yet it “seems in certain ways to adumbrate the covenant of works of the federalists.”
Readers may suspect special pleading here, particularly when Lillback deploys arguments of “lesser and greater grace” in Calvin to distinguish between a prelapsarian covenant and the covenant of law, and then concludes sweepingly that “Calvin’s system can be presented as a series of lessers to greaters.”
There remains another reading of Calvin. When Lillback, for instance, insists that for Calvin the covenant “contains” Christ and has Christ as its “foundation”, readers will want to ask whether Christ illustrates and/or instantiates a covenant lying behind him or is himself the covenant. Would not Calvin’s Christology, particularly his understanding of the Mediator, entail as much? Did not Oecolampadius imply this when he insisted that God first makes a covenant with Christ, which covenant God fulfills for his people in Christ?
Lillback’s book does much to advance the conversation among those who uphold either convergence or divergence with respect to Calvin and post-Calvin Scholasticism. The conversation, however, has by no means been concluded.
Victor Shepherd November 2001
How to Read T.F. Torrance by Elmer M. Colyer
Elmer M. Colyer. How To Read T.F.Torrance: Understanding his Trinitarian & Scientific Theology. Downers Grove , IL : InterVarsity Press, 2001. Pp 393. Paper, n.p. ISBN 0-8308-1544-6.
This book is a comprehensive discussion of the work of a Scottish theologian whose output has been prodigious and profound. Thomas Torrance has long been recognized a seminal thinker in the Reformed tradition and the most important English-speaking theologian of the past fifty years. Influenced particularly by Athanasius, Calvin and Barth, Torrance has yet eschewed becoming a clone of any of them and instead has forged a re-articulation of Protestant theology that has remained in constant dialogue with those whom Protestant theology has largely ignored (e.g., the Nicene Fathers), as well as with those with whom few theologians are able to converse: leading physicists. (In recognition of his competence Torrance has been admitted to several learned scientific societies.)
Introduced to Torrance as an undergraduate, and having wrestled with him for decades, Colyer assists both the new reader who needs an overview of the Torrance corpus as well as the experienced reader who wants an index to it. He displays a mastery (but not a domestication) that encourages readers to explore Torrance themselves, guides them through the focus and argument of thirty-plus books and three hundred articles, expounds in detail the major themes of his work, and provides a lexical aid to words and expressions that recur characteristically.
Colyer prefaces his exposition with a twenty-page biographical overview, noting the significance of Torrance’s early years with his missionary parents in China, his multi-faceted education, his military experience (including his decorations for service at the front in World War II), his academic achievements, publications and recognitions, and finally his preoccupation with the mission of the church and with the tenor of his work in light of his vocation as “theological evangelist.”
Recognizing the architectonic that the doctrine of the Trinity provides for all of Torrance’s work, Colyer apportions his book into four, equal-length sections: “The Grace of the Lord Jesus Christ” (the discussion here including the mediation of Christ — the title of Torrance’s most widely-read book), “The Love of God the Father” (with an exploration of contingent being and its relation to the Creator), “The Communion of the Holy Spirit” (including a protracted comment on the church and its ordained ministry), and by way of integration and summation, “The Triunity of God & the Character of Theology.” (This lattermost section discusses such philosophers and scientists as Descartes, Hume, Kant, and Newton , Einstein, Polanyi.)
The book accurately and adequately treats the features of Torrance ‘s thought that readers have found illuminating on account of Torrance ‘s angle of vision and his “theological instinct.” The homoousion is pre-eminent among these because foundational of all else. Colyer concurs in Torrance ‘s pronouncement that this is “the ontological and epistemological linchpin of Christian theology.” Since the Father and the Son are of the same nature, Jesus Christ is the revelation of God and not merely a revelation of a truth concerning God or an aspect of God. In the same way, because the Spirit possesses the same nature as the Father (and the Son), we are united to God by God himself: nothing besides God can unite us to God.
Torrance ‘s absorption with the homoousion, of course, is one with his absorption with the doctrine of the Trinity, “the ground and grammar” of Christian thought, faith and discipleship. Here the exposition is exceedingly fruitful as the implications of the “onto-relations” in God are identified: what God is in himself he is toward us, and vice versa, there being no dark, arbitrary recesses in God; human knowledge of God can only be a predicate of God’s self-knowing; love is what God is (not merely what God expresses), since the eternal love of the Father for the Son and the Son for the Father renders unnecessary something other than God (the creation) for God to love; the Holy Spirit is that “objective inwardness” which forestalls the “evangelical rationalism” that is otherwise prone to arise as a rationalistic apologetic, rather than the action of God, is thought to render the gospel credible; the economic Trinity must be grounded in the ontological Trinity lest God’s acts fail to include God’s person.
The vicarious humanity of Christ is related to both the above, and is shown to ground the church and to contradict the specific distortion of the “Latin heresy” and the illogic of limited atonement.
Other characteristic aspects of Torrance ‘s work stand out. Among these is the aversion to all theological speculation concerning what God can do or cannot do in the light of what God has done: given himself up to humiliation, suffering, degradation and death in the Son — all of which means that the doctrine of God’s sovereignty, for instance, must be understood as the efficacy of the cross rather than as the capacity to coerce. Natural theology is exposed as the improper attempt at attaining a knowledge of God from a point outside God, thereby rendering the human the measure of the divine. Included here too is Torrance’s willingness to speak of a genuine novum in God’s life, since both the Incarnation and the creation of the world are nova for God, and as such force a reconsideration of such traditional notions as God’s impassivity and impassibility. Colyer succinctly acquaints the reader with the emphasis Torrance has always placed on theology as scientific, “scientific” being properly predicated of any discipline whose methodology is governed by the nature of the object it investigates.
Colyer’s presentation of the filioque controversy, allowing Torrance to familiarize us with what east and west each wanted to preserve as well as fend off, together with the correct meaning of theopoiesis, shows Torrance to be truly Reformed; i.e., thoroughly catholic.
Most profoundly Colyer brings us face-to-face with a servant of the gospel whose humility eclipses his massive learning, as Torrance gladly acknowledges that the simplest believer knows more of God than the most erudite theologian will ever be able to say.
Colyer mirrors as much himself, having learned from Torrance that theology and doxology ceaselessly imply each other. Our apprehension of God fosters gratitude even as our non-comprehension leaves us adoring.
Victor A. Shepherd
Tyndale Seminary
Toronto
(Terry, the text of my review is 1005 words. You had allowed me 1000. Is this acceptable?)
A Comment on Jeremy Begbie’s Theology, Music and Time
(presented 12 May 2001 at “The Jazz of Life” symposium, Trinity College, University of Toronto)
A Comment on Jeremy Begbie’s Theology, Music and Time
Nowhere does Prof. Begbie attempt a “natural” theology of music that holds up music as a source of revelation, the nature of music thereby acquainting us with the nature of God. The book, rather, holds up everywhere Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God, as the event in which we are made the beneficiaries of God’s redemptive and creative gifts through the activity of the Holy Spirit.
At the same time the book nowhere submits to the older (i.e., late eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century) notion of Kulturprotestantismus. In Kulturprotestantismus, supported by many thinkers in one era of Germany’s intellectual history, the kingdom of God is understood in terms of developments within history, the culmination of which is a cultural achievement whose genuine richness only the philistine would ever deny. Yet as world-occurrence was soon to make manifest, the richest cultural achievements are not the kingdom of God, are not revelatory, have no power to redeem (whatever else they might do as a creaturely good), but rather can be and have been co-opted by powers that even the non-charismatic among us have described as demonic.
Prof. Begbie’s book aims, rather, at theologizing through music. Since music tells us more about time than does any other cultural phenomenon, it theologizes specifically through a discussion of time as an essential feature of music. And by probing time in its significance to music, it discusses the theological significance of that temporality which is essential to the entire created order and which God has pronounced “good” without qualification.
In my work as a teacher of theology I have found that students bring with them several misunderstandings that can be traced to their assumption that Plato, particularly in his discussion of time and eternity, is an ally of Christians. The same misunderstandings, I have found, haunt the parishioners whose minister I was in the course of decades of pastoral work. Prof. Begbie’s book highlights these misunderstandings as rooted in a flight from time; specifically, a refusal to cherish the necessity and goodness of the temporality of the created order. I list several of them now.
[1] In his homooousion, where Father and Son are said to possess the same rather than merely similar substance, Athanasius distinguishes between “God in the form of the human” and “God as human”. Students put forward “God in the form of the human” as an affirmation of the Incarnation when in fact it is a denial, God now merely masquerading as human. The Incarnation is reduced to the illustrative, illustrating a truth that lies behind it, where even the “illustration” is dysfunctional because deceptive. To speak accurately of the Incarnation, “God as human”, however, commits us to the temporality of God. On account of the Platonic notion that haunts the church everywhere (in part because it lurks in the Fathers everywhere), temporality and eternality are deemed mutually exclusive. Since God’s eternality is never denied, God’s temporality has to be. The consequent denials are legion, not the least of which is the denial that God suffers.
[2] Since eternity pertains to our ultimate blessing, and eternity is commonly understood as timelessness rather than as fulfilled time, time is suspected as an impediment to that blessing. This flight from temporality entails a flight from the body and its attendant earthliness, not to mention its attendant earthiness. In contrasting a doctrine of creation with Plato’s Timaeus, I set the students the exercise of distinguishing between the erotic and pornographic. Few are able to articulate the distinction; fewer still appear to have the intra-psychic freedom to acknowledge that the erotic is a God-ordained good and is to be received with thanksgiving. More generally, temporal existence pertaining to any of the senses is deemed inferior to a realm of pure spirit (so-called) that has to do with intelligibility. (When, for instance, I ask students about the role of the sense of smell, both literal and metaphorical, in scripture, they are startled to learn that scripture discusses it at all.) While students suspect sin’s distortion everywhere in the created order, they make an exception for intelligibility, thereby indicating the extent to which rationalism has supplanted a biblical understanding of revelation.
[3] A confusion is made between temporal existence and fallen existence. On this point Prof. Begbie discusses Augustine at length. Augustine, however, is not alone. In the theological turbulence of Reformation-era Lutheranism, the gnesio-Lutherans, represented by Matthias Illyricus Flacius and opposed by Philip Melanchthon, maintained that in the wake of the fall humankind is essentially depraved. Paul Tillich says as much himself inasmuch as he equates existence with estrangement. If sin is humankind’s essence, then plainly the fallen creature is no longer human at all, the image of God having been effaced rather than merely defaced. Similarly, if sin is the essence of humankind, then redemption can only render us non-human. When Prof. Begbie opines that many people aren’t “at home” in time [71], his assertion is only confirmed when theologians as diverse as Augustine, Flacius and Tillich exemplify a common confusion.
[4] Students espouse an organic notion of the kingdom of God that borrows from the liberal myth of progress. History is deemed to progress, and the kingdom of God is the crown and completion of the progress. Oddly, those students who are most hostile to any notion of biological evolution (for which there is evidence) are often quickest to endorse a notion of historical progress (for which there is no evidence), thinking that faith must affirm a historical inevitability that is benign. Lost here is the biblical category of promise and fulfilment, wherein promise and fulfilment, alike events in time arising from the act of a person, alike depend on God’s grace.
[5] Most distressingly, in the wake of their denial of the temporality of God students espouse a notion of God’s sovereignty that equates sovereignty with sheer power, sheer arbitrariness. Here it is maintained that if God is truly God, then God can do anything at all, anything he wills. Never considered is “What is it that God wills? How is what he wills related to who he is? What is meant by ‘power’?” (Students are always surprised to learn that power is the capacity to achieve purpose.) Most tellingly, on account of their religious environment, students are reluctant to admit that we humans have no fitting idea at all as to what God can or cannot do. We know only what God has done: in his Son, for our sakes, he has given himself up to suffering, degradation, and the death of profoundest self-alienation.
While the cross has many meanings at many levels, it surely means at least that there is no limit to God’s vulnerability; the resurrection in turn means not that vulnerability has been left behind but rather that there is no limit to the effectiveness of God’s vulnerability. Sovereignty has to be understood in terms of the triumph of a vulnerability limitless with respect to God’s self-exposure and protracted in time.
Since Incarnation, cross and resurrection occur in time, plainly time is affirmed as real; time is the theatre of God’s self-disclosure and self-bestowal; time is the venue of that obedience whereby we “glorify God in our bodies”, and of that instance of obedience which is self-forgetful exultation and praise. Here the students need another book from Begbie; namely, Theology, Dance and Time.
To grasp the temporality that Prof. Begbie probes relentlessly is indeed to find, as he declared, our theologizing assisted. When he speaks of the interplay between the temporal processes of music and the temporal processes that riddle human existence in its multidimensionality, from the “micro” of heartbeat to the “macro” of the change of seasons, I am reminded of a remark I heard from violinist Isaac Stern when last he spoke in Toronto. A promising young violinist played for Stern and admitted she couldn’t get the phrasing of the music right. As often as she re-phrased her playing it wasn’t right. Stern told her to sing the part. “I have a poor voice and I don’t want to sing”, she told him. “Sing the violin music anyway”, he told her. She did, and the phrasing fell into place immediately. “You see”, continued the old master, “when you sing you have to breathe. Breathing is a natural temporal event; the breathing that is part of singing will acquaint you with the natural phrasing — the timing — of the violin music.” The point that Stern made about the relation between the timing and rhythm of breathing, a human occurrence whose “realism” no one denies, and the realism of the phrasing of the music; this relation, an intertwining of music with the temporality of the world at large and also with the temporality of the incarnate one through whom and for whom all things have been made; this matrix I found discussed most profitably throughout the book.
The chapter “In God’s Good Time” provided a framework and an articulation for so many matters that I had had in mind and heart for years yet for which I hadn’t been given useable tools. The first section in this chapter discusses the manner in which time demonstrates that there can be ordered change, that change need not imply chaos. Change is chaos, or at least the threat of chaos, of course, where the frozen fixity or immobility of Greek metaphysics is ascendant, the Greek eternal being the unchanging. Yet according to Isaiah the creator of time asks us, “Behold, I am doing a new thing. Do you not perceive it?” Jesus expects his people to be able to read “the signs of the times.” And discernment of the genuinely new, the new-at-God’s-hand, is the principal gift of the Spirit in the book of Acts.
“Taking time”, the second part of this chapter, recalled for me the time that Jesus spent repeatedly, deliberately, in the wilderness, without which the time he spent elsewhere would have been fruitless. And since “natural processes have an inherent time-structure”, according to Barbara Adams whom Begbie quotes, I felt myself vindicated for the time I am free to “waste”, as it were, instead of having to fill up needed leisure time with something that is deemed to be productive and therefore not actually leisure at all. Time spent waiting recalled for me the scriptural connection between waiting and watching. For God’s people waiting is never “waiting around”, loitering; still it is waiting. Not stated in the book but presupposed nonetheless is the fact that the New Testament word for “wait” combines the two concepts of tension and endurance. Tension, of course, together with resolution, goes to the heart of music, as does endurance, since music, unlike fine art, inherently entails protracted temporal process.
“Temporal differentiation” found in even the simplest music, attests the marvellous variety in the creation and the wisdom needed to avoid forcing “our time” on everything and everyone.
The “Limited duration” of music is one with the limited duration of all creaturely existence. Limited duration is inherent in finitude, finitude as such being not evil but rather an instance of transience. Music bespeaks fruitful transience; i.e., transience that doesn’t reflect a resented futility but rather a welcome transition at God’s hand. As a pastor who stood at deathbeds for thirty years I came to grasp what the writer of Ecclesiastes meant when he wrote, without any hint of bitterness or futility, that in God’s good ordering there is indeed a time to die.
In the chapter “Resolution and Salvation” once again I found an articulation for and exposition of the truth that the “time” of anticipatory yet delayed “closures” within a piece of music points to eschatological anticipation, surely the ultimate “hyperbar” in Christian understanding and living. Our eschatological anticipation is fraught with partial fulfilment “on the way” to the final fulfilment, each partial fulfilment serving to quicken steadfastness, to warn against a premature identification of hope with sight, yet also to reassure us of the substance of hope and the imminence of its appearing.
All my formal music training was classical; only recently have I come to appreciate jazz. For this reason the chapter on improvisation was the most moving part of the book for me, specifically the understanding of improvisation as “giving and giving back.” Prone as we are to “thingifying” (or trying to “thingify”) all that pertains to persons, the mutuality of “giving and giving back” that presupposes the irreducibility of persons found me pondering not only Begbie’s discussion of Romans 9-11 but also the work of a thinker whom the church needs to recover, Martin Buber.
The philosopher Martin Heidegger maintained that language is the “house of being.” To say the same thing differently, being is a function of language. To be sure, Heidegger would never deny the converse: language is a function of being, albeit in the relatively small sphere wherein words name or describe objects. Vastly greater, however, is the sphere wherein being is a function of language. Here the force of language isn’t that we have more words in our vocabulary and can show off more readily; rather, expanded language creates a world and admits us to a world that is vastly richer than the world inhabited by someone with meagre language. Here language doesn’t describe an already-existing world but rather gives rise to a universe imperceptible to those for whom language remains only a function of being.
As I read Prof. Begbie’s book I began to wonder if it couldn’t be said, in the spirit of Heidegger, that metre and rhythm are another “house of being.” Admittedly, temporality as such is common to the created order. Still, I can’t help wondering if our awareness of the fact, nature and ubiquity of the “rhythm over metre” that is exemplified in music and riddles life; I can’t help wondering if one’s awareness of this doesn’t facilitate an ever-expanding universe we should otherwise never know and enjoy.
Victor Shepherd, Tyndale Seminary, 12th May 2001
Thomas Torrance’s Mediations and Revelation by Titus Chung
Titus Chung, Thomas Torrance’s Mediations and Revelation.
Farnham, U.K.; Ashgate, 2011. Pp. xx + 205. Hardcover, US$77.60. ISBN 978-14094-0570-2.
Chung’s purpose is to explore the logic and substance of revelation in the work of Thomas F. Torrance, highlighting throughout the book the role of mediation in all of Torrance’s thought, not privileging any one tome but acknowledging that Torrance’s most explicit discussion is the sustained argument found in the latter’s The Mediation of Christ (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992).
In his investigation Chung carefully distinguishes between mediation (biblically understood) and immediacy. While he never quotes Kierkegaard to the effect that immediacy is paganism, he plainly endorses Kierkegaard’s assessment. And while he never formally states the difference between mediation and inference or deduction, he is evidently aware that according to Hebrew logic any deity that is inferred or deduced or concluded is eo ipse an idol, since the identifying characteristic of the Holy One of Israel is the self-disclosing speech/act that renders all inference not only unnecessary but also impossible. In short, immediacy and inference alike presuppose a deity other than Yahweh. The living God is known non-immediately (only the creaturely realm can be known immediately) yet non-inferentially, since human recipients of God’s grace are included by the Spirit in the divine/human Son’s knowledge of the Father.
Accurately reflecting Torrance’s concern in his many discussions of mediation, Chung begins his exposition with a discussion of Israel and its ardent, oft-anguished wrestling with God wherein its life with God and its disciplinary suffering under God formed it as the “womb” that nurtured and gave birth to Jesus. In Israel’s history under God there were fashioned the categories – such as sacrifice, priest, king, sin, salvation – by which Jesus Christ was to be understood and the language in terms of which he was to be described, announced and commended.
As Chung moves from a discussion of Israel as the locus of God’s self-revealing activity to the locus of the Word incarnate, Chung probes Torrance’s reiterated distinction between anhypostasia and enhypostasia. Enhypostasia means that Jesus Christ is human with the humanness with which all humankind is human, apart from which he would lack representative and substitutionary significance. Anhypostasia means that in order for the Son or Word to become incarnate he must be incarnate in a particular human individual. Apart from anhypostasia no incarnation has occurred; apart from enhypostasia, the incarnation possesses no significance for anyone beyond Jesus of Nazareth.
Chung’s exploration of the foregoing forms the bridge to his examination of dualism and Torrance’s hallmark aversion to it. In his theological work spanning almost seven decades few matters drew Torrance’s ire more than the dualism that he regarded as having disfigured theology for centuries. Dualism – between fact and meaning, soul and body, eternity and time, act and being – warped theology and above all theo-epistemology wherein a hiatus appeared between our knowledge of God and God’s knowledge of himself. Humankind’s knowledge of God was distorted by assorted speculations instead of rightly being seen as an implicate of God’s knowing himself, the latter a predicate of God’s own intra-Trinitarian life.
In light of the above Chung fittingly guides readers to Torrance’s searching, searing criticisms of Arius in the realm of Christology and Newton in the realm of physics. Athanasius (Torrance never relaxed his admiration for the latter’s homoousion apart from which Torrance always insisted the gospel would have been lost) remained as pivotal for Torrance in theology as Maxwell, Einstein and Polanyi did in science, not least because of the lattermost’s sustained argument for the presence of a personal yet non-subjectivistic element in all knowing, scientific included. Newton’s dualism divorced God from the world and rendered God unknowable as surely as Arius’ Christology rendered Jesus Christ neither divine nor human and therefore divorced from both at once.
Chapter three, “The Epistemological Realism of Theological Science,” traces Torrance’s epistemological debt to Albert Einstein, particularly Einstein’s insistence that science progresses not by guesswork concerning the cosmos but rather as aspects of the objective world under investigation become transparent to patterns of intelligibility that inhere them; almost exude them, as it were. Science is possible only because there is a match-up between patterns of intelligibility in the natural world and the pattern or structure of human intelligence. Apart from this correspondence no one could think truthfully about the natural world. Inspired by Einstein, Torrance went beyond him in relating the correspondence between patterns of intelligibility in the cosmos and of intelligence in humans to the rationality or intelligence of the Logos, the second person of the Trinity, the one through whom all things have been made (John 1:3) and therefore whose inner principle or rationality has been imprinted upon God’s creation. As theologian Torrance maintains that only the Logos (Incarnate) is the sufficient ground for the phenomenon Einstein spotlighted.
From here Torrance explores revelation concerning its inherent logic, which logic ‘stamps’ itself upon humans as their reason – its structure survived the Fall but its integrity concerning knowledge of God did not – is now healed by grace to facilitate a non-speculative knowledge of God that can claim to be realist in the above sense as surely as scientific knowledge is realist. The remaining chapters of the book apply the material in the first three chapters to an examination of Torrance’s understanding of scripture, preaching, sacraments and church.
Doubtlessly Chung will be challenged with respect to the use he makes of Paul Tillich. In the course of comparing Tillich and Torrance Chung suggests areas where Tillich may supply a corrective to deficits in Torrance Chung claims to have identified. Are these putative deficits actual? Specifically, has Chung misread Tillich’s notion of correlation? And has Chung failed to understand the nature of theological trajectories in Torrance and Tillich that are not merely different but disparate?
The book is marred by gravely defective English. Punctuation is incorrect and inconsistent. Non-idiomatic English expressions jar the reader on every page: e.g., “David’s [David Fergusson’s] initial supervision was consequential in setting my research in firm footing” (Preface); “The period between the two [nineteenth-century biblical criticism and postmodernism], of which Thiemann regards as leading the discipline into a blind alley, cannot be spared the influence of either” (p. xiv); “Torrance’s discourse of baptism does not end as his scripture” (p. 162); “…the referential relation between language and the objective reality of which it signifies” (p. 112); “Tillich although is unequivocal in the tenet of ‘directedness,’ his deterministic emphasis remains very much on the structure of the question” (p. 74). Most upsetting, perhaps, with respect to non-idiomatic English and sub-academic assessment is “Torrance is not the ordinary Barthian of regurgitation.” (pp. xiv-xv)
Worse are the numerous instances where the English word used is simply incorrect: e.g., “…a window to identify dualism as the threat that has to be harnessed resolutely” (p. 43); “…it is suffice at this juncture….” (p. 188); “…so that we are able to relate to divine compulsiveness” (p. 106); “On this note, the hypostatic union of Christ and his homoousion with the Father are impinged” (p. 40);“…Torrance underpins that the ultimate ‘hearing’….: (p. 188) (Throughout the book Chung uses “underpin” repeatedly when he seems to mean “affirm” or “emphasize” or “insist.”)
Ungrammatical sentences keep readers off-balance everywhere in the book, force a re-reading, and frequently end in an irksome opacity: e.g., “Only by the epistemic dynamic of the Spirit that such trans-formal experience is made possible, so that as human we are able to know….” (p. 105)
The misrelated modifier (not to say the pointlessness ) is evident in “Being a theologian, Torrance’s articulation is expectedly theological.” (p. 71)
Readers are similarly rattled by the non-parallelism of verb tenses: e.g., “The guiding question is whether Torrance’s explication of the work of the Spirit….We would engage Kruger and Gunton….” (p. 94).
Worst of all, and indefensible, are the countless instances where major authors such as Torrance, Gunton and MacIntyre are misquoted: e.g., “…the various sciences themselves, ranging from physicals and chemistry…: (p. 175); “…they are already on the way that leads to the really existence of God” (p. 179); “It must not conceal us that such language…” (p. 78); “…the one who prefects the creation…” (p. 101).
Much work remains to be done on this book before it can be recommended to those interested in the contribution Thomas F. Torrance has made as theologian, logician of science, and the manner in which theology is deemed ‘scientific’ in the German sense of wissenschaftlich. Torrance characteristically argued that theology, like science, was marked by its own logos. For both disciplines the method of investigating any subject is mandated neither by speculation nor by importing another academic discipline (e.g., philosophy) but by the essence, structure and inner logic of the subject under discussion as the subject-matter forges within the thinker categories for understanding it in conformity with its own inherent logic as both (science and theology) attempt to give an ordered account of a reality that lies beyond them.
Victor Shepherd
Tyndale University College & Seminary
Toronto, Ontario
Email: victor.shepherd@sympatico.ca
Thomas C. Oden, John Wesley’s Teachings: Volume 1, God and Providence.
Thomas C. Oden, John Wesley’s Teachings: Volume 1, God and Providence
Grand Rapids; Zondervan, 2012. Pp. 240 Paperback US$22.99 ISBN 978-0-310 32815
Volume 2, Christ and Salvation. Grand Rapids; Zondervan, 2012. Pp. 320 Paperback US$22.99 ISBN 978-0-31049267-2.
Oden’s scholarly versatility is noteworthy: see, for instance, his three-volume systematic theology, his multi-volume exploration of pastoral theology and practice, his study of the church in Africa, his examination of the Early Fathers, and his Patristic commentaries on Scripture. His current project, John Wesley’s Teachings, will eventually include volumes three (pastoral theology) and four (ethics and society). Reflecting the order of Wesley’s adherence to classic consensual Christian teaching, the work is an expansion of Oden’s earlier John Wesley’s Scriptural Christianity (1994), albeit four times longer.
Always unashamed that his ‘home’ is the Methodist tradition; always cognizant of Wesley’s catholicity, substance and particular gift to the Body of Christ; always unapologetic in the face of the weighty contributions of the Lutheran and Reformed traditions, Oden has once again expounded the angle-of-vision on theology, discipleship and community embedded in Wesley’s astute fusing of the riches of Anglicanism, Puritanism, and Pietism – with all of this enlivened by the Spirit-infusion characteristic of Methodists and their charismatic descendants.
Oden’s stated purpose is to forefend the oft-heard criticism that Wesley did not think systematically; to render Wesley’s vast patrimony available to the non-professional contemporary reader; and to increase accessibility through reducing archaisms and ambiguities.
Sternly Oden exposes the ignorance of those who think Wesley soteriologically shallow: “There is not a shred of Pelagianism in Wesley.” (v.2, p.240) Emphatically he refutes those who regard the Methodist movement as mawkish: “Especially odious to Wesley was a sentimental hymnody….” (v.2, p.95) Relentlessly he supports Wesley’s insistence that theological novelty is eo ipse heresy, since the truth and reality of the gospel is found in the apostolic confession of Jesus Christ and in the ecumenical, consensual affirmation of it found in the following four centuries. Judiciously he insists that while Wesley is a child of the West (i.e., unambiguously Protestant, ‘justification by faith’ never compromised), Wesley’s Protestantism is rooted in the Eastern Fathers no less than in the Western. Realistically Oden reminds the reader that while some might regard Wesley’s descendants as merely one more family among the dozens in the universal church, in fact Wesley’s understanding is proving at this moment to be the theology of evangelization globally: in Latin America (albeit with a Pentecostal infusion), in Continental Europe and, not least, in Russia. Profoundly Oden highlights Wesley’s theology as neither one-sided nor shallow; while rooted in antiquity it is more readily acknowledged and owned today than are the ersatz theologies that marry modernity only to find themselves widowed shortly.
Oden warns readers that “Only two subjects in the Wesley literary corpus place serious intellectual burdens on the ordinary reader, and this [i.e., predestination] is one of them (original sin being the other).” (v.2, p.157) Wesley’s articulation of original sin is his longest treatise, while Oden’s discussion of predestination is the longest chapter in the two volumes under review. Sidestepping no biblical issue, Oden develops, without discomfiture or defensiveness, Wesley’s protracted discussion of angels (parenthetically noting that Wesley’s angelology intrigues audiences more than anything else Oden says about Wesley.)
Unerringly Oden highlights Wesley’s accentuation of sanctification as transformation in this life, emphasizing the difference now in those who embrace the Saviour who releases believers from sin’s power or grip no less than from sin’s guilt. In such a judicious balance of justification and sanctification Oden points out Wesley’s insistence on the equilibrium of Christology and Pneumatology, or what God does for us in the Son and what God effects in us through the Holy Spirit; for a one-sided elevation of Christology issues in “formalism” (a frigid orthodoxy that fills the mind yet freezes the heart) while a one-sided elevation of Pneumatology issues in “enthusiasm” (an inflamed subjectivism that welcomes irrationalism). Wisely Wesley upholds the Spirit-invigorated restoration of reasoning’s integrity while eschewing philosophical rationalism.
Thanks to his extensive and intensive knowledge of Wesley, Oden can direct readers to documents wherein are found ready-to-hand deposits or concentrations of key themes. For instance, all of Wesley’s major points concerning the Holy Spirit are stated summarily in his “A Letter to a Roman Catholic” (1747); the quickest route to Wesley’s Christology is found in his “Order for the Administration of the Lord’s Supper” (1784); and the foundational documents for Wesley’s understanding of justification by faith (he never disagreed in the slightest with the Magisterial Reformers on this point) are the “Doctrinal Minutes,” the distillate of the first three Annual Conferences (1744-1746).
Christians of Pentecostal persuasion will profit from Oden’s thorough discussion of Christian Perfection. Oden points out that ‘perfect’, in Wesley’s understanding, is informed not by the Latin perfectus (faultless, admitting no development) but by the Greek teleiosis (a self-abandoned aspiration to self-forgetful love of God and neighbour).
Since Wesley names double-predestination “the very antidote of Methodism,” nothing less than a “lie” that renders God satanic, Oden patiently explores the nature and logic of prevenient grace, the merciful activity of God that ‘comes before’ sinners are even aware of their need of grace and only by means of which they can respond to saving grace. In this regard Oden faithfully reflects Wesley’s attentive reading of his Patristic mentors and the logic of prevenience at every stage of the Ordo Salutis.
Oden has performed a fine service in appending helpful bibliographies at the conclusion of each section of each volume, thereby directing readers to books and articles that amplify or situate any one item of Wesley’s theology. Since Wesley’s theology is entrenched in sermons, letters, journals, diaries and numerous tracts, footnotes indicating where corroboration of Oden’s interpretation can be found, especially in the lesser-known repositories of Wesley’s thought, are invaluable. An appendix paralleling the Jackson Edition (1829-31) and the Bicentennial Edition (1975-) of Wesley’s Sermons will save serious students no little time and spare them much frustration.
Victor Shepherd, Tyndale University College & Seminary, Toronto.
John Vissers, The Neo-Orthodox Theology of W.W.Bryden
John Vissers, The Neo-Orthodox Theology of W.W.Bryden.
Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2011. Pp.xi + 297. Pb, US$40.00. ISBN: 978 0 227 17370 1.
The main purpose of Vissers’ book is to explore and assess the contribution of W.W.Bryden, sixth principal of Knox College (University of Toronto) and professor of theology, 1925-1952. To this end Vissers prosecutes a two-fold task: an examination of Bryden’s role in introducing and magnifying the theology of Karl Barth in Canada, and, in light of Bryden’s neo-orthodox convictions, an investigation of the nature and force of Bryden’s relentless criticism of church union in Canada (1925). In the wake of the union that gathered up all of the Methodists and seventy per cent of the Presbyterians, the minority “continuing” Presbyterians perceived themselves as having to identify, articulate and defend the grounds of their resistance to a development that most of the historic Protestants in Canada had assumed to be God-willed.
Bryden was never persuaded by those who facilely spoke of church union as one manifestation of the creation-wide reconciliation wrought in Christ. He feared, on the contrary, that those who spoke like this were unwittingly embracing neo-paganism. In the surge of Barth’s tidal wave he discerned a theological resource whose substance and logic could expose theological deterioration and help a jarred denomination contend for the integrity of the gospel; and in the course of helping contend for the gospel, help the church identify its lamentable (but not irreversible) accommodation and acculturation.
Bryden regarded the churches of his era as having put asunder what God mandates, and the Magisterial Reformation echoes, be kept together: Word and Spirit, or what God does for us (Christology) and what God does in us (Pneumatology). Bryden, astute reader of Reformation theology and church history, knew that Word divorced from Spirit renders Word lifeless orthodoxy, a rationalism that merely happens to employ religious words in its thinly disguised naturalism; Spirit divorced from Word renders Holy Spirit lethally indistinguishable from human spirit, whether philosophical idealism or psychological optimism or social evolutionism. Bryden saw unerringly that the Spirit alone is the power of the Word, while the Word alone is the substance of the Spirit.
For this reason Bryden was no less convinced that the way ahead for his denomination did not lie in a retreat to biblical fundamentalism or uncritical confessionalism. While the Westminster documents unquestionably had served the church well and could continue to inform it, no less certainly their theological deficits and deficiencies would have to be specified and corrected.
Throughout the acrimony surrounding church union and the hostile stand-off following it, Bryden remained opposed to the theological indifference on both sides. The pro-union faction appeared theologically apathetic and historically amnesiac, wanting only to construct an ‘umbrella’ large enough to accommodate all who wanted to huddle together under it; the anti-union faction appeared too often to have opposed the union for the wrong reasons: e.g., to preserve Scottish ethnicity or to retain real estate or to repristinate Westminster orthodoxy or Reformed scholasticism. The path Bryden chose to tread was lonely, and invited rejection at the hands of those who regarded him as an impediment to their cause.
Profoundly influenced by Barth, Bryden was nonetheless never a sycophantic camp-follower. Rather he recognized in Barth not merely a rescuer of the silted-over treasures of Reformation figures like Luther and Barth but also someone who could help the Canadian church re-think faith in the judging-saving Word. This Word, supposedly irrelevant (according to the theological liberalism arising from Troeltsch and his school), alone was life-giving.
Bryden’s theology, Vissers points out, was at once a theology of revelation (God speaks and acts so as to acquaint us with himself ‘from above’ since no approach ‘from below’ – natural theology – can render sinners savingly intimate with God), a retrieval of Reformation gains, and all of this addressed to a post-Enlightenment people who neither flee modernity fearfully nor fawn over it flatteringly. Bryden’s major work, The Christian’s Knowledge of God (1940, republished at Cambridge: James Clark & Co., 2011) embodied these convictions. In line with Barth’s characteristic emphasis he maintained that God’s speech is simultaneously God’s act: supremely at the cross God did something that was cosmos-altering, not merely said something. Correspondingly humankind’s declared response, “I believe,” is simultaneously act: faith is that gift of God which must be humanly exercised, humanly experienced and humanly exemplified. Not least, Bryden, aware that evangelism regularly heads the New Testament lists of ministries of the Spirit, insisted that a theology was useful only to the extent that it invigorated the church’s evangelistic ministry. Not surprisingly, two evangelical giants to whom he remained indebted in this regard were Reformation historian T.M. Lindsay and theologian James Denney.
Vissers helpfully informs the reader of the formative influences bearing upon Bryden, of the intellectual currents flowing in early twentieth-century Canada (e.g., the philosophical idealism then in vogue at Queen’s University and whose conflation of the divine and the human was thought to be essence of Christianity), of the varieties of Continental and Scottish Calvinism that had found their way to the New World, and of Bryden’s social awareness wherefrom he consistently protested, in the name of the gospel, glaring social inequities that were nothing less than iniquities.
A major highlight of Vissers’ book is its chapter on Bryden’s theology of the Holy Spirit. Bryden rightly recognized a serious underemphasis in Barth’s thought, the work of the Holy Spirit in regenerating sinners, assuring them of their new nature in Christ and bringing forth such fruits of the Spirit within them as to transform character. This operation of the Spirit begins with God’s address to sinners, God’s address being nothing less than God-in-person speaking to us so as to render us persons. (Not mentioned in the text but presupposed is the biblical notion that humans are the only creature to whom God speaks, God’s address being one of several ways of understanding what it is to be made “in the image and likeness of God.”) The Spirit, therefore, has everything to do with one’s experience of the living God (not merely with acquiring information about God), and with one’s awareness that God’s address has occasioned a crisis within the sinner that can be relieved only as the sinner embraces the crucified one whose arms have already embraced her. Reading the New Testament closely in this matter Bryden correctly recognized the emphasis given to the work of the Holy Spirit, that power of God which Christ uniquely bears and bestows, and the concomitant emphasis on faith’s experience of Christ. Where Barth had appeared reluctant to discuss Christian experience lest he be accused of pietism, Bryden boldly forged ahead, confident he had read the apostles aright. Bryden’s talk of “Christ mysticism,” then, was not a religious vagueness blurring creator and creation or melding sin and righteousness. Rather it was a Spirit-fostered apprehension that the cross exposes the sinner as enemy of God, and simultaneously a Spirit-facilitated inclusion of the sinner in Christ’s life, which inclusion entails an intimacy that finds language forever inadequate. In expounding the scope and depth of the Spirit’s work Bryden was helped chiefly by John Calvin, recognized among Reformation scholars as ‘the theologian of the Holy Spirit.’
Implied in Bryden’s insistence on the reality of the Spirit was his insistence on the reality of the church, the creation of the Spirit. Eschewing a voluntarist notion of the church Bryden rejected the widespread notion in North America that the church is an association of like-minded individuals whose commonality happens to be Christianity. Rather he averred, with the Reformers, that the church as Body of Christ is divinely constituted as the elect in Christ “before the foundation of the world.” (Ephesians 1:4) and to which individual believers are admitted by faith.
Bryden did not lack opponents. Fulton Anderson, formidable chair of the University of Toronto’s philosophy department, fumed over Bryden’s doggedness concerning sin’s distortion of reason. Frank Beare, church historian at McGill University’s Presbyterian College, deemed Bryden’s theology a “chain” that crippled its catholicity. Yet James D. Smart, one of the twenty-plus students of Bryden who became professors, pronounced him an exemplary representative of the Reformed tradition.
While Bryden’s work is now more than half-a-century old it remains timely. Note, for instance, his discovery, as early as the 1920s, that the church was understood less as the community of the Spirit joyfully embracing the crucified and more as a locus of business expertise and management technique.
Vissers’ book will find readers eager to probe Bryden’s major work (in print once again) and therein assess the influence of a continental giant on a major Canadian thinker who, like Barth, never scoffed at the vocation of village pastor. It provides insight into the genesis, challenges and resilience of the Presbyterian Church in Canada. In looking back to the latter’s most formative theologian it may even suggest a way forward for a denomination that struggles as much now as it did in 1925.
Victor Shepherd
Tyndale University College & Seminary
Toronto, Ontario
Email: victor.shepherd@sympatico.ca
Crucial Words in the Christian Vocabulary: [Wo]man
Genesis 1:24-31 Colossians 1:15-20 Luke 8:1-3
Are you an angel, a devil or an animal? As a matter of fact different writers have argued that humankind is at bottom an angel in disguise or a devil in disguise or an animal that thinks it’s more than an animal. Two decades ago Mr Desmond Morris’s book, Trousered Apes, told everyone what Morris thought: we humans are animals who dress up and think that dressing up elevates us.
What about you or me as individuals? Are we merely an insignificant cog in a powerful machine? Chinese and Korean communists would say yes. Or are we merely a twitch, as short-lived and unremarkable as any twitch? Jean Paul Sartre, existentialist philosopher, would say yes. Or am I as a male a nuisance; worse than a nuisance, an oppressor whose presence ought always to be monitored? Feminists, at least many of them, would say yes.
Then what am I? What are you? Who is a human being? The question is crucial, for unless we answer it correctly our misunderstanding of what we are will impoverish our own humanness and threaten the world of the non-human as well.
In answering the question, “What is it to be human?,” let’s imagine an extra-terrestrial being, like “ET” of yesteryear, visiting us. What would an extra-terrestrial being discover about us? What should it discover?
I: — It would surely notice immediately that we human beings are rooted in the world of nature. We belong to the realm of plants and animals. According to the old story in Genesis we were created on the same “day” as the animals. Animals need plants to survive. We need plants to survive. The Hebrew poet reminds us that we come from the dust of the earth. Humus is the Latin word for “earth.” We humans ought to remain humble (even though we don’t;) humans ought to remain humble because however high falutin’ we think ourselves to be, we come from humus, earth, and our remains shall return to it. We are never angelic; that is, we humans are never pure spirit, never unembodied spirit. We never escape our earth-ness. We are intimately bound up with nature. And of course the most modern ecologist agrees. Ecologists tell us that either we humans are going to rediscover and re-own our inescapable oneness with nature or we are going to perish at the hands of the nature we have poisoned.
If ever we think we have left the realm of nature behind all we have to do is wait until part of our body doesn’t work properly. And if the breakdown in body-part is accompanied by pain, we can think of little else. Pain alters personality; pain is a challenge to character. Protracted pain threatens sanity. And even if there’s no pain, a very small amount of extra tissue growing in one’s brain will unhinge personality and undo stability frighteningly.
In saying that we humans never escape our earth-ness we aren’t saying there’s nothing more to us than there is to the plant or the animal. We aren’t denying the unique features of our humanness: art, music, poetry, imagination, abstract thought. They are wonderful indeed, and they are part of what distinguishes us from the animal world. Yet they all occur in us humans whose fragility is linked to the fragility of nature. William Shakespeare could write matchless plays inasmuch as the plant and animal world sustained him, there was non-toxic air to breathe, and his body hadn’t broken down to the point where his mental functioning was impaired.
In the interest of helping human beings we do massive medical research on animals. We don’t use animals just because they are plentiful and cheap; we use animals because there are the most significant physical similarities between them and us. If there weren’t then medical research with animals wouldn’t profit humans at all.
We must be sure to note that our earth-ness doesn’t diminish our humanness; it doesn’t degrade us. Instead it exalts the realm of nature. It doesn’t rob us of our honour; instead it recognizes that honour which God intends nature to have. Our affinity with nature doesn’t demean nature; instead it dignifies everything God deems necessary for us who are apple of his eye and alone made in his image.
Most people look upon reptiles, for instance, as ugly. We might fondle our dog but we’d never kiss an alligator. Still, if alligators could talk they’d say, “Shepherd, you may not be fond of me. But you had better understand that you need me while I don’t need you. Remember that, Shepherd: you need me, but I don’t need you. So if you are wise at all you won’t trifle with us alligators and with the whole realm of nature that supports us and you.”
The first thing ET has to notice about us is that we are inescapably rooted in nature.
II: — The second truth about us humans is equally obvious: every one of us is either a male or a female, a man or a woman. “And God said,” reads the ancient text in Genesis 1, “Let us make man (’adam, mankind) in our image; male and female created he them (plural).” Two matters leap out at us here. One, the distinction between male and female God has built into the creation; two, we are human only in the context of our gender opposite. Both of these matters require comment.
There are many matters that divide people today, such as differences in wealth, in education, in social opportunity. None of these distinctions, however, is God-ordained. None is built right into the creation. All such distinctions can be overcome in principle, and many of us would say that we should do all we can to overcome them. Differences in financial resources, for instance, are glaring and gruesome. At the same time, we have graduated income tax and social subsidies in order to redistribute wealth and re-equilibrate the divisions among us fostered by disparities in wealth. In the same way we have tax-supported public education to give those who would otherwise have no educational privilege the opportunity of adequate schooling. There remains, however, one distinction in the creation that we ought not to try to overcome: the distinction between man and woman. God has pronounced our gender polarity “good” and we are not to try to transcend it in a “unisex” mentality. For this reason, for instance, scripture forbids cross dressing. Now I notice that many of the women in this congregation, my wife included, wear slacks or trousers to church. Good. There’s nothing wrong with that, for the women who wear slacks are manifestly not trying to pass themselves off as men; there’s no attempt to hide one’s gender or misrepresent oneself sexually or deceive anyone in any way. There’s no attempt to deny that one is a woman and therein deny the gender specificity that God has pronounced “good;” no attempt to obliterate the one and only distinction in the creation that God has said should never be obliterated.
The second comment to be made here: each of us is gender-specific – a male or a female – in the context of the gender opposite. To say that I’m a male is to say that I’m a male with respect to a female. To be sure, the animals are male or female too. But with the animals the male/female distinction serves only the purpose of procreation. With humans, however, the male/female distinction first serves the truth that we are made in the image of God.
This is not to say that God is either male or female, or both male and female. God is not gender specific at all. Still, when we are told that we are made in God’s image two things have to be noted. One, the individual human being is made in God’s image. The individual man, the individual woman, is made in God’s image. Two, the individual man is man only in the context of woman, and the individual woman only in the context of man. While a dog is dog, male or female, irrespective of gender-opposite (in other words, a male dog all by itself is 100% dog), a male human all by himself can’t be 100% human, can’t be human at all. Humans are individually made in the image of God even as no individual can be individual only. Each of us, man or woman, needs our gender-opposite to be properly human.
I have said we need our gender-opposite. I haven’t said we need to be married; I haven’t said we need to be sexually active. Jesus wasn’t married, wasn’t sexually active, but was human. Indeed, so far from being deficiently or defectively human he is the instance of God’s intention for our humanness. At the same time, we should be sure to note that while Jesus wasn’t married and wasn’t sexually active he moved among women every day, moved among them with no awkwardness, and moved among them in ways that horrified the people of his day. He called at the home of Mary and Martha, unmarried women. This wasn’t done in his day. He allowed a menhorragic woman to touch him. This wasn’t done. He spoke in public with a woman of the shadiest reputation (five times married) when men didn’t even speak to their wives in public. He had several women in his larger group of disciples (Luke tells us), when some of these women were single and some were already married. It was women who were last at the cross (at least they didn’t abandon him) and first at the grave on Easter morning. Obviously they loved him. They relished his company and he relished theirs. They enriched him and he enriched them. At bottom, apart from them he wouldn’t have been human and apart from him they wouldn’t have been either. (This, by the way, is a truth that the shriller feminists fail to grasp.)
There was nothing inappropriate in these encounters. At the same time there was everything necessary in these encounters. The truth is God ordains, requires even, a mutual, complementary engagement and delight for all men and women, including those who aren’t married and never will be.
To be human is to be gender-specific and gender-complemented.
III: — Our extra-terrestrial visitor notices a third thing about us. We are individuals who live in societies. Both the individual and the society must be protected. When you asked an ancient Israelite his name he always gave you his name together with the name of his tribe. (Jesus belongs to the tribe of Judah .) Why? Because he knew that he is who he is only in the context of his community.
But the converse is true as well. A community differs from a crowd in that a community cherishes and protects individuals while a crowd submerges individuals. Our world is burdened with societies that trample individuals. The USSR did so for 75 years and could revert to doing so at any time. Germany did so in a Reich that lasted only 12 years but intended to last 1000. Not to mention China (the single largest nation in the world), North Korea , Indonesia (now we are identifying right-wing disdain for the individual), many countries in Africa, and of course so very many countries in Latin America that we shan’t attempt to list them. After the “disappeared” people of Argentina had remained “disappeared” for several years, the government of Argentina shamelessly announced what everyone had surmised already: the disappeared were dead. They were dead, the government announced, inasmuch as the government had killed them.
Christians must always recognize the balance between individual and society, individual and community. We must always recognize the need for the balance and the exquisite delicacy to the balance. We must always recognize why individual and community are essential to each other. After all, without the preservation of the individual the community becomes a crowd (also known as a mob.) On the other hand without the preservation of the community the individual person becomes a thing. The balance is exquisitely fine and exquisitely challenging to maintain.
One place in our society where this necessary balance is visible, together with its attendant sensitivities, is the school. Parents expect the school (which is a mini-society) to educate their youngsters for personal edification and employment, promote character formation in them, and all of this to the end of producing solid citizens. But every educator knows that no school can uphold standards of intellectual rigour and decency and deportment and civility and ethical integrity; no school can uphold these if the individual parent doesn’t or the community doesn’t. On the other hand, no conscientious parent can uphold what a school consistently undermines.
Individual and society always interpenetrate each other and regulate each other. Jesus belongs to the tribe of Judah .
IV: — Our extra terrestrial visitor might notice one last feature of us human beings, even though it isn’t last in importance. Then again, our “ET”’ visitor might not notice it since it isn’t obvious as our gender specificity is obvious. This feature is that we are made for fellowship with God. While we are discussing it last this morning it’s actually first. It’s not the case that our engagement with God is an add-on, a decoration, a frill, an after-thought. Rather it is the profoundest truth about us. To be a human being is to be God’s cheerful, grateful obedient covenant partner.
Christians know that human existence is always relational. When we speak of a thing like a tree or a termite we know that where trees and termites are concerned to exist is simply to be. But where humans are concerned to exist is to be-in-relation. We have already seen this with respect to gender specificity: to exist at all is to exist either as male or female; and to exist as male or female is to be-in-relation to female or male.
It’s the same with respect to God. While God doesn’t need humankind in order to be God, God has willed himself not to be God apart from humankind. God has willed himself to be God only in intimate, undeflectible covenant solidarity with humankind. And as for us, we can be human at all only as we are human in relation to him. To say that this is truth, this is reality, is not to say that everyone is aware of the truth or welcomes the truth or one day will own the truth. But it is to say that truth remains truth, reality remains reality, just because God has willed himself to be God only in relation to us and has willed us to be human in relation to him. Doesn’t Jesus say that it is his meat and drink to do the will of his Father?
If we disdain our appointment as God’s glad, grateful covenant partners we shall ravage nature, foolishly thinking that our attitude to God’s creation and our sustenance doesn’t matter.
If we disdain our appointment as God’s glad, grateful covenant partners then we, as men and women, are stuck with a hostile standoff where all we can do is torment one another. We shall then have men exploiting and brutalizing women. (This aspect of the standoff is centuries old.) Or we shall have women sneering contemptuously at men. (This aspect of the standoff is centuries old too but has come to the surface only recently.)
If we disdain our appointment as God’s glad, grateful covenant partners we shall rant and rave about our individual rights, caring nothing for anyone else. Or we shall undiscerningly support those social collectivities that promise much, deliver little, and always manage to brutalize and bury individuals.
Our appointment as God’s glad, grateful covenant partners is our call to communion with him. This dimension of the human isn’t the least and the last of many; this is the foundation of all others and their preservative as well.
We must be sure notice something too readily overlooked: it is only our appointment as God’s covenant partners that confers and conserves our dignity and worth. Even when God’s invitation goes unheeded; that is, even when there is lacking the response of faith and obedience, nevertheless the fact of God’s invitation continues to confer a dignity and worth that can’t be eliminated and can’t be forfeited. There is no other source of human dignity and worth.
When Maureen’s mother was institutionalized in a nursing home Maureen visited her faithfully, never complaining about it, thankful that such provision was available. One afternoon, having been exposed to the nursing home scene yet again, Maureen stumbled home and said to me, “There is no such thing as innate human dignity or innate human worth. Apart from God’s having appointed us to covenant partnership with him there isn’t any dignity or worth at all.” She was right. There is no evident, observable dignity in people who are mindless, toothless, toiletless.
Then what are we? Angel? Devil? Animal? Twitch? Cog? Feminist fodder? We are none of these. We are those creatures with whom God wanted fellowship and whom he wanted never to be without before he created so much as one atom. In fact all that he’s created he has created for the sake of us who are made in his image, who are the apple of his eye, and whom he loves, Good Friday’s cross tells us, more than he loves himself. Why wouldn’t we love him now and want only to love him forever?
Victor Shepherd
March 2004
Of Trees and The Tree
Genesis 2:8-9; 15-17
Genesis 3:1-7 Deuteronomy 21:22-23 Galatians 3:13
1 Peter 2:24 John 19:16b-30
I: — What’s wrong with you? What’s wrong with me? What’s wrong with the world? What’s wrong with the world is something the world would never guess: it slanders the goodness of God.
The old, old story (saga, legend) of Genesis 3 is a timeless story about the history of every man and every woman, for “Adam” is Hebrew for “everyman” and “Eve” for “mother of all the living”. According to the old story God has placed us in a garden abounding in trees: “every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food”. God has placed us in a setting that delights us and nourishes us abundantly. In addition to the myriad trees in Eden (“Eden” being Hebrew for “delight”) there are two extraordinary trees: the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The tree of life symbolizes the fact that the origin of life and the conditions of life and the blessings of life rest in God; the tree of life symbolizes this and reminds us of it. As John Calvin says so finely, “God intended that as often as we tasted the fruit of the tree of life we should remember from whom we received our life, in order that we might acknowledge that we live not by our own power but by the kindness of God.”
In addition to the tree of life there stands the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. “Good and evil” does not mean “good plus evil”. “Good-and-evil” (virtually one word) is a semitism, a Hebrew expression meaning “everything, the sum total of human possibilities, everything that we can imagine.” To know, in Hebrew is to have intimate acquaintance with, to experience. In forbidding us to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil God is warning us against intimate acquaintance with the sum total of everything that we can imagine. He is warning us against thinking we must experience or even may experience whatever we can dream up. In other words, God has set a limit to human self-extension; God has set a limit to our extending ourselves into anything at all that the mind and heart can invent.
Why has God set such a limit? Why does he urge us to become intimately acquainted with everything that is both nourishing and delightful, both essential to life and culturally rich — and then in the same breath warn us not to become intimately acquainted with “good and evil”? He sets such a limit just because he loves us; he sets this limit for our blessing. This side of the limit is blessing; the other side is curse. This side of the limit there is the blessing of curative medicines; the other side of the limit there is cocaine, curse. This side of the limit there is the one-flesh union of marriage, blessing; the other side there is the curse of promiscuity and perversion with their degradation and disease. God, who is good in himself, wants only what is good for us.
Good? We don’t think that God is good when he tells us, “Every tree except the one tree”; we think he’s arbitrary. After all, he didn’t consult us when he decided where the boundary line was to be; he simply told us; arbitrary.
The root human problem is that we disparage the goodness of God. We disparage the goodness of God when we scorn the tree of life, dismissing the goodness of God and the truth of God, even as we tell ourselves that he has proscribed the tree of the knowledge of good and evil not because he longs to bless us but just because he’s arbitrary; and not only arbitrary, but a spoilsport as well since he won’t allow us to extend ourselves into all those possibilities that would surely enrich us.
The tree of life represents discipleship; the tree of life represents what it is to be profoundly human: human beings are created to be glad and grateful covenant-partners with God. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil — prohibited! — is the alternative to discipleship, the alternative to glad and grateful covenant-partnership with God. The root human problem, then, is that we don’t want life from God’s hand under the conditions God sets for our blessing. We prefer an alternative; we want to be the author and judge and master of our own life.
According to our ancient story the garden of profuse creaturely delights continues to delight us as long as we hear and heed the creator who gave them to us. As soon as we try to “improve” upon him, however; as soon as we disobey him, proposing an alternative to the covenant-partnership of discipleship, the creaturely delights no longer delight us. They become the occasion of endless frustration, emptiness, futility, curse.
II: — The process by which we typically arrive at God-willed curse in place of God-willed blessing is subtle. The serpent is the personification of this subtlety. The serpent asks with seeming innocence, “Did God say? Did God say you weren’t to eat of that one tree?” The serpent hasn’t exactly lied: at no point does it say, “God never said….” While the serpent never exactly lies, neither does it ever exactly tell the truth. The serpent (subtlety personified) smuggles in the assumption — without ever saying so explicitly — that God’s word, God’s command is subject to our assessment.
The subtlety takes the form of a question that appears innocent but in fact is a doubt-producing question with a hidden agenda. What’s more, the doubt-producing question is an exaggeration: “Did God say, ‘You shall not eat of any tree of the garden?’” Any tree? There’s the exaggeration. God has forbidden us to eat of one tree, one tree only.
Eve (mother of all the living) decides to correct the serpent. Surely there’s no harm in correcting an exaggeration. But for her there is, for as soon as she attempts to correct the serpent she’s been drawn into the serpent’s territory; now she’s dialoguing with a subtlety to which she isn’t equal. When first she heard “Did God say?” the only thing for her to do was to ignore the proffered subtlety. Correcting it looks harmless but is ultimately fatal, for now she’s been drawn into the tempter’s world.
Isn’t it the case that as soon as you and I begin to reason with sin we are undone? As soon as we begin to reason with temptation we’re finished. Temptation can only be repudiated, never reasoned with, for the longer we reason with it the longer we entertain it; and the longer we entertain it the faster our reasoning becomes rationalization — and rationalization, as everyone knows, is perfectly sound reasoning in the service of an unacceptable end.
As soon as Eve attempts to correct the serpent’s exaggeration she exaggerates. “God has told us not to eat the fruit of the forbidden tree; we aren’t even to touch the tree, lest we die.” God had never said they weren’t to touch it. They were certainly to be aware of the tree, always aware of it, and never to eat of it, never to experience it. In trying to correct the serpent’s exaggeration, Eve now exaggerates. In trying to undo the serpent’s distortion of the truth, she now distorts the truth. Of course. To dialogue with a subtlety pertaining to temptation is invariably to be seduced by it.
Eve doesn’t know it yet, but she’s undone. She doesn’t know it, but the serpent does. For this reason the serpent leaves subtlety behind and accosts her blatantly. “You won’t die”, it tells her as plainly as it can, “You won’t die; you’ll be like God, the equal of God.” It’s the tempter’s word against God’s; it’s temptation’s contradiction of God’s truth.
But God has said that we shall die if we defy him; we are going to be accursed if we extend ourselves into areas and orbits beyond blessing. “You won’t die.” Please note that the first doctrine to be denied is the judgement of God. Doctrines are the truths of God, and the first truth of God to be disdained is the judgement of God. We should note in passing that Jesus everywhere upholds the judgement of God.
Adam and Eve eat the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, with the result that “their eyes were opened”. They had thought that by defying God they were going to be enlightened. By defying him, however, they have moved to a new level of experience; their eyes are opened — but they are anything but enlightened. They now know “good and evil”. They now have intimate acquaintance with, first-hand experience of, what God had pronounced off-limits. Too late, they now know too why it was pronounced “off-limits”: it’s accursed.
To sum it all up, the primal temptation to which every human being succumbs is the temptation to be like God, to be God’s rival (actually, his superior). The primal temptation is to regard God’s truth as inferior to our “wisdom”; to slander God’s loving “No” as spoilsport arbitrariness; to regard obedient service to God as demeaning servility; to pretend that a suicidal plunge is a leap into life. Ultimately the primal temptation is to look upon God’s goodness as imaginary, his will as capricious, and his judgement as unsubstantial.
III: — The result is that Adam and Eve are expelled from the garden. Expelled means driven out. By God’s decree. Does forced expulsion strike you as too heavy-handed for a God whose nature is love? Then be sure to understand that the forced expulsion is also the logical outcome of disobedience. After all, Jesus insists (John 17:3) that life, eternal life, is fellowship with God. And fellowship with God is precisely what humankind repudiates. Then a forced expulsion from the garden — a forced expulsion that issues in estrangement instead of intimacy, creaturely goods that frustrate instead of delight, daily existence that is cursed instead of blessed, and a future bringing the judge instead of the father — all of this we have willed for ourselves. We think the expulsion to be heavy-handed? We wanted it.
In the ancient story the cherubim, spirit-beings who safeguard God’s holiness, together with a flaming sword that turns in every direction; these guarantee that God means what he says: humankind is out of the garden, can’t find its way back in, is now living under curse, and can’t do anything about it.
IV: — We can’t do anything about it. Only the holy one whose holiness cannot abide our sinfulness can. Only he can. But will he? Has he? Peter cries, “He himself bore our sins in his body on the tree!” (1st Peter 2:24) He himself did? Who is “he himself”? It is our Lord Jesus Christ, he and none other.
We must never think, however, that after Peter had denied his Lord and run away he suddenly came to the happy conclusion that Jesus is the great sin-bearer for the whole wide world. At the cross he had concluded only that Jesus was accursed. After all, the Torah said it all clearly: “…a hanged man is accursed by God. Therefore, if a man has committed a crime punishable by death and you hang him on a tree, don’t leave his body on the tree overnight; remember, anyone hanged on a tree is accursed by God.” (Deut. 21:22-23) Since Jesus had been hanged on a tree (of sorts), Jesus had to be accursed by God. Such people weren’t accursed because they were hanged; they were hanged because they were accursed; and they were accursed because they were unspeakably debased sinners.
It was only in the light of Easter morning that Peter understood what had really happened. It was through his Easter morning encounter with the risen one himself; it was in the light of the Father’s Easter vindication of the Son that Peter saw several things simultaneously.
[1] Jesus was accursed; he had died under God’s curse.
[2] Yet Jesus wasn’t accursed on account of his sin; he was accursed on account of humankind’s sin. That is, while he was not a transgressor himself, he was “numbered among the transgressors”. While not a sinner himself, he identified himself so thoroughly with sinners as to receive in himself the Father’s just judgement on them.
“He bore our sins in his body on the tree.” To “bear sin” is a Hebrew expression meaning to be answerable for sin and to endure its penalty. The penalty for sin is estrangement from God. In bearing this penalty — demonstrated in his forlorn cry of God-forsakenness — Jesus answered on our behalf.
[3] Because Jesus Christ is the incarnate son of God he possesses the same nature as God. Father and Son are one in nature, one in purpose, one in will. It is never the case that the Son is willing to do something that the Father is not, that the Son is kind while the Father is severe, that the Son is eager to pardon while the Father is eager to condemn. Incarnation means that Father and Son are of one nature and mind and heart. To say, then, that Jesus bore the judge’s just judgement on our sin is to say that the judge himself took his own judgement upon himself. But of course he who is judge is also father. Which is to say, when Jesus bore our sins in his body the Father bore them in his heart. The just judge executed the judgement that he must; then he bore it himself and therein neutralized it, and this so that his characteristic face as Father might be the face that shines upon you and me forever. Father and Son are one in judgement, one in its execution, one in anguish, and one in pardon. What the Son bore the Father bore, in order that justice uncompromised might issue in mercy unimpeded.
In the light of Christ’s resurrection the truth of the cross and the nature of its curse flooded Peter.
V: — When Peter cried, “He bore our sins in his body on the tree” (the Good News of Good Friday), he went on to say in the same breath, “in order that we might die to sin and live to righteousness.”
Then the only thing left for us to decide this morning is whether or not we are going to die to sin and live to righteousness. Here only do we have anything to say, to do, to become. We can’t do anything about Eden. We have been expelled, and rightly expelled, having disparaged the goodness of God and disobeyed the wisdom of God and disdained the blessing of God. Just as we can’t do anything about Eden we can’t do anything about our consequent condition: we can’t overturn it, can’t right it, can’t alter it however slightly. In the same way we can’t do anything to effect atonement, can’t do anything to make ourselves “at one” with God once more. We can’t do anything here for two reasons. In the first place, offenders can’t finally achieve reconciliation in any personal relationship anywhere in life. Reconciliation is always finally in the hands of the offended party anywhere in life. Since we are offenders any possibility of reconciliation rests with the God we have offended.
We can’t do anything to effect atonement, in the second place, just because it’s already been done.
God wrought our reconciliation to him in the cross. To think we can improve upon it is to disdain the blessing he has fashioned for us; and this is to commit the primal sin all over again.
Then there is only one matter for us to settle. Are we going or are we not going to die to sin and live to righteousness? If we intend to do this today or to go on doing it today we must cling in faith to the crucified one himself. He is the son with whom the Father is ever pleased. Then in clinging to him in faith we too shall become that child of God who delights the Father. He is the wisdom of God. Then in clinging to him we shall forswear our folly and know blessing instead of curse. In clinging to him and following him throughout life we shall know that his service, so far from servility, is in fact our glory. His tree, the cross, is now become the tree of life. To become ever more intimately acquainted with it is to relish the rigours of discipleship, recognizing all alternatives as the spiritual suicide that they are.
VI: — As we cling to our Lord Jesus Christ in faith the psalmist will say of us what he said of others so long ago:
They are like trees planted by streams of water,
which yield their fruit in its season,
and their leaves do not wither.
In all that they do they prosper.
For the Lord watches over the way of the righteous,
but the way of the wicked will perish. (Psalm 1:3,6)
Victor Shepherd
Revised March 2013
You asked for a sermon on The Tower of Babel. You asked for a sermon on Pentecost
Genesis 3:1-9
Part One
Anyone who loves Jesus cherishes his parables. As a matter of fact many of us came to know Jesus by means of his parables. We began hearing these stories when we were four years old. At first they were intriguing stories. As we grew older they became moving stories. As we grew older still they became revelatory stories; they revealed the truth of God concerning God, concerning us, concerning our world.
No one dismisses the parables of Jesus just because the parables don’t describe historical events. “A certain man had two sons”, Jesus begins his best-seller about the prodigal. Jesus isn’t referring to an actual historical figure, Mr. X on 42nd Street, Mr. X being a man known to everyone in Nazareth who happens to have two sons. The parable, rather, is a story that Jesus makes up on the spot. Luke tells us (Luke 15) how the parable of the prodigal came to be. Our Lord’s opponents are mumbling and grumbling and grousing and not-so-quietly accusing him of dirtying himself by befriending irreligious people. Jesus, never as stupid as his opponents think him to be, is aware of what they are saying about him. They are faulting him. In order to exonerate himself and the people he’s befriending he spins out the parable on the spot. The parable is utterly fictitious. Jesus makes it up on the spot. It is utterly fictitious, and utterly true; true, that is, in that it tells us the truth about ourselves under God, true in that it tells us the truth about God over us. Wholly fictitious, wholly true. No one denies that the parables of Jesus are revelatory just because they are fictitious.
The first eleven chapters of Genesis are parables too. Like the parables of Jesus, the parables in Genesis 1-11 tell us the truth about ourselves under God and the truth about God over us. Then why is it preachers have been expelled from pulpits for saying so, hearers have been crushed or enraged at hearing so, and congregations have been split over it all?
If someone says, “But if we admit that the first eleven chapters of Genesis aren’t historical, where will it all end? What will we deny to be historical next?” If someone advances this argument, the immediate reply is, “But if we ever admit that the parables of Jesus are parables, everything is lost!” This is not a very profound argument.
All of the parable-stories in Genesis 1-11 are profound. One such story is the Tower of Babel.
I: — Our story begins with humankind’s cry, “Let us make a name for ourselves! Let us build a city, and a tower, a tower so tall that everyone will be able to see our tower. As our city becomes famous on account of our tower, our name will be known everywhere. Let’s make a name for ourselves!”
“What’s wrong with building a tower?”, someone asks. “Is there something wrong with creativity?” Of course there is nothing wrong with creativity. God is creative. We are made in his image and likeness. We have an inborn urge to create. To stifle this urge is to impoverish ourselves and to disdain his good gift. There is nothing at all wrong with creativity.
“What’s wrong with building a tall tower, even the tallest tower?”, someone else adds. “Is there something wrong with the pursuit of excellence?” Of course there is nothing wrong with the pursuit of excellence. There is everything right with it. We need to see more of it. After all, we live in an era that congratulates mediocrity. Mediocrity is sin. The pursuit of excellence can only be commended.
“What’s wrong with building a city, the venue of civilization?”, a third questioner asks. “Is civilization bad? Is culture bad? Should we be more holy or more virtuous or more human if we lived in caves and swung from trees and ate bugs and grunted in monosyllabically?” Of course there is nothing wrong with culture. Culture is riches without which we should be humanly poorer.
“Then what is the problem with fashioning city and tower? What is wrong with making a name for ourselves?”
According to the parable the problem with making a name for ourselves is that we reject the name that God has given us. He has named us his creatures. When he names us his creatures he emphasizes both words: “his”, “creature”. He is Lord and life-giver. We come from him, we belong to him, we can be blessed only in him. Because we come from him and belong to him and can be blessed only in him, to reject him is to reject blessing and therefore be stuck with curse.
“Name”, in Hebrew, means “nature”. The name God gives us is our nature. Our nature is to be God’s loving, obedient, grateful, faithful covenant-partner. Anything else is unnatural.
But we don’t like the name God has given us. We are irked by the nature God has given us. Be his obedient covenant-partner? Surely it is servile to have to obey anyone! We want to make our own name, make a name for ourselves. The name we give ourselves will be a better name; it will render us superior.
The problem is, of course, that there is no agreement among humankind as to what this name is going to be. The name we give ourselves will render us superior? Superior to whom? If I find it demeaning to be inferior to God, how much more demeaning do I find it to be subordinate to my fellows! Then I shall have to be superior to my fellows. I shall have to give myself a name that establishes my superiority over them!
And so we set about naming ourselves.
(i) One such name is race. The name of racial superiority isn’t mentioned in polite company, yet it is a name that no one renounces readily. Professional boxing is always looking for what it calls “the white hope”: a superior caucasian boxer who can end black domination of the “sport”. Several years ago when Sean O’Sullivan was in the newspaper every day it was hoped that this Canadian welterweight (147 pounds, the most competitive division in boxing, whose champion is nearly always the best boxer in the world) would become world-champion. The media “hyped” him. The fact of the matter is, O’Sullivan was never in the top 20 welterweights; I don’t think he was even in the top 30. Still, he was “hyped” as a future champion, only to lose in the second round to a black man who has never distinguished himself. Nevertheless, for a few months we had our “white hope”.
All races attempt to make a name for themselves through pretended racial superiority. Wherever black people have assumed power in African countries they have treated brown people savagely. And if you want to commit a huge social blunder and call down someone’s fury on you, simply mistake a Japanese person for a Korean.
(ii) Another such name is harder to describe. It isn’t racial, it isn’t even nationalistic. It is deep-down ethnic. When I was studying in Britain I noticed that war films appeared on TV every week; not Hollywood movies about war, but actual film-footage of World War II: the Battle of Britain, Rommel in North Africa, submarine warfare in the North Atlantic, and so on. When I returned to Britain in the mid-80s I saw the same films on TV. I thought this must be unhealthy, since it must surely inflame anti-German hatred. And yet I kept noticing that the British appeared much fonder of the Germans than of the French, when the French had been their allies twice in this century. I was puzzled and spoke of it to one of my relatives. Whereupon he smiled cheerfully as he said, “It’s not difficult to understand why we like the Germans but not the French. The British and the Germans are descended from the same Anglo-Saxon, Teutonic stock. We and they constitute the master-people. But the French are Latins, inferior.” There is no end to the ways we can make a name for ourselves.
(iii) Another name is social class. The jokes about social-climbing are legion. The jokes are legion, of course, just because social-climbing itself is never-ending.
A woman, no longer in our congregation, tore into me one day inasmuch as she felt I hadn’t made enough of her husband’s Ph.D and his work-place position. His Ph.D had elevated him in the work-place. His work-place ascendancy issued in social ascendancy, according to this woman. By not fussing about his Ph.D I was failing to acknowledge his social superiority. Her parting shot was, “You are a phoney. You won’t recognize a Ph.D, but you worship the ground that M.D.s walk on.” (And all along I had thought myself to be rather hard on M.D.s!)
(iv) Language is another “name” we give ourselves. In our saner moments we might think that language-diversity can only be enriching. At the very least another language exposes us to another literature. What is more enriching than this? Besides, thinking in another language is a good check that our thinking really is thinking and not merely the shuffling of cliches. Yet most of the time any suggestion of another language begets suspicion and hostility.
There is a delightful touch in the parable we are probing today. When we have finished building that tower so tall that it reaches to the heavens, God still can’t see it! Our tallest tower, as high as the heavens, we think to have penetrated even the abode of God himself. But in fact our tall tower is such a pipsqueak thing that God can’t see it. The text in Genesis tells us that he has to “go down”; he has to leave his abode, get down on his hands and knees with his magnifying glass in order to see this puny fabrication.
The racial superiority we deem simply obvious; the ethnic advantage that is surely self-evident; the social elevation that declares itself to the world; all of these are so paltry, so puny, such trifles that God has to get down on his hands and knees to see them.
In any case we have achieved what we set out to do: we have made a name for ourselves. But others have just as effectively made a name for themselves too. They are now boasting of their superiority in blind ignorance of our boasting of ours. The consequences are far-reaching. Our story-teller tells us of two consequences. We are “scattered over the face of the earth”; which is to say, there is no community. There are crowds everywhere, but no community. The second consequence is that we do not understand each other. We talk, we listen, we even claim to hear. But we don’t understand each other. We certainly know the meaning of the talk we utter; we know the meaning of the talk we hear. We say we understand others even as we insist they don’t understand us. Everyone claims to understand but not to be understood. In other regards, regardless of the words we understand, we don’t understand each other. Of course we don’t. People understand most profoundly not with their ears but with their hearts. Our hearts are clogged and calcified. We don’t understand each other. But we keep talking anyway. We talk past each other. Our attempt at communicating has become babble. The builders of the tower of Babel can only babble.
Part Two
What is the solution to the “Babel-babble” that is endemic to humankind? Many solutions are proposed, virtually all of them one form or another of social engineering.
One man, a schoolteacher, bent my ear several times about Esperanto, an artificial language whose devotees are attempting make the international language. A common language will undo everything that the parable of the Tower of Babel describes, says this man. Most of us needless to say, find this naive, albeit harmless.
Equally naive, but not harmless, are the attempts of totalitarian states to enforce conformity, including thought-conformity. Citizens don’t appear to understand each other? don’t appear to understand their rulers? don’t seem to know their place? won’t surrender their pretension to individual superiority even as they are told to support a national superiority which finds them dead on battlefields? Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Pinochet alike insisted that people appear to understand much more quickly when threatened with torture; solutions seem to be forthcoming much more quickly when a gun is held to people’s heads. But of course what such tyrants describe as a solution is actually a brutal manifestation of the problem.
The Ba’hai religionists and the New Age ideologues are touting world-government. Why do they think that world-government is going to solve what governments on a smaller scale have never been able to solve?
The only genuine solution to Genesis 11 is the one that begins in Genesis 12. Genesis 12 begins with the calling of Abraham and Sarah. Abraham and Sarah are promised that through them all the families of the earth will be blessed. Through Abraham/Sarah and their descendants the curse of Genesis 11 will be overturned. Through Abraham’s and Sarah’s lineage there will come someone, finally, who doesn’t have to make a name for himself in that he honours the name which his Father has given him; someone who knows not only that he is the Father’s creature but the Father’s son; someone who doesn’t have to twist himself grotesquely in the attempt at rendering himself superior just because he is willing to be humbled, humiliated even, for the sake of those whose preoccupation with “climbing” is killing them. The turnaround comes fully and finally in Abraham’s descendant, Jesus of Nazareth.
The turnaround which Jesus is is magnificent as God’s triumph over humankind’s self-victimization. As magnificent as it is “out there”, as an event in world-occurrence, it is nonetheless useless for us unless what occurs “out there” also occurs “in here”. That turnaround which our Lord is is useless for me unless it also turns me around. Can it do this? Can he do this? Is our risen Lord merely risen (i.e., risen but also ineffective), or is he risen and able, able to turn us away from our self-destroying and neighbour-destroying tower-building and name-making? The event of Pentecost answers this question with a huge “Yes!”. Pentecost, after all, is the incursion of that Spirit who is simply the power in which Jesus Christ acts upon us and within us; Pentecost is the celebration not merely of Christ risen (resurrection), not merely of Christ ruling (ascension) but of Christ reversing and reforming; reversing the curse of the tower and reforming the people who are otherwise fixed forever in the curse.
On the first Pentecost, Luke tells us, there are crowds of people in Jerusalem who have come from civilized lands. They hear the apostles declare the gospel. As the apostles speak and the gospel is declared hearers understand “the great things God has done”, says Luke. Hearers, scattered in places near and far, are alike grasped by what God has done. As they are grasped by what God has done for them, God does it afresh in them. Pentecost is God’s reversal of Babel. In Jesus Christ alone, and through the power of his Spirit alone, people find that they don’t have to make a name for themselves, glorying as they are now in the name that God has given them. They don’t have to invent something like Esperanto in order to understand each other, for now they understand with a heart refashioned by the heart-specialist himself. They don’t have to exhaust themselves in a quest for superiority which only disfigures them and afflicts others. They are content to identify themselves with him who ate and drank with anyone at all and was glad to do so.
Are we still tempted to make a name for ourselves through nationality or nationalism? But Jesus Christ has made us members of his body, the church. And the church, St.Peter reminds us, is the holy nation. Are we still tempted to advertise ourselves as extraordinarily talented at tower-building? But we are now identified with the tower, “towering o’er the wrecks of time”, the cross. Are we still tempted to make a name for ourselves, give ourselves whatever nature we want to have, through that city whose cultural achievements let us strut and boast and sneer? But we are citizens of another city, the New Jerusalem. Not only are we citizens, we are heralds of this new city; we point to it and point others to it, therein pointing them away from those other cities where they trample each other in pursuit of a name that isn’t worth having.
These other cities are many, old and varied. They are Rome, Babylon, Sodom, Buenos Aires, Jerusalem, Montreal, Mississauga. Jerusalem is the city that slays God’s prophets and crucifies his Messiah (i.e., Jerusalem is every city inasmuch as it spurns the gospel). Sodom is the city of those whose sensuality will prove destructive on all fronts. Rome (ancient Rome) is the city of admirable cultural accomplishment and also the site of every idolatry imaginable. Modern Beijing is the city of conscienceless cruelty. (Think of Tiannemen Square.)
Babylon is almost in a class by itself. Babylon is the city that gathers up all other cities. Babylon is the city whose paganism grows with its wealth and whose affluence swells only as a blind eye is turned everywhere. Everybody lives in Babylon; we can’t help living in Babylon. But as Christians we aren’t citizens of Babylon. We are citizens of the New Jerusalem. We belong to the holy nation; we are people of a new name and a new nature and new understanding and a new community.
There is a most important feature of the parable of the Tower of Babel which we must not fail to mention. The Hebrew bible puts forward the tower of Babel as the Hebrew equivalent of Babylon, Babel and Babylon alike being Jewish and Gentile monuments to humankind’s God-defiance. But paradoxically the literal meaning of the word “Babel” is “gate of God”. Bab-el is the gate of God. God meets us at our point of greatest defiance (the cross of him whom we crucify) and by his grace renders it the point of our access to him.
Pentecost is that miracle of grace, that miracle of the Holy Spirit, that wonder at the hands of Jesus Christ risen and ruling whereby our God-defiance collapses just because we are granted access to God. Babylon (“babble on”) is rendered the gate of God, where we hear each other as never before, understand each other, cherish each other, find community in each other — and all of this because we are no longer desperate to make a name for ourselves, but want only to be named citizens of that city which cannot be shaken, the city of God, the holy nation, the church of Jesus Christ.
Pentecost, everyone knows, has to do with the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is that power whereby the victory of Jesus Christ becomes his victory in us. Our Lord was never driven to make a name for himself in that he cherished the name his Father had given him. He never had to bend himself out of shape by trying to give himself a nature he was never meant to have. He was son by nature. You and I are to become sons and daughters by faith, thereby regaining that nature we have long since forfeited through our building and babbling.
Pentecost means this: the Holy Spirit is the power by which Jesus Christ does in us what he has already achieved for us. In other words, Pentecost celebrates that power by which the wreckage of Babel-babble is turned into the gate of God, as by faith we own our place in the holy nation and in faith cling to him whose name is above every name, above all the silly, false and dangerous names we should otherwise give ourselves.
Victor A. Shepherd
June 1995
Questions people ask: How are we to understand Noah’s Ark?
Genesis 6:9-22; 8:13 & 20; 9:8-17 Hebrews 11:1-7 Matthew 24:36-44
It’s the child’s all-time favourite bible story. And why not? The story has the adventure of an ocean voyage plus the warmth of a zoo.
All children assume that the animals enter the ark two-by-two. Few people, whether children or adults, read far enough to know that only the animals notused for sacrifice in Israel ‘s worship enter two-by-two. Animals offered up in worship enter seven-by-seven. (Had they entered only two-by-two and been offered up in worship the species would plainly have become extinct.)
How are we to understand this ancient story? We have to understand that the first eleven chapters of Genesis are best understood not as history but as parable. To say that the story of Noah’s Ark is a parable doesn’t mean that it’s “untrue” any more than the parables of Jesus (fiction) are untrue. Since our Lord’s parables are his parables, they are true; that is, they tell the truth about men and women under God at all times and in all places. C.S. Lewis has said that since the Jews are God’s chosen people, their parables are God’s chosen parables — and therefore stories such as Noah’s Ark are profoundly true, everywhere and always humanly true.
I(i): — The story begins starkly:
The Lord saw that the wickedness of humankind was great in the
earth, and that every inclination of the thoughts of their
hearts was only evil continually. And the Lord was sorry
that he had made humankind on the earth, and it grieved him to
his heart. (Genesis 6:5-6)
God is heartbroken that the only creatures whom he has crowned with his own image and likeness persist in rendering themselves wicked. He is sorry that he has created humankind at all. Plainly, according to our simple, primitive story, God is distressed that those whom he fashioned the apple of his eye should turn out so badly.
The narrator of our story amplifies the matter of humankind’s wickedness: “The earth was corrupt in God’s sight, and the earth was filled with violence.” Everyone knows what is meant by “violence.” But “corrupt”? The Hebrew word translated “corrupt” literally means “destroyed.” In other words, what God decided to destroy was already so very corrupt as to be self-destroyed. What rendered the earth self-destroyed? Wickedness, one of whose principal manifestations is violence. The story-teller tells us that the earth was filled with violence. There is violence everywhere.
A few years ago a man in Scotland entered an elementary school, shot sixteen children, shot the teacher, and then shot himself. A parishioner wrote me a letter describing the gunman, Thomas Hamilton, as singularly wicked.
I don’t wish to make light of the schoolhouse tragedy in any way. At the same time, I don’t think that Thomas Hamilton and his trigger-finger are what the story of Noah’s Ark is about. I am not a psychiatrist, but I strongly suspect that Hamilton was deranged. Violent, yes, but a violence born of derangement.
What Noah’s story is about isn’t derangement; it’s about the violence born of sanity; the violence born of people who are perfectly sane, the violence of sober citizens and pillars of whatever community. It’s about the violence that is premeditated, calculated, implemented, boasted about. The story-teller tells us that such violence comes forth from every person’s heart, not merely occasionally from the small percentage of people who are deranged.
I’m not making light of the sixteen children in Scotland . At the same time, I don’t wish to become sentimental. Every day in Argentina the police pick up homeless children who are living on downtown streets, take them away who knows where, and execute them. Every year Thailand sacrifices thousands of twelve-year old children to the sex trade, a tourist industry that the government of Thailand encourages. Seven thousand people are murdered in the United States every year.
Let’s not forget that during the worst days of the American Civil War, 25,000 men were succumbing every day. Let’s not forget that when the city of Dresden was bombed at the end of World War II ( Dresden was a city peopled with young children and seniors, a city of no military significance whatever), 100,000 civilians died in one night. How did they die? Instantly on account of blast? No. The air-raid started a firestorm, and the firestorm sucked all the oxygen out of the air, with the result that children and old folks died wretchedly through asphyxiation.
Think of the more recent “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia . The full story there has yet to be told. Serbs, of course, are worried about reprisals. They should be worried, because the people they victimized are waiting to retaliate. All of which means that our story-writer is correct: the earth is “filled with violence.” Think of the thousands slain in Rwanda ; and then the same thing in Burundi . Romeo Dallaire, a Canadian who witnessed it, says he’ll never get over it. As horrible as the holocaust was in Europe, it happened again in Cambodia through Pot Pol and the Khmer Rouge. What about Saddam Hussein and the Kurds he gassed?
But we shouldn’t point the finger at anyone. When I was a member of the ministerial association of the City of Miramichi , New Brunswick , a fellow-clergyman proposed that we have a multi-denominational service on Dominion Day, July 1st. The theme of the service was to be “Gratitude for the gift of the land.” I looked at him as though he were from Mars. “The gift of the land?” I asked. “The gift? Our foreparents took it at the point of a gun and blew away anyone who disagreed with them.”
Then there’s the violence that is no less violent for having nothing to do with nations and armies. Think of the violence pertaining to the world of labour. At one time Henry Ford employed a strong-armed thug named Harry Bennett. Bennett had many jobs. One was acting as contact-person between the Ford Motor Company and the mafia. Another job was beating up, with the help of the Ford Company’s goon-squad, anyone whom Henry Ford and family wanted beaten up. Ford was especially eager to have beaten up anyone attempting to organize auto workers. Ford had Bennett and his men beat up Walter Reuther and his brother so badly (the Reuthers were the auto workers’ first leaders) that both brothers were hospitalized for six months. Is it any wonder that unions respond with their own kind of violence? Of course it’s no wonder — even as the proliferation of violence confirms the story-teller’s line, “…and the earth was filled with violence.”
In all of this we must not overlook domestic violence. Domestic violence is a huge problem everywhere. It is no less violent for being domestic. Our society must never wink at the man who told me that he slugged his wife several times “because it’s the only language she understands.” Do you know that the call to a home where domestic violence is occurring is the most dangerous call a police officer answers? That’s why older police officers wait twenty minutes before they show up at such a home.
We shouldn’t assume that violence has to be physical in order to be violence. Violence is committed when people are violated in any way. When I was in grade nine science the day came, in our introductory study of electricity, when the teacher taught us about hydro metres. We were taught what watts were, what kilowatt-hours were, how electricity-consumption was measured in terms of kilowatt-hours, and how metres were read. Then the teacher said, “Now you youngsters in this shabby part of the city (yes, my family was poor); none of your parents has a university-degree; your parents don’t know very much; your parents wouldn’t even know how to read a hydro metre.” I thought of my poor dad, poor to be sure, yet self-taught and giving me gems every day from the book-review section of the Sunday New York Times; I thought of his fertile mind, his ceaseless quest for knowledge; I thought of how much better educated he was than was this teacher, a vulgar ignoramus who insisted on slandering my family in absentia. I knew that day that I had been violated, and the entire class with me.
The story-teller is right: the human heart foams with violence.
(ii) How does our ceaseless violence affect God? What does it do to him? “It grieves him to his heart.” God’s first reaction isn’t rage or contempt; it’s grief, sadness too deep for words. God is heartbroken. He weeps over us whom he has made in his image, over us who have rendered ourselves monstrous.
(iii) At the same time, while God is grief-stricken he isn’t immobilized. While he is saddened, to be sure, he doesn’t wallow helplessly in the swamp of sentimentality. His grief issues in judgement. His grief has to issue in judgement. Did it not issue in judgement God would be devoid of integrity. He isn’t devoid of integrity; which is to say, judgement becomes operative.
II: — All of which brings us to the flood. It’s right here, frankly, that the child’s delight in the parable surprises me. After all, the story of Noah’s Ark resembles a horror movie. None of us would ever want our child to witness a drowning. And the spectacle of countless bloated corpses, animal and human, might give an adult nightmares. (To be sure, the story of Noah’s Ark is no more violent than many fairy tales. Children love fairy tales. Bruno Bettelheim, psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, and himself a death camp survivor, has written profoundly as to how it is that violent fairy tales help children past their childhood fears. We haven’t time to probe Bettelheim’s psychoanalytic profferomgs and must leave them for another day.)
We must take time, however, to note that the story of Noah’s Ark is not telling us that God is vindictive; it does not say that God is a cruel ogre who delights in mass drownings. It tells us instead that God’s judgement becomes operative as God gives us precisely what we want. At the beginning of the sermon I mentioned that the Hebrew word translated “corrupt” in our English bible literally means “destroyed.” I mentioned too that what God’s judgement consigns to destruction is already self-destroyed. People bent on violence plainly want destruction. With our lips we all say we don’t want destruction, if only because no one in his right mind wants destruction. But that’s just the point — we who are made in the image of God, are now bent on violence, and have saddened God to the point that he can’t grieve more — we aren’t in our right mind. And therefore regardless of what we say with our lips, as violent people we want destruction, since violence always ends in destruction. God’s judgement is simply God consigning to destruction what is already self-destroyed in any case.
III: — Yet there is Noah. Three things are said about Noah: he was righteous, he was blameless, and he walked with God. “Blameless” means “single-minded,” what Jesus will later call “pure in heart.” “Blameless” describes Noah’s relation to God; “righteous” describes Noah’s relation to his neighbours; “walked with God” means Noah knew God intimately and endeavoured to obey him consistently. Noah and his family, together with the animals, are brought through the flood. The waters recede; total destruction is averted. The rainbow is painted into the sky. And God himself speaks: “Never again shall there be a flood over all the earth; never again shall violence go all the way down to utter destruction; never again shall the human heart, foaming with violence, precipitate total destruction.” This is God’s promise. In the bible it is called a covenant. God makes this promise to Noah, yet makes it for the sake of the entire creation everywhere. The covenant is made with Noah alone, yet the whole creation is blessed on account of it. Which is to say, the covenant is made with Noah alone, and the whole creation is blessed on account of him.
Plainly Noah is one person who represents many. The principle of one representing the many is common throughout scripture. God makes a covenant with Abraham, and through this one man all the nations of the earth are to be blessed. God makes a covenant with David, and through David all Israel is to be blessed. God makes a covenant with Noah, and the covenant is this: God has promised never to allow his creation to collapse all the way down to that self-destruction it is bent on and deserves. To be sure, when our story speaks of the flood, it speaks of God’s consigning the creation to destruction, albeit the destruction it perversely wills for itself. Yet the story concludes with God’s promise that in fact he will preserve his perverse creation however violent it might be. This promise is the gospel of Noah’s Ark.
Because God keeps the promises he makes he tells Noah to raise up children. Does it make sense to bring children into a world whose violence devours them? William Sloane Coffin jr., 17 years the chaplain at Yale University and more recently the senior minister at Riverside Church, New York City; Coffin was a liaison officer between the United States Armed Forces and Russian forces during World War II. Assigned to the Russian front, he saw scenes there that I shall not attempt to describe. After the war he received several European pastors who had pastored-on throughout the worst years of the war. One pastor said quietly, slowly, movingly, “During the worst of the fighting the front moved back and forth through my town eight times. And after the front had passed through my town, each time I spent days doing little more than bury children.”
Is it reasonable to ask Noah to raise up children in a world where children are rendered helpless victims? The fact that God will not allow his creation to sink all the way down to irretrievable self-destruction doesn’t mean that the human heart is any less lethal. After the last war the Jewish people asked themselves a terrible question: “In view of the holocaust-horror (one and a half million children burnt alive), are the Jewish people morally obliged not to have children?” Nevertheless, world-wide Jewry decided it would continue to beget and bear children, and decided this for many reasons, not the least of which was that it trusted the promise. God will never consign his creation to the fullest, uttermost destructive consequences of its self-willed violence. For the Jewish people, God’s promise, and their faith in the promise, meant more than any calculation.
Have you ever asked yourself why the world doesn’t become utterly uninhabitable as each generation adds its evil to that of the preceding generation? Why doesn’t evil accumulate, like a snowball rolling downhill, until the accumulated evil is so vast that human existence becomes impossible? Our story tells us why. God has made a covenant: he has promised that he will never abandon his creation to that total self-destruction which violent-hearted people always tend to produce.
The implications for us are obvious. If God isn’t going to abandon the world, then neither should we. If no frustration can deflect God’s commitment to the world, then no frustration should deflect ours. If God can endure seemingly-endless setbacks, so must we. The bottom line is this: we shall never be in the situation where we are seeking an end to violence and God is not. We shall never find ourselves spending ourselves on behalf of a world that God gave up on a long time ago. Our struggle can never be hopeless. God has made a promise; he will ever keep his promise. This is good news, gospel, the gospel of Noah’s Ark.
IV: — There is one more point for us to consider. When Noah emerges from the ark he offers up an animal in sacrifice to God. Part of the sacrifice is eaten. Up to this point in the unfolding biblical story men and women have been vegetarians. Now they are permitted to become meat-eaters. Their eating meat at meals is God’s concession to their violence: human beings kill and eat their first cousins, the animals.
But their eating meat is more than this. In Israel of old every occasion of eating meat was more than a means of satisfying hunger; it was also an act of worship. Meat — a dead animal eaten at the dinner table — was as much an act of worship as was the animal sacrificed in the temple on the Sabbath. In fact, said our Israelite foreparents, every time a family ate meat at home it was pointing to the lamb slain in the temple.
You and I eat meat. According to our foreparents in faith whenever we eat meat we are pointing to a lamb slain. We are not pointing to any lamb, but to the lamb, the Lamb of God; we are pointing to him who bears in himself the sin and suffering and sorrow of our violent world. In a few minutes you and I are going to go home to our Sunday dinner and eat meat of some sort. When we do this we shall be pointing to our Lord Jesus Christ, the lamb of God slain, who has been offered up on our behalf and who ever invites us to feed on him.
As we feed on him a new heart and a new spirit will become ours. A new heart and a new spirit means that we have pleaded with God to do in us whatever it takes to remove from us humankind’s characteristic violence.
Noah’s Ark isn’t just a story for children. It is very much a story for adults. It’s a story, a parable like the parables of Jesus. It’s about our deep-seated violence, about God’s grief, about God’s judgement. It’s also about God’s promise — he will never abandon his world, and therefore neither must we. Finally, it’s about God’s provision — he has offered up his Son as surely as Noah offered up a sacrifice — wherein you and I may find ourselves with a new heart and a new spirit. For then, like Noah, we too shall be “blameless and righteous”, those who live to bear witness to the “shalom” of God, the peace of God, that kingdom which can never be shaken and whose fullest manifestation we pray for every day.
Victor Shepherd
January 2005
Do Seedtime and Harvest Never Cease or Five Myths That Slander God
Genesis 8:22
2 Kings 6:24-31
2 Corinthians 9:6-15
John 6:27-35
In the course of a food shortage in Hong Kong, decades ago, a British executive of the Bank of Hong found a British soldier staring at him. The bank executive had come upon a half-rotten orange in the gutter and was about to eat it when the soldier hollered that the food was crawling with maggots and would certainly make him ill. The man became hysterical, shrieking and crying. Can’t you imagine the spectacle: a man in grey-striped formal trousers, black vest and suit jacket, bowler hat and umbrella — plainly someone from the highest echelon of Britain’s highest class – this man blubbering hysterically because he wasn’t allowed to eat his vermin-ridden garbage?
Hunger doesn’t merely make the tummy ache. Hunger doesn’t merely produce diseases and deformities born of protein or vitamin deficiencies. Hunger also bewitches the mind. Hungry people start thinking about doing, and actually do, what they would otherwise never imagine themselves doing. Hunger exposes civilisation as no more than skin deep. When an airliner crashed in the Andes Mountains in South America several years ago it was learned that the survivors had survived by eating the remains of fellow-passengers who had already died. Immediately the tabloids featured headlines on cannibalism, while more thoughtful magazines probed ethical issues raised by this turn of affairs. Hunger bewitches.
Reflect for a minute on a story from the life of the prophet Elisha. Syria’s army besieged the Israelite people, and these people were soon hungry. And hungrier. Desperate. So desperately hungry that 80 shekels of silver (80 shekels would normally buy you 40 roasting rams or 90 bushels of grain); so desperately hungry that people were now paying 80 shekels for the head of a dead donkey. A dead donkey’s head? Hungry people will eat anything. If you had only 5 shekels you could purchase half a pint of bird-droppings. (There’s food in bird-droppings, you know; if you poke around in bird-droppings you’ll eventually find a few seeds.) If you had no shekels what did you do? Two Israelite women knew what to do. “Let’s make a deal”, one said to the other; “today we’ll boil your infant son and eat him; tomorrow we’ll do the same with my son.” One mother boiled her son and shared him with her friend. Next day the second woman said she couldn’t. The king was called in to settle the matter. The king exploded and swore he would kill the prophet Elisha.
Kill Elisha? What did the prophet have to do with this horrible turn of events? Nothing at all. Then why go after him? Hunger makes even rulers irrational, doesn’t it? Hunger twists people’s minds until a pretzel looks like a straightedge.
Hunger is terrible. How terrible Jeremiah knew when he wrote, his mind reeling, “The hands of compassionate women have boiled their own children….” (Lamentations 4:10)
I: — Today is thanksgiving Sunday. Today we customarily thank God for food. The people in our world who don’t have food, millions upon millions of them; for what do they thank God? After all, God has promised to supply food. He who is our creator would be a mocker if he created us only to turn his back on us. (Human beings who turn their back on their children are sent to jail, aren’t they?) God maintains that he’s not only creator; he’s also provider and sustainer. Now I believe that he is. But then, I’m not hungry.
Still, I am persuaded that God is as good as his word. He does provide for us creatures whom he’s fashioned in his own image. He does keep the promise he makes: “While the earth remains, seedtime and harvest…shall not cease.” (Genesis 8:22) I’m persuaded it’s entirely correct to thank God for food, and thank him as often as we eat it. In the words of a common Eucharist liturgy, God does care for all that he makes.
And yet even with God caring as much as he can care, a great many people are hungry. Scores of thousands starve to death every day. Far more are permanently damaged in mind and body on account of their hunger.
On the one hand, Jesus tells his disciples not to worry about food since God feeds his people as surely as God feeds the birds of the air. On the other hand, the apostle Paul tells believers that not even famine can separate them from God’s love vouchsafed to them in Christ Jesus their Lord. Clearly Paul knows that God feeds (as promised) yet famine occurs, and famine kills. Famine kills even as God continues to feed. Famine kills even as God’s love remains uncontradicted.
Yet every day someone tells me that the fact of widespread hunger throughout the world does contradict God’s love. Then where are we with respect to God? Where is God with respect to us?
II: — It’s plain to me that God has been slandered; perhaps slandered unknowingly (in other words, the people who have faulted him in the face of the world’s hunger have done so thinking they were telling the truth about him), but slandered none the less. “He doesn’t care”, they have said, or “He doesn’t care enough.” Today I wish to vindicate God’s name. I wish to show that the appalling hunger in the world at this moment can’t be blamed on a deficient supply of food. In clearing God’s name of the calumny that attends it I’m going to explode several myths.
MYTH #1 People are hungry because food is scarce. In truth, food isn’t scarce. There’s enough food in the world at this moment to feed adequately every man, woman and child. Think of grain-production alone. There’s enough grain grown right now to provide everyone with sufficient protein and with 3000 calories per day. (Most of us need only 2300 per day.) The 3000 grain-calories per person per day produced right now doesn’t include many other foods that aren’t grains, foods like beans, root crops, fruits, nuts, vegetables, and grass-fed meat.
What’s more, sufficient food is produced right now even in those countries where millions are hungry. Even in its worst years of famine, for instance, India has produced so much food as to be a net exporter of food. (India has been a net exporter of food every year since 1870.) In India, while millions go hungry, soldiers patrol the government’s six million tons of stockpiled food — which food, of course, now nourishes rats. In Mexico, where at least 80% of the children in rural areas are undernourished, livestock destined for export are fed more grain than Mexico’s entire rural population. There’s no shortage of food.
MYTH #2 — Hunger in any one country is the result of overpopulation in that country. If this were the case, we should expect the worst hunger in those countries where there are the most people per food-producing acre. But it’s not so. India has only half the population density per cultivated acre that China has. Yet the Chinese eat while millions in India do not. China has eliminated visible hunger in the last 50 years.
There’s dreadful hunger in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Yet these countries have scant population per cultivated acre. In Africa, south of the Sahel, where some of the worst hunger continues, there are fewer people per cultivated acre than there are in the USA or in Russia; there are six to eight times fewer people in Africa south of the Sahel per cultivated acre than there are in China.
Please note that I’ve spoken of “cultivated acre.” We must be sure to understand that less than 50% of the world’s land that could grow food is now growing food. (It’s plain to everyone, by even this point in the sermon, that the real barriers to alleviating hunger aren’t physical but rather political and economic.)
MYTH #3 — In order to eliminate hunger our top priority must be to grow more food. Already you’re aware that the world is awash in food right now. The real problems concerning feeding hungry people lie elsewhere. For instance, land-ownership is concentrated in too few hands. A recent United Nations survey of 83 countries disclosed that 3% of the world’s landlords control 80% of the land. In most countries only 5% to 20% of all food-producers have access to institutionalised credit, such as banks. The rest, the other 80% to 95%, have to get their credit from virtual loan sharks who charge up to 200% on farm loans.
What’s more, new agricultural technology benefits only those who already possess land and credit. It’s been documented irrefutably that strategies which simply aim at having more food produced have dreadful consequences. Here’s what happens. New agricultural technology (for instance, hybrid seeds that produce bigger crops from less fertiliser) attracts investors whose primary interest is investment, not food-production; i.e., new agricultural technology attracts investors who see agriculture simply as a good investment. Moneylenders, city-based speculators and foreign corporations rush to get in on the good investment. The new money swells the demand for land. The price of land skyrockets. Tenants and sharecroppers are then squeezed off the land. These folk can’t feed themselves and now go hungry. What about the crops that the new technology has made possible and that speculators now produce in record quantities? These crops are luxury items (carnations, for instance, to adorn dining room tables); these luxury items are purchased by consumers in the western world and the northern hemisphere. In other words, new agricultural technology reduces food production.
We’ve all heard of the Green Revolution, a breakthrough in agricultural technology that promised to generate oceans of foodstuffs for the world’s hungry. The Green Revolution was born in northwest Mexico. Overnight the average farm size jumped from 200 acres to more than 2000. And overnight three-quarters of the rural workforce was squeezed off the land — now with nothing to eat. The Green Revolution found rural people hungrier than ever.
Any attempt at remedying hunger simply through greater agricultural sophistication renders people hungrier than ever.
MYTH # 4 — The increase in population (and therefore the need for greater food production) requires the use of chemicals that are environmentally dangerous. In fact very little pesticide or fungicide or insecticide is spread on farmland. I know, when we hear of the tonnage of these assorted “‘cides” it sounds colossal. For instance, the USA alone spreads 1.2 billion pounds of pesticide every year. One-third of this, however, is used on golf courses, lawns and public parks. Very little farmland is treated with these chemical substances. In fact, in the USA only 5% of cropland and pastureland is treated with insecticides; only 15% with weedkillers; only one-half of 1% with fungicides. Over half of all the insecticide used in the USA isn’t used on food crops at all. (Most of it is used on cotton, and even then, most of the land that grows cotton isn’t treated.)
Greater demand for food doesn’t issue in overwhelming chemical pollution.
MYTH #5 — In order to help the hungry we should improve our foreign aid programs. The truth is, increased foreign aid will do very little to alleviate hunger. The question we must always ask concerning foreign aid is this: when the government of a western nation sends financial aid to a hungry country, into whose hands does the money find its way? The money falls into the hands of that tiny number of people who exercise social and political control. This tiny number benefits; few others do. In Guatemala, for instance, virtually all the money sent as foreign aid merely enriches still more the handful of largest landholders.
What happens overseas is much like what I’ve seen in Canada. When I was a pastor in New Brunswick and lived closer to corruption than I do in Ontario, the federal government of Canada launched its “LIP” programme. (“L.I.P.”: local initiative project.) Ottawa was handing out millions to small communities in order to help the poorest people in them survive. My village received an LIP grant. The grant amounted to thousands of dollars ($200,000 in today’s money.) In my village four men worked five days per week for twenty weeks, building a small vault in the local cemetery. The vault was so small it would hold only two caskets. These four men laid one concrete block per day each. (Think of it: four men each laying one concrete block per day for twenty weeks.) Who were the men who pocketed the money? Were they the poorest in the village whom the programme was meant to help? Of course not. Poor people aren’t “connected”; poor people don’t have access to the levers of influence and favours. But well-to-do people have such access. In my village it was the sons of the richest, those with connections, who siphoned off the government “goodies.”
Next year our village received another LIP grant, this time to put a washroom (worth $75,000 in today’s money) in a small building that was used four hours per week. Same story. Third year, third grant. But not one needy person was ever hired for any of these projects.
Increased foreign aid won’t feed hungry people. But it will build highways and bridges, thereby making land a better investment. Land that is now a better investment attracts investment speculators who then use the land for purposes unrelated to food production.
Historically, it was different in England and America. In England political changes ended the landholding arrangement of feudalism and gave people access to land, at the same time that additional political changes gave common people protection against the powerful, the wealthy and the state. In the USA a constitution (it had to be secured by force of arms) guaranteed the people freedom from the oppressions that had ground down common people in Europe for centuries, which oppressions America would fend off at any cost. The oppressions fended off in the English and American revolutions are the oppressions we see in developing countries today. Political change, not foreign aid, is what feeds people in the long run.
With respect to the short run I want to say a word here about mission support from the local church. It’s important. When the late Dr. Allen Knight, an agricultural missionary who spent years in what was then Angola, spoke to my congregation in Mississauga about the “Seeds for Africa” programme, the congregation supported him without hesitation. We knew we could trust him. The money we gave for seeds purchased seeds; money given for well-drilling actually drilled wells. People were fed. When my friend Dr. Peter Webster was performing surgery in Africa and schooling villages in preventive medicine, any monies he received from friends and congregations were used for their designated purpose, used for that purpose only, and used immediately. We must never diminish our support for trustworthy Christian workers who are doing front-line work among needy people.
Have you heard enough this morning to convince you that God doesn’t merit the slander that is customarily heaped on him? God is defamed repeatedly on the grounds that he doesn’t keep the promises he makes; he doesn’t care for all that he has made; day and night and seedtime occur without interruption to be sure, but the harvest doesn’t — say those who tell us that God lies.
I trust you are persuaded that the presence among us of hungry people, together with the bodily and mental distortions that hunger produces, can’t be blamed on God. He is as good as his word; he does care for all that he has made. And for this reason he is to be praised.
III: — God is to be praised even more, for not only has he provided bread, he’s provided the bread of life. No one lives by bread alone. Without bread we humans disappear; without the bread of life we humans remain fixed — fixed in what? Fixed in our perverse rebellion against God, fixed in our deadly defiance of him, fixed in our frustration and futility, which frustration and futility we can either rage against or surrender to but in any case can’t remedy. Still, the Creator of us all doesn’t give up on us.
Because God won’t give up on us he’s forever pressing the bread of life into our hands. The bread of life isn’t made anew each day, but it’s offered anew each day. “I am the bread of life”, says Jesus, “whoever comes to me will never hunger again.” (John 6:35) The bread of life became available to us when provision was made for us in the cross. Now it’s offered afresh as often as our Lord steals upon anyone anywhere and says, “Why don’t you stop running past my outstretched arms?”
No one lives without bread; no one lives most profoundly by bread alone. Only the bread of life can restore men and women made in the image of God to the favour of God. Only the bread of life can relieve us of the consequences of our rebellion against God by releasing us from the rebellion itself. Only the bread of life can reconcile us where we are estranged, thaw us where we are frozen and sensitise us where we are unresponsive.
In his 2nd letter to the congregation in Corinth Paul is glad to acknowledge that God provides seed and bread. Unquestionably he’s grateful for seed and bread. Yet his ecstatic exclamation, “Thanks be to God for his inexpressible gift!” plainly pertains to him and only to him who is the bread of life, Christ Jesus our Lord. Then the bread of life we must seize or seize afresh today.
The church has only one mission: to offer Jesus Christ to any and all, near and far. For in offering him, the one through whom and for whom all things have been made (John 1:3,10), we shall remind detractors that God has kept his promise to provide seedtime and harvest; and in offering him, the bread of life, we shall recall rebels to their rightful ruler, to their Father, as it turns out, from whom they henceforth receive eternal life.Victor Shepherd October 2014
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Our Father Abraham
Genesis 17:1-8; 15-22
Psalm 47 Hebrews 11:8-12 Luke 1:67-80
Whenever we bring out our family photo albums and look at our ancestors – great-grandfather, grandmother, father, and then finally ourselves – it’s easy to see a family resemblance. Our ancestor’s jaw or hairline or nose is evident generation after generation.
More important than the biological family that we were born into and whose traits we’ve inherited, however, is the family of God. The family and household of God, scripture reminds us, consists of those whom the truth and reality of God has startled and stimulated. The family and household of God consists of those whom God’s presence and persistence has roused from spiritual slumber and who have found themselves jabbed awake or won over or wooed into loving the One who comes upon different people in different ways but always to the end of rendering us his children.
To be sure the nature of the response varies from person to person. Some are taking their first, tentative steps in faith, fending off detractors who tell them that faith is no more than unconscious fantasy and love for their Lord no more than disguised love for themselves. Others have lived close to him for years and want only to move closer to him. No matter. All alike belong to the family of faith, and all share a family resemblance with their foreparent in faith.
Foreparent? Yes. Everywhere in scripture, newer testament and older testament alike, Abraham is deemed the ancestor of God’s people. Abraham is acknowledged the prototype of the believing person, the model for all believers in all eras and in all circumstances. Abraham is the ancestor whose spiritual “genes”, as it were, are found in all whom the gospel captivates.
I: — What is the first family resemblance that is traceable from Abraham to you and me? The first is that we live by God’s promise. Abraham’s story begins with his obedience to God’s command: “Go from your country and your kindred and your father’s house to the land that I will show you.” Abraham is invited and summoned to step out from his comfortable familiarities and step towards a new land, step into a new future. What land? We don’t know its name. It’s spoken of only as “the land of promise.” Abraham is invited and summoned to move out into a future that appears radically uncertain and therefore radically insecure.
Then is Abraham merely naïve? Is he simply foolish, even stupid? Not at all, for Abraham isn’t stepping into a vacuous future; he isn’t stepping into a cosmic hole or into cosmic treachery. He’s stepping into a future that appears uncertain and insecure from a human perspective, to be sure; yet this future is already filled with the God whose faithfulness and goodness Abraham knows he can trust. At this point Abraham begins to live by the promise. But of course living by promise makes sense only if the promise is going to be kept. Then to live by promise is to live trusting the promise-keeping God. Abraham steps out confident that God will unfailingly keep the promises he has made to Abraham. Only the promise-keeping God can we trust, and only the promise-keeping God should we trust.
It has always been the conviction of the Church that the promise God made to Abraham concerning land – “Go to the land that I will show you” – is fulfilled in the kingdom of God . The promise of land made to Abraham doesn’t entail real estate; the promise is fulfilled in the kingdom of God .
The kingdom-promises of God are manifold.
[i] Here’s one. “Whoever comes to me I never turn away.” This is the promise of ready welcome, of free forgiveness, of a Father’s eagerness to embrace any and all who are fed up with living in the “far country” and want only to go home where they belong. This promise guarantees that any penitent who looks homeward is going to find arms of mercy that seize her even as her sin is forgiven and forgotten forever.
[ii] Another promise. “Whoever gives to one of these little ones a cup of cold water…will not lose his reward.” This is God’s guarantee that the work we undertake in the name and Spirit of our Lord for the sake of his people; our work in this regard will unfailingly be fruitful even if we don’t see the fruit. The work we undertake for God’s people he will invariably use to enhance others and to increase our own faith and enlarge our opportunity for service.
[iii] Another promise. “The peace of God which passes all understanding will keep your hearts and minds in Christ Jesus.” “Will keep”? The Greek word phulassein means “will garrison (it’s a military metaphor), will safeguard” our life in Christ and our identity in Christ regardless of what howls down upon us. As often as we are assaulted in life Christ’s grip on us will always be stronger than our grip on him, with the result that we are garrisoned within that “fort” which Jesus Christ unfailingly is for his people.
[iv] Another promise, as profound as it is simple: “I will never fail you or forsake you.” It is simple, isn’t it. At the same time, what could be more profound? After all, don’t other people fail us as surely as we fail them? Worse still, don’t we fail ourselves? And as for forsaking, don’t others forsake us as surely as we forsake ourselves? All of us have said and done what left others looking at us sideways, muttering to themselves, “And I thought I knew who he was.” All of us have said and done too what left us shocked at ourselves, saying to ourselves, “I always thought I knew who I was.” What else is this but to be self-failed and self-forsaken? In the midst of all such distress, whether inner or outer, there continues to sound forth that throbbing, bass note of our lives, “I will never fail you or forsake you.” This throbbing, bass note determines the rhythm of our lives; it’s the downbeat of our lives; it’s the first beat in the bar, the predominant beat, as we step ahead as people of promise: “I will never fail you or forsake you.” He who raised his son from the dead is never going to abandon you and me to that deadliness by which we are otherwise victimized, even self-victimized.
[v] Concerning the congregation here in Schomberg there are two promises taken together that move me over and over: Jesus says, “Where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them” and “If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed…nothing is impossible to you.” David Bloomer has told me several times of the days when the worshipping congregation here was down to four or five people. They sat at the front of the church and the minister, wanting to be less formal amidst so few people, pulled up a chair before them and simply related to them in a conversational tone what he had meant to preach that day. I am moved at the promise-clinging faith of people like David and Betty and a couple others who didn’t give up, didn’t turn angry or bitter, didn’t do anything except trust that with God a promise made is a promise kept. It is because of their Abrahamic confidence that there’s a congregation here today.
Living by promise is always an adventure. It’s as much an adventure in 2004 as it was for Abraham. For like him, you and I don’t know what life is going to bring before us. We don’t know which people, what events, what kind of challenges or assaults or griefs or opportunities are going to appear from nowhere, loom before us and linger with us. We can’t anticipate them.
Myself, I noticed years ago that virtually all of the disastrous downturns that I feared might happen to me didn’t happen. In other words, my anticipation of negativities was groundless. On the other hand, the assaults that clobbered me (one of which at least brought me as close to being admitted to hospital as I’ll ever come without being admitted) I couldn’t anticipate in any case. We tend to fear what turns out not to happen, and we can’t anticipate what does happen. Then we are left having to live by the promises of God.
Promises, plural. Yes, the promises of God are manifold. Nonetheless, said John Wesley, all the promises of God recounted in scripture are gathered up in one, overarching, grand promise. There is one grand promise that comprehends them all: it’s the promise of shalom, salvation. The promise of shalom, salvation, is the promise that on the day of our Lord’s appearing we are going to be found fully restored, every last defacement of God’s image in us remedied, every last disfigurement addressed, every last sin-wrought flaw healed. We are going to be found restored. The book of Hebrews says it succinctly: “There is a Sabbath rest (restoration: in the wake of the Fall “rest” is restoration) promised the people of God.”
Knowing that this grand promise is going to be kept, like Abraham of old we step forward in life knowing that whatever else the adventure brings, it always brings with it the unfailing goodness of the promise-keeping God. He will not fail us or forsake us.
II: — While we are thinking of family resemblances on Christian Family Sunday we should realistically admit that there are some family resemblances we wish weren’t there. There is an unsightliness here or there, a blemish, even an ugliness, which appears from generation to generation. We wish it weren’t so, but it is.
As much can be said about Abraham’s life under God and about ours too. Abraham is journeying with his wife into foreign territory. The king of this foreign country, a fierce fellow, starts eyeing Sarah, Abraham’s wife. Abraham sees that this king has lecherous designs on Sarah. Abraham, frightened now to the point of near-panic, thinks to himself, “This man is going to rape Sarah. If he thinks she’s my wife, he’ll kill me in order to have her. But if he thinks she’s only my sister, he’ll rape her in any case but spare me.” In that dreadful moment of screwed-up thinking that is as understandable as it is inexcusable Abraham blurts, “She’s my sister; she’s only my sister.” Truth to tell, Abraham did this twice. He lied to save his skin.
Are you and I any different? In a moment of intense pressure haven’t we falsified ourselves, falsified someone else, exaggerated, lied or simply fallen silent because in our cowardice we panicked before the consequences of telling the truth? When was the last time we were dead wrong before our children but wouldn’t admit it because the loss of face would have been too humiliating? Haven’t we given silent, tacit consent to malicious gossip, wickedly untrue, because we didn’t have courage enough to stand up for the person our silence victimized, and didn’t have courage enough to contradict the crowd we wanted to include us? Haven’t we all behaved in a manner that could never be squared with a profession of faith in Jesus Christ, and immediately pleaded any number of “reasons” that will never extenuate us?
Abraham lied to spare himself even as he exposed his wife to sexual molestation. This can only be a hideous, grotesque disfigurement in our spiritual forefather. Yet we must admit that it is part of the family resemblance, since the same cowardly abandonment is found in us.
God’s people are those whom scripture speaks of as his “peculiar treasure.” Unquestionably we are God’s peculiar treasure. And yet the treasure is tarnished. We shouldn’t be cavalier about this. At the same time, neither should we be paralysed by it. You see, because God has promised that there will always be more mercy in him than there is sin in us, we shouldn’t write ourselves or others out of the household and family of God just because the treasure is tarnished. Tarnished treasure is still treasure. What matters finally isn’t that our discipleship is perfect; what matters is that we aspire after consistency. John Calvin was fond of saying that what mattered finally was aspiration not achievement.
In a moment of panic Peter says, “Jesus? Never heard of the man.” Once? Three times. Still, eventually Peter is the acknowledged leader of the church in Jerusalem . Everyone knows what happened yet no one is writing him off.
Mark accompanied the apostle Paul on a missionary journey. Mark was only nineteen years old. He became homesick and returned home. Paul, of course, was disappointed. More than disappointed, he pronounced Mark unfit for apostolic work and refused to have Mark accompany him on his next missionary journey. Barnabas, on the other hand, Barnabas thought Paul to be wrong with his “one strike and you’re out” approach. Barnabas thought Mark should be given another opportunity. And so Barnabas took on Mark as missionary companion. Eventually Mark gave us the gospel that bears his name. Barnabas proved himself right in the episode with Mark, Paul wrong. Paul must have known he was wrong, for he subsequently wrote, “I’m not perfect…but I press on.”
In our Abrahamic venture what matters is that we press on. What counts is our aspiration. We aspire to be worthy of our Lord Jesus Christ who has called us. And as God continued to use Abraham despite Abraham’s treachery, God’s promise is that he will continue to use us. Martin Luther said it so well: God can draw a straight line with a crooked stick. God will ever use us despite the disfigurement we can’t hide.
III: — All of which brings us to the last family resemblance we are going to discuss today. Abraham is called out of the city of Haran . Haran is Toronto , Montreal , Newmarket , Aurora , King. Abraham and his family are called away from this. They are to distinguish themselves from that city which doesn’t know Abraham’s God and behaves as not knowing Abraham’s God. Abraham and his people are to have a different outlook, different convictions, different commitments. God’s people are always and everywhere different simply for being God’s people. We are therefore to think and do differently. We must distance ourselves from the outlook, convictions and commitments of those who aren’t Abraham’s descendants.
Yet Abraham doesn’t shun the city in principle. Instead, having distinguished himself from the city, having distanced himself from it as it were, he intercedes for the city; he pleads for Sodom and Gomorrah . This twofold movement, withdrawal from our city for the sake of commitment to our city with its people and problems and perverseness; this twofold movement is a pronounced family resemblance of the household of God. As the people of God we are called to an orientation different from that of our society so that we can exercise a ministry of intercession for the sake of our society.
Judicious balance is required here. Lack of balance results in two polarized positions. One segment of Christendom wants to repudiate utterly the society around it. These people speak of the need to keep oneself “unspotted from the world.” They uphold a religious isolationism that seeks to preserve the church by segregating the church from a society which they describe as godless. Such isolationism renders the people of God irrelevant.
The other pole in Christendom is determined to be “with it.” No isolationism for them. No self-distancing from the world at all. They identify with the world uncritically. While they are quick to tell us they love the world just because God loves the world, they fail to understand that they and God don’t love the world in exactly the same sense. God loves it to redeem it. They love it to ape it. Such uncritical aping renders the people of God useless.
The truth is, Abraham is neither irrelevant nor useless. Abraham stands back from his society precisely in order to be able stand with it. Abraham refuses to identify himself with the society in order to be free to intercede for the society. We who are possessed of Abraham’s faith must grasp what is to be done here and why: we who are citizens of the kingdom of God first are never citizens of that kingdom only; we remain citizens as well of a realm to which God has appointed us just because he has appointed himself to it, for indeed “The earth” – the whole earth – “is the Lord’s,” says the psalmist.
In order to exercise a ministry of intercession for our society we have to have a mind informed by the mind of Christ. As Paul puts it, “Don’t let the world around you squeeze you into its own mould, but let God remake you so that your whole attitude of mind is changed.” (Rom. 12:1) Christians are mandated to be aware of what enhances human existence and what is degrading; what enhances community life and what destroys it. We have to be aware of what is important and what is indifferent. Some people will agree with us; many will not. No matter. When Abraham set out he was a minority; when he interceded for Sodom he was a minority. All that matters is that we discern the truth of God and do it.
At all times we must return to the balance of the twofold movement: God’s people can be helpful in a society only if they are first holy – distinct in some sense. (The root meaning of “holy” is “different.”) Conversely, we are genuinely holy only if we intend to be helpful (God’s holiness, remember, always aims at helping us.)
Some of the people who are most committed to a holy intervention in the world may be people whom we think initially to be world-denying. Thomas Merton, instance. Thomas Merton was a Roman Catholic Trappist monk in rural Kentucky . Yet when members of the churches in the USA were involved in voter registration drives for Afro-Americans; when Christians gave leadership in the civil rights movement and the anti-Viet Nam war demonstrations, it was Thomas Merton whose writings and conversations and wisdom informed these leaders and infused them, even as Merton wrote and spoke from within a monastery. Merton not only informed and infused; he reminded Christians relentlessly that unless they were immersed in Jesus Christ they would soon have nothing to say or do or be concerning the society around them.
Long before Merton, long before me, Abraham knew.
-Abraham knew about the society he would neither fawn or nor forsake.
-Abraham knew as well that the treachery of his own heart didn’t disqualify him as God’s servant.
-Above all, Abraham knew what it is to live in the land of promise, knowing that no uncertainty or insecurity outweighs the substance and truth of the God who unfailingly keeps the promises he makes.
Abraham’s is the family resemblance we want to recall and glory in on this day, Christian Family Sunday.
Victor Shepherd
May 2004
With What Do We Struggle? With Whom?
Genesis 32:22-32
One of my friends, a pipe-smoker, found himself sitting in a meeting beside a fellow who was also a pipe-smoker. My friend told the other man where pipe tobacco could be purchased in Toronto for 75 cents a tin less than anywhere else. But this tobacco shop isn’t easy to find. And so my friend described in complicated detail how one gets to this shop, buried as it is among the back streets and alleys of innermost inner Toronto – all for the sake of 75 cents. When the meeting concluded my friend learned he’d been talking to Charles Bronfman, one time owner of Seagram’s Distilleries, owner of the Montreal Expos Baseball Club, owner of the Montreal Canadiens Hockey Club, owner of so very much more that he, Bronfman, has forgotten just how much more.
All of us have had an experience like this. We’ve all encountered someone whose identity we weren’t aware of, and came to be embarrassed by what we had said to the person we didn’t recognize. Or perhaps we weren’t embarrassed following such an encounter; perhaps we were amused or even delighted as we discovered that the woman who had sat at the lunch table with us was the Lieutenant Governor or the vice president of the Royal Bank.
I: — Today we are looking at a story, three thousand years old, that speaks of a man wrestling all night with someone whose identity he learned only in the morning. Jacob wrestles during the night. He is locked in a desperate struggle. In the night’s thickest darkness he thinks he’s contending with another man. In the bright light of the new day he learns who his “antagonist” was: it was God himself. It’s only at the end of the life-and-death encounter, only when Jacob has struggled, hung on, fought through, that he learns the identity of the one he’s contended with throughout a night he had thought was never going to end.
At some point in our lives all of us have dark nights. At some point all of us struggle with something that resists us, thwarts us, threatens to overwhelm us. From a human perspective it appears to be a struggle with a purely human situation or a merely human opponent. In the bright light of a new day, however, we learn that through it all we were contending with nothing less, no one other, than God himself.
You see, because God is present to all of life, every situation in life, every encounter in life, every struggle in life, every engagement, anywhere in life, is also an engagement with God ultimately. From a human perspective it appears to be no more than a purely human struggle, terrible as this often is. Yet since God abandons no one, since God forsakes nobody, any struggle anywhere in life is ultimately a struggle with God.
Let me say right now that because our Lord Jesus Christ was profoundly forsaken by his Father on Good Friday in Gethsemane and on Calvary for our sakes; because our Lord Jesus Christ was profoundly God-forsaken for our sakes, there is no human being, anywhere in the world, who is God-forsaken now or ever will be.
This is not to say that there’s no one who doesn’t feel God-forsaken. At some point we all feel God-forsaken, even as in truth we never are.
Neither is this to say everyone has come to faith, is going to come to faith, or wants to come to faith. I am not pretending that because God forsakes no one therefore everyone is now a secret believer. Still, the fact that some have not yet recognized God and acknowledged him; the fact that some have never heard of him; the fact that some have heard of him but choose to ignore him; none of this means that he is now ignoring them. God ever remains that “Other” with whom all men and women are involved at all times, whether they are aware of it or not. What appears to be only a human situation, however difficult, is also, always, an encounter with God.
What are some of these situations? Disappointment, depression, despair, bereavement; temptation to revenge, temptation to bitterness, temptation to that peculiar form of insanity wherein we know that sin is sin, know that a terrible price is attached to committing it, yet perversely want to commit it anyway. In all of these situations we can simply lie down and quit, overwhelmed; or we can wrestle and keep on wrestling until daybreak.
Jacob wrestled during the night. Darkness is a rich biblical symbol suggesting turbulence, threat, loneliness, and fear. As Jacob wrestles he cries to his opponent, “I will not let you go unless you bless me.”
In my work as pastor I see much human distress, and see many people attempting to cope with that distress. Some give up. Others say, “I’ll never quit. I have to see this situation through to some resolution. I can’t let it go until something in this struggle has been wrested to my good. I have to prevail until my prevailing finds me a different person.”
A few years ago I sat at a meeting of Alcoholics Anonymous with a man who was struggling desperately to recover his sobriety. He had had a “slip” and had been on a terrible drunk. He was now coming off it, and he was frightened. He was afraid of going into the “DTs”, the delirium tremens, wherein the suffering alcoholic has nightmares that are beyond any nightmare that any of us can imagine. As many of you are aware, alcoholic persons are overtaken by the “DTs” not when they are drunk but when they are becoming sober. Therefore there is one, unfailing way to avoid the horror: get drunk again. But of course to do this is to give up; it’s to walk away from the struggle and forfeit the blessing awaiting us on the other side of the struggle. This man wasn’t going to give up. He was going to struggle. He sat beside me, shaking like a leaf, perspiration pouring down his face, frightened, sick, but determined to see it all through to the end, because he knew deep down that at the end there really was blessing: sobriety. It wasn’t a pretty sight, but it was certainly an authentic sight: a man determined to wrestle through a night that might be longer than he thought and darker than he imagined, in the midst of which he cried out, in effect, “I will not let you go unless you bless me.”
Recently I spoke with an ex-convict who had been “on the street,” as he put it (i.e., out of jail) for eighteen months. He had been a “paper hanger” – a writer of rubber cheques, worthless cheques. He had been “on the street” several times over in the past few years, but had been able to stay on the street only for a week or two before he succumbed to temptation yet again and wrote another bad cheque. Then it was back to jail. He had repeated this pattern for twenty years. Now he was on the street once more. Eighteen months of freedom was more than he had had in two decades. He could never be described theologically sophisticated. Nevertheless every morning, he told me, he cried to someone, somewhere, to keep him on the street for one more day; just one more day. He was going to wrestle through each night until daybreak.
I’ve never been tempted to “hang paper.” But we’ve all been tempted by something else, in some other direction. And hasn’t the temptation been so awful, so visceral, that our stomach turned and our knees shook? And wasn’t the struggle so very intense just because the outcome was so crucial for us? At the time we thought it was only a human struggle, only a struggle we were having with ourselves. Unbeknown to us it was more than that; it was a struggle that involved the living God.
No one makes light of bereavement. I don’t doubt that it’s dreadful. The more we loved and were loved by the one we’ve lost the more deeply our bereavement bites. C.S. Lewis, professor of English Literature and Christian thinker, married in his fifties. He was wondrously happy. He felt his “ship had come in.” Within three years, however, he went from husband to widower. Upon the death of Joy Davidman, his wife, he spelled out his anguish in a little book, A Grief Observed. He begins the book, “No one ever told me that grief felt so like fear. The same fluttering in the stomach, the same restlessness….I keep on swallowing. At other times it feels like being mildly concussed. There is a sort of invisible blanket between the world and me. I find it hard to take in what anyone says.” He adds, “I was happy before I ever met my wife. I’ve plenty of what are called ‘resources;’ I shan’t do so badly….Then comes a sudden jab of red-hot memory and all this ‘common sense’ vanishes like an ant in the mouth of a furnace.” (I speak carefully here, carefully and reticently, since my wife hasn’t died – yet.) We’ve all seen bereaved people give up. We’ve all seen bereaved people quit, go under, and wait for the undertaker to close the lid a second time. And we’ve also seen bereaved people wrestle agonisingly through a long, dark night of turbulence, loneliness and fear. They keep on wrestling. Come daybreak, they want – and are going to receive – that blessing they’ve refused to forfeit.
You may have noticed a distinction in the situations I’ve described: while our society doesn’t fault someone for being bereaved, it does fault someone for being fraudulent or alcoholic. But all such social distinctions have no bearing whatever on the struggle in which people find themselves. What difference does it make whether they landed in the turbulence through their fault, someone else’s fault, or no one’s fault? One of the features of Jacob’s struggle had to do with the fact that he had cheated his brother Esau. When he finds himself wracked Jacob fears that maybe Esau has caught up to him and is going to retaliate; Jacob fears he’s struggling for his life, and all of this on account of his own wrongdoing. But whether we struggle on account of our own wrongdoing or not is beside the point. All that matters is that we don’t give up just because at the end of it all there is going to be blessing for us.
Struggles are legion: the struggle against habitual negative thinking; the struggle against a besetting temptation which, from a rational standpoint, is silly and yet continues to mesmerize us until we are tempted to keep on staring at it like a rabbit staring at a snake, then to find that it’s got us; the struggle against mind-bending disappointment more painful than a punch in the mouth; the struggle against disillusionment that threatens to curdle our spirit and shrivel our heart for the rest of our life.
In all of this there is turbulence, loneliness and fear. In all of this it appears we’re engaged in a difficult human situation only, contending with a human reality only. Yet because God is the environment in which all of life unfolds, ultimately we wrestle with him.
II: — In the old, old story of Jacob the dawn comes at last. Light is a biblical symbol for order and wholeness. As light – order and wholeness – overtakes Jacob, he is asked his name.
Now to us modern folk someone’s name is merely a means of labelling that person. To say that my name is Victor doesn’t mean I’m victorious in any sense. My name is simply a label that keeps me from being confused with Bill or Tom or Jerry.
For Israelite people, however, “name” meant “nature.” Someone’s name was her chief characteristic. If an Israelite were named “Victor” it was because he was victorious, or he wouldn’t have that name.
The name “Jacob” means cheater. Jacob is asked his name (he had earlier cheated his brother Esau) and he replies, “Cheater; that’s my name; that’s who I am.” From a human perspective a person is what she does. She cheats? Then she’s a cheater. Name and nature are one.
This, of course, is how we regard other people but never how we regard ourselves. If someone lies to us once, just once, we say he’s a liar. But if we lie, and lie more than once, we never identify ourselves privately or announce ourselves publicly as a liar. Anyone else who boasts is a boaster; anyone else who commits adultery is an adulterer. The truth is, what we predicate of other people must be predicated of us as well. As surely as we insist other people name themselves by what they do, we name ourselves by what we do.
Then what’s your name, and what’s mine? It all depends on what we do. How would others speak of us? Cheater, liar, manipulator, exploiter, complainer, worrier, weeper, whiner, tantrum-thrower?
“Not fair,” you say; “there’s more to me than that.” But we never make this concession to other people. “Still not fair,” you say, “because we are being ‘named’ precisely where we are struggling most valiantly.” Correct. The sarcastic person who is struggling with all his might to rid himself of his deep-dyed sarcasm is still labelled, and labelled contemptuously, “acid-tongue.” The bereaved person who is struggling is still labelled, and labelled contemptuously, “blubberer.”
Despite the apparent unfairness of it all there remains something positive, health-promoting, about it. When Jacob admits his name, “cheater,” he then – and only then – receives the blessing. The blessing is a new name. He is no longer named “Jacob” but rather “ Israel .” New name means new nature, new principal characteristic. New name means new nature, new identity, new future. We know what “Jacob” [Ja-kob] means: cheater. And “ Israel ?” “ Israel ” [Yisra-el] means “he who contends with God.” The alcoholic who says, with painful honesty, “yes, I am an alcoholic: that’s who I am” – this person is on the threshold of the blessing: contented sobriety. Any person who honestly, painfully (honesty is always painful) admits her name: liar, luster, habitual negative thinker, fault-finder, adulterer – any such person is on the threshold of a new name, a new nature, a new identity, a new future.
It all happens for Jacob at dawn, after the struggle through the long, dark night. It happens at dawn, when light brings order to his life and wholeness as well.
III: — Naming and renaming are crucial throughout scripture. Jesus says to Simon, “‘Simon’? That’s no name for you. From now on I’m going to call you Petros, Peter, the rock. Rocky. That’s it. ‘Rocky’.” New name, new nature, new identity, new future.
We reply, “But Peter didn’t appear rock-like for quite a while. After Jesus had named him “Rocky” didn’t he deny the Master, three times over? Wasn’t he among the disciples who abandoned the Master at his most agonising hour?” Then why does Jesus call him “Peter, The Rock, Rocky”? Because our Lord knows that when someone is given a new name he conforms himself to that name. He becomes what, who, he’s been named.
We all know how this operates at the purely psychological level. If you keep telling a child he’s stupid he’ll believe himself to be stupid and act stupidly. If you keep telling a child she’s superior she’ll believe herself superior and act like the snob she is. People conform themselves to the name wherewith they are named.
If this is true at the merely psychological level, how much farther-reaching it is at the spiritual level. Because of what has occurred to believers through our Lord’s cross and resurrection; because of the Holy Spirit who cements Jesus Christ into us and us into Christ; because of all this we have been given a new name: we are son or daughter of God; we are brother or sister to Jesus Christ our elder brother; we are friend to the Friend who sticks closer than a brother. To be sure, in most of this the reality may be largely unapparent – as unapparent as it was in Peter the day Jesus called him “Rocky.” But let’s remember: the day came when stumbling Peter; the day came when fumbling, faltering, falling down Peter was acclaimed the leader of the church in Jerusalem . The day came when Peter’s influence was so widespread and so telling that people laid their sick friends in the street in order that Peter’s shadow might fall on them.
The truth is, the day has been appointed for all of us when what we have been named in Christ Jesus our Lord will cease to be only apparent and will be made fully manifest.
The apostle Paul tells us that the new nature which has been given us is “being renewed every day.” New right now, as new as it can ever be, yet always being renewed? He means that the new name/nature God has given us as a title is beginning to characterize us and will continue to characterize us until the gap between name and nature is overcome, and title and fact are one.
Like Jacob of old you and are I contending somewhere in life today. It could be in any of the areas I have mentioned; more likely it is in scores more that I have not. This makes no difference.
What matters is this: we never give up the struggle; we never quit. We are going to continue wrestling through the night, however dark or lonely or fearsome, because the day does dawn. And with the dawn, light, our lives are blessed with order and wholeness.
The reason for all this, of course, is that regardless of where we are struggling in life, with what, ultimately we are contending with the God who contends with us in the sense that he first contends for us, contends for us effectually in Christ Jesus, just because he wants only to bless us.
In Jesus Christ he has given us a new name. One day the name we’ve been given, the nature we’ve been promised, will be ours in reality. And on that day the blessing we’ve long craved because long needed will be ours, and ours for evermore.
Victor Shepherd
April 2004
Joseph
Genesis 39:1-23
Imagine it is Thanksgiving Sunday. The choir is singing thanksgiving music. The sopranos are singing, “We plough the fields and scatter the good seed on the land.” A few bars later the basses come in singing, “Now thank we all our God.” At this point there are two themes or motifs running through the choir anthem at the same time. A few bars later still the altos and tenors begin singing something else. Now there are several themes or motifs wending their way through the one piece of music at the same time. In the hands of an able composer such music isn’t a giant discord that jars hearers; in the hands of an able composer such music is multi-textured and marvellously rich.
Life is like this. There are many different things going on in everybody’s life at the same time. This doesn’t mean that life is therefore distressingly complicated and hopelessly fragmented. On the contrary, it means that our lives are complex. The fact that they are complex means that they are multi-textured and can be marvellously rich.
Joseph, one of our ancestors in faith, lived a life, under God, that gathered up many different themes or motifs. Under God it all issued in a life that was not only rich for Joseph, but rich for everyone whose life touched his back then; and rich as well for every one of us whose life touches Joseph’s now. Today we are going to deepen our acquaintance with Joseph, for as we meet him afresh and find our lives and his coursing through each other, we shall become richer still.
I:: — Let’s look first at the theme of God’s steadfast love. It was Joseph’s conviction that God’s love is steadfast despite the seeming jumble of events that made up Joseph’s life and appeared to contradict it.
Events often seem to unfold around us the way “pick-up sticks” fall out and fall over each other as soon as the child opens her hand and releases the sticks. We’ve all played pick-up sticks. We’ve all watched the sticks fall out helter-skelter, with no apparent order, the sticks merely sticking out higgledy-piggledy everywhere. Life appears to unfold, “fall out”, just like this.
Think of the developments in Joseph’s life over which he has no control at all. His father favours him inasmuch as he is born when his father is old and his father thereafter dotes on him. His brothers resent him. His natural gifts (including his innate business smarts) cause others to envy him. Foreign traders come along when his treacherous brothers have thrown him into a pit and carry him off to Egypt. In Egypt he’s imprisoned. Famine scourges the people. All of this is beyond his control. He hasn’t asked for any of it, isn’t responsible for it, and can’t do anything about it. It just “falls out” the way pick-up sticks fall out.
How is Joseph to react? He could have reacted the way we’ve all seen people react (the way we may have reacted ourselves) as events jumble themselves around us.
– “I’ve been victimized!”, Joseph could have said, “by my family, no less!” Who hasn’t said it?
– “Life isn’t fair!” True! Life isn’t fair. Fairness happens to be an adjective we never get to use of life.
– “I’m powerless!” He is powerless when a nasty woman slanders him and has him jailed. A psychiatrist under whom I studied told the class that powerlessness is the greatest stress anyone can undergo in a stress-ridden life.
– “I’m forever having to `skate on thin ice.’ I’m forever caught in a welter of insecurities.” He could have reacted this way, since if he fails to please Pharaoh, Pharaoh will have his head. There are a thousand insecurities that keep all of us skating on thin ice all the time.
– “I’m not appreciated!” Joseph could have reacted in this manner too. After all, he does the butler an enormous favour which the butler then forgets. The truth is, none of us is appreciated the way we feel we should be, and likely none of us is appreciated the way we ought to be.
We can always react in any of these ways, as Joseph could have too. But shouting furiously while we pound our fist on the wall won’t help. Nevertheless, there is something that will help. We grasp what it is as we follow Joseph in his ups and down all the way down to prison where the text of scripture tells us, “The Lord was with Joseph and showed him steadfast love.”
It is years after the most turbulent period of his life that the fact of God’s steadfast love is stamped on Joseph and he sees in retrospect that God’s love has been steadfast in all circumstances. The most turbulent period was the abuse Joseph suffered at the hands of his brothers; their mistreatment, after all, landed him in Egypt and precipitated everything that befell him thereafter. One day his brutal brothers find themselves (and their families) desperate during a famine. They go to Egypt in hope of acquiring food. Joseph identifies himself to his brothers. They think now they are never going to get food, since Joseph has a long memory; they think too that not only will they not get food, they’ll get vengeance. Joseph looks them in the eye and says, “When you fellows abused me and abandoned me years ago you were bent on evil, NOTHING BUT EVIL, weren’t you!” (Now the brothers think they won’t survive another ten minutes.) “Yet the evil you intended, God has turned to good — for I can give you food.”
It’s all true for us as well. Regardless of what befalls us accidentally; regardless of what evil others visit upon us deliberately; regardless of what happens whose nature — bane or blessing — we can’t assess in the moment of its happening; regardless of what it is, God takes it all up and does something with it, something good for us or others, something that can ultimately be only an expression of his steadfast love just because steadfast love is all he himself is ultimately.
Everyone knows that when the pick-up sticks fall out, they fall out in disarray. Everyone knows that there are periods in life bleak beyond telling and black beyond describing. Everyone knows there are developments in life that seem as pointless as they are pitiless. Nevertheless, what the brothers intended for evil — and was evil — God yet wrested for good. Just because Joseph knew what God’s steadfast love had done in the worst moments of his life, Joseph would know for the rest of his life what he could count on God’s steadfast love to do — even if Joseph didn’t see it at the moment.
We who know of that incarnation which postdated Joseph have even more startling evidence of God’s steadfast love: he whose Son was victimized uniquely vindicated that Son — and therein vindicated himself — as he raised his Son and displayed him as evidence of steadfast love.
II: — There is another theme or motif in Joseph’s pick-up stick life. The theme is the forgiveness we press upon those who mistreat us. When his brothers appeared cap-in-hand before him Joseph could have done two things: he could simply have let them starve, or he could have nodded to the Egyptian police and said, “You know what to do with them.” Joseph had his brothers in his gunsight — and he refused to pull the trigger.
Never think that Joseph is a wimp. Wimps don’t forgive; wimps can’t forgive; wimps are too weak to do anything except find themselves victimized again. To forgive requires immense strength, ego-strength. To forgive means the injury that has wounded us we neither continue to absorb in ourselves helplessly nor boomerang back onto our assailant vindictively. The manifestly weak person can only invite further victimization. The seemingly strong person can only boomerang his assailant’s weapon back onto the assailant himself. It is precisely the strong person who can forgive.
A cruel way of ridding oneself of nuisance animal is to put ground glass in the animal’s food. As the animal eats, it swallows tiny fragments of sharp glass. The needle-sharp fragments perforate the animal’s digestive tract and the animal haemorrhages to death in terrible pain. Most people look upon the matter of forgiving assailants as no more than eating ground glass. Why swallow an indigestible substance that leaves us bleeding to death in terrible pain? People who think like this, of course, have it all wrong. It isn’t forgiving that amounts to swallowing ground glass; it’s resentment, it’s nursing a grudge, it’s plotting revenge, it’s biding one’s time, it’s fuelling hatred, it’s settling scores. This is the ground glass diet of those who mistake forgiveness for wimpiness.
Five hundred years after Joseph a prophet appeared, Jeremiah by name, who was mistreated much as Joseph had been. (Among other things, men with murderous hearts threw Jeremiah into a dry well hoping that they had heard the last of him.) Jeremiah survived, not in order to see whom he could pay back next — and thereby stuff himself with ground glass unknowingly; Jeremiah survived to write, “The steadfast love of the Lord never ceases, his mercies never come to an end; they are new every morning; great is thy faithfulness. The Lord is my portion.” (Jer. 3:22-23) To have as our portion that Lord whose faithfulness to us is great is to be steeped in his ceaseless mercies. Blessed by ceaseless mercies, how can we fail in turn to bestow them?
Forgiveness of injuries little and great is not only a sign of faith in God, it is a sign of wisdom in us.
III: — The rich complexity that was Joseph’s life discloses yet another theme: integrity. The wife of Joseph’s boss tried to seduce him. She tried not once but many times. Joseph was appalled. “How can I do this great wickedness, and sin against God?”, he retorted as Potiphar’s wife redoubled her adulterous efforts. Joseph didn’t yield.
Integrity is easy when there’s no temptation. Obedience is easy when there’s no seductive whisper. Obedience comes is difficult, however — and means worlds more — when temptation is relentless. Obedience is cheap when there’s no price to be paid for obeying. But after Joseph had cried “No!” to Potiphar’s wife she slandered him; now obedience was costly. In costly situations obedience is rendered to God and integrity is maintained in us only by grace and by grit.
In Egypt Joseph is a long way from home, a long way from anyone who knows him, a long way from prying eyes and wagging tongues which (let’s be honest) help to keep us upright. Joseph can yield to Potiphar’s wife without fear of being detected. Yet he doesn’t think about this for so much as a second. His instantaneous reaction is, “How can I do this great wickedness and sin against God?”
We must be careful to note what Joseph’s instantaneous response was not. He didn’t blurt, “But I might get AIDS! or “You might become pregnant!” or “Your husband might kill me!” or even “I don’t find you attractive.” Any of these responses has nothing to do with obedience to the Holy One of Israel and integrity before him; any one of these responses is mere self-interest, as much self-interest as the self-indulgence of the fornicator (albeit somewhat more prudential.) No doubt at some point Joseph said to the Egyptian aristocrat, “But I’m an Israelite!”; and no doubt she replied, “Yes, but you aren’t in Israel now!” Joseph could only have said then, “Nevertheless, Israel is in me, however much I am exiled through having to live in Egypt!”
The business person on a business trip; the schoolteacher at that convention in Montreal; the bank employee counting bills by herself in a back office (after all, the chartered banks write off millions of dollars every year because of employee theft); the preacher sitting alone in his study (nobody knows whether he’s hard at work quarrying in the granite of scripture and theology or collecting his salary for reading Sports Illustrated and McClean’s magazine) — these are the situations where we can “get away from it” (at least at some level). Therefore these are situations where we must be so schooled in the school of Christ that our instantaneous reaction is, “How can I do this great wickedness, and sin against God?” And then having said this from our heart, know with our head too that the matter isn’t over: there remains a price to be paid, as Joseph learned when his rejection of the seductress landed him in greater difficulty still.
Today, of course, a secular world and a secularized church can’t understand Joseph. Instead we are told, “Of course Joseph will yield: the Victorian era is over. Of course Joseph will yield: the sexual revolution has been with us since the pill. Of course Joseph will yield: he’s a young man beset with hormones. Of course, of course, of course….”
Joseph was simpler, profounder, godlier all at once. “How can I do this great wickedness, and sin against God?” Twelve hundred years after Joseph an apostle appeared, John by name, who wrote to Christian friends whom temptation was hammering. “Remember”, said John, “he who is in you is greater than he who is in the world.” (1 John 4:4)
IV: — There is yet another theme, along with the other three, multiplying the richness of Joseph’s complex life: the theme of blessing. One of the most startling features of Joseph’s story is the fact that people whose lives intersect Joseph’s find themselves blessed, assisted, enhanced. To be around Joseph is to be graced and to find oneself enriched.
We all know that the opposite kind of person exists as well, the person whose mere presence is a dark cloud, a millstone, a wet blanket — and worse. Years ago I saw such a person depicted in the movie Becket. The wife of mediaeval England’s King Richard, a woman who has to be the world’s all-time nagger, is nagging him fiercely, relentlessly, as her custom is. In addition, her appearance is as off-putting as her tongue: her hair always looks to be combed by an egg-beater, her face resembles the compost pile, and her personality is as lively as a dialtone. Her ceaseless nagging finally pushes Richard over the edge; he turns on her and says, acid in every word, “You, woman, are a barren desert into which I was forced to wander.” Terrible but true. It was just the opposite with Joseph. He was an oasis in which others found themselves growing and their lives fruitful. People who gathered around Joseph found their spirits lifted and their faces brightened and their load lightened. Under God, Joseph himself prospered; through Joseph, others prospered.
God’s people are everywhere called to be salt and light and leaven. Salt forestalls putrefaction and brings out hidden flavour. Leaven (yeast) permeates dough and lightens it, obviating that indigestible lump which only gives people stomach ache. Light dispels mildew, the foul-smelling fungus that ruins anything kept in the dank. Salt, light and leaven aren’t dramatic items. As undramatic as they are, however, they are needed if others are to find their lives lightened and brightened and eased. Salt, light, leaven are scarcely noticed themselves; yet in even the smallest quantities their immediate influence is vast. Joseph was a good person to be around, for those who kept company with him found their lives bettered in every way.
V: — What was it about Joseph that gave rise to all of this? What was it about Joseph that rendered him a blessing? It was this: Joseph always knew who he was. Regardless of where he was, but especially when he was in Egypt, in all circumstances Joseph knew who he was. It’s crucial that we know who we are.
When I was admitted to The Writers’ Union a couple of years ago I was thrilled with this turn of events. I imagined myself meeting Margaret Atwood and Robertson Davies and Timothy Findley and the whole host of literary luminaries. About this time I happened to be visiting a very wise man in the congregation one afternoon, and of course I managed to tell him to what august company I had been admitted. No doubt I appeared elated with this frippery, intoxicated even, but he didn’t leap to share my elation. Instead he stared at me for the longest time, face expressionless, and then said quietly, soberly, somewhat uneasily, “Victor, before you run off to The Writers’ Union, just be sure you know who you are.”
Who am I? Who tells me who I am? Who are you? And who tells you who you are? By faith in Jesus Christ I am a child of God. He makes me who I am; and having made he who I am, he — and he alone — tells me what he has made: child of God, not child of darkness or child of night of child of perdition.
Since, as the apostle Paul reminds us, Jesus Christ was known in essence ‘though not by name to patriarchs and prophets, Joseph knew the same Lord as I, knew himself born of the same Saviour as I, and found himself a beacon, a lighthouse, amidst a “crooked and perverse generation” (Phil. 2:15), as his descendant from Tarsus was to say 1200 years later.
It is by faith that we become children of God, and are therein made to be those whose lives, as complex as anyone’s, are also as rich and helpful as Joseph’s.
Victor Shepherd
June 1997